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ULYSSES' TALE, DANTE, THE INFERNO
[A] nd turning our stem toward morning, our bow toward night,
we bore southwest out of the world of man;
we made wings of our oars for our fool's flight.
Five times since we had dipped our bending oars
beyond the world, the light beneath the moon
had waxed and waned, when dead upon our course
we sighted, dark in space, a peak so tall
I doubted any man had seen the like.'

THE ASCENT FROM HELL, DANTE, THE INFERNO
[A] nd it may be that moved by that same fear,
the one peak that still rises on this side
fled upward leaving this great cavern here.
Down there, beginning at the further bound
of Beelzebub's dim tomb, there is a space
not known by sight, but only by the sound.
of a little stream descending through the hollow
it has eroded from the massive stone
in its endlessly entwining lazy flow.
My Guide and I crossed over and began
to mount that little known and lightless road
to ascend into the shining world again.
1. DANTm AuGHmRI, THE INFERNO, Ulysses' Tale, Canto XXVI, Circle 8, Bolgia
8:115-17, 121-25 (John Ciardi trans., New American Library 1954) (1306-21).
2. DANTE AuGHmREi, THE INmo, The Ascent From Hell, Canto XXXIV, Circle 9,
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A. EXPLORERS
Ulysses-traveling west-spotted a peak so tall no man had seen
the like. The poet and his guide climbed out of hell through a hollow
that a little stream-discovered only by its sound-had bored, into the
lighted upper world.
As westerners, we recognize this immediately: Dante's tales are the
story of the Great Western Journey. We feel the joy and awe of
Zebulon Pike and Major Stephen H. Long (1806 and 1820) in sighting
the Great Divide, rising out of a scorched and blasted desert plain and
ascending up a freshet of mountain water.3 Traveling with Long,
botanist Edwin James observed:
The images of pools of water, which we saw in the deserts of the
Platte, appeared to us similar to those mentioned by Elphinstone,
likewise to those observed by Nieburgh in Arabia, where inverted
images were seen.

They ascended a primitive mountain which seemed to be of superior
elevation, in order to overlook the western ranges, but they here
found their horizon bounded by the succeeding mountain, towering
majestically above them. To the east, over the tops of a few inferior
elevations, lay expanded, like an ocean, the vast interminable prairie,
over which we had so long held our monotonous march.
Aridity. That's why the vistas shine so. And why the noses of our
best western writers twitch so dryly.
B. WRITERS
Drouth-1824
Hear how the wagons crack
In the copper drouth of the prairie,
The pitch that boils from the seams
Is not yet chilled by the moonrise,
The great wheels groan like slaves,
Under the loads they carry,
The wheels are shrunken and spiked
With wedges to keep them from breaking.6

Round 4:127-38 (John Ciardi trans., New American Library 1954) (130-21).
3.

FROM

PrTSBURGH

To

THE

RocKY

MoUNTAINs:

MAJOR

STEPHEN

EXPEDITION 1819-1820, at ii, viii-ix (Maxine Benson ed., 1988).
4. Id. at 195.
5. Id. at 210.
6. Thomas Hornsby Ferril, Drought-1824, in THOMAS HoRNsBY
AMzRicAN WEsT 16 (Robert C. Baron et al. eds., 1996).

LoNG's
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REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED STATES
The Arid Region is... something more than four-tenths of the whole
country, excluding Alaska.

...During the fall and winter the streams are small; in late spring
and early summer they are very large. A day's flow at flood time is
greater than a month's flow at low water time. During the first part of
the irrigating season less water is needed, but during that same time
the supply is greatest. The chief increase will come from the storage
of this excess of water in the early part of the irrigating season.

...All the waters of all the arid lands will eventually be taken from
their natural channels, and they can be utilized only to the extent to
which they are thus removed, ancq water rights must of necessity be
severed from the natural channels.

LIVING DRY, WALLACE STEGNER'S AMERICAN WEST
Adaptation is the covenant that all successful organisms sign with the
dry country.... [W]ater is safety, home, life, place. All around those
precious watered places, forbidding and unlivable,
8 is only space, what
one must travel through between places of safety. s

THE SOUTHWEST
As a result of these three drying agents-sun, wind, and
transpiration-all but the highest mountains suffer from what
agronomists call "moisture deficiency." In many places this deficiency
exceeds twenty inches. This means that no matter how excellent the
soil or how free of frost the nights, unless irrigation water equal in
amount to twenty or more inches of rain is spread at appropriate
intervals on the fields, crops cannot be grown.

7. JOHN WESLEY POWELL, REPORT ON THE LANDS OF THE ARID REGION OF THE UNITED
STATES

8.

5-6, 13-14, 42 (facsimile reprint, Harvard Common Press 1983) (2d ed. 1879)
WAUACE STEGNER, Living Dy, in MARIUNG THE SPARRow's FAu 213, 226-27

(Page Stegner ed., 1998).
9. DAVID LAVENDER, THE SouTHwEsT 20 (1980).
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COLORADO, A HISTORY OF THE CENTENNIAL STATE
[P]eriods of abundant rainfall and drought have occurred in regular
cycles on the plains. The years from 1865 to 1872 were dry; those
from 1873 to 1885 were wet. Droughts then came in cycles of twentyone years, with the driest years occurring in 1892, 1912, 1934, and
1953. Total rainfall in the bad years dropped 15 to 25 percent below
normal, with most of the reduction during the July and August
growing seasons.10

THE LAND OF LITTLE RAIN
Not the law, but the land sets the limit. Desert is the name it wears
upon the maps.. i..Void of life it never is, however dry the air and
villainous the soil.

WATER AND THE WEST, THE COLORADO RIVER COMPACT AND THE
POLITICS OF WATER IN THE AMERICAN WEST
No area of the world is more aware of the current water crisis than
western America, a vast arid and semiarid region embracing nearly
half the continent of North America. Except for a strip along the
north Pacific coast and isolated areas in the high mountains, the West
is a region of sparse rainfall and few rivers. The implications of these
facts of geography have been enormous. From the time of the first
settlers to the present, few westerners have failed to comprehend that
control of the West's water means control of the West itself-its
industry; agriculture; 12population distribution; and, withal, the
direction of the future.
We have learned from the relatively new science of paleohydrology
not to be so arrogant or dismissive about the origins and reasons for
Native
mid-nineteenth century western water development.
waters
the
working
were
Americans, followed by Hispanic Americans,
ocean-like
the
from
Trail,
Oregon
the
before
long
Americas
of the
prairie to the waves of mountains blue to the western shores, opened
for the Overlanders a way west.

10. CARL ABBOTT
ed. 1994).

11.
12.

ET AL., COLORADO: A HisTORY OF THE CENTENNIAL STATE 173 (3d

MARYAUSTIN, THE LAND Or LrrrLE RAIN 1 (1950).
NORRIs HUNDLEY, JR., WATER AND THE WEST: THE COLORADO

THE POLITICS OF WATER INTHE AMERICAN WEST, at ix (1975).
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C. NATIVE AMERICAN WATER USES
1. PUEBLOANS OF MESA VERDE
William H. Jackson, photographer and artist, accompanied the
mapmakers.' 3 As a member of Ferdinand V. Hayden's Survey of
Colorado in 1874-75, Jackson described the Pueblo ruins of the
Puebloans (Anasazi) in the Mesa Verde region." High up on the side
of a southeast-facing cliff, he spotted ruins of ancient homes up a
series of weathered steps perched-almost impossibly-on sheer
vertical space ledges.' 5 Opposite one of the rooms was "a large
reservoir, or cistern,
the upper walls of which came nearly to the top of
6
the window."

In 1893, the archaeologist G. Nordenskiold found what he called
"conclusive evidence that the cliff-dwellers had to contend with the
same dry climate and the same scarcity of water as now obtain in these
regions." 7 He described an ancient reservoir-enclosed by a circular
wall, with a ditch running into it-that he found on Chapin Mesa."8
Nearby were the ruins of a considerable village.' 9 Referring to the
ruins of ancient irrigation works found in northern Arizona,
Nordenskiold conjectured, "It is not at all improbable that irrigation
by artificial means was
in use even among the prehistoric inhabitants
20
of the Mesa Verde."

In 1985, reporting on the University of Colorado's survey of Mesa
Verde National Park, which took place between 1971 and 1977,
archeologist Jack E. Smith reported the existence of two possible
ancient reservoirs. The first is known as Mummy Lake (Far View
Reservoir, probably the reservoir Nordenskiold had described) and is
located on Chapin Mesa, the second is in Morefield Canyon.'
Recent survey, engineering, and archeological work by teams of
the Wright Paleohydrological Institute-in cooperation with the
National Park Service and the Colorado Historical Society-has
reservoirs.
confirmed the existence of four ancient Mesa Verde

13. See W. H. Jackson, Ancient Ruins in Southwestern Colorado, in 1 BULLETIN

OF THE

UNITED STATES GEOLOGICAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL SURVEY OF THE TERRITORIES, 1874 AND

1875, at 17 (Washington, D.C, Gov't Printing Office 1875).
14. Id. at 17-38.
15. Id. at 20-21.
16. Id. at 21.
17. G. NORDENSKIOLD, THE CLIFF DWELLERS OF THE MESA VERDE 73 (Mesa Verde
Museum Association, Inc. 1990) (1893).
18. Id. at 74.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. JACK E. SMITH, MESAS, CLIFFS, AND CANYONS: THE UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO
SURVEY OF MESA VERDE NATIONAL PARK 1971-1977, at 14-15, 21 (1986).

22. The following Reports by Wright Paleohydrological Institute each discuss one
of the four ancient reservoirs: DAVID A. BRETERNIT, THE 1969 MUMMY LAKE
EXCAVATIONS: SITE 5MV833, at 27 (1999); JACK E. SMITH & EZRA ZUBROW, 1967
EXCAVATIONS AT SITE 5MV1931, MOREFIELD CANYON, MESA VERDE NATIONAL PARK,

Issue 1

THE ROLE OFCLIMATE

Examination of sedimentation samples, soil and pollen testing, and
broken pottery and other cultural artifacts, have produced estimates of
the operational life of these reservoirs:
*
•
*
*

Morefield Reservoir in Morefield Canyon (AD 750-1100)
Far View Reservoir (also known as Mummy Lake) on Chapin Mesa
(AD 950-1180)
Sagebrush Reservoir on an unnamed mesa west of Chapin Mesa
(AD 950-1100)
Box Elder Reservoir in Prater Canyon (AD 800-950)."

Ken and Ruth Wright, with the help ofJack Smith and others from
the Wright Paleohydrological Institute, conducted field investigations
of the Morefield Reservoir in October 1995, May 1996, and May 1997,
excavating an exploratory trench with a permit from the Park Service.
The Morefield reservoir mound is 220 feet in diameter, rises 16 feet
above the valley floor, is 21 feet deep, and has a long berm-looking
structure extending north from the reservoir up the valley floor to
intercept the intermittent stream channel. 2
The entire structure looks like an inverted frying pan. 6 Sediment
samples showed that clay and sand were carried into the reservoir from
the stream channel; the clay helped to seal the reservoir from
leaking." The Puebloans mucked out the sediment as best they could,
throwing the material onto a growing embankment 28 The mound
rose over the centuries from sedimentation. What probably began as a
hole dug into the channel to intercept shallow groundwater became
an off-channel reservoir as the intermittent stream routed itself around
a rising embankment.2
Potsherds in the Morefield Reservoir trench were evidence that the
people dipped water out of the reservoir and carried it away in water
They used deer antlers, sticks, and baskets to muck out the
jars.

COLORADO 35 (1993); KENNETH K WRIGHT, MESA VERDE PALEOHYDROLOGY, SAGEBRUSH
RESERVOIR SITE 5MV1936, at 74 (2002); see WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS, FINAL REPORT:
MOREFIELD CANYON RESERVOIR PALEOHYDROLOGY, MESA VERDE NATIONAL PARK; SITE

5Mv1931, PROJEcT# 96-02-090 (1998); WRIGHT PALEOHYDROLOGIcAL INST., MumMY LAEE
PALEOHYDROLOGY STUDY 48 (2000).
23. RUTH WRIGHT, PREHISTORIc COLORADO RESERVOIRS AT MESA VERDE NATIONAL
PARK 1 (2003).

24. WRIGHT WATERENGINEERS, supra note 22, at iii, 15.
25. KENNETH R. WRIGHT, WATER FOR THE ANASAZI: How THE ANCIENTS OF MESA
VERDE ENGINEERED PUBLIC WORS 19, 26 (2003). I had the privilege in May of 2003 to
be part of a Wright/National Park Service/Colorado Historical Society survey team for
the Box Elder Reservoir in Prater Canyon. Appendix A to this article is a journal I
kept of the May 2-4, 2003, investigations at the Box Elder and Morefield reservoir
sites.
26. WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS, supra note 22, at 1.
27. KENNETH R. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 26.
28. Id. at 21.

29. Id. at 19-21.
30.

WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS, supra note 22, at 21.
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reservoir.3 '
The Puebloans used a feeder ditch or canal to divert water into the
reservoir.3 ' There are numerous large stones-the size of a large
cowboy hat, and larger-lying at the surface of the dike that extends
from the reservoir north. 33 The rocks are aligned and clearly appear to
have been placed there, not washed in. This is evidence of the ditch
or canal structure cutting northward to intercept the stream channel,
1400 feet of it!N'
Apparently, the Puebloans used the four reservoirs for a drinking
water supply. At Mesa Verde, they were dry land farmers, growing
corn and storing it in nearby granaries they built of rock. 5 They knew
of droughts; in fact, they tried to keep up to two years of corn in
storage.
There's a great kiva near the Morefield Reservoir. 7 House ruins in
the vicinity show a population of nearly 500 people. 8 They must have
been proud of their reservoir, and very worried that it took so much
work to muck out the reservoir and lengthen the canal. As the berm
grew, they had to shift their diversion point again and again to
intercept the shifting stream channel. 9 They must have prayed for the
rain to come and the water to enter the canal without washing it out.
The Wright Final Report on the Morefield Reservoir Investigation
has a chart of tree ring data that show an annual average precipitation
of eighteen inches per year from AD 800 to AD 1100-not much
different from today in the Mesa Verde region, but there were good
wet years and recurring droughts. 0 The Anasazi farmers, like today's,
remained perched between a sudden flood and enduring scarcity.
PUEBLO PEOPLE OF MESA VERDE
You want to know where water's precious,
Where every scoop of dirt's a prayer of life;
And tomorrow's blessing-carried in a pot

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at 22.
Id.
Id. at 23.
Id. at 22.
There is evidence that Native Americans grew maize in the center of the
Colorado Plateau 3000 years ago. R-G. MATSON, THE OIGINS OF SOUTHWESTERN
AGlicuLTuRE 258 (1991).
36. Richard G. Milo, Corn Productionon Chapin Mesa: GrowingSeason Variability, Field
Rotation, and Settlement Shifts, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANASAZI SyMPOIUM, 1991, at 35,
39-40 (Art Hutchinson &Jack E. Smith eds., 1991).
37. KENNETH R. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 19.
38. WRIGHTWATERENGINEERS, supra note 22, at 13.
39. KENNETH R. WRIGHT, supra note 25, at 21.
40. WRIGHT WATER ENGINEERS, supra note 22, at 11-12.
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Of clay is a source of wonder up a slope
A thousand years away-perch upon
A buried kiva's rim and take within the
Arcing southeast sun this light they sawYou see-and may you keep this light
Within and speak it openly;
They worked and loved, like we, this
Land, this calling, this Mesa Verde. 4
The Wrights credit the ancestral Puebloans with having good
organizational capabilities and considerable skill in building and
maintaining large public works with rudimentary tools in a harsh
climate:
Long before Columbus sailed for America, the ancestral Puebloans,
people that we refer to as the Anasazi, were thriving at Mesa Verde,
even though the winters were harsh and water supplies were limited.
They had no written language; they did not have bronze, iron, or
steel; and they did not use the wheel. As a result, our American
history books tend to underrate them in terms of technical
capabilities and social organization. However, the Anasazi had
rudimentary knowledge of hydrological phenomena, water transport,
and storage. To build reservoirs, they also had good organizational
capabilities; otherwise, their large public works efforts requiring
major and continuous operation and maintenance work would not
have been possible. They were able to plan, build, and operate
reservoir projects in southwestern Colorado more than one thousand
years ago. The evidence that they left behind has provided ample
proof of their civil engineering achievements that spanned hundreds
of years.4

The four Mesa Verde reservoirs captured water only during storm
events from runoff in the canyons and on top of the mesas. The two
mesa-top reservoirs lacked natural drainage basins. 4 Nevertheless,
well-traveled paths, the environs of pueblos, and upslope agricultural
fields created runoffs from even small rainfalls.5

41. Gregory Hobbs, May 2-4, 2003.
42.
43.
44.
45.

RuT WIGT, supra note 23, at 1.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id.
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Extended droughts periodically occurred." One of these in the
800s, resulted in depopulation for a time, 47 although the so called
"Great Drought of 1276-1299" in the region may have been the reason
why the Pueblo people abandoned Mesa Verde by 1300.48 Why they
left is still a mystery the archeologists have not solved. Perhaps, the
combined factors of a shortage of wood for construction and fuel,
depletion of soil nutrients, and the rise of the Pueblo culture in New
Mexico and Arizona attracted them to move to the "big city" to join
others already there 4 ' For example, groups may have moved to the
Hopi villages on their mesas and the Rio Grande Pueblos.5°
2. THE Hopi
Lieutenant Joseph C. Ives of the United States Corps of
Topographical Engineers encountered the Hopi (called Moqui then)
in 1857 during the expedition when he wrecked the steamboatemblazoned "Explorer" on its wheel house-at Black Rocks, where
Boulder Canyon Dam now stands. 5' Proceeding on foot and mule
overland, he arrived at the South Rim of the Grand Canyon.52
Acrophobic at seeing that astounding chasm, Ives uttered one of
history's most ironic false prophecies:
The region last explored is, of course, altogether valueless. It can be

approached only from the south, and after entering it there is
nothing to do but to leave. Ours has been the first, and will doubtless
46. Jeffrey S. Dean & Carla R. van West, Environment-Behavior Relationships in

Southwestern Colorado, in SEEKING THE CENTER PLAcE: ARCHAEOLOGY AND ANCIENT
COMMUNmTTES IN THE MESA VERDE REGION 81, 87 (Mark D. Varien & Richard H.
Wilshusen eds., 2002) (From tree ring studies, droughts of 15 or more years' durations
are evident for AD 990-1015, 1030-1050, and 1276-1299.).
47. Eric Blinman, Adjusting the Pueblo I Chronology: ImplicationsFor Culture ChangeAt
Dolores and In The Mesa Verde Region At Large, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANASAZI
SYMpOsIUM, 1991, at 51, 55 (Art Hutchinson & Jack E. Smith eds., 1991) "A major
series of droughts hit the Mesa Verde region in the AD 805-825 period, probably
terminating the early villages as viable farming communities .... ." Id. See also Richard
H. Wilshusen, EstimatingPopulation in the Central Mesa Verda Region, in SEEKING THE
CENTER PLACE, ARCHAEOLOY AND ANCIENT COMMUNrrlEs IN THE MESA VERDE REGION

101, 107, 111, 119-120 (Mark D. Varien & Richard H. Wilshusen eds., 2002) (A
substantial reduction in the population of the area may have occurred between AD
880 and AD 940, with population increases between AD 950 and AD 1200, for a total
population of 11,000 to 14,000 persons, one-sixth of whom were at Mesa Verde, the
rest located on the Great Sage Plain and Dolores areas of Southwestern Colorado; by
AD 1200, total migration occurred, not, apparently, in response solely to drought as
populations had persisted in the area throughout prior droughts).
48. Carla R. van West, Reconstructing Prehistoric Climatic Variability And Agricultural
ProductionIn Southwestern Colorado, A.D. 901-1300: A GIS Approach, in PROCEEDINGS OF
THE ANASAZI SyMpOSiuM, 1991, at 25, 28-31 (Art Hutchinson & Jack E. Smith eds.,
1991).
49. Id. at 30-31.
50. Id. at 31.
51. JOSEPH C. IVES, CORPS OF TOPOGRAPHICAL ENGINEERS, 36TH CONG., REPORT UPON
THE COLORADO RIVER OF THE WEST, EXPLORED IN 1857 AND 1858, at 81-82, 119-20 (1st
Sess. 1861).
52. Id. at 98-99.
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be the last, party of whites to visit this profitless locality. It seems
intended by nature that the Colorado River, along the greater
of its lonely and majestic way, shall be forever unvisited and
portion
undisturbed."
Following the drainage of the Little Colorado River, Ives found the
Hopis on their mesas.M He described how at several of the villages-by
a system of upper and lower reservoirs, intake ditches, and irrigation
ditches-the Hopi stored, conveyed, and used drinking, irrigation, and
stock water:
The face of the bluff, upon the summit of which the town was
perched, was cut up and irregular. We were led through a passage
that wound along some low hillocks of sand and rock that extended
half-way to the top. Large flocks of sheep were passed; all but one or
two were jet black, presenting, when together, a singular
appearance. It did not seem possible, while ascending through the
sand-hills, that a spring could be found in such a dry looking place,
but presently a crowd was seen collected upon a mound before a
small plateau, in the centre of which was a circular reservoir, fifty feet
in diameter, lined with masonry, and filled with pure cold water. The
basin was fed from a pipe connecting with some source of supply
upon the summit of the mesa. The Moquis looked amiably on while
the mules were quenching their thirst, and then my guide informed
me that he would conduct us to a grazing camp. Continuing to
ascend we came to another reservoir, smaller but of more elaborate
construction and finish. From this, the guide said, they got their
drinking water, the other reservoir being intended for animals.
Between the two the face of the bluff had been ingeniously converted
into terraces. These were faced with neat masonry, and contained
gardens, each surrounded with a raised edge so as to retain water
upon the surface. Pipes from the reservoirs permitted them at any
time to be irrigated.
Peach trees were growing upon the terraces and in the hollows
below. A long flight of stone steps, with sharp turns that could easily
be defended, was built •into the face of the
55 precipice, and led from
the upper reservoir to the foot of the town.
Ives, an engineer, admired the engineering skill of the Hopi:
The whole reflected great credit upon the Moquis' ingenuity and skill
in the department of engineering. The walls of the terraces and
reservoirs were of partially dressed stone, well and strongly built, and
the irrigating pipes conveniently arranged. The little gardens were
neatly laid out.6

53. Id. at 110.
54. Id. at 119.

55. Id. at 120 (describing water works at Mooshahneh).
56. Id. at 124 (describing water works at Oraybe).
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Ives depended on Native American guides to lead him to other
water holes as he trekked back out of what appeared to him as an
appalling, exotic, bone-dry, except-for-a-few human-created-gardenspots landscape.57
3. EARLY SPANISH EXPLORER REPORTS

The Spanish explorer Francisco Vasquez de Coronado-looking
for mineral treasure his culture coveted-reported that the Native
Americans of the Southwest worshipped water: "So far as I can find
out, the water is what these Indians worship, because they say that it
makes the corn grow and sustains their life, and that the only reason
they know is because their ancestors did so."5 The Maya practiced
water religion by means of the "most elaborate New World water cult,"
and like many Native Americans, particularly in the desert southwest,
"[b] ecause of its cardinal role in the daily struggle for survival [water]
was also afforded a telling reverence in southwestern religion,
mythology, and lore."59
In 1697, Padre Kino and co-explorer, Captain Juan Mateo Manje,
reported seeing ruins of waterworks built by the Hohokam in the
Arizona Salt and Gila river drainages. 6° Archaeological investigations
in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries revealed an estimated total
of 135 to 150 miles of canals in the Salt River Valley alone by A.D.
800.6162 Some of the irrigation works may have existed as early as 300
B.C.
Complicated water systems flourished among Mexico's high
aboriginal cultures:
In YucatAn, Oaxaca, and the Central Valley of Mexico complicated

water systems flourished. Sophisticated irrigation agriculture allowed
the food surplus which, in turn, made the development of urban

civilization possible. Throughout the constellation of civilizations in
central and southern Mexico one could find diversion and check
dams, dikes, canals, sluices, aqueducts, deep wells, reservoirs, tanks,
and irrigation ditches with technologically advanced headgates and
lateral channels. 6
t

57. Id. at 125-131.
58. IRA G. CLARK, WATER IN NEW MExIco 1 (1987) (quoting letter of Coronado to
Mendoza written on 3 Aug. 1540). The Hohokam understood the importance of
laying out the canal with good gradient for water flow, and may have plastered the
bottom of canals with adobe to prevent leakage. MICHAEL C. MEYER, WATER IN THE
HisPAiic SouTHwEsr, A SOCIAL AND LEGAL HisToRy, 1550-1850, at 12 (1984).
59. MEYER, supranote 58, at 8-9.
60. CLAuc supra note 58, at 1.
61. Id. at 2.
62. Id.
63. MEYER, supranote 58, at 16-17.
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D. HISPANIC WATER USES
For nine years, from 1831-1840, Josiah Gregg crossed and recrossed the plains by means of the Santa Fe Trail. In Commerce of the
Prairieshe describes the acequia system by which the Hispanic settlers
irrigated long, narrow parcels abutting the stream from a mother ditch
feeding smaller laterals to five or six-acre fields. 65 Operation and
maintenance of the acequias was a common enterprise for the benefit
of the community. Three hundred or more acequias were operating
in New Mexico by the 1800s. 6
The Siete partidas (1265), Politica indiana (1647), Recopilaci6n
(1681), and Novisima recopilaci6n (1805), and specific ordinances and
royal decrees were a basic source of Spanish and Colonial law,
including the law of water use!" The Plan de Pitic (1783) set forth a
mechanism for the assignment of land and irrigation water rights. A
special commissioner in the locality was to divide the water "in such a
way that all the land subject to irrigation (that portion previously
designated as subject to irrigation) would receive its benefits, especially
during the spring and summer, the season most crucial to a successful
harvest."6
The construction of an irrigation system for the new communities
began even before the houses, public buildings, and churches were
"[I]
finished."
t was crucial to have the ditches in place before the first
sowing. "7 The water official (alcalde) assigned and supervised the
irrigation schedule of each farmer.7
Beneficial use and priority of use, along with cooperation in
community, were important principles in the New Mexico water
system, which derived from Moorish and Spanish laws and customs.
Settlers were to respect the amount of water the Native Americans had
m
long used for drinking water and irrigation."
However, conflicts
between neighboring landowners, and between Native Americans and
the Hispanic settlers, inevitably occurred because land with a reliable
and permanent water source was scarce.74
The New Mexico acequia tradition influenced Colorado in two
direct ways. First, the oldest continuous water right in existence today
is for the 1852 San Luis People's Ditch diverting from Culebra Creek.
64. JOsIAH GREGG, COMMERCE OFTHE PRAIIES, at xix (Max L. Moorhead ed., 1954).
65. Id. at 107-08
66. New Mexico State Engineer's Office, Acequias (July 1997), available at
http://www.seo.state.nm.us/water-info/acequias/acequias-ditches.html (last modified
Oct. 29, 1998).
67. MEYER, supranote 58, at 106-11.
68. Id. at 157-58.
69. Id. at 36.
70. Id. at 37.

71. Id.
72. Id. at 36.
73. CLARK, supra note 58, at 17.
74. MEYER, supranote 58, at 47-49.

75.

JANE E. NoiRus & LEE G. NoRRis, WRITrEN IN WATER: THE LIFE OF BENJAMIN
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It was built to irrigate the fields of Hispanic
76 settlers on the Sangre de
Cristo Grant, an 1844 Mexican land grant.
Second, when Benjamin Eaton-later, a Colorado governorbecame disillusioned with gold mining as one of the Colorado 1859ers,
he learned to work acequia water on the Maxwell Land Grant outside
of Cimarron, New Mexico. 77 Returning to homestead in Colorado
Territory in 1864, he dug his own irrigation ditch and helped to
construct the Union Colony No. 2 Canal in the early 1870s and, later,
both the Larimer and Weld Canal in northern Colorado and the High
Line Canal in the Denver basin.78 As a member of the territorial
legislature, constitutional convention, and state legislature, he worked
to shape the prior appropriation provisions of the Colorado
Constitution and early statehood water statutes, including the
Adjudication Acts of 1879 and 1881.7
E. CLIMATE AND THE WATER LAWS
1. THE WESTERN MOVEMENT

The western movement was more than seeking the material goal of
working lush farmlands in Oregon, like Ulysses venturing west: "It was
Manifest Destiny made visible in wheel tracks. It was, as Thoreau
recognized, a culmination of Occidental man's age-old instinct to
follow the setting sun to the blessed isles, to the gardens of the
Hesperides."8 But the emigrants into the West had to go through the
arid lands to get there. U.S. Army Captain Randolph Marcy's 1859
guide to the Overland Trail warns of "long stretches where grass and
water are scarce. "81
Walter Prescott Webb observed that settlers coming into contact
with strange and new conditions can become innovators. Sometimes,
their way of coping is a radical break from the past:
In the development of institutions there is always a conflict between
custom and necessity. Through custom people cling to old traditions
and try to perpetuate them by adapting them to new conditions, but
necessity argues the case on its merit without much regard for
precedent. Out of the conflict comes a compromise in which the old
is modified and adapted. Since the frontier was ever in contact with
strange and new conditions, the frontiersman became an innovator

HARRISON EATON 24 (1990); see also Gregory A. Hicks & Devon G. Pefia, Community

Acequias in Colorado'sRio Culebra Watershed: A Customary Commons in the Domain of Prior
Appropriation, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 387 (2003).
76. Lobato v. Taylor, 71 P.3d 938, 943 (Colo. 2002).
77. NoRiS & NoRtis, supra note 75, at 32, 220-22.
78. Id. at 94, 221-22.
79. Id. at 94, 104, 122, 139, 140, 146, 214.
80. DAVID LAVENDER, WESTWARD VISION: THE STORY OF THE OREGON TRAIL 27
(1963).
81. RANDOLPH B. MARcy, THE PRIRIE TRAVELER: A HAND-BOOK FOR OVERLAND
EXPEDmONS

45 (Harper & Brothers 1959) (1859).
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and therefore sometimes a radical."
Sharp departure from prior customs may result in new laws that
institutionalize the change. This happened in the American West,
because of climate. Colorado's experience is an excellent example.
2. DROUGHTS GIVE RISE TO PRIOR APPROPRIATION LAW
The years from 1865 to 1872 were dry.1 In 1872, the Colorado
Territorial Supreme Court issued its first water decision, Yunker v.
Nichols.84 The reality of settling into the arid lands, long known to the
Native and Hispanic Americans by hard experience-that water is a
scarce and precious community resource needed to grow cropsproduced a radical break from the pre-existing English and American
common law, which the Territorial Supreme Court encapsulated as
the ruling principle of Colorado water law:
[R] ules respecting the tenure of property must yield to the physical
laws of nature, whenever such laws exert a controlling influence.
In a dry and thirsty land it is necessary to divert the waters of streams
from their natural channels, in order to obtain the fruits of the soil,
and this necessity is so universal and imperious that it claims
recognition of the law.
The law of water scarcity and need-so the court declaredimposed a servitude across private and public lands for the building of
ditches to divert and carry water to its place of beneficial use for
irrigation, wherever that might be.6 The pre-existing English and
American common law assigned the right to use the waters of the
stream only to those who held land adjoining the stream, limited the
amount to de minimus consumption, and required the landowner's
consent for any crossing of property or the construction of facilities on
the lands of another." Yunker v. Nichols abrogated all three of these
pre-existing property right formulations in favor of public water
ownership and the establishment of use rights therein by private
individuals and public agencies."
Although the court based its decision in part on a statute of the

82.
83.

WALTER PRESCOTT WEBB, THE GREAT PLAINS 385 (1931).

ABBOT ET AL., supranote 10, at 157.
84. 1 Colo. 551 (1872).
85. Id. at 553
86. Colorado law initially focused exclusively on irrigation, despite the stereotypical
belief that mining produced the water law. Not until 1903 did Colorado adopt an
adjudication act that provided for decreeing the priority dates of all beneficial uses,
not just irrigation. See Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado's 1969 Adjudication and
AdministrationAct: Settling In, 3 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
87. Yunker, 1 Colo. at 552-53.
88. Id. at 556, 559.
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first territorial legislature in 1861,9 it baldly proclaimed that the
necessity of water use in the and climes prevented the legislature from
repealing the fundamental right of the people to access and use the
scarce public water supply:
I conceive that, with us, the right of every proprietor to have a way
over the lands intervening between his possessions and the
neighboring stream for the passage of water for the irrigation of so
much of his land as may be actually cultivated, is well sustained by
force of the necessity arising from local peculiarities of climate ....
It seems to me, therefore, that the right springs out of the necessity,
and existed before the statute was enacted, and would still survive
though the statute were repealed.
If we say that the statute confers 9the
0 right, then the statute may take it
away, which cannot be admitted.
The 1876 Colorado Constitution ratified the principles of Yunker v.
Nichols, establishing prior appropriation for beneficial use as the
governing precept for the waters of the natural stream, and providing
for a right of private condemnation across the lands of another to
build the necessary water works for beneficial use.9' In 2002, the
Colorado Supreme Court, citing the court's 1872 decision, reiterated
the Colorado Doctrine as follows:
Advancing the national agenda of settling the public domain
required abandonment of the pre-existing common-law rules of
property ownership in regard to water and water use
rights. Reducing the public land and water to possession and
ownership was a preoccupation of territorial and state law from the
outset. A new law of custom and usage in regard to water use rights
and land ownership rights, the "Colorado Doctrine," arose from
"imperative necessity" in the western region. This new doctrine
established that: (1) water is a public resource, dedicated to the
beneficial use of public agencies and private persons wherever they
might make beneficial use of the water under use rights established as
prescribed by law; (2) the right of water use includes the right to
cross the lands of others to place water into, occupy and convey water
through, and withdraw water from the natural water bearing
formations within the state in the exercise of a water use right; and
(3) the natural water bearing formations may be used for the
transport and retention of appropriated water. This new common
law established a property-rights-based allocation and administration
system which promotes multiple use of a finite resource for beneficial
purposes.

89. Act of Nov. 5, 1861, sec. 1-6, 1861 Colo. Sess. Laws 67-68 (protecting and

regulating the irrigation of lands).
90.

Yunker, 1 Colo. at 570 (Wells, J., concurring).

91.

COLO. CONST. art. XVI (1876).

92. Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Park County Sportsmen's Ranch, 45 P.3d 693, 706
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The water provisions of Colorado's 1876 constitution and
Adjudication Act of 1879 directly resulted from upstream/downstream
junior/senior disputes over water scarcity.93 The 1870 Union Colonydownstream, near the confluence of the Cache la Poudre and South
Platte Rivers-built and began to operate their irrigation canals, only
to find in 1874 that diversions by a new, upstream ditch near old Fort
Collins had reduced the Cache la Poudre's flow to a trickle. 4 Clearly,
the priority system and its enforcement-prior reliance on turning the
water to beneficial use and protecting that use-had to be
institutionalized within the three branches of Colorado government
for the benefit of the citizens. Therefore, the Colorado General
Assembly assigned the state'sjudiciary to decree water rights priorities,
and the state and division engineers and water commissioners to
enforce them. 95
The pitch of water scarcity resounds repeatedly along the channel
of the water law.
1882, COFFIN V. LEFT HAND DITCH:
The climate is dry, and the soil, when moistened only by the usual
rainfall, is arid and unproductive; except in a few favored sections,

artificial irrigation for agriculture is an absolute necessity....

We conclude, then, that the common law doctrine giving the riparian
owner a right to the flow of water in its natural channel upon and

over his lands, even though he makes no beneficial use thereof, is
inapplicable to Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to the
countries which gave it birth, compels the recognition of another
doctrine in conflict therewith.

1938, PEOPLE V. LETFORD:
It is a matter of common knowledge that, due to climatic conditions,
except in a few limited areas, agricultural crops cannot be produced
in Colorado except by irrigation of the land. Also it was early evident,
and still is obvious, that the economic and industrial development of
an and state is directly dependent on its water supply.

(Colo. 2002).
93. COLO. CONST. art. XVI (1876); Act of Feb. 19, 1879, 1879 Colo. Sess. Laws 94.
94. ROBERT G. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS INWESTERN WATERs 88-89 (1983).
95. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U. DENV.
WATER L. REV. 9, 10 (1997).
96. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443, 446-47 (Colo. 1882) (citing
Territorial Legislative Acts, § 32, 1864 Colo. Sess. Laws 58).
97. People ex rel Rogers v. Letford, 79 P.2d 274, 280-81 (Colo. 1938).
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1986, COUNTY COMMISSIONERS V. DENVER WATER:
The effects of drought on water supply in Colorado are well
known. The impact of drought on municipalities has resulted in lawn
watering restrictions, moratoriums on service, and other restrictions
on use to conserve water. A drought in the 1950s was so severe that
the Board restricted use by temporarily creating a "Blue Line" beyond
which water service would not be extended, and within which service
was not assured.
As a result of the drought crisis of 1976 and 1977, the Board adopted
water restrictions and a Tap Allocation Program which established
procedures and criteria to allocate new taps among the various
entities under contract outside Denver which are served by the
Board's water system.98

3. THE ROLE OF ADJUDICATION AND ADMINISTRATION

Prior appropriation is a doctrine of scarcity that curtails undecreed
water uses and decreed surface and tributary groundwater junior water
uses, in accordance with decreed priority, when there is insufficient
Adjudication of water rights
water available to supply all uses."
priorities, and engineering studies of diversions and uses in wet,
average, and dry times, allow water planners and suppliers to
determine whether present and future water demands can be met, and
what water rights have a supply dependable enough to support new
uses by acquisition and change of those senior water rights to the new
Augmentation and
uses through water market transactions.'0°
substitute supply plans may operate to allow out-of-priority uses to
continue if adequate replacement water is made available to the
otherwise injured water rights.1 0 '
F. A WATER LAW AND INSTITUTIONAL BRIDGE-JOHN
WESLEY POWELL
In his 1879 Arid Lands Report to Congress, John Wesley Powell
identified principles of climate, necessity, law, and use remarkably
similar to those the Colorado Supreme Court had announced in 1872:
The ancient principles of common law applying to the use of natural
streams, so wise and equitable in a humid region, would, if applied to
the Arid Region, practically prohibit the growth of its most important
industries.

98. Bd. of County. Comm'rs v. Denver Bd. of Water Comm'rs, 718 P.2d 235, 239
(Colo. 1986).
99. Gregory J. Hobbs, Jr., Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle, 32
ENVrL. L. 37, 48 (2002).
100. See generally Daniel S. Young & Duane D. Helton, Developing a Water Supply in
Colorado:The Role of an Engineer,3 U. DENv. WATER L. REV. 373-90 (2000).
101. Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50, 55 (Colo. 2003).
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If there be any doubt of the ultimate legality of the practices of the
people in the arid country relating to water and land rights, all such
doubts should be speedily quieted through the enactment of
appropriate laws by the national legislature. Perhaps an amplification
by the courts of what has been designated as the natural right to the
use of water may be made to cover the practices now obtaining; but it
hardly seems wise to imperil interests so great by intrusting them to
the possibility of some future court made law.'"

1. VISIONS OF AGRARIAN DEMOCRACY
Powell emphasized that priority of utilization, based on seniority of
rights, should apply in times of short supply based on the "necessities
of the country." 0 He would limit the water anyone could appropriate
to water actually used; his caveat was that water ought to be tied to the
land permanently, a position he reasserted when serving as a member
4
Like Jefferson before him, he
of the Public Lands Commission'
foresaw the West's future in terms of an enduring agrarian democracy.
Instead, today's West is a rapidly urbanizing, multi-faceted democracy,
but Powell had a major hand in the rise of western irrigated
agriculture and the institutions that grew up around it. Western
agriculture-beyond Powell's vision-has supported the rise of western
urbanization and a water law that provides stability, reliability, and
in the identification, protection, and change of water use
flexibility
0 °5
rights.
°6
Like the Native Americans, who animated his ethnology work,'
Powell saw the hand of the Great Spirit in the blessing and the working
of water. He revered both the desert and the garden that is the
American West. Son of a Methodist minister, his scientifically poetical
writing invokes the redeeming power of the water drop: "It may be
anticipated that all the lands redeemed by irrigation in the Arid
Region will be highly cultivated and abundantly productive, and
agriculture will be but slightly subject to the vicissitudes of scant and
excessive rainfall." 01 7 Climate, flood and drought, the power of
divinely-inspired human labor teamed with natural cosmic forces to
102. POWELL, supra note 7, at42-43.
103. Id. at 43.
104. DONALD WORSmrR, A RIVER RUNNING WEST: TBE LIFE or JOHN WESLEY POWELL
378 (2001).
105. The rise of the cities and of commerce, in addition to agriculture, requires a
water law that recognizes security, reliability, and flexibility. "Security resides in the
system's ability to identify and obtain protection for the right of water use. Reliability
springs from the system's assurance that the right of water use will continue to be
recognized and enforced over time. Flexibility emanates from the fact that the right
of water use can be changed, subject to quantification of the appropriation's historic
beneficial consumptive use and prevention of injury to other water rights." Empire
Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1147 (Colo. 2001).
106. WORSTER, supranote 104, at 371.
107. POWFLL, supra note 7, at 10.
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make a settling place through science, engineering, law, individual and
community enterprise, and enlightened public policy-Powell
harnessed Stephen Long's desert view and William Gilpin's garden
view'"0 into a vision of government in service to the cause of western
settlement.
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Powell saw the necessity of invoking the power of the national
government to aid the farmer; otherwise, corporate monopolies-not
animated by the public interest-would control the scarce water
resource. His vision started with cooperative efforts, like those of the
Mormons in Utah and the Union Colony in Colorado, to construct
ditches from the streams to the land.'9 Inevitably, however, the settlers
could not-within the limits of their own labor and financesconstruct the reservoirs that would be needed to compensate for
nature's yearly watershed rhythm of a flood of water off the mountains
from spring snowmelt, then a drought when the heat of mid-summer
requires crop water but the streams ebb low. °
Powell became a law and institution builder, serving as director of
the U.S. Geological Survey after the short tenure of fellow western
surveyor Clarence King."l He advocated the organization of irrigation
and land use districts, and supported laws that would institutionalize
2
the ability of western settlers to survive and enjoy living on the land."
A series of alternate droughts and flash floods during the late 1880s
and early 1890s brought [western farmers to] the belated realization
that they could not maintain their farms unless they stabilized their
water supplies by building larger reservoirs and stronger dams and

canals than those they had attained so far through private effort.'1

With congressional funding, the U.S. Geological Survey produced
a survey of potential reservoir sites and a short-lived piece of Powellproposed legislation to withdraw reservoir sites from settlement under
the Homestead laws,' 4 so they would be available for use as needed in
108. William Gilpin, Colorado's first Territorial Governor, promoted western
settlement during a cycle of wet weather, proclaiming another of the western great
false prophecies: "rain follows the plow." JoNI LOUISE KINSEY, THOMAS MORAN AND THE
SURVEYING OF Tin AMERICAN WST 110 (1992). After President Lincoln removed him as
Territorial Governor after one year in office, Gilpin became a land development,
railroad, and irrigation proponent. In numerous speeches and writings that received
nationwide attention, he argued, "Colorado's dryness was an advantage, for irrigated
farming was the most efficient form of agriculture .... " THOMAS L. KARNtS, WLiAM
GILPIN: WESTERN NATIONALIST 318 (1970).

109. PoWELL, supra note 7, at 11.
110. Id. at 12-14.
111.
112.

KINSEY, supra note 108, at 99.
POWELL, supra note 7, at 40-45; WORSTER, supra note 104, at 479-86.

113.

DAVID LAVENDER, COLORADO RIVER COUNTRY

173 (1982).

114. WILLIAM DEBUYS, SEEING THINGS WHOLE: THE ESSENTIAL JOHN WESLEY POWEn.
214-15 (2001).
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the future.""
Powell envisioned segmenting major rivers into a series of "natural
districts" or "hydrographic basins" for the resolution of land and water
problems; each district would own the water within its boundaries, and
each landowner in the district would share in the water and water
decision making." 6 Although his land reservation proposals caused a
congressional furor and repeal of the reservoir site reservations, his
vision of local water districts in charge of water rights and decision
making-aided by national legislative and administrative policy-has
been followed throughout the West, at least in part, through local
district sponsorship and operation of reclamation projects.
G. CLIMATE AND WATER INSTITUTIONS
Water scarcity sparked Powell's proposals, as they mark the current
western institutional landscape. Drought events of four years or more
occurred in large regions of Colorado and the West during the years
1899-1902, 1933-1937, and 1952-1956.Y7
Each of these
climatologically-caused episodes corresponded to the enactment of
major laws creating significant water institutions.
In 1902, Congress enacted the Reclamation Act, creating the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation." 8 Also in 1902, Kansas sued Colorado,
commencing the era of interstate water allocation through United
States Supreme Court equitable apportionment decrees and interstate
water compacts." 9
In 1937, the Colorado General Assembly created the Colorado
Water Conservation Board,'2 the Colorado River Water Conservation
District, 2 ' and the Water Conservancy Act,1u under which the
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District became the first of the
fifty-one water conservancy districts existing in Colorado today'23
In 1956, Congress enacted the Colorado River Storage Project
Act, 24 putting into place a network of Colorado River reservoirs
structured to support the operation of the 1922 Colorado River
Compact.'9 The 1956 Act was inevitable-the years 1905 to 1929 were
the longest recorded wet cycle'--and resulted in a significant
overestimation of Colorado River water available for allocation to the
KINSEY, supra note 108, at 98; WORSTER, supra note 104, at 356-58.
116. WORSTER, supra note 104, at 494-95.
117, See Nolan Doesken & Tom McKee, Drought in Colorado, 1 CoLO.
Winter 1999/2000, at 13, 20.
118. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-390 (2002).
119. SeeKansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902).
120. CoLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-101 to -130 (2002).
121. Id. §§ 37-46-101 to -151.
122. Id. §§ 37-45-101 to -153.
115.

123.

CLIMATE,

Colo. Water Resources Research Inst., Colorado Water Conservancy Districts, at

http://waterknowledge.colostate.edu/cnsvancy.htm (last visited Jan. 12, 2004).
124. 43 U.S.C. §§ 620a-620o (2002).
125.

See id.

126. Doesken & McKee, supranote 117, at 20.
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Upper and Lower Basin Colorado River states. 7 The guarantee of a
75 million acre-foot per ten-year period running average to the Lower
Basin left the Upper Basin states in dire need of a large storage system
that could withstand at least a severe four-year drought. 28
In turn, reaction to the implementation of the 1956 Act-through
the construction of Glen Canyon, Flaming Gorge, Blue Mesa, and
Navajo dams-helped to counter-produce the 1964 Wilderness Act,i
as proposed dams at Echo Park and Marble Canyon dramatized the
environmental call for creation of a national wilderness preservation
system.
H. RECLAMATION
Harking to Powell's view of water scarcity and the need for
redistribution of the natural hydrograph through reservoirs, the
progressive era produced a marriage of the national forest
preservation system with the reclamation program of irrigation
development.
1. HEARINGS ON THE RECLAMATION AcT

The 1901 congressional hearings on the Newlands and Shafroth
bills' 30 sounded loudly with the principle that forest watersheds must
be protected in aid of western water development and use.
Congressman Newlands of Nevada emphasized that the capacity of
locally built direct flow ditches, to provide a stable irrigation supply,
had reached its limit, and the existing settlers were in need of water
storage they could not finance on their own:
On all those streams lands have been taken up and reclaimed, but the
limit of reclamation under the present system has been
reached. These rivers discharge immense quantities of water during
the early spring and summer months, but become attenuated threads
during July, August, and September. The only
method of further
3
development of irrigation is by water storage.1 1

127. David H. Getches & CharlesJ. Meyers, The River of Controversy:Persistent Issues, in
NEW COURSES FOR THE COLORADO RIVER: MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NExT CENTURY 51, 56

(Gary D. Weatherford & F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
128. Based on tree ring studies, the long term average flow of the Colorado River
Basin is 13.5 million acre-feet, but the Compact negotiators assumed there was at least
an average of 16 million acre-feet. "The system of reservoirs now in place in the
Colorado Basin is capable of storing approximately four times the average annual flow
of the river." KATHLEEN A. MILLER, NAT'L CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH, CLIMATE
VARIABIIrv ,
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42

(1997),

at

http://www.esig.ucar.edu/wwprac/report.pdf.
129. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2002).
130. The Reclamation and Disposalof the Arid Public Lands of the West: Hearings Before the
House Committee on the Public Lands, 56th Cong. (1901).

131.

Id. at 11 (statement of Hon. F.G. Newlands, of Nevada).
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The snows on the mountains are in a certain sense storage reservoirs
for the water. The snows fall in immense quantities and great banks
form in the ravines and the valleys, and as long as they are protected
by the trees, the melting is not as rapid in the spring andsummer
months as it otherwise would be. When these trees are cut down the
snow is exposed to the fierce rays of the sun, it melts rapidly, and the
water rushes down in the early spring months. The destruction of the
forests has limited and cramped many of the existing irrigation
systems of the arid regions. Settlements which in former years never
suffered from drought are now suffering, not because there is not the
same quantity of water in the streams, but because it comes at a time
when it is not needed, on account of the
melting of the snow
32
hastened by the cutting down of the forests.
Congressman Newlands invoked Powell's earlier admonition that
private corporations could not be trusted to act in the public interest:
Private capital will not undertake to build storage works unless there
is a speculative profit. Investors wish to get a large area of land out of
which they may make this profit by leading irrigation ditches over it,
and the general tendency of such a course is to create land
monopolies. The object of the people of the United
States is to
33
prevent land monopolies and promote settlement.
Pointing to the over-appropriation of the South Platte by the direct
flow ditches, Congressman Shafroth of Colorado urged federal
funding of reservoirs to allow irrigation of newly developed lands and
to stabilize the water supply of existing farmers:
Now, the Platte River in Colorado has been appropriated eight times
over, and on account of the increase of the population the claims on
the waters of the Platte River have increased to eight times beyond
what it is possible for the river with its ordinary flow to supply, and
there is not a drop of water for any new lands.... [I]f you construct
reservoirs and put them in direct connection with the reclamation of
Government lands and designate that the water is to be utilized in
that connection, the water turned into the stream from the reservoir
can be taken out at a lower point and taken to the land the
Government owns. T 4
Shafroth emphasized that the "laws of the irrigation States" recognized
conservation of water for the improvement of lands. 35
2. FOREST AND WATER CONSERVATION
The great American forester Gifford Pinchot also testified at these
hearings that the forest reserves would support, not impede, present
and future water uses: "The successful development of those lands, the

132.
133.
134.
135.

Id. at 31.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 33 (statement of Hon.John F. Shafroth, of Colorado).
Id.
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continuance of their prosperity, and the extension of this irrigation
system over
the West depends absolutely on the preservation of these
6
forests."

Colorado was central to the public debate surrounding the
creation of the national forests. Colorado Senator Henry Teller, who
also served for a time as United States secretary of interior, contended
for the conveyance of the public lands to state and local interests and
fought against federal forest reserves. 37 President Teddy Roosevelt
campaigned on the ground in Colorado for the forest reservations,
arguing that withdrawal from homesteading and conservation of the
forested watersheds was necessary for the development and use of
water for farms and cities.' ss Fourteen million acres of forest reserve
exist in Colorado today."s Roosevelt convinced many Coloradans,
despite Teller's
adamant states' rights advocacy.'
Key to the
• 141
were provisions in the 1897 Forest Organic Act'4
compromise
adhering to state water law and allowing rights-of-way for irrigation
canals, ditches, flumes, and reservoirs.
The 1902 Reclamation Act 4 4 wedded the national government's
role in water conservation to forest conservation. As a result of this
progressive conservation marriage, the Bureau of Reclamation
("Bureau") has celebrated its one-hundred year anniversary. It has
created more than six hundred dams and reservoirs, and it distributes
water to more than 31 million urban and rural residents in the West,
including one-fifth of the region's irrigation farmers on land that
produces 60 percent of the nation's vegetables.
The Bureau's early,
almost exclusive, irrigation focus inevitably shifted as the western
United States proceeded into the World War I, Great Depression,
World War II, and environmental eras.

136. Id. at 65 (statement of Gifford Pinchot, chief forester, United States
Department of Agriculture).
137. DUANE A. SMrrH, HENRY M. TELLE. COLORADO's GRAND OLD MAN 229-30
(2002).
138. See G. MocHAEL McCARTHY, HOUR OF TiuAL: THE CONSERVATION CONRFIcr IN
COLORADO AND THE WESt 1891-1907, at 88 (1977).
139. Jusncl GREGORYJ. HoBBs, JR., COLO. FOUND. FOR WATER EDUC., CITIZEN'S GUIDE
TO COLORADO WATER LAw 25 (2003).
140. See McCARTHY, supra note 138, at 88.
141. Id. at 57.
142. 16 U.S.C. §§ 471-539 (2002).
143. Id. §§ 524, 525.
144. 43 U.S.C. §§ 371-390 (2002).
145. DonaldJ. Pisani, Federal Reclamation in the Twentieth Century: A Centennial
Retrospective 33 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation Centennial Symposium, June 18-19, 2002). Powell had estimated that
thirty million acres could be irrigated; the actual productive area today is closer to ten
million. Shelly C. Dudley, The First Five: A Brief Overview of the First Reclamation
Projects Authorized by the Secretary of the Interior March 14, 1903, at 30 (2001)
(unpublished manuscript, prepared for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Centennial
Symposium, June 18-19, 2002).
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3. FROM THE EARLY PROJECTS TO COMPLEX CONTROVERSIES

In the late 1920s, Southern Californians were as much interested
in the power production and flood control benefits of the Boulder
Canyon Project as they were in a water supply.14 6 Dams, as energy
producers and cash registers, helped the effort of the United States to
emerge from the Great Depression and produce the power needed to
7
win World War II and supply the growing cities after the war." Today,
kilowatts
14.7
million
of
producing
Bureau dams have a total capability
48
of electricity.'
The creation of jobs, power, and water for cities often worked at
cross-purposes to the homestead ideal upon which the Bureau began,
and, despite charges that it has tried to dominate and compete,
cooperation with local interests and institutions has been a major tread
of its step. 49 Congress interjected the Bureau into a web of preexisting land and water laws that recognized the values and rights of
private entrepreneurs, and expected the Bureau to operate as a
business, recapturing investments, while producing economic and
democratic miracles for the disenfranchised urban poor and soldiers
returning to civilian life.'-4
Colorado benefited from early reclamation projects and suffered
detriment to its interests from others, dramatizing the point that the
Bureau was responsive to a national constituency that included
Among the first five
competing regional and state interests.
authorized projects were the Gunnison (Uncompahgre) Project in
western Colorado and the Sweetwater (North Platte) Project in
Wyoming and Nebraska.' 5'
The Uncompahgre Project resulted from the late 1890-early 1900s
drought, rescuing and completing a project that local residents had
The Gunnison Tunnel, diverting Gunnison River water into
started.
the Uncompahgre Valley, six miles long with a carriage canal another
twelve miles long, came on line in 1909."' In the ensuing decades, the
Bureau "built additional diversion dams and either purchased private
miles."' 54
canals or constructed new ones, totaling approximately 470
By 1913, "the Uncompahgre Project canals delivered water to 37,000
146. Jay Brigham, From Water to Water and Power: The Changing Charge of the
Bureau of Reclamation 15 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the U.S.
Bureau of Reclamation Centennial Symposium,June 18-19, 2002).
147. Pisani, supra note 145, at 15-16.
148. Brigham, supra note 146, at 3.
149. Pisani, supranote 145, at 14, 32.
150. Patricia Nelson Limerick, One Hundred Years of The Bureau of Reclamation:
Looking from the Outside In 11, 15-16 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation Centennial Symposium,June 18-19, 2002).
151. See generally Dudley, supra note 145 (discussing the Bureau's first five projects).
The other three of the earliest projects were the Milk River (Montana), Newlands
(Truckee, Nevada), and Salt River (Arizona) projects. Id.
152. DAVID LAVENDER, supra note 113, at 175-77 (1982).
153. Dudley, supra note 145, at 12.
154. Id.
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acres while the private irrigation structures transmitted water to 13,600
acres.... Within the next decade, the acreage increased to 64,180
acres irrigated within the project.""'5
John C. Fremont's 1842 surveying expedition produced a sevenpart strip map of an overland, watered route by way of the North Platte
through South Pass.'l The North Platte River from Chimney Rock
through Scott's Bluff and Ft. Laramie was a critical
portion of the
57
Oregon Trail's opening into the mountain West.
The Bureau's Sweetwater Project benefited these portions of the
North Platte valley in Wyoming and Nebraska.'-'
It included the
construction of Pathfinder Dam, named for Fremont, and the Fort
Laramie and Interstate canals. Water deliveries started in 1908.1 By
the mid-1920s, the Bureau constructed over two thousand miles of
canals and laterals, bringing water to about two hundred and twenty
thousand acres in Wyoming and Nebraska.' 60 The Bureau added
Guernsey Dam at Goshen Hole, Wyoming, and created Lake Alice and
Lake Minatare in Nebraska. 16' Under the Warren Act,6 2 allowing
contracting of water with private water users for supplemental water on
their lands, irrigated acreage increased another one hundred
thousand acres. 65
Early reclamation projects resulted in an embargo on Colorado's
development of the waters of the Rio Grande and North Platte Rivers
and contributed palpably to (1) interstate water litigation in the U.S.
Supreme Court; (2) successful negotiation of numerous water
compacts; (3) construction of ever-larger waterworks by the Bureau
and others; and (4) the essential and enduring role of the states, local
water districts, and municipalities.
All of these embedded
arrangements resulted from adaptation of a changing West to the
reality of western aridity.
I. INTERSTATE DISPUTES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
In the same year Congress passed the Reclamation Act, Kansas
sued Colorado for impeding the flow of the Arkansas River into
Kansas. Kansas was a riparian state; Colorado, a prior appropriation

155. Id. at 13.
156. WILLAM E. HLL, THE OREGON TRAEL: YTERDAY AND TODAY 32-38 (1994)
(containing copies of the Fremont-Preuss maps).
157. See generally MERIULJ. MATTES, THE GREAT PLATTE RIVER ROAD: THE COVERED
WAGON MANaINE VIA FORT KEARw To FORT LARANE 378-521 (1969) (presenting the
important role the Platte River Road played in opening the West).
158. See Dudley, supra note 145, at 17-18.
159. Id. at 18.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 43 U.S.C. §§ 523-525 (2002).
163. Dudley, supra note 145, at 17-18; Alan S. Newell, Did The Secretary Sell Us
'Blue Sky'? Inclusion of Warren Act Contractors in the North Platte River Project 2-3
(2002) (unpublished manuscript, prepared for the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
Centennial Symposium, June 18-19, 2002).
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state; the United States, the owner of huge federal lands from and
through which the vast percentage of western water flowed.'" In the
course of the litigation, which resulted in two opinions,'" Kansas
claimed its law required Colorado to by-pass all water to it; Colorado
claimed its law could keep any water from flowing into Kansas; and the
United States claimed that all unappropriated western water had been
reserved for development and distribution through the 1902
Reclamation Act.'6
The United States Supreme Court rejected all three theories in
favor of case-by-case original jurisdiction for the equitable
apportionment of waters between states that share an interstate stream
The Court held that each state could choose its own water
system.
law, could not impose its choice on another state, and the national
government's interest in reclamation of arid lands could not supplant
state water law selection.'"
Having failed to establish a reservation of western water for the
reclamation program, the United States used its property power over
federal lands to embargo permits for crossing of federal lands
• 169
necessary to build non-federal water projects upstream of Pathfinder
Dam in Wyoming and Elephant Butte Reservoir in New Mexico.
This embargo, and the looming loss to Wyoming in an equitable
apportionment case,"70 spurred Delph Carpenter of Colorado to
in the era of interstate water
idea" resulting
formulate the "compact
171
....
compact negotiation and ratification.
Professor Daniel Tyler explains in his biography of Delph
Carpenter that this water compact brainstorm derived from
Carpenter's understanding of drought and "river culture":
The culture of rivers and streams is dictated by geographical
location. Upstream residents tend to manifest an attitude of
superiority. Their connection to reliable water is guaranteed,
especially during periods of drought. Their major concern comes
from the fact that most western states accept the principle of first in
time, first in right. Economic development downstream, where
warmer temperatures encourage agriculture and population growth,
results in a prior use of water and therefore a potential legal claim to
Downstream residents worry
that water in times of scarcity.
164. Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 125, 138 (1902).
165. Id.; Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46 (1907).
166. 206 U.S. at 85.
167. Id. at 117-18.
168. Id. at 92, 97; accord Simpson v. Highland Irrigation Company, 917 P.2d 1242,
1247 (Colo. 1996) (referencing and summarizing the U.S. Supreme Court's 1907
decision). The Supreme Court pointed out that section 8 of the Reclamation Act
requires the secretary to proceed "in conformity" with state laws. Kansas v. Colorado,
206 U.S at 93.
169. William A. Paddock, The Rio Grande Compact of 1938, 5 U. DENy. WATER L. REV.
1, 13 (2001); see DANiL TYLER, SILVER Fox OF THE RocKIEs: DELPHus E. CARPENTER AND
WESTERN WATER COMPACrS 119, 154, 169, 314 n.58 (2003).
170. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922).
171. TYLER, supra note 169, at 119.
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excessively about upstream transfers of water out of the river basin
and upstream consumption that diminishes downstream flows at
critical times.1
Experience with interstate water litigation taught Carpenter three
great lessons. When the United States Supreme Court exercises its
original jurisdiction to resolve an interstate water dispute, (1) the
doctrine of equitable apportionment governs; (2) what is an equitable
apportionment in one decade may not be so in another; and (3) the
upstream state can lose to a downstream state whose development
occurs first, if not now then later.
Carpenter had two primary fears: California would preempt
Colorado by its capacity for early development, and the federal
government-through the Bureau-would command all western rivers
to the detriment of individual states.n However, by the time the
Supreme Court recognized Wyoming's interstate Laramie River
priority, leaving only 15,500 acre-feet per year for additional Colorado
use,74 Carpenter had convinced the powerful League of the Southwest
to endorse the compact idea for the Colorado River, and Congress had
enacted legislation for a seven-state Colorado River Compact
Commission, 175 whose chair became Commerce Secretary Herbert
Hoover.
The Colorado River Compact of 1922 institutionalized, as a matter7
of state and federal law, the allocation of Colorado River water. 1
Because of reliance on the longest wet cycle in recorded Colorado
history (1905 to 1929),' the Upper Basin states of Colorado, New
Mexico, Wyoming, and Utah are shorted in dry times by the guarantee
of a 75 million ten-year running average of water delivery at Lee Ferry
for the Lower Basin States of Arizona, California, and Nevada.'78 This
realization led to the alliance Colorado Congressmen Ed Taylor and
Wayne Aspinall forged with western state congressional colleagues to
build reclamation projects in the Upper Basin and throughout the
West-projects to assist in the operation of the compacts and assure
local water supply for agricultural,
municipal, commercial, power
179
production, and recreation.

172. Id. at8.
173. SeeJames S. Lochhead, An Upper Basin Perspective on California'sClaims to Water
from the Colorado River, 4 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 290, 291, 299 (2001).
174. Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. at 496.

175. Lochhead, supra note 173, at 294.
Colorado River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 (2002).
177. Doesken & McKee, supranote 117, at 20.
178. Lochhead, supranote 173, at 319.
179. See STEVEN C. SCHULTE, WAYNE ASPINALL AND THE SHAPING OF THE AMERiCAN
WEST 25, 68 (2002); see also CAROL EDMONDS, WAYNE ASPINALL: MR. CHAIRMAN (1980).
176.
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J. STATE AND LOCAL WATER BOARDS, DISTRICTS,
MUNICIPALITIES, DITCH AND RESERVOIR COMPANIESTHEIR ENDURING ROLE
The Great Depression drought of the 1930s propelled water
development as a major means for rehabilitating America. Colorado's
successful effort to forge a permanent water arrangement with the
United States through the Great Divide flushed up construction and
operation of the Colorado-Big Thompson Project, with water features
tapping the headwaters of the Colorado River to benefit water uses on

the western and eastern slopes of Colorado.'80
In 1937, the Colorado General Assembly gave birth to the
Colorado Water Conservation Board,' the Colorado River Water
Conservation District ("Colorado River District"),' 8 2 and the Water
Conservancy Act."s The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy
District became the first of the now-current fifty-one conservancy
districts in Colorado.'8 " The Colorado River District was the first of
three conservation districts established by the Colorado legislature, the
District 85 and
other two being Rio Grande Water Conservation
86
District.
Southwestern Water Conservation
A primary motivator for the establishment of state and local boards
and districts was that the Reclamation Act required the Bureau to
contract with local entities to obtain repayment for part of federal
water project construction and operation costs87 The conservancy
districts-empowered by the legislature to receive public funds from a
property tax mill levy, make assessments, and charge fees for water
usero -undertook the water project sponsorship and repayment role.
Along with the conservancy districts, the conservation districtsassigned with a regional responsibility for water development and
basin protection in separate major watersheds within the state sgbecame fixtures for state and national assertion of local water interests.
The Colorado Water Conservation Board-whose representatives
are from all regions of the state, and are appointed by the governor
and confirmed by the senate'9-became the coordination and
180.

See generally DANIEL TYLER, THE LAST WATER HOLE IN THE WEST:

COLORADO-BIG

THOMPSON

PROJECT

AND

THE

NORTHERN

COLORADO

THE
WATER

CONSERvANcYDISTRIcr 4, 19-25 (1992) (describing the development and construction
of the C-BT project).
181. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-101 to -130 (2002).
182. Id. §§ 37-46-101 to-151.
183. Id. §§ 37-45-101 to-153.
184. Colorado Water Resources Research Institute, Colorado Water Conservancy
Districts, at http://waterknowledge.colostate.edu/cnsvancy.htm (last visited Jan. 12,

2004).
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-48-101 to -195 (2002).
Id. §§ 37-47-101 to -151.
See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c) (2002).
COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-45-121 to -131 (2002).
See, e.g., id. § 37-45-102(1).
Id. § 37-60-104(1).
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planning reservoir for marshalling Colorado's interest in the
development and use of its scarce water resource.""' The state and
division engineers continued their historic role of administering the
decrees of Colorado courts confirming the priorities of water use
rights. 192
The Colorado Groundwater Commission oversaw the
permitting of ground water withdrawals from designated deep
groundwater basins. 93
Across the state, towns and cities, water and sanitation districts,
irrigation districts, mutual ditch and reservoir companies, homeowner
associations, and individual businesses each have a local constituency
and responsibility for water planning and delivery. Although criticized
at times for acting undemocratically and for a narrow interest, each of
these organizations-with the governor, the legislature, and the courts
also performing their assigned roles-focuses on conserving water for
community uses, a very important public interest also pursued by the
Native American and Hispanic peoples-and western visionaries like
John Wesley Powell. These institutions-and the result of pressure
and counter-pressure among constituent groups-shape and reshape
the water customs and values of the people. 94
K. THE 1956 COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ACT AND
WILDERNESS PRESERVATION, COUNTER-TWINS
The annual native flow of the Colorado River can vary between 4.4
million acre-feet in drought times to 21.9 million acre-feet in wet
years. 195 The Colorado River Compact guarantees a delivery of 75
million acre-feet measured at Lee Ferry to the Lower Basin over any
ten-year period.' 96 Only by storing water can the Upper Colorado River
Basin states "even come close to meeting 9their
allotted annual uses and
7
discharging their Lee Ferry obligations."

In 1956, Congress enacted the Colorado River Storage Project
("CRSP") Act99 to assist the Upper Basin states in developing their
allocation of water, producing hydropower, and ensuring Compact
deliveries, among other uses that, as a result of the 1968 Colorado
River Basin Act, include fish, wildlife, and recreation.'" Particularly in
times of drought, the Aspinall Unit on the Gunnison River in
Colorado-together with Navajo Dam in New Mexico, Glen Canyon
Dam in Utah, Fontenelle Dam in Wyoming, and Flaming Gorge Dam
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

See id. § 37-60-106.
Id. § 37-92-301.
Id. § 37-90-107.
See HOBBS, supra note 139, at 19.
Getches & Meyers, supra note 127, at 56.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-61-101 art. 111(d); HOBBS, supra note 139, at 23.
Edward W. Clyde, InstitutionalResponse to ProlongedDrought,in NEw COURSES FOR
THE COLORADO RIVER MAJOR ISSUES FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 113 (Gary D. Weatherford
and F. Lee Brown eds., 1986).
198. Colorado River Storage Project Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 620-620o (2002).
199. Colorado River Basin Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1501 (a) (2000); Bd. of County Comm'rs
v. Crystal Creek Homeowners' Ass'n., 14 P.3d 325, 333, 339-340 (Colo. 2000).
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in Utah-operate as a "savings account," so that the citizens of
Colorado and the other Upper Basin states can develop and use the
water allotted to them by the Compact "without fear of being 'called
out' at some time by the demands of the Compact."'°°
The proposal to build a dam on the Green River at Echo Park near
the Colorado-Utah border-and another at Marble Canyon just east of
the main gorge of the Grand Canyon below Lee Ferry-gave birth to
the compromise of constructing Glen Canyon Dam and also helped
Congress pass the1964 Wilderness Act to flow forth from Congress.
In late 1955 and early 1956, Howard Zahniser of The Wilderness
Society worked unceasingly at trying to insert a proviso into the CRSP
that would protect the sanctity of the park system from future
reclamation projects. Conservationists also insisted upon a second
rovision protecting Rainbow Bridge National Monument from the
huge reservoir that would be created by the proposed Glen Canyon
Dam. After another round of negotiations on Capital Hill, Zahniser
gained assurance from Upper Basin leaders like Aspinall and William
Dawson of Utah that they would support the provisos in return for
opposition to the
the cessation of conservation-organization
CRSP. At long last, the way seemed clear to passage.
Water storage to assist state use of water compact allocations, park
protection, and wilderness preservation-these are the three essentials
of the CRSP compromise that forged beneficial use and preservation,
not just beneficial use, to the maturing western experience. Just as the
reclamation movement tapped Native and Hispanic American water
use roots, so the wilderness movement tapped a resonant core of awe
and respect in Americans. Wilderness has fundamentally shaped our
American character. Preservation of its remaining vestige is a great
national achievement, the argument for which included the water
quality and quantity benefits of preserving natural watersheds.
The movement for preservation started with the great nineteenth
century western surveyors themselves-and the artists, photographers,
botanists, and geologists who accompanied them-but most
importantly the citizens of the United States. Congress intended the
surveys of George Wheeler, Clarence King, Ferdinand Hayden, and
John Wesley Powell to provide the location and resource nexus for
But, the people of the United States through
settlement of the West.
the work of artists, journalists, and popular magazines, such as

200. Crystal Creek Homeowners'Ass'n, 14 P.3d at 334; HOBBS, supra note 139, at 20-21.
201. See NoRMS HUNDLEY, JR., THE GREAT THiRsr, CALIFORNIANS AND WATER, 1770s-1990s, at 307-309 (1992). For a wonderfully readable account of the construction of
Glen Canyon Dam, see RUSSELL MARTIN, A STORY THAT STANDS LIKE A DAM, GLEN
CANYON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR THE SOUL OF THE WEST (1989)
202. SCHULTE, supra note 179, at 66.
203. Robert W. Karrow, Jr., George M. Iheeler and The GeographicalSurveys West of the
100th Meridian 1869-1879, in EXPLORATION AND MAPPING OF THE AMERiCAN WEST:
SELECTED ESSAYS 121-124 (Donna P. Koepp ed., 1986).
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Harper's Weekly, 04 also saw how vast, beautiful, varied, and stupendous
this land is, carved of sporadic, surging rivers and trickling drops; sun;
wind; and plenty of parching days.
The paintings of Thomas Moran, the sketches of William Henry
Holmes, and the photographs of W.H. Jackson were direct products of
the Powell and Hayden surveys. These works led the way for the
establishment of those jewels of the park system, including
Yellowstone, Grand Canyon, and Mesa Verde National Parks-and
with the tremendous added value of John Muir's hiking, writing,
wandering, and advocacy, Yosemite.205
San Francisco tapped Muir's beloved Hetch Hetchy Valley for
municipal storage. Muir's reaction to what he viewed as a moral
outrage sounds a high and clear tone of the liberty bell that Americans
can hear-and appreciate-among all the tones we hear from the lyric
and rhythm of Nature and its influence on our national character.
That any one would try to destroy such a place seems incredible; but
sad experience shows that there are people good enough and bad
enough for anything. The proponents of the dam scheme bring

forward a lot of bad arguments to prove that the only righteous thing
to do with the people's parks is to destroy them bit by bit as they are
able. Their arguments are curiously like those of the devil, devised
204. Harper's Weekly-which modestly called itself "A Journal of Civilization"described Denver as an oasis community created in the desert a little over 25 years
after the 1858 gold strike at the junction of Cherry Creek and the South Platte River:
If the city were less substantial in appearance than it is, if it possessed certain
glaring peculiarities, it would be much easier to describe it. But it so belies its
age, and seems so much older than it really is, that one falls to taking for
granted that which should be surprising. Wide, shaded, and attractivelooking streets, handsome residences surrounded by spacious grounds, noble
public buildings, and the many luxuries of city life, tempt one to forget that
Denver has gained all these excellencies in less than twenty-five years. Every
tree that one sees has been planted and tended; every attractive feature is the
result of good judgment and careful industry. Nature gave Denver the
mountains which the city looks out upon; but beyond those hills and the
bright sky and the limitless plains, she gave nothing to the place which one
has only to see to admire. The site originally was a barren waste, dry and
hilly. Never was it green, except perchance in early spring, and not a tree
grew, save a few low bushes clinging to the banks of the river. Surrounded on
the east, south, and north by the extended prairie lands, fast being converted
into productive farms, and having on the west the mountains with their
treasures of gold, silver, coal, iron, and lead, Denver is the natural
concentrator of all the productions of Colorado. From it are sent forth the
capital, the machinery, and the thousand and one other necessities of a
constantly increasing number of people engaged in developing a new
country.
THE WEST: A COLLEGrION FROM HARPER'S MAGAZINE 52-53 (1990).
205. See generally KEvIrNJ. FERNLUND, WLIAM HENRY HOLMES AND THE REDISCOVERY OF
THE A.MEcAN WEST 102-122 (2000); WILtAM HENRY JACKSON & JOHN FIELDER,
COLORADO 1870-2000 (2000);John Muir, Our NationalParks, inJOHN MuIm THE EIGHT
WILDERNESS DISCOVERY BOOKS 457-605 (1992); THOMAS J. NOEL & JOHN FIELDER,
COLORADO 1870-2000 REvISIED: THE HISTORY BEHIND THE IMAGES (2001); Paul D.
Sheats, After Yosemite: John Muir and the Southern Sierra, in JOHN MUIR: LIFE AND WORK
245-264 (Sally M. Miller ed., 1993); DOUGLAS WATLEY, WILLIAM HENRY JACKSON:
FRAMING THE FRONTrER 105-141 (1998); THURmAN WIKINS, THOMAS MORAN: ARaTM OF
THE MOUNTAINS 106-135 (2d ed. 1998).
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for the destruction of the first garden - so much of the very best Eden
fruit going to waste; so much of the best Tuolumne water and
Tuolumne scenery going to waste. Few of their statements are even
partly true, and all are misleading.
Thus, Hetch Hetchy, they say, is a 'low-lying meadow'.
On the
6
contrary, it is a high-lying natural landscape garden.2
Twenty-four wilderness areas, over three million acres, exist in
Colorado today because Coloradans joined with other citizens of the
20
United States to pass the wilderness acts, starting with the 1964 Act.

1

Congressman Wayne Aspinall, as chairman of the House Interior
Committee-a procurer of water projects for Colorado-played a key
if reluctant role.2 08 Echo Park Dam had been a part of plans for the
Colorado River Storage Project, but Congress removed it from the
CRSP because of wilderness advocate
opposition in favor of preserving
2 9
Dinosaur National Monument.
Wallace Stegner's Wilderness Letter of December 3, 1960 speaks to
the preservation chamber of America's heart, just as John Wesley
Powell's water writings address the beneficial use chamber of the same
heart:
We need wilderness preserved-as much of it as is still left, and as
many kinds-because it was the challenge against which our
character as a people was formed. The reminder and the reassurance
that it is still there is good for our spiritual health even if we never
once in ten years set foot in it. It is good for us when we are young,
because of the incomparable sanity it can bring briefly, as vacation
and rest, into our insane lives. It is important to us when 21
we0 are old
simply because it is there-important, that is, simply as idea.
Colorado, the state of the Great Divide-mother of rivers-headwaters
of the Platte, Arkansas, Rio Grande, and Colorado Rivers has an
enduring legacy of water preservation, conservation, and beneficial
use.
L. 2000-2003 DROUGHT, TESTING THE LIMITS
1. THE INTERSTATE WATER CAPS
In the South Platte, Arkansas, and Colorado River watersheds,
Colorado has approached the limits of its interstate water allocations.2,
The Colorado Water Conservation Board uses an estimated four
206. John Muir, The Yosemite, inIHE

EIGHT WILDERNESS DiscovERYBooKs 715 (1992).
16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-1136 (2002); Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1408
Cir. 1990).
See RODERiCKNASH, WILDERNESSAND THEAMERICAN MIND 215-219 (1967).
Id. at 219.
Wallace Stegner, Wilderness Letter, in MAFaNG THE SPARRow'S FALL: WALLACE
STEGNER'S AMEiC.AN WEST 112 (Page Stegner ed., 1998).
211. See HOBBs, supra note 139, at 13.
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hundred thousand acre-feet of water available for development under
Compact and Upper Colorado River Compact
its Colorado River
2
apportionment.
Normally, Colorado rivers generate an annual average of sixteen
million acre-feet of water.1 3 In the drought year 2002, they produced
approximately four million acre-feet. 21 4 Colorado lived in 2002 on six
million acre-feet of storage water released from reservoirs.2 15 About
2000 reservoirs exist in Colorado.1 6
Colorado's current population is over 4.25 million persons.2 17 In
1971, agriculture accounted for 92 percent of the state's water
deliveries for consumptive use; today, that figure is 85 percent. " The
difference represents market transfers, primarily to domestic and
municipal use, which accounts for 10 percent of Colorado's deliveries
for beneficial use. 9
2. CONSERVATION AND NEW USES
Together with demand-reducing measures, such as water
restrictions and surcharge pricing, reservoirs with adequate storage
rights are crucial to the state's ability to endure drought, such as the
one Colorado has just experienced. A water right is a right to share in
the public's water resource.2" Conservation is indispensable-in all its
forms-in stretching a scarce resource. The measure, scope, and limit
of a water right is beneficial use. z22 Beneficial use without waste or
speculation is the core of our western water law doctrine. In times of
scarcity, juniors defer to seniors, and the water market operates to
transfer senior priorities to those who want to make a new use or firm
Augmentation plans allow out-of-priority diversions
up a junior use.
to operate if adequate replacement water is supplied to senior water
rights that would be injured otherwise.222
The Colorado General Assembly has adopted an instream flow law
for fish and wildlife protection 4 and has enacted a recreational inM

212.
213.

Id. at 23.
Id. at 20.

214. Id. at 22.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 21. The reliance of the United States on storage is shown by an
illustration that storage capacity increased from less than 50 million acre-feet in 1925
to 450 million acre-feet in 1990. WAYNE B. SOLLEY, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURvEY, ESTrMATES
OF WATER USE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES IN 1990 AND WATER-USE TRENDS

at 2 (1997), availableat
http:// ww.wat erst.ogjreadingreadingiles/fedreportfiles/wateruse.pdf.
217. HOBBS, supra note 139, at 4.
218. Id. at 7.
219. Id.
220. See id. at 13.
221. Id. at 7.
222. See id. at 15.
223. See id. at 16.
224. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-102, -60-122.2 (2002).

1960-90,
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Surely, these laws are
channel diversion law for rafting and boating.
reflections of our maturation as westerners. They take their place in
the priority system, with the opportunity to firm their use, through
water market transfer of senior rights and water storage and release.
These legal mechanisms have their institutional counterparts: the
Water Conservation Board for the instream flow program; cities,
conservancy districts, and other local governments, with consultation
by the Water Conservation Board, for recreational in-channel
diversions2 6
3. WATER PLANNING AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST
A true mark of western water being a scarce public resource is how
long and how often we have institutionalized its conservation and use.
This is apparent in legal assignments made to national, state, and local
public agencies-from the U.S. Geologic Survey to the Bureau of
Reclamation, from the Water Conservation Board to the Upper
Gunnison Water Conservancy District, from the City and County of
Denver to the Town of San Luis.
The public institutions, created by legislative bodies at all levels,
have the duty, in the public interest, to plan for and secure a firm
water supply, responsive to environmental laws as well as all other
applicable laws, to the best of their ability. Environmental institutions
and citizen groups help shape how, when, if, and why additional water
works will be built, but they do not have the public's water supply
responsibility and will not be answerable for a lack of planning and
failure to undertake needed actions. Public officials, on the other
hand, will be held accountable.
As a result of severe drought at the outset of the twenty-first
century, public officials at all levels are engaged in drought planning
and response. As a result of the 1976-1977 drought and a dry year in
1981, Colorado's governor initiated the development of a
comprehensive drought management plan.2 2 "The Colorado plan is
effective because it incorporates three primary components: a
monitoring system, an impact assessment system, and a response
system. The State is currently attempting to give greater emphasis to
mitigation in its plan."28 This effort has redoubled as a result of the
most recent drought.

225. Id, §§ 37-92-102(5)-(6),-92-103(4).
226. Id §§ 37-92-102(3),-102(5).
227. DONALD WmITrE, NAT'L DROUGHT MITIGATION CTR., IMPROVING DROUGHT
at
THE
WEST
17
(June
1997),
available
MANAGEMENT
IN
http://www.waterwest.org/reading/readingfiles/fedreportfiles/drought.pdf.
228. id, at 18.
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4. ADJUSTING THE WATER LAWS

In its 2003 session, the Colorado General Assembly added
additional flexibility to Colorado water law, extending administrative
authority in the state engineer for water banking, changes of water
rights, substitute supply plans, emergency water plans, loans of water
including for instream flow purposes, prohibition of new covenants
that restrict the use of drought-tolerant vegetative landscapes, state
technical assistance for water usage and billing systems, and water
rights for conservation easements, consistent with the laws for water
court adjudication of water rights and state engineer enforcement of
them.2" The legislature also provided for financial mitigation to
counties that suffer tax revenue loss from the removal of agricultural
water from their jurisdiction.2 30 The assembly has directed the Water
Conservation Board to undertake a statewide assessment of water
supply, water demand, and water development strategies; project
alternatives are to include social, economic, and environmental
impacts and a consensus-building approach. 2 ' These short- and longterm measures have their bud in the most recent drought but their
root in the long, ongoing process of adapting to the arid lands. Surely,
the arena of reducing water demand and increasing the efficiency of
water application and use deserves additional action.
We must not forget the contributions of the professional
community, including climate scientists-meteorologists, hydrologists,
climatologists, among them-who help us gauge, analyze, and forecast
based on past and current data, so we can prepare for what we must do
to conserve supply and reduce demand. Our heritage is the same as
all of those who have preceded us here. We must work the water well,
and we must also leave it alone to do its shaping.

229.

S. 03-073, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (substitute, temporary,

and emergency water supply plans); H.R. 03-1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2003) (prohibiting new restrictive covenants limiting use of drought tolerant
vegetation, providing technical assistance for customer water use and billing systems,
allowing State Engineer approval of temporary changes of water rights); H.R. 03-1008,
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easements); H.R. 03-1318, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (water banks
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2003) (loans of water rights for instream flow use in drought emergencies); H.R. 031334, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (temporary interruptible water
supply agreements during time of drought emergency).
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Board funding, section 14).
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M. CONCLUSION

In one ironic sentence, Bernard DeVoto summed up the problem
and experience of the way west-such as Lewis and Clark realized after
they had bushwhacked their way with a lot of supreme effort, and
luckily, to the mouth of the Columbia with the help of Native
Americans, Sacagawea, the Shoshone, and the Nez Perce: "The point it
indicated was clear and precise: the route they had taken west was
certainly not the shortest and probably not the best one.23

I would add, how else goes the course of western civilization?
Weather and water politics, in the wild cycle of their beneficial seasons,
will always be with us.
GOOD COLORADO HEADWATERS EDUCATION
Good we don't have to buy the weather,
Good isn't for sale and just happens whenever.
Predictions, though good and getting better,
Are wildly inaccurate when the best worst weather
Hits so suddenly you can't tell where the pitch
Comes from.
I prefer weather to politics,
I mean, at least, when you sear your lips
Or an will wind spanks your bottom, you can
Rightly say, "Wait just a minute, it'll change"Colorado axiom-any politics charging straight
Off the Divide is worth standing to for.
Sure you have to hunker down when thunder
Booms and lightning catches between a vortex
Pit-of-gut instinct and a gearing rain that may never
Touch ground. "Norm" is only a mathematical
Possibility. Yell, Hail! and run. Your averageStaked tent blows down any minute.
Greg Hobbs
6/7/2003

232.
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N. APPENDIX: GREG HOBBS, MESA VERDE JOURNAL
Prater Canyon Box Elder Reservoir Survey
By Wright Paleohydrological Institute
In Cooperation with the Colorado Historical Society
And the National Park Service, May 2-4, 2003
May 1, 2003
Bobbie picks Greg up at the new Idaho Springs High School where
the Colorado Supreme Court has heard oral argument on two criminal
cases in front of students from a number of area high schools.
Greg and Bobbie drive through four major watershed headwaters
on their way to Cortez: the Platte, the Arkansas, the Rio Grande, and
the Colorado.
The route is 1-70 to Eisenhower Tunnel (Platte
watershed), Eisenhower Tunnel to Leadville (Colorado River
watershed into Arkansas River watershed), Leadville to Wolf Creek
Pass (Arkansas River and Rio Grande watersheds), and Wolf Creek
Pass to Cortez (Colorado River watershed-San Juan, Pine, Piedra, La
Plata, and Mancos Rivers sub-watersheds).
Arrival and check into Comfort Inn at 10:00 p.m. We are met by
Terri Ohlson.
May 2, 2003
Some engineer has set the clock radio in Greg and Bobbie's room
to go off at 5:00 a.m. Promptly at 5:00 a.m. the radio comes on!
Breakfast is at six. The survey team early arrivals arrive for
breakfast.
7:00 a.m. the team assembles in the Comfort Inn parking lot. Ken
and Ruth Wright welcome all of us. Jack Smith, former Chief
Archeologist at Mesa Verde National Park, briefs us on Park etiquette.
In short, the etiquette is you may find and pick up artifacts but put
them back where you found them. No collecting!!
Ken explains that this is the "intellectual day." The "heavy lifters"
come tomorrow.
Doug Ramsey, a soil scientist, and Dick Wiltshire, U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation civil/geotechnical engineer, load up a mobile coredrilling rig loaned by the Bureau of Reclamation.
We are off to Mesa Verde-sky high canyon home of the Anasazi.
Ruth explains on the way:
The Pueblo I occupation was 750-900; the Pueblo I, 900-1100;
and Pueblo III, 1100-1300. The Box Elder Reservoir in Prater Canyon
was likely in operation from 750 to 950 A.D., during the Pueblo I
period primarily. Its location and existence became known after the
year 2000 Bircher fire burned off the pifion, juniper, and sagebrush.
A fast and furious wind burned fiercely 27,000 acres.
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The Box Elder Reservoir is named for the unusual box elder trees
that are in the stream channel near the reservoir. Box Elder is the
fourth Mesa Verde reservoir the Wright Paleohydrological Institute has
surveyed. Two are mesa top reservoirs: Far View Reservoir (also known
as Mummy Lake) on Chapin Mesa (A.D. 950-1180), and Sagebrush
Reservoir on an unnamed mesa west of Chapin Mesa (A.D. 950-1100).
The third is a canyon-bottom reservoir, Morefield Reservoir in
Morefield Canyon (A.D. 750-1100).
We pass through Morefield Canyon and wind over tricky
switchbacks into Prater Canyon.
Our first view of Box Elder Reservoir, site 5MV4505, is from high
on the Prater Canyon ridge. No doubt about it. There's a big berm
We see
on the channel side of a circular-shaped landform.
burned/ghostly white box elder trees in the channel at the upper end
of the reservoir site.
This may be an "intellectual day" for some of us, but Doug Ramsey
and Dick Wiltshire get right to work on setting up the drill rig and start
drilling and extruding cores-they're at it all day with the help of
Ernie Pemberton, formerly head of the Bureau of Reclamation's
Sedimentation Branch; John Rold, former Colorado State Geologist;
and David Breternitz, retired archeologist.
Bobbie has sharp eyes. She spots a sheer-white small and elegantly
shaped arrowhead lying on the south slope of the berm.
We set out with archeologistJim Kleidon to find P-I and P-I sites in
the vicinity of the reservoir. We walk up the west slope of the canyon
to the north end of the reservoir site. We find a P-II site (900-1100).
Jim explains that the potsherds we see all over the ground are pottery
pieces of P-II black and white and corrugated pottery. This is site
5MV3159.
Bobbie finds what we call a "hammer stone." It's made out of
igneous rock and has a chipped out portion in the center for tying on
a handle. It is broken, split right down the middle from top to bottom.
We examine with awe this tool of 1,100 years ago, and put it back in
place.
We return to the surface of the reservoir body-now just a large
mound because of sedimentation over the centuries. The soil experts
are excited. They point to cored material that is clearly the result of
sediment transport and compression within the reservoir body. The
cores taken so far are down to 11 feet.
Ken signals we are going back over the ridge to Morefield Canyon.
Terri Ohlson and Jack Smith have hiked over the ridge between Prater
Canyon and Morefield Canyon-to the east-to see how long it takes
to walk between the two reservoirs.
Driving up the bottom of Morefield Canyon, we see Terri and Jack
walking up the road towards us. They've proved the point. Even
though they found, then lost, the ancient Anasazi trail near the top of
the ridge, it took only an hour and a quarter to cross over. Forty-five
minutes probably would do it for those familiar with the trail-and
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strong from constantly walking where they needed or wanted to go-a
thousand years ago.
We see the Morefield Reservoir mound, site 5MV1931. Ken and
Ruth, with the help of Jack Smith, conducted field investigations here
in October 1995, May 1996, and May 1997, excavating an exploratory
trench with a permit from the Park Service.
The mound is 200 feet in diameter, rises 16 feet above the valley
floor, is 21 feet deep, and has a long berm-looking structure extending
from it north up the valley floor. The whole thing looks like an
inverted frying pan. Soil samples and potsherds showed that clay and
sand were carried into the reservoir from the stream channel.
The Anasazi mucked out the sediment as best they could, throwing
the material onto a growing embankment. The clay sealed the bottom
of the reservoir from leakage. The mound rose over the centuries, so
what probably began as a hole dug into the channel to intercept
shallow groundwater became on off-channel reservoir as the
intermittent streambed routed itself around a rising embankment.
To get water into the reservoir required a feeder ditch/canal.
Bobbie and I walk up the elevated berm-like structure from the
reservoir north. The stream channel is to our west. We clearly see
large numerous stones lying at the surface-the size of a large cowboy
hat, and larger. They are aligned and clearly appear to have been
placed, not washed in. Here is evidence of the ditch/canal structure
cutting northward to intercept the stream channel!
Bobbie and Ken (who has joined us) walk back and forth among
the stones, showing me the canal's alignment. 1,400 feet of it!
Ken says there was no irrigation used here. This was a drinking
water supply. The Anasazi at Mesa Verde were dry land farmers, using
valley bottom alluvial land and terraces to grow their corn, storing it in
nearby granaries they built of rock. They knew of droughts. They
tried to keep up to two years of corn in storage.
The potsherds in the reservoir trench showed the Anasazi dipped
the water out and carried it away in waterjars, which sometimes broke
in the effort to bring water back to their families. Deer antlers, sticks,
and baskets were used to muck out the reservoir.
There's a great kiva near the Morefield Reservoir. House ruins in
the vicinity show a population of nearly 500 people. They must have
been proud of their reservoir, and very worried that it took so much
work to keep it scooped out and to lengthen the canal. As the berm
grew, they had to shift their diversion point again and again to
intercept the shifting stream channel. They must have prayed for the
rain to come and the water to enter the canal without washing it out.
I have with me a copy of the Wright Final Report of the Morefield
Reservoir investigation, dated January 1998. It has a chart of tree ring
data that show an annual average precipitation of 18 inches per year
from 800 to 1100 A.D.-not much different from today in the Mesa
Verde region, but there were good wet years and droughts. The
Anasazi farmers, like today's, always perched between a sudden flood
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and enduring scarcity. The reservoir likely operated from 750 to 1100
A.D.
It's getting near to lunch, and we better get back to Prater Canyon!
A tailgate lunch with a famished crew is what we enjoy. The Boise
State University history professor from Idaho, Todd Shallat, peppers
the sandwiches and canned ice tea with questions: "Did the ducks fly in
to sit on the reservoir water and the Anasazi eat them?" Archeologist
David Breternitz answers they ate the corn they grew and turkeys they
kept. But, what about the ducks? says Todd. (Bobbie and I saw duckheaded petroglyphs on several hikes to Grand Gulch twenty years
ago-Todd is onto something).
After lunch, Jim Kleidon leads us down canyon and we climb a
southeast-facing slope. The rocks of house structures and the sink spot
of kivas are clearly visible. Potsherds dot the landscape.
Site
5MV3146. Jim did the post-Bircher fire survey of the ruins, identifying
previously hidden additional houses and where they needed to be
protected against erosion. Ute Indian teams then came in to place
protective checks to divert water away from them. 275 new sites found
at Mesa Verde after the fire!
Jim shows us how the houses were aligned west to east with the
kivas dug on the south side. The midden-or waste pile-is down
slope. These are the archeological treasure houses that reveal the
discarded tools of a people working to survive in a hard but familiar
homeplace.
We can see how they perched themselves on the southeast-facing
slopes to take advantage of the light and warmth a winter-sinking sun
parcels out to those who seek it well.
Jim says the large P-1I community here-though smaller than the
population of Morefield Canyon-probably was home to 300 people.
We spend hours marveling at the privilege of a dawning
understanding. These were smart people who used the native
materials-and their craft at making clay and stone tools-to grow and
store corn and conserve water to survive and live. Their places of
prayer, the kivas, could also have served as winter homes, out of the
wind and cold.
We arrive back to the Box Elder core-drilling. Dick Wiltshire and
Doug Ramsey have been prodigious workers! The soil samples in long
rows are spread out on a white sheet and boxed for later lab analysis of
the reservoir profile, as best it can be determined from the cores, to
show how deep and for how long this water body served these people.
At 4:00 p.m. we pile our sore feet and wind-chapped faces back
into the vehicles and unpile at the Comfort Inn. A short snooze, wake
to dinner at the Mexican Fiesta, and retire to a fiery western sky. Day
one is done, the intellectual day, bundled up to our persistent
memories.
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May 3, 2003
Same clock radio goes on at the same time, 5:00 a.m., breakfast at
6:00 a.m., depart at 7:00 a.m. These engineers know how to organize a
survey!
The "heavy lifters" are here. They turn out to be young people,
strong and confident. They will do the hand augering and handle the
precise surveying and global positioning instruments. They include
engineers, geologists, biologists, and hydrologists: Jason Alexander,
Eric Bikis, Chris Brown, David Foss, Pete Foster, Matt Gavin, Kurt
Loptien, and Ryan Unterreiner.
Dr. Mary Gillam, a Quaternary geologist and soils stratification
expert, alsojoins the team.
Ken announces the assignments for this day's work on the Prater
Canyon Box Elder Reservoir survey. Peter Monkmeyer, Chairman of
the Civil Engineering Department, University of Wisconsin-who was
with us yesterday-will team up with Jason to see whether hand
augering in the channel bottom will reveal groundwater.
The
surveyors will determine the channel parameters and locate natural
and cultural features, the building blocks of an accurate map. The
soils and sedimentation experts will ascertain the depth of the
reservoir and the variety of its deposits. The archeologists will confirm
the identity of cultural features and artifacts.
Greg will work with Jim Kleidon and Ernie Pemberton to identify
the diversion point and canal alignment, if evidence of a canal can be
found. Bobbie will accompany Eric Bikis and Jack Smith to fix, by
GPS, the location of special cultural artifacts, like those Bobbie found
yesterday. Jack will then accompany Jason in the afternoon to the
abandoned Prater Brothers' homestead sites up the canyon, to auger
for groundwater in the abandoned wells.
Ruth will continue photographing the work of all the teams, and
Ken and Terri will continue with overall coordination and logistics.
Todd will press his questions. He is editing the Wright report on the
four Mesa Verde reservoirs for publication in a professional journal
later this year.
We are at full strength and eager to get to work! At Prater Canyon
we rivet and disperse to our assignments.
I set out with Jim and Ernie, walking north of the reservoir body.
We have the map of the October 2002 field survey of the Wright
Paleohydrological Institute, which this day's work will supplement. We
check out "Ernie's ditch alignment." Ernie has hypothesized an
alignment that takes us on a northern path from the reservoir's body
onto an alluvial fan of material washed down from the canyon walls
over the centuries.
Will we find cultural evidence similar to that in Morefield Canyon
along the trace of an ancient ditch to a diversion point on the stream?
Finding evidence will be difficult. It looks like a thousand years of
washed-down soil has buried whatever may have been.
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Approximately a hundred yards north of the reservoir's upper end,
we encounter a gully that cuts the alluvial fan with a slice towards the
channel. We see the tops of stones aligned in an up-canyon direction!
Jim thinks they may have been placed there-tentative evidence of
ditch reinforcement and demarcation. We walk on.
Thirty feet farther on we see a number of large stones flanking the
western slope of the stream channel. Ken and Ruth join us. We show
them this stone grouping. Jim lights up. He is finding P-I gray ware
shards on the embankment. Large stones apparently arranged for
erosion control, and potsherds-this is physical evidence of ditch/
embankment armoring. Similar to Morefield Canyon, here in Prater
Canyon is proof of an off-channel reservoir and canal-carefully
tended water features operating at the same time in two canyons by
people who could easily communicate and learn from each other by
walking over the ridge.
Jim and I walk straight on. We find more scattered stones, too
large to have been washed here, how many more are buried beneath?
We reach the channel just below its confluence with a tributary
channel running in from the northeast. Here's the likely diversion
point into the canal.
We walk west up the main channel among the box elder trees. No
more large placed stones on the bank, not a one! Jim and I believe we
have confirmed that Ernie's tentative canal alignment is matched with
on-the-ground cultural proof. We leave the gradient check to the
surveyors (the Morefield canal had a one-percent gradient running
from the diversion point to the reservoir).
Now we need to find the habitations of people who could have
built and maintained this reservoir and canal. It's got to be a P-I site,
as all the sherdsJim found along the ditch alignment were P-1. Nearby
is a P-I1 site on the western canyon slope; there's another P-I1 site
directly across on the eastern slope. Where's the P-I?
We climb up the western canyon wall. Jim is thinking out loud. P-I
sites could be buried beneath the P-II structures, including the large
down-canyon village we visited yesterday.
We climb to a site that perches way up near the top of the western
canyon wall. Jim surveyed this site after the 2000 Bircher fire. Site
5MV3190. It's a glorious spot with a comprehensive view of the
reservoir below and a southeast facing down-canyon view. We find
many P-I sherds matching the type Jim found along the canal
alignment.
We look directly out on the reservoir site below where the drill
crew is busy drilling cores and laying out the telling proof of how these
people stored their drinking water. I can see the paths those people
walked, carrying their water pots, to fill them when the water was
there, returning to their lofty homes in the sun. And how they must
have thirsted when the reservoir was near-empty, watching and waiting
for the skies to drop the weight of clouds into their storage bowl!
Jim and I see Bobbie walking amongst the ruins down below us.
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We join her. She's been to a P-II site across the canyon with Jack
Smith. They found an axe! Now she is looking for the hammer stone
she found the day before. Jim and I recall it being at the P-II site
northwest of the reservoir at the edge of the burned-out forest.
Bobbie finds the hammer stone again! The site marker reads
5MV3159. I go get Eric from the reservoir site. He locks in the
coordinates with his global positioning unit.
N37 14.471
W 108 25.214
Elevation 7289-hammer stone.
We go back to the reservoir berm to position in the arrowhead
lying where Bobbie found it yesterday, site 5MV4505.
N37 14.585
W 108 25.228
Elevation 7289-arrowhead.
We go across canyon to the P-II ruins on the east side of the
channel downstream from the reservoir where the axe head is lying.
Site 5MV3033. We lock it in.
N37 14.471
W 108 25.214
Elevation 7257-axe.
It's lunchtime at the tailgates!
At lunch, Ken asks Greg and Bobbie if they will accompany Jason
up to the Prater Brother homesteads for groundwater testing. The
hand auguring in the vicinity of the reservoir, down to 10 feet, has not
reached ground water. Will augering at the old well sites up-canyon
show and ground water?
Jack Smith had planned to go withJason, but isn't feeling well. It's
a two-mile hike each way.
Jack briefs us before we start off. Brothers Albert and William
Prater had adjacent homesteads in the canyon between 1900-before
Mesa Verde National Park was created (1906)-to the late 1920s when
the Park bought them out. They grazed cattle and sheep. In 1974,
Jack tested the water in the lower Prater well. It was about ten feet
from the surface.
We hike up-canyon on an old road that disappears half way up.
The canyon is lined on the east side with beautiful rim rock. We spot
the first green tree-likely a Douglas fir-we've seen in Prater or
Morefield Canyons in two days. The 2000 Bircher fire was devastating.
We pass the lower well. The windmill structure, without its turning
wheel, stands forlornly in the middle of a deserted field. We reach the
upper Prater homestead site. Two busted windmill wheels lie apart
from each other. We see the charred remains of wooden foundations
and fence posts. The well has caved in, forming an open pit about
four feet deep, so Jason has a good start at the augering. Site
5MV3129, Middle Well.
He reaches a depth from surface of 10 ft. 8 inches. We hear a
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sucking noise as Jason pulls out a core of peat-he's gone through
quite a bit of it-but no groundwater, just a heap of moist peat.
The day is growing late, and we need to be back by 4 p.m. to the
vehicles, so we don't have time to test in the vicinity of site 5MV2896,
Lower Well.
When we return to the reservoir site we learn that the coring work
has shown that that the reservoir is 20 feet deep-very close to the
depth of the Morefield Reservoir.
The wind has been lashing us all afternoon, and we are exhausted.
The core drilling team is still at work when we leave with Terri, Jack,
and Peter. We join the group for dinner at 7 p.m., but Ken is worried.
Jack Smith doesn't show for dinner.
May 4, 2003
We arrive for the wrap-up symposium on Chapin Mesa at the
Recreation Hall in the old CCC camp. We learn that Jack slipped and
fell last night and is still in the hospital recuperating. To our great
relief, apparently he's all right.
The teams report their findings. Archeologist David Breternitz,
Professor Emeritus, Archeology Department, University of Colorado,
sums up. We have confirmed that Box Elder Reservoir is a P-I site in
Prater Canyon, the construction of which commenced somewhat later
than the Morefield Reservoir. Both were in operation at the same
time, although the Morefield Canyon Reservoir was longer-lived.
Plainly the people in both canyons were in communication and
learned from each other. Because the great kiva is in Morefield
Canyon-David says the people from Prater Canyon "probably went to
church over there."
Ken thanks all the members of the team for their work and says
that a written report of the findings and a map will follow.
We say goodbye to each other, knowing we have shared a great
privilege, to see-on their ground-how the organizational skills of
these Pueblo people helped them live in a harsh environment they
probably loved for its elevated light.
Bobbie and Greg visit the Chapin Mesa Museum and the Far View
Reservoir and villages on their way out of the Park.
Like Sagebrush Reservoir, Far View Reservoir is on top of a mesa
Instead, it
and was not fed by an intermittent stream channel.
intercepted rainstorm runoff from compacted soils and perhaps a
collection ditch. You can see an inlet structure to the reservoir that
likely conveyed water, and a separate set of stairs for the people to dip
their water pots.
Driving out of the Park at the top of Prater Canyon, we see a big
turkey cross the road right in front of us and head down through the
burned-out oak brush. These faithful life-sustaining birds the Anasazi
domesticated are still here! We hear this pilgrim sounding off for a
good five minutes before disappearing across a high meadow into the
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skeleton forest beyond.
We wind down out of the Park. Good views of the Mancos River
bottom lands below, where farmers are planting this year's crops.
On the way home, we visit the BLM's Anasazi Heritage Center
outside of Dolores. We see a photograph of David Breternitz on the
wall! We've been in the company of famous archeologists these past
two days.
We drive over Lizard Head Pass through Telluride, up and over
the Dallas Divide, the glorious SanJuan and Uncompahgre Mountains
surround us.
It's snowing on Vail Pass. We arrive home Sunday night after 11
p.m. The lights of Denver are a long way from the silent mound of the
Box Elder Reservoir. And we are glad, so glad, to have its location and
purpose fixed in the context of the long-yet still unfoldingcommunity of Colorado.

PUEBLO PEOPLE OF MESA VERDE
You want to know where water's precious,
Where every scoop of dirt's a prayer of life;
And tomorrow's blessing-carried in a pot
Of clay is a source of wonder up a slope
A thousand years away-perch upon
A buried kiva's rim and take within the
Arcing southeast sun this light they sawYou see-and may you keep this light
Within and speak it openly;
They worked and loved, like we, this
Land, this calling, this Mesa Verde.
Greg Hobbs
5/2-4/2003
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I. INTRODUCTION.
Colorado is a semi-arid state. On average, fewer than fifteen
inches of precipitation falls in an average year and less in drought
years. In 2002, Colorado experienced its most severe single-year
drought on record.2 Stream flows statewide were the lowest in over
100 years, and tree ring data suggest flows were probably the lowest in
300 to 500 years.3 In response to these conditions, Colorado
lawmakers considered forty-three water bills and resolutions-many
aimed at drought relief.4 This article considers one of the
consequences of six water-related bills the legislature actually enacted:
an increase in state agencies' authority over water rights
administration and development It is unlikely the General Assembly
1. JAMES N. CORBRIDGE, JR. & TERESA A. RiCE, VRANESH'S COLORADO WATER LAW
§ 1.2 (rev. ed. 1999).
2. Nancy Lofholm, Mclnnis Rejects Governor's Water-Storage Pitch, DENVER POST, July
24, 2003, at B3.
3.
OF

DANIEL F. LuEcKE ET AL., WHAT THE CURRENT DROUGHT MEANS FOR THE FUTURE
WATER
MANAGEMENT
IN
COLORADO
5
(2003),

http://www.cotrout.org/DroughtReport/reportl.03.htm
(asserting the
current
drought is the most severe on record "by several measures", including current and
multiple year streamflows).
4. See generally H.R. 03-1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); Colo.
H.R. 03-1003; Colo. H.R. 03-1005; Colo. H.R. 03-1008; Colo. H.R. 03-1090; Colo. H.R.
03-1092; Colo. H.R. 03-1100; Colo. H.R. 03-1113; Colo. H.R. 03-1120; Colo. H.R1 031146; Colo. H.R. 03-1195; Colo. H.R. 03-1233; Colo. H.R. 03-1280; Colo. H.R. 03-1318;
Colo. H.R. 03-1320; Colo. H.R. 03-1324; Colo. S. 03-045; Colo. S. 03-047; Colo. S. 03073; Colo. S. 03-085; Colo. S. 03-087; Colo. S. 03-090; Colo. S. 03-110; Colo. S. 03-115;
Colo. S. 03-126; Colo. S. 03-181; Colo. S. 03-236; Colo. S. 03-276; Colo. S. 03-278; Colo.
S. 03-311; Colo. S. 03-313; Colo. S. 03-319; Colo. S. 03-346; Colo. H.RJ. Res. 03-1007;
Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1008; Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1011; Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1015; Colo.
H.R.J. Res. 03-1017; Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1019; Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1046; Colo. H.R.J.
Res. 03-1048; S.J. Res. 03-007; H.R. Concurrent Res. 03-1009.
5. See generally Colo. H.R. 03-1001 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3795-109, 37-86-104, 37-87-101, 37-60-126, 37-92-308); Colo. S. 03-073 (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-308, 37-90-103, 37-92-103, 37-90-137, 37-92305); Colo. H.R. 03-1318 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-80.5-102,
-103, -104, -104.5, -105, -106); Colo. H.R. 03-1320 (codified as amended at COLO. REV.
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would have enacted so many bills related to water rights administration
and water development had the drought not been so severe.
Four of the General Assembly's 2003 resolutions reflect the
magnitude of the drought, the political pressure the drought created,
and the reasons the legislature took such dramatic steps. Through
these resolutions, the legislature called on citizens, municipalities, the
state government, and even Congress to help address the crisis the
drought created.
Even a cursory review of the resolutions highlights the legislature's
concerns. Calling for a reduction in the amount of water used for
landscaping, the General Assembly recognized that "[w]ater demands
imposed by traditional landscaping... result in an unreasonable and
unnecessary burden on future water resources."6 The General
Assembly also adopted a resolution endorsing ten principles designed
to guide State water policy making, particularly regarding transbasin
diversions.7 In calling upon Congress to adopt federal legislation to
§ 37-83-105); Colo. H.R 03-1334 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309);
Colo. S. 03-236 (adding COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-201, -210; amending §§ 37-60-106,
37-95-103, -107, -107.5, 37-95-116).
6. Colo. H.IJ. Res. 03-1015.
7.
(1) All Colorado water users must share in solving Colorado's water resource
problems.
(2) The State of Colorado should provide assistance, when requested, for
local water supply planning and assist in the implementation of consensusbased water resource solutions that respect local authorities, private property,
and water rights.
(3) During the process of planning to meet future needs, water suppliers and
utilities should give preference to development of economically viable local
water sources and demand management as they consider other options,
including development of new water transfers.
(4) Additional water storage should be pursued through the improvement
and rehabilitation of existing structures and the development of new
structures. These activities should be accomplished with local consensus.
(5) The right of water rights owners to market their water rights must be
protected in the following ways:
(a) Colorado must fully explore flexible, market-based approaches to
water supply management, including interruptible water contracts, water
banking, in-state water leasing, and groundwater recharge management.
(b) Those seeking to transfer agricultural water to another use should
consider leasing or other temporary arrangements for transfer of water,
rather than relying exclusively on the purchase of water rights. Leasing
or other such temporary arrangements could allow for reversion of the
water to agricultural purposes under certain conditions.
(c) In the event that agricultural water is transferred, the transaction
must adequately address the need for maintaining the existing tax base,
protecting the remaining water rights in the area, and maintaining the
proper stewardship of the land, including revegetation and weed
control.
(6) Appropriate recognition should be given to preservation of flows
necessary to support recreational, hydroelectric, and environmental needs
concurrent with development of water for beneficial consumptive uses.
(7) Adverse economic, environmental, and social impacts of future water
projects and water transfers should be minimized; unavoidable adverse
impacts must be reasonably mitigated; all communities involved should
commit themselves to identifying and implementing reasonable mitigation
measures as an integral part of future water projects or transfers.
STAT.
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control tamarisk-an invasive phreatophyte species that consumes
large quantities of water in the riparian systems where it grows-the
General Assembly reminded its audience that "water consumption in
Colorado due to the tamarisk... may exceed 250,000 acre-feet per
year; and ... Colorado is currently experiencing the worst drought in
modern history."' Finally, the General Assembly supported the
Secretary of Interior's decision to enforce the Interim Surplus
Guidelines under the Colorado River Compact, and prohibit
California from taking more than its 4.4 million acre-feet allocation of
Colorado River water.9 Again, the General Assembly recognized that
"the past 4 years of drought, culminating in the record-setting parched
conditions of 2002, have touched every region of the State of
Colorado; [w]ater shortages... have reached crisis proportions."0
Certainly, drought was much on the minds of Colorado legislators.
These resolutions, however, did not alter Colorado's system of
water rights administration and development. Even with these
recommendations, legislators faced another burden: Colorado's courtbased water allocation system can be inadequate for responding to
severe drought conditions in a timely manner." Lawmakers realized
they needed to increase the flexibility and speed of the system for
more effective drought response.12 Therefore, to solve both short and
long-term problems caused by Colorado's drought cycles, state
legislators set out to integrate increased flexibility and speed into water
rights administration and development."3
The legislature's response is remarkable because increasing state
agency authority over water rights administration and development
runs counter to Colorado's traditional hands-off approach in
managing water resources.
Since the late nineteenth century,
Colorado has maintained a court-based system for water rights
determination. 4 The 2003 legislation attempts to streamline processes
to increase the overall efficiency of water rights administration, but
also gives a state agency the power to make determinations in matters
(8) Future water supply solutions must benefit both the area of origin and
the area of use.
(9) Water conservation measures that do not injure other water rights should
be aggressively pursued.
(10) There must be an ongoing, concerted effort to educate all Coloradans
on the importance of water, and the need to conserve, manage, and plan for
the needs of this and future generations.
Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1019.
8. Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1048.
9. Colo. S.J. Res. 03-007.
10. Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1019.
11. Judicial proceedings necessary to obtain a new water right or to change the use
of an existing water right can range in length among water divisions from six months
to two years or more. Telephone Interview by A. Lain Strawn with Stuart Corbridge,
Judicial Clerk, Division One Water Court, Greeley, Colo. (Aug. 10, 2003).
12. See generally Colo. H.R.J. Res. 03-1019.
13. Arthur Kane, Owens Announces South Platte Well Deal, Touts Water Legislation,
DENVER POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at Al (early edition).
14. CoLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-203 (2002).
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previously reserved to the courts.'" Similarly, the State has played a
limited role in water development because so many other entities have
had the power and responsibility to provide water to those entitled to
its use. The federal government, private interests, quasi-governmental
entities like water districts, and municipalities have facilitated water
project planning, financing, and development.' 6 The output of the
2003 legislative session, however, suggests that the legislature is
interested in seeing the executive branch take on a much more active
role in Colorado's water development.
This article examines the legislature's actions relating to both
water rights administration and water development. Part II considers
water rights administration in Colorado, provides an overview of the
state engineer's traditional role, discusses the suite of 2003 legislative
enactments that increase the state engineer's powers, and outlines the
possible implications of these changes for the future of water
administration in Colorado. Part III considers the State's changing
role in water development. This section first examines existing
entities-federal and local-that have played a role in water
development in Colorado. This section then compares and contrasts
the historic role of both the Colorado Water Conservation Board
("CWCB") and the Colorado Water and Power Development Authority
("the Authority") with the expanded role these agencies will play in
future water development projects. Finally, this section analyzes
whether the recent legislation represents an incremental change in
state agency authority in response to the drought or a more significant
shift in the balances of power for water development.
H. LEGISLATURE EXPANDS AUTHORITY OF STATE ENGINEER
Colorado, alone among states using the prior appropriation system
to allocate rights to use water, relies exclusively on a court-based
system of determining these water rights. During the 2003 legislative
session, however, the state engineer received new authorities that go
beyond the traditional administrative role and allow agency
determinations of injury to others holding water rights.

A. THE HISTORICAL BALANCE OF POWER BETWEEN COLORADO'S WATER
COURTS AND STATE ENGINEER

The State included the prior appropriation doctrine for water
allocation into its Constitution in 1876."' Developed in the California
mining camps of the 1850s, the doctrine recognizes water rights in
15. See, e.g., Colo. H.RIJ. Res. 03-1019 para. (5)(b) (The 2003 legislation embodies
mechanisms to increase speed and overall efficiency of water administration especially
in times of drought).
16. See CHARLES F. WIL.INSON, CROSSING THE NEXT MERIDIAN: LAND, WATER, AND
THE FuTURE OFTHE WEST 231, 241, 274 (1992).
17. SeeS. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., secs. 1, 14-15 (Colo. 2003); S. 03236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., secs. 1, 4-6 (Colo. 2003).
18. COLO. CONST. art. XVI, §§ 5-6.
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priority ("first in time, first in right") for diversions of water from the
natural system to beneficial use elsewhere, so long as the water
continues to be used' 9 ("use it or lose it"). Six years later, the
Colorado Supreme Court, in Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Company,
affirmed prior appropriation as the state's system for allocating water
rights. In Coffin, the court explained that diverted waters "acquire[] a
value unknown in moister climates. Instead of being a mere incident
to the soil, [water] rises, when appropriated, to the dignity of a
distinct.., right of property. " 2' As a result, water users have a property
right to use water protected through a complex court-based scheme of
water rights determinations. 2 Thus, notwithstanding a companion
constitutional declaration that Colorado's water is a public resource,
water users themselves, individually and in groups, effectively
developed both their water rights and a legal system for the protection
interest.2 3
of water rights in a manner that did not consider the public
Traditionally, water users have viewed state governmental
interference with the appropriation of Colorado's water resources,
other than for purposes of administration, as "completely inconsistent
with the constitutionally mandated doctrine of prior appropriation. "24
While a state official, the state engineer, has administered water rights
virtually since statehood, 5 the state engineer's role has not significantly
In 1969, the Colorado General Assembly
changed over time.
revamped how the State would implement the prior appropriation
system, and clarified the state engineer's authority over administration
of water resources. 6 Since the 1969 Act, there have been only
relatively modest changes to the state engineer's authority. 7 However,
19. CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 7, 8.
20. 6 Colo. 443, 447 (1882). The Left Hand Ditch Company built a ditch to
irrigate crops some distance from the river. Subsequently, George Coffin purchased
land adjacent to the river and sought to use the water for irrigation. The court upheld
the Ditch Company's superior claim to the water, thus choosing a prior appropriation
system of water administration rather than a riparian system.
21.

Id. at 446.

22. It is necessary to distinguish ownership of a water right from ownership of the
water itself. The property right recognized by the court is not a right to the water
itself, but rather a right to divert a decreed amount of water subject to a water user's
priority. Title to the water is public, therefore the water user has a usufructuary right
to the water. See COLO. CONST. art. XVI, § 5.

23. See Aspen Wilderness Workshop, Inc. v. Colo. Water Conservation Bd., 901 P.2d
1251, 1263 (Colo. 1995) (Mullarkey, J., dissenting) (Colorado Supreme Court has
never recognized the public trust doctrine with respect to water).
24.

GregoryJ. Hobbs, Jr. & Bennett W. Raley, Water Rights Protection in Water Quality

Law, 60 U. COLO. L. REv. 841,886 (1989).
25. Act of Mar. 5, 1881, 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 119. Administration of court
ordered decrees was achieved by water commissioners in Colorado's seventy water
districts. The commissioners had the authority to administer calls on the basis of
priority dates, check headgates and maintain records of diversions. The state engineer
also approved reservoir design safety and metering temporary exchanges. See COLO.
RaV. STAT. §§ 148-15-1 to -12 (1963); § 37-87-105 (2002); §§ 37-83-101 to -106 (1973).
26. See Water Rights Determination and Administration Act of 1969, COLO. REV.
STAT. §§ 37-92-101 to -602 (2002).
27. Colorado State Engineer Hal Simpson, Keynote Address at the Colorado Bar
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the current drought appears to have motivated lawmakers to delegate
increased authority to the state engineer, thereby increasing the
overall flexibility of Colorado's water rights system.
In order to understand the changes made to the role of the state
engineer in 2003, however, an overview of the traditional means of
administering and determining water rights through water courts and
the state engineer, and the relationship between them, is instructive.
1. Water Courts
In Colorado, the legislature has given the judiciary the job of
adjudicating water rights.
In so doing, the General Assembly
intended to optimize the efficiency of water allocation and ensure the
certainty of water rights. Since the courts identify decreed rights with
specificity as to their amount and priority, and establish a means of
protecting the vested rights of water users from injury by others, the
State can ensure "maximum" utilization of its scarce resource and
water users can operate with certainty that they will be able to use
water at specific times subject only to the seniority of their water
right.2
One of the long-standing tasks delegated to the water courts is
determining whether material injury to an existing right is likely to
result from a proposed application for a new water right, a change to
an existing water right, an augmentation plan, or an exchange. 30
Injury exists if a senior water right holder proves, with evidence
demonstrating more than potential injury, that the new right will
materially affect a senior user's ability to use its decreed water."'
Although an applicant may offer conditions designed to prevent
injury, the water judge ultimately determines whether an application,
with appropriate conditions, will cause material injury to senior water
rights. 2 Even after the court issues a decree, a party potentially
injured may return to argue injury anew. To allow for consideration of
unforeseen injuries, the water court retains jurisdiction over a case to
re-visit the material injury question after the applicant actually uses the
new or changed right.33
Association's Retrospective of the Water Rights Determination and Administration Act
of 1969 (Oct. 8, 2003).
28. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 37-92-203 (2002).
29. See Fellhauer v. People, 447 P.2d 986, 994 (Colo. 1969); Colorado Water Rights
Determination and Administration Act of 1969 (codified as CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-92-

101 to -602); id. § 37-92-501(2).
30. Green v. Chaffee Ditch Co., 371 P.2d 775, 783 (Colo. 1962) ("material injury"
and "injuriously affected" standards used interchangeably); City of Colorado Springs v.
Yust, 249 P.2d 151, 154 (1952).
31. Brighton Ditch Co. v. City of Englewood, 237 P.2d 116, 120 (Colo. 1951); see
Fellhauer,447 P.2d at 991 (Colo. 1969).
32. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-305(3) (2002).
33. Id. § 37-92-304(6).
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The process of obtaining a water court decree can take months, if
not years. One court official estimated that on average, it takes at least
six months and as many as two ears before the court issues a decree
Contested cases often take even
for an unopposed application.
longer. Because of the complexity of even "typical" water rights
adjudications, the discovery and disclosure periods are highly variable
and can last for months. Moreover, while the statutes governing water
rights determination do impose certain deadlines within the process,
other steps have no time limitations.3 5
2. The State Engineer
The role of the state engineer remained relatively constant from
1889 to 1963.6 The state engineer enforced the court's water rights
decrees and performed a few tasks collateral to water rights
administration, such as approving designs for reservoir safety 7 and
water users.3 As
exchanges between
metering temporary
technological advancements of the 1950s and 1960s enabled well
drilling into Colorado's alluvial aquifers, the legislature expanded the
state engineer's administrative duties to include the administration of
both surface and tributary ground water diversions. 9
34. Telephone Interview by A. Lain Strawn with Stuart Corbridge, Judicial Clerk,
Division One Water Court, Greeley, Colo. (Aug. 11, 2003). Rule 11 of the Uniform
Local Rules for All State Water Court Divisions provides general guidelines once an
application is filed, providing that a case is "at issue" ninety days after either the entry
of order of re-referral, or a filing of protest to a ruling of the referee, whichever is
earlier, unless the water court directs otherwise. Unif. Local R for All State Water Ct.
Divs. 11, para. (a). If the water court directs otherwise, the time-period for filing a
proposed Case Management Order shall be no later than 75 days after a case is at
issue. Id. at para. (b). The timeframes established by the Case Management Order
are highly variable with no recommendations provided by the water court. The Order
contains the trial date, the disclosure and discovery schedule as agreed upon by the
parties, the time-frame for identifying persons, documents, and tangible things,
joining additional parties, amending pleadings, making pre-trial motions, and
discussing settlements.
35. Telephone Interview, Corbridge, supra note 34. For example, no time
limitation applies to cases that return to the water judge for resolution either because
a party sought re-referral or protested the referee's ruling.
36. See generally 1881 Colo. Sess. Laws 120-22 (enumerating engineer's duties upon
creation of the position); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 147-11-1 to -21 (1953) (enumerating
duties as of 1953).
37. COLO. REv. STAT. § 147-11-3 (1953).
38. Id. § 147-6-5 (1953).
39. Act of May 3, 1965, ch. 318, 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1244. Attempts to administer
non-tributary groundwater also appeared during this time, but due to its unique status
both hydrologically and legally, it is beyond the scope of this article; the water court's
determination entitling junior appropriators to historic return flows also expanded
the role of the state engineer. See Fort Lyon Canal Co. v. Chew, 81 P. 37, 41 (Colo.
1905); Enlarged Southside Irrigation Ditch Co. v. John's Flood Ditch Co., 183 P.2d
552, 554 (Colo. 1947); Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 272
P.2d 629, 632 (Colo. 1954).
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When the General Assembly revamped Colorado's existing water
rights administration system in 1969, it codified many of the state
engineer's expanded responsibilities and reorganized his office.4 1 Still,
the 1969 Act did not expand the role of the state engineer beyond
administration. For example, the state engineer grants well permits
The state
but does not determine the water right for the well."
engineer tabulates all of the water rights and their relative priorities,
and once a decade proposes to the water court a list of potentially
abandoned water rights, but the water court ultimately approves the
abandonment list and tabulations.42 While the state engineer enjoys
the authority to promulgate regulations for integrating well and
surface diversions, if the regulations are contested (which invariably
happens), the water court determines their validity.4
B.

GENERAL ASSEMBLY GRANTS STATE ENGINEER AUTHORITY TO MAKE
DETERMINATIONS OF MATERIAL INJURY AND APPROVE TRANSACTIONS

Several events caused the recent deluge of water legislation. The
2002 drought, the likelihood of future drought cycles, and Colorado's
population explosion-which has placed increased pressure on the
state's limited water resources-together created a need for a political,
and therefore legislative, response to Colorado's water supply
problems. Moreover, the drought highlighted the water courts'
inability to respond quickly to water user needs during drought
conditions. It is interesting to examine the water legislation passed in
2003 for the extent to which the new laws increased the state
engineer's powers over water administration and determination of
water rights. The drought was a catalyst for the Colorado General
Assembly to move Colorado's system one step away from its traditional,
"pure" court-based system of water resources determination towards a
more flexible system in which state administrative agencies, rather
than the courts, make determinations of water rights.
Specifically, House Bill 1318 creates water banks, which allow the
state engineer to approve temporary water transfers without formal
House Bill 1320
changes in ownership requiring adjudication."
to the CWCB to
water
right
a
diversionary
to
lend
permits a water user
protect junior instream flow rights during a season in which the
governor has declared a drought or other emergency pursuant to the
House Bill 1334 allows for
approval of the state engineer. 45
interruptible water supply agreements-option contracts between two
or more water rights holders that allow for the transfer of historic
40. See generally Water Right Determination and Administration Act of 1969, ch.
373, 1969 Colo. Sess. Laws 1200; COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-92-306,-401 (1)(b)(VI), 37-90137 (2002).
41. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-137, 37-92-305(6) (2002).
42. Id. § 37-92-401(1)(a), (6), (7).
43. Id. § 37-92-501.
44. H.R 03-1318, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
45. Colo. H.R. 03-1320.
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consumptive use to a different use or place of use, again with the
approval of the state engineer. 46 Finally, Senate Bill 73 provides a
limited bridge for water users along the South Platte to continue
pumping their wells out-of-priority and House Bill 1001 expands the
state engineer's authority to approve substitute supply plans ("SSPs")
statewide.
1. Water Banks
House Bill 1318 allows water banking throughout Colorado. 48 A
water bank enables willing water owners to deposit water in the "bank"
for lease to willing "lessees" on a short-term basis.4 9 A water bank gives
those interested in fallowing their fields for a season the option of
receiving rental payments for their water without otherwise changing
or affecting the underlying water rights.50 Water banking adds
flexibility to water administration by permitting temporary transfers
without formal changes in ownership, thereby making water available
quickly without protracted adjudication in water court.51 Whether the
reason for desiring more flexibility stems from societal changes that
require easier transactions or from a drought that requires quick
mitigation, the same principles apply.
While in theory either a governmental or a private entity can
administer a water bank, 3 Colorado's General Assembly vested this
power with the state engineer, who may delegate his operational
authority to another entity.54 The statutory structure also suggests that
if the State in fact creates banks, local water districts will operate the
banks. 5
Although the bank operators will be responsible for
facilitating leasing and transactional requirements (including storage,
financial accounting, and ensuring the water bank's operations do not
injure other water users),- House Bill 1318 directs the state engineer
to establish rules for bank operations that will effectively control and
substantially limit the bankers' independent discretionary authority.5 '
The Northern Water Conservancy District ("Northern") has
already had what, by all accounts, is a positive experience with water
banking. Northern operates a bank for the water users within its
system. Through the bank, Northern can transfer water anywhere
within its boundaries at no charge and without water court
Colo. H.R. 03-1334.
Colo. S. 03-073; Colo. H.R. 03-1001.
Colo. H.RI 03-1318.
49. LAWRENCE J. MACDoNNE.L ET AL., WATER BANKs rN THE WEST 1-4 (1994).
50. Colo. H.R. 03-1318.
51. See id. at sec. 4 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5).
52. See Kevin B. Pratt, Water Banking: A New Tool for Water Management, 23 COLO.
LAW. 595, 595 (1994).
53. Id.
54. Colo. H.R. 03-1318, sec. 4 (codified at § 37-80.5-104.5(1) (d)).
55. Id.; see infra Section II.B. for a discussion of local water districts.
56. Colo. H.R. 03-1318, sec. 4.
57. Colo. H.R. 03-1318.
46.
47.
48.
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adjudication.5 There is no need to determine whether injury' might
occur because Northern owns all of the water rights involved.5 Water
users with direct allotments of Northern's water, or water users who
own shares in ditch companies with allotments of Northern's water,
arrange a transaction between each other on a willing buyer/willing
seller basis, transferring the water through Northern's facilities or
their own ditches.0 In addition, the parties must notify Northern of
the
to
card
post
via
transactions
proposed
finalized,
District.61 Although nowhere articulated, such transfers are limited to
62
one irrigation season.
The fundamental concepts embodied in a water bank-short-term,
informal loans of water between users without the need for
adjudication-are not new to Colorado water law. A temporary,
informal loan statute has been on the books since 1899.63 It was not
until 2001, however, that the Colorado General Assembly enacted
legislation for a water banking pilot program in the Arkansas River
Basin." The statute allowed the state engineer to establish a water
bank and delegate its operations to the local water district, in this case,
the Southeastern Water Conservancy District ("Southeastern").6 The
statute directed the state engineer, after consultation with the CWCB,
to promulgate rules to balance in- and out-of-basin supply demands,
prevent material injury to vested water users, and establish criteria to
The
guide the state engineer in material injury determinations.6
criteria related to depositing water in the bank, crediting withdrawal
from the bank, administering the water within the priority system, and
delegating the administration of the bank to a public or private
entity.67 Although the statute authorized the state engineer to delegate
administration of the bank to Southeastern, 6 he retained exclusive
69
The
authority to determine material injury without adjudication.
leased water, however, would still be subject to administration within
the prior appropriation system. 70 The statute eliminated the need to
adjudicate the water bank transactions given their short-term nature
58. See Telephone Interview by A. Lain Strawn with Dennis Miller, Operational
Coordinator, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District (Aug. 8, 2003).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See id. Permanent transfers are also permitted but have different procedural
mechanisms and must be approved by Northern's Board of Directors.
63. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 236.
64. Arkansas River Pilot Water Banking Act, H.R. 01-1354, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2001).
65. See id. sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104).
66. Id.
67. Id. sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104(1) (c)).
68. See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
69. Colo. H.1L 01-1354, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5104(1) (a) (IV)).
70. Id. (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104(1)(c) (IV) (A)).
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(year-to-year).7' The state engineer issued rules to govern the pilot
program in 2002," and the bank "opened" for business for the 2003
irrigation season.
Although the General Assembly had no information, during the
2003 legislative session, about whether or how the bank was working,74
the legislature extended the opportunity to create and operate banks
to all water divisions in the state. For the most part, the legislature
simply applied provisions of the 2001 legislation governing the pilot
project to other banks and added criteria the state engineer had
developed in his rulemaking. 76 For instance, the legislation requires
the state engineer to consult with the CWCB and allow time for public
comment before issuing rules governing both the operation of the
bank and limitations on transfers. These rules are subject to judicial
review. 8
Moreover, in part to limit the potential for injury as a result of a
bank transaction, neither the pilot nor the other banks will allow blind
deposits and withdrawals; rather, they will function like water
"brokerages" where the state engineer or his delegate will match
specific water rights proposed for deposit in the bank with specific
water users looking to rent.79 However, House Bill 1318 does differ
from the original pilot program in one important way: unlike the pilot,
under House Bill 1318 water banks cannot lend water out of the basin
of origin.8 m

Thus, the state engineer enjoys broad latitude to administer the
state's water resources through the water banks, and can make water

available immediately to mitigate drought conditions or promote
economic development without the burdens of water court
proceedings.

Unlike the other statutes enacted during the 2003

legislative session that increase the authority of the state engineer, the
water bank statute is not limited to drought emergencies; the

legislature has authorized the banks' operation in perpetuity."' Like
71.

See Rules Governing the Arkansas River Water Bank Pilot Program, 2 COLO.
§ 37-80.5-104 (2002).

CODE REGS. 402-12, Rule 4(J) (2002); see also COLO. REv. STAT.
72. 2 COLO. CODE REG. 402-12 (2002).

73. See Arkansas River Water Bank Program, Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy
Dist., at http://www.coloradowaterbank.org/ (last visitedJan. 3, 2004).
74. In April 2003, the online database for the Arkansas River Water Bank listed two
deposits. Apparently, there has been no subsequent activity. See Water Listings,
Southeastern Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., at
https://www.coloradowaterbank.org/listingsonline/AllListings.asp (last visited Jan. 3,
2004) (bank lists only one deposit as of October 5, 2003).
75. H.R. 03-1318, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003).
76. Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104 (2002) and 2 COLO. CODE REG. 402-12
(2002), with Colo. H.R. 03-1318, sec. 4.
77. Colo. H.R. 03-1318, sec. 4 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5).
78. Id sec. 5 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-105).
79. See COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104 (2002); Colo. H.R 03-1318, sec. 4 (codified
at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5).
80. Colo. H.R. 03-1318, secs. 1, 4.
81. The only limitation in H.R. 1318 is the state engineer may not permit a loan
from the bank for instream flow use, unless such a transfer is to the CWCB. Id. sec. 4.
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the other bills discussed below that increase the state engineer's
authority to approve temporary transactions and determine material
injury,82 the banking bill does create a potentially daunting process for
would-be users to navigate. 3 Thus, the jury remains out as to whether
the transactions will be so cumbersome that the banks will not actually
be able to offer water users seeking quick fixes an easier route than the
water court has provided.
2. Instream Flow Protection
Another statute affecting the state engineer's authority to
administer state water resources is House Bill 1320. The bill permits a
water user to lend a diversionary right to the CWCB to protect one of
that agency's junior instream flow rights during a season in which the
The
governor has declared a drought or other emergency.
transaction does not require adjudication because the new law limits
the loan to a single irrigation season.8 Therefore, the state engineer
or his representative has the authority to determine material injury
instead of the water court.86
The bill expands a temporary water loan statute from 1899.8

It is

specifically designed to benefit instream flows, a beneficial use that did
not exist in 1899." The original statute permitted agreements between
water users on the same stream to save crops from drought or to use
water in a "more economical manner" by allowing one user to loan or
exchange water with another user for a "limited" time. 9
The impetus for House Bill 1320 arose out of the plight of the
9
Roaring Fork River's gold-medal fisheries during the 2002 drought.0
With the Roaring Fork reduced to a series of pools, its gold-medal
fishery thus imperiled, and the CWCB's instream flow water right too
junior to be in priority, the cities of Aspen and Glenwood Springs
worked out a deal with the Salvation Ditch Company ("Salvation") to
use the century-old loan statute to trade some of Salvation's senior
water on the Roaring Fork River to Glenwood Springs for use on its
ball fields.9' Aspen would have paid Salvation, and Glenwood Springs
This is consistent with general Colorado water law limiting instream flows.
82. See, e.g., Colo. H.R 03-1320.
83. See Colo. H.1. 03-1318, sec. 4 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80.5-104.5).
84. Colo. H.R 03-1320, sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83105(2) (a)).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, ch. 105, 1899 Colo. Sess. Laws 235.
88. Compare id., with Colo. H.R. 03-1320.
89. Act of Apr. 6, 1899, § 3. For instance, water released from a downstream
reservoir is exchanged for water diverted above the reservoir. The Colorado Supreme
Court placed a "no injury" construction upon the statute in 1905. Ft. Lyon Canal Co.
v. Chew, 81 P. 37, 40 (1905); see also Bowman v. Virdin, 90 P. 506, 507 (1907) (pointing
to the no injury construction from Chew).
90. See Allyn Harvey, Rippy's Stream-Flow Bill Could Help Rivers In Need, ASPEN TIMES,
Mar. 11, 2003, http://www.aspentimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/frontpage.
91. Id.; Janet Urquhart, Roaring Fork River Silenced, ASPEN TiMEs, Aug. 20, 2002, at
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would have received a municipal benefit. Most importantly, the water
being loaned would have been protected from Salvation's headgate to
Glenwood Springs, a distance of approximately fifty miles. The loan
would have sustained flows for the fishery, while allowing downstream
diversion and use.92
The state engineer received a proposal from the interested parties
in which Salvation agreed to transfer five cubic feet per second ("cfs")
downstream to Glenwood Springs for the remainder of the season.9'
To the shock of the parties involved, the state engineer denied the
request because the parties did not identify crops in critical need, and
Glenwood Springs was not, in the eyes of the State, experiencing a
drought emergency, at least insofar as its need for water for
recreational facilities. 4 Thus, Colorado's water administrator
prohibited willing parties from loaning water to protect an instream
water right.
Moved by the Roaring Fork saga, the Colorado legislature enacted
a statute facilitating the kind of transfers requested by the stakeholders
on the Roaring Fork.9 5 While the Roaring Fork interests had proposed
a private transaction between users, the statute requires the
participation of the CWCB, the only entity in Colorado authorized to
hold non-diversionary water rights for the preservation of the instream
environment.97 Thus, the new legislation allows the loans provided the
CWCB agrees to the transaction.
The statute, however, does require notice to water users and an
opportunity for them to comment on the proposal. 98 The local
representative of the state engineer, the division engineer for the area
water division, determines if material injury will result.99 If he makes a
determination of no injury, a water user claiming injury may make an
expedited appeal to the water court.0 0 On the other hand, if the
division engineer determines that injury will occur because he
determines the conditions articulated in the statute are not satisfied,'9 '
he has the authority to refuse the transaction."
Despite the expanded authority of the state engineer or his
representative to determine material injury, the new authority that
Al.
92. Jeanne M. Beaudry & Kristine Crandall, Roaring Fork Conservancy, Letter to
Gov. Bill Owens and Department of Natural Resources Director Greg Walcher, Refine
Our Water Policies, ASPEN TIMES, Oct. 2, 2002, at 9.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Harvey, supra note 90; H.R. 03-1320, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1
(Colo. 2003).
96. See Harvey, supranote 90.
97. Colo. H.R. 03-1320, sec. 1.
98. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (b) (II), (V)).
99. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (b)).
100. Id. (codified as amended at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (b) (VIII)).
101. See id. (codified as amended at CoLo. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (b)).
102. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2) (b) (VII)).

Issue I

COLORADO'S DROUGHT

House Bill 1320 gives the state engineer is quite limited: there must be
drought, the transfer is for a single season, and the transfer is
exclusively to benefit a CWCB water right.' 0 Still, the statute allows
these loans without an adjudication, and grants the state engineer
authority to determine material injury, a power previously reserved for
the water courts. In addition, that the General Assembly precluded
water users from making trades for instream flow protection without
the CWCB's participation and approval confirms the trend discussed
in the second half of this article regarding the legislature's efforts to
increase that agency's authority as well.'" Finally, as noted in the
previous discussion on water banking, given the complexity of the
administrative process fashioned by the legislature, it remains to be
seen how often any water user will actually take advantage of this new
tool.
3. Interruptible Water Supply Agreements
House Bill 1334 allows for interruptible water supply agreements
("IWSAs")--option contracts between two or more water rights
holders that allow for the temporary transfer of the historic
consumptive use of an absolute water right to a different use or place
of use. The transactions enable entities with junior water rights,
most often municipalities, to augment those rights, which may not be
in priority during low water years, with more senior water rights, most
Therefore, junior users are guaranteed a
often held by irrigators.
more reliable supply without developing "new" water or buying
additional permanent supplies. House Bill 1334 gives the state
engineer authority to approve interruptible water supply agreements
during governor-declared emergencies.
Interruptible water supply agreements infuse Colorado water
resources administration with greater flexibility. For instance, a city
can contract with an irrigator to use his water during drought years
when the city's water rights are not in priority.'0 8 The city pays both to
retain the farmer as a reserve supplier and to use the farmer's water
during drought events.' 9 This allows the farmer to make money
during dry years without harvesting a crop, yet maintain ownership of
his water right." At the same time, the arrangement provides the city
a reliable water supply during emergencies. Both parties save time and
money by avoiding the water court adjudication required were they to
103. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-83-105(2(a)).
104. See infra Section II.
105. H.R. 03-1334, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-309).

106. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMM. ON WESTERN WATER MGMT.,
TRANSFERS IN THE WEST: EFFICIENCY, EQurIy, AND THE ENVIRONmENT 32 (1992).
107.
108.

WATER

Colo. H.R. 03-1334, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-309(3)).
See, e.g., HYDROSPHERE RESOURCE CONSULTANTS ET AL., METROPOLITAN WATER

SUPPLY INVESTIGATION FINAL REPORT

109.

Id.

110.

Id.

96 (Jan. 1999).
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apply for a permanent change of water right, an alternate point of
diversion, place of use, or type of use."'
During the 2002 drought, entities, notably the City of Aurora, tried
to implement IWSAs under legislation passed earlier that year which
permitted temporary SSPs. ' l2 However, the procedure governing IWSA
transactions was ambiguous and the statutory language did not permit
water transfers between basins.' Furthermore, the legislation did not
exempt IWSA transactions from water court adjudication.
114 Therefore, willing parties faced spending significant
resources to
enter into IWSAs."5 Such high transaction costs foreclosed IWSAs to
most potential irrigator-lessors; others were deterred from expending
their economic resources because they feared the permanent loss of
their water rights."6 Additionally, while farmers and ranchers were
willing to lend water to thirsty cities on a temporary basis, many were
uncomfortable with the limitations on future, long-term transfers that
might result from court decrees allowing IWSAs."
Motivated by these deficiencies and the severe drought, Colorado
lawmakers enacted House Bill 1334, which expressly authorized
IWSAs."8 The statute authorizes the state engineer to approve IWSAs
after determining that no injury will occur to vested water users.119
Allowing the state engineer to make this decision enables interested
parties to avoid costly and time-consuming water court adjudications.
However, the state engineer's decision is subject to expedited review in
water court. 2 ' Moreover, IWSAs approved under House Bill 1334 are
limited to times when the governor has declared a drought or other
emergency and the first full year thereafter.1
As with the water banking and instream flow protection bills, the
interruptible water supply agreement legislation increases the
authority of the state engineer, particularly insofar as it authorizes the
about
material
to
make determinations
state
engineer
injury. Additionally, as with the temporary instream protection statute,
the legislation effectively increases the flexibility of water rights
administration during drought because it eliminates the need to
obtain water-court approval prior to transferring water to a different
I11. The bill does not require adjudication before the state engineer may approve
an IWSA. See Colo. H.R 03-1334, sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 37-92-309).
112. H.R 02-1414, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2002) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115.

116.
117.
118.
COLO.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See HvDROSPHERE REsOuRCE CONSULTANTS ET AL., supra note 108, at 102.

See id. at 107.
Id.
H.R 03-1334, 64th Gen. Assem.,
REv. STAT. § 37-92-309).
Id. (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
Id. (codified at COLO. REV. STAT.
Id. (codified at COLO. REv. STAT.
Id. (codified at COLO. REv. STAT.

1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified at
§ 37-92-309(3)(a)-(b)).
§ 37-92-309(1), (3)).
§ 37-92-309(4) (2003)).
§ 37-92-309(3)(c)(I)-(II)

(2003)).
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place and use.
It is interesting to note, however, that in both House Bills 1320 and
1334, the General Assembly directed the state engineer to use a quasijudicial procedure in making his material injury determination.13 The
applicant must provide notice to interested parties and the application
must include a detailed written report prepared by a professional
engineer.'
The state engineer must allow thirty days for other water
fights holders to file comments on the proposed agreement.' These
comments may include claims of injury and conditions to the
agreement to avoid injury."16 After considering the comments, the
state engineer, much like a water judge, is to render a decision
regarding the temporary agreement and impose conditions ensuring
no injury to other water users.'
However, while the water judge
cannot refuse to hear a case, the state engineer has discretion in
deciding whether to hold a formal hearing. ' On a finding of no
injury, a water user who disagrees may file an expedited appeal to the
water court." This process appears designed to protect senior water
rights holders in much the same way as water court proceedings.
4. Substitute Supply Plans
The remaining bills enacted in the suite of legislation increasing
the authority of the state engineer were aimed at resolving an on-going
conflict between Colorado's executive branch and judiciary over water
rights administration. This particular dispute continued to smolder
even after legislative attention in 2002 due to the increasingly severe
drought conditions that gripped the state that summer. A brief
overview of the events leading to the 2003 legislative enactments
follows.
Since shortly after passage of the 1969 Act, the state engineer has
approved SSPs on a year-to-year basis.'" Substitute supply plans are
temporary augmentation plans that permit new water users to divert
water out of priority, ' pending court approval of their augmentation
plans. ' With SSPs, public or private entities "may provide a
substituted supply of water to... appropriators senior to them."' As
long as such substituted supply is available to meet the senior's
requirements, the rights of the senior "shall be deemed to be
123. See Colo. H.R 03-1320, sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-83105(2) (b)); Colo. H.R. 03-1334, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309(3)).
124. Colo. H.R. 03-1334, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309(3) (a)).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-309(3) (b)).
128. Id.
129. Id. (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-309(4)).
130. See, e.g., Empire Lodge Homeowners' Ass'n v. Moyer, 39 P.3d 1139, 1144 (Colo.

2001).
131. As long as adequate replacement water is put into the affected stream system.
132. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-80-120(2) (2002).
133. Id.
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satisfied."'34 The substituted water must be "of a quality and continuity
to meet the requirements of use to which the senior appropriation has
normally been put."3 5 The effect of this provision is to allow what are
effectively involuntary exchanges of water so long as no injury results
to the senior appropriators. The exchanges are "involuntary" because
the senior water rights holder must accept the substituted supply if the
conditions are satisfied.'3 In practice, for close to three decades, the
state engineer approved SSP plans, often for decades at a time. In fact,
the state engineer even approved SSPs where the water user had not
3 7
actually filed an application for a permanent augmentation plan.
Many of the SSPs allowed junior irrigation well users to pump for years
even though they were out-of-priority.'
Along the South Platte River, the long, hot, dry summer of 2002
tested the limits of senior appropriators' tolerance for out-of-priority
diverters whose replacement water they believed inadequate. While
senior water users might have continued to accept the SSP system had
reservoirs remained full and rivers kept running deep, as Colorado
entered its third year of drought, vested water rights holders were
unwilling to look the other way while unadjudicated, out-of-priority
diversions caused injury to their decreed water rights, such rights often
having been acquired at great expense.139
Colorado lawmakers were determined to find a short-term
legislative solution that would allow out-of-priority wells to continue
pumping (thereby saving affected farms and rural communities), but
also would recognize the water court's determination that the state
engineer's continuing approval of SSPs from year-to-year exceeded his
statutory authority. 14 Following intense negotiations involving the
state engineer, entities operating under SSPs, and senior water users,
the legislature passed two bills to accomplish these goals. 4' Senate Bill
73 allows water users in the South Platte to obtain SSPs under certain,
limited conditions, but only for three more years while they "get
134. Id.
135. Id. § 37-80-120(3).
136. Id. § 37-80-120(2).
137.
138.

See, e.g., Empire Lodge, 39 P.3d at 1144-45.
See, e.g., id.

139. See Simpson v. BUou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003). Senior water users
were encouraged by the 2001 Supreme Court decision striking down SSPs in the
Arkansas River Valley (and by extension the South Platte River Basin). Empire Lodge,
39 P.3d 1139. In 2002, in response to the court's decision in Empire Lodge, the
legislature directed the state engineer to issue rules to allow well users who had
historically relied on SSPs in the South Platte River Basin to continue to irrigate.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 3 7 -92-308(1)(c)(II) (2002). For further analysis of the recent
issues plaguing water users in the South Platte River Basin, see A. Lain Strawn, The Last
GASP: Current Conflict Over Management of Replacement Water in the South Platte River

Basin, 75 U. COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming May 2004).
140. See Mike Shimmin, Recent Developments Concerning State Engineer Rulemaking
Authority for the South Platte River Basin, 6 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 549, 552-53 (2003).
141. See Theo Stein, Bill Targets IrrigationWells, DENVER PosT, Feb. 5, 2003, at BI; see
also Theo Stein, Options Drying Up for Well Users on South Platte, DENVER POST, Jan. 31,
2003, at B4.
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legal." 2 House Bill 1001 is more expansive. Given its permanent,
statewide143 scope, the bill actually increases the state engineer's SSP
powers.
Senate Bill 73 has four main provisions. First, the state engineer,
when considering an SSP, must (1) provide notice to interested parties
so objectors can challenge the application, and (2) conduct a detailed
Second, the bill allowed parties to
comment and hearing process.
Third, all users
make an expedited appeal to the water court.
operating under SSPs must file for an augmentation plan by December
31, 2005.146 Fourth, if the state engineer discovers well users are
plan, the
pumping without an application for a decreed augmentation
147
state engineer must curtail those wells without exception.
House Bill 1001 picks up where Senate Bill 73 leaves off by
providing the state engineer with new, expansive, and permanent
statewide authority to approve SSPs when a water user applies for
either an augmentation plan or a change of water right.'48 Allowing
SSPs for a change of water right is a significant expansion of the state
engineer's SSP authority. This expansion makes sense in a change
situation because it allows entities like municipalities that normally
have enough water to contract with a willing party, like an irrigation
ditch company, both during times of drought and while the entity's
change application winds its way through water court proceedings.14 9
Also, House Bill 1001 allows a water user who repairs or improves a
storage structure owned by a third party, so as to remove a storage
restriction imposed by the state engineer, to apply to use the newly
unrestricted storage as part of a SSP. 150 Under House Bill 1001,
moreover, the state engineer can approve SSPs on a year-to-year basis,
for up to five years.1 51 In approving the SSP, the state engineer makes a
determination regarding material injury, which cannot be appealed
separately from the underling water rights case involving the
augmentation plan or change. 52
142. S. 03-073, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(1)(c) (II), (3)(a)); Timothy R. Buchanan,
Doing the Right Thing, BRUSH NEWS TRIBuNE, Jan. 22, 2003, at 15, available at
http://www.brushnewstribune.com.
143. H.R. 03-1001, 64th Gen. Assem., IstReg. Sess., sec. 2 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308).
144. S. 03-073, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(3)(b)(II)-(IV)).
145. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (e)).
146. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (d)).
147. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (VII)).
148. H.R. 1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 5 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. R~v. STAT. § 37-92-308 (4) (a)).
149. Telephone Interview by A. Lain Strawn with Dave Nettles, Division One
Engineer, Water Division One (Aug. 14, 2003).
150. Colo. H.R. 03-1001, sec. 5 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(9)).
151. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(4)(b)).
152. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-92-308(4) (a) (MV)).
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Unlike Senate Bill 73, House Bill 1001 provides that once the state
engineer makes a determination of no material injury, he need not
The state engineer can
conduct any additional formal proceeding.'
even extend an SSP beyond the statutory three-year period if the
applicant justifies the reason for the delay in obtaining its water court
decree. l 4 Furthermore, under Senate Bill 73, water users may use
existing surface rights as replacement water for an SSP even if such
rights are not decreed for replacement so long as the state engineer
prevents expanded use.'55
Ultimately, both bills clarify that SSPs are merely a stopgap
measure temporarily allowing diversions pending water court
adjudication of augmentation plans. But, while Senate Bill 73 reduces
the scope of the state engineer's authority to approve South Platte
River basin SSPs from year-to-year in perpetuity, House Bill 1001
effectively expands the state engineer's powers statewide.
C. SYNTHESIS

This suite of new legislation raises an important question about
water administration in Colorado, particularly insofar as it gives the
state engineer a substantial role in making at least short-term material
injury determinations. Colorado, alone among other western states,
has resisted vesting authority in its executive branch to determine
water rights. While all other western states have migrated to a permit
system, with an administrative agency granting users rights to use

water, Colorado has kept the exclusive power to determine water
156
rights with the courts.
Colorado's

approach

has

advantages

and

disadvantages.

However, there is no question that empowering the state engineer to
determine material injury, and not just during drought or emergency
situations, recognizes that the court system is not flexible enough to
address all of the legitimate water rights transactions that arise in
today's fast-paced world. The next question for the legislature is
whether the state engineer's new authority is sufficient, or whether the
times demand an even broader transfer of power from the courts to
the administrator.
153. Id.
154. Id. (codified as amended at § 37-92-308(4) (b)).
155. S. 03-073, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLo. REv. STAT. § 37-92-308(3) (c) (IV)).
156. Melinda Kassen, A Critical Analysis of Colorado's Water Right Determination and
Administration Act of 1969, 3 U. DENY. WATER. L. REv. 58, 58-59 (1999).
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LEGISLATURE EXPANDS AUTHORITY OF COLORADO
WATER CONSERVATION BOARD AND COLORADO
WATER RESOURCES AND POWER
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY

Most of the fifteen inches of precipitation Colorado receives
annually falls as snow and remains in the mountains through the
winter.' In the spring, snowmelt runoff fills rivers and streams to
flood stage. Without storage structures, this water would flow
through-and out of-Colorado, leaving the state's rivers low for the
rest of the year. Although the natural hydrograph supported native
species and ecosystems, people wanted water at times and places where
it was not naturally available. To accommodate these needs and to
carry over excess water from wet years to dry, Colorado water users
have built increasingly elaborate water storage and diversion systems
over the last 150 years.'- In these structures, the State stores roughly
six million of the seventeen million acre-feet of water Colorado
receives annually.' 59 The remainder flows out of Colorado, almost all
of it to satisfy interstate compact obligations and equitable
apportionment decrees.' 6
For the most part, local water users and the federal government
have played the dominant roles in building, operating, and
maintaining these systems. 161 Until now, the State's role in developing
water has been modest 6
However, the legislation enacted by the
2003 General Assembly suggests the State may assume a more active
role in water development, at least in planning and financing new
water supplies, if not in constructing or operating water delivery
systems.
This section first examines the historical roles of the federal
government, local water users, and the State in constructing and
financing water projects. The section then outlines the Colorado
General Assembly's 2003 legislation that significantly increased state
agency authority over water development planning and financing.
Finally, this section considers whether this recent legislative action
represents an incremental or more significant change in the balance
157. CoRBRiDGE & RIcE, supra note 1, § 1.2, at 3.
158. See id., § 5.1, at 277.
159. Telephone Interview by A. Lain Strawn with Dave Nettles, Division Engineer,
Water Division One (Oct. 10, 2003).
160. See, e.g., La Plata River Compact, COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-6t-101 to -102 (2002);
Colorado River Compact, COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-61-101 to -104 (2002); Kansas v.
Colorado, 185 U.S. 125 (1902); Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. 419 (1922), modified,
260 U.S. 1 (1922).
161. See David H. Getches, The Metamorphosisof Western WaterPolicy: Have FederalLaws
and Local DecisionsEclipsed the States' Role?, 20 STAN. ENVrL. LJ. 3, 11-12, 52-53, 55-58
(2001).
162. See id.
163. See S. 03-236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-60-106, 37-95-103, -106, -107, -107.5, -116).
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of power for water development

A. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: FROM DEVELOPMENT TO MANAGEMENT
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
federal government actively promoted emigration to the American
West.' 6
Heavily subsidized federal water projects helped keep
nineteenth century settlers on the land of the Great American
Desert,1 65 after it became clear that, without reliable water supplies,
they would leave. In the latter half of the twentieth century, this
federal support declined.' 66 In a remarkable reversal of mission, the
federal government today at least pays lip service to encouraging
conservation through effective
water management rather than
67
promoting new development.
1. The Bureau of Reclamation: Water Developer
With the Reclamation Act of 1902,'" Congress adopted a "national
water development program" 69 that included a new agency, the
Bureau of Reclamation ("the Bureau"), to build the necessary water
infrastructure.170 Initially, Congress envisioned the Bureau building
single purpose projects that would deliver irrigation water.' 7 1 Over
time, Congress added municipal use, hydropower (a major source of
income to the federal government) 1 and eventually, recreation and

environmental
uses.' Congress
originally expected
project
beneficiaries to repay the federal investment; however, over time,
Congress significantly relaxed the repayment requirements, as it
became clear74 that the beneficiaries could not fully repay the federal
investment.1

164. DAVID H. GETCHES, WATER LAW INA NUTSHELL 371 (3d. ed. 1997).
165. SeeWIl.NSON, supra note 16, at 12.
166. See JOHN R. MATHER, WATER RESOURCES: DISTRIBUTION, USE, AND MANAGEMENT
297-98 (1984).
167. See U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ASSESSMENT '87: A NEW DIRECTION FOR THE BUREAU
OF RECLAMATION i-ii, 1-2 (1987) [hereinafter AsSEsSMENT '87]; see also U.S. DEP"T OF
INTERIOR, PRINCIPLES GOVERNING VOLUNTARY WATER TRANSACTIONS THAT INVOLVE OR
AFFECT FACIITIES OWNED OR OPERATED BY THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR (1988)
[hereinafter 1988 PRINCIPLES], reprinted in A. DAN TARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT: A CASEBOOKIN LAW AND PUBLIC POUCY (5th ed. 2002), at 825-27.
168. Reclamation Act, 43 U.S.C. § 391 (2000).
169. TARLOCK, supra note 167, at 817.
170. 43 U.S.C. § 391 (2000).
171. Id.
172. As Congress became aware that money from crop revenues was insufficient to
repay project costs, Congress amended the 1902 Act to allow for other uses such as
hydropower for growing cities. Compare Boulder Canyon Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (1929),
with Boulder Canyon Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617 (2000). Much of the hydropower generated
by the Reclamation projects, however, is used to pump irrigation water to project
beneficiaries, rather than being sold more profitably to cities. TARLOCIC, supra note
167, at 824.
173. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 383 (2000).
174. See 43 U.S.C. § 390ee(c) (2000).
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Reclamation projects in Colorado enabled much of the success of
the state's agricultural sector and have also supported its dramatic
municipal growth. Projects built in Colorado during the twentieth
century reflect the expanded uses of project water and the Bureau's
changing mission and values. Some of the larger Bureau projects in
Colorado include: 175
Project Name

Built

Uncompahgre

1937

Colorado-Big
Thompson

1957

Aspinall

1978

Major Features
Taylor Park
Reservoir
(106,230AF);
Gunnison Tunnel
(1100 cfs).
12 Reservoirs
(including
Granby, Estes and
Green Mountain),
the 35 mile Adams
Tunnel, 95 miles
of canals and 700
miles of
transmission lines.
Average annual
diversion
260,00AF.
Blue Mesa,
Morrow Point,
and Crystal
Reservoirs. Active
I Storage Capacity:

River
Basin
Gunnison

Purpose

Colorado,
South
Platte

Irr.,
M&I
Rec., FC,
HP1, CSh

Gunnison

Irr.,
M&I,
Rec.,
F&W,
HP, FC

Ir7b
Rec.c,
F&Wd,
FCe

175. For information on some of the Bureau's larger projects in Colorado, see
BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DAMS, PROJEcTs & POWERPLANTS:
(last
http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/uncomp.html
UNCOMPAHGRE PROJECT,
visited Dec. 15, 2003) [hereinafter UNCOMPAHGRE PROJECT]; BUREAU OF RECLAMATION,
U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DAMS, PROJECTS & PowERPLANTs: COLORADO BIG-THoMPSON
PROJECT (1996), http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/cbtl.html (last visited Dec. 15,
2003); NORTHERN COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY DIST., COLORADO BIG-THOMPSON
PROJECT, http://www.ncwcd.org/project&features/cbt-main.asp (last visited Dec. 15,
2003); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DAMS, PROJEcTs &
POwERPLANTS: COLORADO RIVER STORAGE PROJECT ("CRSP"), AsPINALL UNIT: BLUE MESA
DAM,

MORROW

POINT

RESERVOIR,

http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/crsp.html
SOUTHEASTERN COLO. WATER CONSERVANCY
FRYINGPAN-ARKANSAS PROJECT,

AND

(last

CRYSTAL

visited

DiST., HISTORY &

Dec.

RESERVOIR,

15,

2003);

DESCRIPTION OF THE

(last visited Dec. 15,
http://www.secwcd.org/History%20and%20Description.htm
2003); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, DAMS, PROJECTS &
POWERPLANTS: DOLORES PROJECT, http://www.usbr.gov/dataweb/html/Dolores.html
(last visited Dec. 15, 2003); BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, U.S. DEP'T OF INTERIOR, ANIMAS(last
LAPLATA PROJECT, http://www.usbr.gov/uc/progact/animas/overview.html
visited Dec. 15, 2003).
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River

Purpose

Basin

Frying-Pan
Arkansas

1973

Dolores

1985

AnimasLaPlata

a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
g.
h.
i.

803,441AF.
Reudi, Turquoise,
Twin Lakes and
Pueblo Reservoirs.
Total Capacity:
630,304 AF
McPhee Reservoir
(Total Capacity:
381,195AF); Great
Cut Dike. Average
Annual Diversion:
90,900AF.
Ridges Basin
Reservoir,
Durango Pumping
Plant. Projected
Annual Diversion:

Arkansas,
Colorado

San Juan,
Dolores

San Juan

Irr.,
M&I,
F&W,
FC, Rec.,
HP
Irr.,
M&I,
F&W,
Rec., FC,
HP, ED'
M&I,
Tribal

57,100 AF
AF=Acre-Feet.
Irr.=Irrigation.
Rec.=Recreation.
F&W-Fish and Wildlife.
FC=Flood Control.
M&I=Municipal and Industrial.
HP=Hydro-Electric Power.
Compensatory Storage.
Economic Redevelopment.

With the dramatic exception of hydropower generation, the costs
to the federal government of building these Bureau projects almost
always outweighed the economic returns. As a result, these Bureau
projects dramatically altered entire river basins that would have been
left in their natural state but for the federal subsidy.' 76 This is due, in
part, to Bureau projects being too big and expensive for private
interests to finance and build.'
Private water development projects
cost from three to eight times less per acre of irrigated land thanT
projects

funded

and

built

under

the

Reclamation

Act.1 8

Unfortunately, at these prices, the agricultural beneficiaries of the
Bureau projects, in particular, have been unable to generate sufficient
revenues to repay the federal government's investment.'
Thus, the
FREDERICK MERK, HISTORY OF THE WESTWARD MovEMENT 509-510, 512 (1978).
177. Id.at 511.
178. Id. At the time of Merk's writing, costs were $15-20 for private projects and
$43-162 for Bureau projects per acre of irrigated land. Id.
176.

179.

RIcHARD W. WAHL, MARKETS FOR FEDERAL WATER: SUBSIDIES, PROPERTY RIGHTS,

AND Ta BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 27-46 (1989).
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most recent modifications to the 1902 Act include a wholesale shift
from water development to water resource management.18
2. The Bureau of Reclamation: Water Manager.
The first sign that the Bureau's primary mission would change
from building and operating large dams and diversion projects to
water management came in 1977, when President Carter issued his
infamous "hit list."'' Determined to balance the federal budget in the
face of runaway inflation and a deficit of nearly one trillion dollars, the
President naively suggested eliminating construction of new water
Assisted by Carter's
projects requiring large federal subsidies.'
incredibly poor timing-Colorado and the other western states were in
the midst of a severe drought-powerful western interests defeated
this initiative.8 s But, the Western states' victory did not mean the hit
list projects would be built.l'
While President Reagan never discussed a hit list, as a practical
matter his administration essentially followed Carter's plan, albeit in
Thus, Reagan proposed, and
the name of "fiscal conservatism."
Congress adopted, legislation that not only slashed $2 billion from
seven proposed dam projects, but also required local interests to fund
significant portions of water development projects.'
In 1987, the Bureau released a report signaling a change in its
87
mission: the Bureau wanted out of the big dam building business.
The landmark report states: "The Bureau's primary role as the
developer of large, federally financed agricultural projects is drawing
to a close.... [T] he Bureau of Reclamation must change from an
agency based on federally supported construction to one based on
resource management. " "" Rather than building more large-scale water
infrastructure projects, the Bureau sought to use its existing network
of storage and distribution facilities to allow for " [e lxchanges in type,
location or priority of use.., according to State law... allow[ing]
water to be used more efficiently to meet changing water demands,
and also ... protect and enhance the Federal investment in existing
180.

See U.S.

DEP'T OF INTERIOR, WATER

2025:

PREVENTING CRISES AND CONFLICT IN

THE WEST 2-3, 11 (2003), www.doi.gov/water2025/ppt/html

(last visited Dec. 15,
[hereinafter WATER 2025].
Getches, supranote 161, at 16-17.
Christine A. Klein, On Dana and Democracy, 78 OR. L. REv. 641, 700-01 (1999).
See MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING
WATER 318-19 (rev. ed. 1993); see also RICHARD D. LAMM & MICHAEL McCARTHY, THE
ANGRY WEST: A VULNERABLE LAND AND ITS FuTURE 197-98 (1982).
184. LAMM & MCCARTHY, supranote 183, at 202.
185. A. Dan Tarlock & Sarah B. Van de Wetering, Growth Management and Western
Water Law: From Urban Oases to Archipelagos, 5 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENVrL. L. & POL'Y
2003)
181.
182.
183.

163, 170 n.42 (1999).
186. See Klein, supra note 182, at 702.
187.

See ASSESSMENT '87, supra note 167, at i-ii, 1-2, 8, 10-11.

188. Id. at 1.
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facilities."'89 The report even listed
90 principles to facilitate the Bureau's
new policy of water management.
In the 1990s, the Bureau's mission continued to evolve. President
Clinton's first Commissioner of Reclamation, Dan Beard, issued a bold
plan to reform the Bureau from an agency with a focus on dam
construction to a water resources management agency. 19' In 1994
Beard stated that the "traditional approach for solving problems-the
construction of dams and associated facilities-is no longer publicly

acceptable. We [the Bureau] are going to have to get out of the dam
building business. Our future lies with improving water resource
management and environmental restoration activities, not water
189.
190.

1988 PRiNaPLEs, supra note 167, reprintedinTARLOcK, supra note 167, at 825.

1. Primacy in water allocation and management decisions rests principally
with the States. Voluntary water transactions under this policy must be in
accordance with applicable State and Federal laws.
2. The Department of the Interior (DOI) will become involved in facilitating
a proposed voluntary water transaction only when it can be accomplished
without diminution of service to those parties otherwise being served by such
Federal resources, and when:
(a) there is an existing Federal contractual or other legal obligation
associated with the water supply; or
(b) there is an existing water right held by the Federal government that
may be affected by the transaction; or
(c) it is proposed to use Federally-owned storage or conveyance capacity
to facilitate the transaction; or
(d) the proposed transaction will affect Federal project operations; and
(e) the appropriate State, Tribal or other non-Federal political
authorities or subdivisions request DOI's active involvement.
3. DOI will participate in or approve transactions when there are no adverse
third-party consequences, or when such third-party consequences will be
heard and adjudicated in appropriate State forums, or when such
consequences will be mitigated to the satisfaction of the affected parties.
4. As a general rule, DOI's role will be to facilitate transactions that are in
accordance with applicable State and Federal law and proposed by others. In
doing so, DOI will consider the positions of the affected State, Tribal and
local authorities. DOI will not suggest a specific transaction except when it is
part of an Indian water rights settlement, a solution to a water rights
controversy, or when it may provide a dependable water supply the provision
of which otherwise would involve expenditures of Federal funds. Such a
suggestion would not be carried out without the concurrence of all the
affected non-Federal parties.
5. The fact that the transaction may involve the use of water supplies
developed by Federal water resources projects shall not be considered during
evaluation of a proposed transaction.
6. One of DOI's objectives will be to ensure that the Federal government is
in an acceptable financial, operational and contractual position following
accomplishment of a transaction under this policy. Unless required explicitly
by existing law, contracts, or regulations, DOI will refrain from burdening
the transaction with additional costs, fees, or charges, except for those costs
actually incurred by DOI in performance of its functions in a particular
transaction.
7. DOI will consider, in cooperation with appropriate State, Tribal and local
authorities, necessary measures that may be required to mitigate any adverse
environmental effects that may arise as a result of the proposed transaction.
Id. at 826-27.
191. See DANIEL P. BEARD, BUREAU OF RECLAMATION, BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM: THE
COMMISSIONER'S PLAN FOR REINVENTING RECLAMATION 1-2 (1993).
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project
construction."" Although
Beard's
stint
as Bureau
commissioner was short-lived, his vision lives on in a greatly reduced
federal role in constructing water projects, and in an increased role in
managing existing projects.
Most recently, in 2001, President George W. Bush's Secretary of
the Interior Gale Norton asked the Bureau to assess existing water
supplies and identify areas in which water supplies are likely to be
insufficient to meet water demand over the next twenty-five years.13
The result, dubbed Water 2025, is another effort to redefine the
Bureau's mission and encourage conservation rather than new
construction, 1 and
voluntary water transfers rather than unilateral
94
federal action.
B. LOCAL WATER USER ORGANIZATIONS: THE MAINSTAY OF COLORADO
WATER DEVELOPMENT.

Local water user organizations, such as ditch companies, water
districts, and municipalities, are the other major category of water
project sponsors in Colorado. Since early in Colorado's state history,
the state legislature has recognized a wide variety of water user
organizations and explicitly given them the authority necessary to
develop water and the ability to tax. The result has been that-aside
from the Bureau-ditch companies, water districts, and municipalities
provided capital for and built most of Colorado's water projects.
These entities have been active participants in developing Colorado's
water resources for over a century. 95 Moreover, unlike the Bureau, all
of these entities continue to play an active role in developing new
water supplies!"
192. Daniel P. Beard, Remarks Before the International Commission on Large Dams
7 (Nov. 9, 1994) (transcript on file with the University of Denver Water Law Review).
193. See WATER 2025, supra note 180, at 2-11.
194. Id. at 3, 14-18.
195. See, e.g., Oppenlander v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 31 P. 854 (1892) (holding that
the right to use water can be merged into one's rights as owner and stockholder of a
ditch company, thereby encouraging water users to join ditch companies to facilitate
rapid water development).
196. For example, the City of Denver participates in an Interruptible Water Supply
Arrangement with agriculture. See HYDRospuERE RESOURcE CoNsuLTANTs, supra note

108, at 89.
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1. Ditch Companies
Ditch companies assumed a variety of different forms as water
develo ment in Colorado became increasingly complex.197 Joint,95
mutual 9 and carrier
ditch companies allow for a considerable
degree of flexibility in permitting private water users to join forces for
water development. The ditch company holds a single priority right;
however, within the company, there is substantial flexibility to allow
temporary exchanges between shareholders to deliver water to users
with the greatest need.20 1
For example, Farmer's Ditch, completed in 1862, was the first
source of water for most of Boulder and by 1890 irrigated
approximately 2500 acres of farmland.2 2 The ditch supplied water to
power a four mill, facilitated intensive agriculture in north Boulder,
and provided water to allow for new housing developments after
World War 11.203 Farmer's Ditch is still in use today irrigating hundred
of acres north of the city of Boulder.0 4
Another example of the importance of water to early irrigators
appeared with the creation of the Boulder and White Rock Ditch
Company in 1873.205 The ditch runs for twenty-five miles to the Weld
County border.20 6
The ditch was capitalized with $20,000 (an
exorbitant sum in the late nineteenth century) by the issuance of stock
197. See CORBRiDGE & RIcE, supranote 1, § 5.1, at 277.
198. Joint ditch companies hold the ditch, its right-of-way, and the responsibilities
for structural maintenance or expansion in co-tenancy, allowing individual water users
along the ditch to monitor one another and prevent material injury without outside
administration. Each tenant is the owner of an individual interest in the entire estate.
Therefore, upon the death of a co-tenant his or her property interest passes to the
heirs not the surviving co-tenants. See ROGER CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF REAL

PROPERTY§ 5.2 (2d ed. 1993); CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 1, § 5.2, at 278-79.
199. Mutual ditch companies are analogous to a private corporation, but distribute
water instead of profits to shareholders. See generally COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 7-42-101 to
-107. Mutual ditch companies charge shareholders for the continued operation and
maintenance of a company's ditches and reservoirs. Id. § 7-42-104. Stock goes to
shareholders based on the amount of land each shareholder irrigates. CORBRIDGE &
RICE, supra note 1, § 5.3, at 284-85.
200. Carrier ditch companies do not own water rights themselves, but rather supply
a ditch with water from the stream so the water rights holders can more economically
obtain their water. CORBRIDGE & RIcE, supra note 1, § 5.4, at 292. Therefore, the
carrier ditch seeks a profitable return on its investment. Id.; see also City & County of
Denver v. Miller, 368 P.2d 982, 984 (1962).
201. CORBRIDGE & RICE, supra note 1, § 5.2, at 278-79.
202. MICHAEL HOLLERAN, BOULDER VALLEY DrrcHEs: FARMER's DITCH A HISTORY AND
GUIDE, at

(last
http://thunderl.cudenver.edu/aandP/people/folders/holleran/Farmers.html
visited Dec. 15, 2003).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Boulder & White Rock Ditch & Reservoir Company Workshop, June 12, 2003
(on file with the author).
206. Id.
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to local farmers.2 7 The Ditch Company owns very little of the land
under its ditch, but possesses an easement under and along the ditch.
The easement allows the Ditch Company to run the shareholder's
water and includes the right to enter the easement for repair and
maintenance.0 In addition to the historical benefit of providing water
to farmers and cities, ditches like White Rock are valued today for the
riparian corridor it creates for recreation and urban habitat for
animals, fish and birds.m
2. Water Districts
Water districts are a second category of water user organization.
Colorado's three statutorily created conservation districts primarily
exist to protect the interests of water users in their areas and promote
water development. 210 Thus, they usually do not build their own
projects and are not directly water suppliers.2 1 ' However, they are

often engaged in negotiations regarding both Bureau and other
entities' new projects. For example, the Colorado River Water
Conservation District ("River District") played an integral role in the
creation of Colorado's first compensatory storage project-Green
Mountain Reservoir-built as part of a Bureau project to enable water
development in the basin of origin where the primary project takes
large amounts of water out of the basin. The Southwestern Colorado
Water Conservation District has played a pivotal role in championing
the Bureau's Animas-La Plata project, now under construction, that is
being built to meet the requirements of the 1988 Indian Water Rights
Settlement Agreement.2 3 And, the River District also helped conceive
and construct Wolford Mountain Reservoir, which it now operates, as a
joint project with Front Range diverters to provide water on both sides
of the Continental Divide.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Conservation districts differ from conservancy district because they are created
by legislative action. CORBRmGE & RIcE, supra note 1, § 5.7, at 313. Colorado currently
has three conservation districts: the Colorado River Water Conservation District,
Southwestern Water Conservation District, and Rio Grande Water Conservation
District, which plan for growth and develop Colorado's compact entitlements and
apportioned shares of interstate rivers. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-46-101, -47-101, -48-

101 (2002).
211. While these districts have the authority to both acquire property (including
water) and build projects, historically, they have not engaged in their own water
development; rather, they help conservancy districts and the Bureau fund and
construct their projects. CORIRIDGE & RICE, supra note 1, § 5.7, at 317.
212. Fighting for Green Mountain was actually the reason for the River District's
creation. See About the Colorado River District, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., at

http://www.crwcd.org/whoweare.htmI (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
213.

See The History of Southwestern Water ConservationDistrict, Water Info. Program,

214.

See Wolford Mountain Fact Sheet, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., at

http://www.waterinfo.org/history.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
http://www.crwcd.org/wolford/factsheet.html

(last visited Feb. 8, 2004); Wolford

Mountain History and Current Operations, Colo. River Water Conservation Dist., at
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Irrigation 5 and conservancy21 6 districts often form to receive the
benefits of a Bureau project, but they also build projects of their own.
For example, the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District
("Northern") is the beneficiary of the Bureau's Colorado-Big
Thompson project;2 1 7 in addition, its municipal sub-district built and

operates the Windy Gap project, to bring an additional 48,000 acrefeet of water to Northern's Front Range water users.2 ' Northern is
currently engaged in an effort to expand the Windy Gap project.29
Similarly, the Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District is the
beneficiary of the Bureau's Fryingpan-Arkansas Project,2' but is also
engaged in trying to add new capacity to that project.2 2

'

Finally, the

Uncompahgre Valley Water Users Association, an irrigation district,
operates and maintains the Bureau's Uncompahgre Project,22 but is
http://www.crwcd.org/wolford/history.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
215. Irrigation districts own privately held property but are quasi-governmental in
that they have the power to levy ad valorem taxes. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 3743-132 to
-136 (2002). In situations where a district is the beneficiary of a large-scale federal
project, the project's infrastructure can be expensive. For example, some of the
Uncompahgre Valley Water User's Association is the beneficiary of water supplied by
the Gunnison Tunnel, a major feature of the Bureau of Reclamation's Uncompahgre
Project. See UNCOMPAHGRE PROJECT, supra note 175. In most other cases, the small
number of project beneficiaries limits irrigation to small water projects. See CORBIRDGE
& RicE, supra note 1, § 5.5, at 295.
216. Conservancy districts encompass relatively larger geographic areas and are
authorized to contract with the United States to build and maintain water projects,
build water projects of their own, manage water projects and employ eminent domain.
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-45-118(1) (e), (1) (b) (I) (c), (1)(h) (2002). In 1999, Colorado
had forty-five water conservancy districts. CORBRIDGE & RicE, supra note 1, § 5.6, at
313. Conservancy districts' statutory authority also allows them to export water from
basins of origin to basins of use as long a such transfers do not impair the present or
future appropriations in the basin of origin. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-45-118(b)(II)
(2002) (e.g. facilitating transfers from Colorado's Western slope to water users on the
Eastern slope). A water conservancy district is created by a majority vote of the
landowners in the watershed, with the board of directors comprising people who live
in the district. Id. §§ 37-45-109(1)-(2.5), -114(1) (a). The board is authorized to tax
those within the district to fund water development. Id. § 37-45-121. The board has a
significant amount of flexibility to assess taxes on the entire district or levy special
assessment taxes on corporate entities or individuals. While irrigators are charged, the
primary source of revenue comes from charging fees for uses other than irrigation and
selling or leasing water within the district. Id. § 37-45-118(1) (g), (1) (b) (I) (B).
217. See About the District,N. Colo. Water Conservancy Dist., at
http://www.ncwcd.org/ncwcd about/about_main. asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
218. See Windy Gap Project,N. Colo.Water Conservancy Dist., at
http://www.ncwcd.org/project&features/wgp-main.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
219.

See Windy Gap FirmingProject,

http://www.ncwcd.org/project&features/wgpirming.asp (last visited Feb. 8, 2004);
see also infra, note 235.
220. See History and Description of the Fyingoan-Arkansas Project, Southeastern Colo.

Water Conservancy Dist., http://www.secwcd.org/History%20and%2ODescription.htm
(last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
221. See Press Release, Congressman Joel Hefley, Hefley Introduces Bill That
Addresses
Colorado's
Future
Water
Needs
(May
3,
2001),
http://www.house.gov/hefley/pr_-20010503.htm (last visited Feb. 8, 2004).
222.

See, UNCOMPAHGRE PROJECT, supra note 175.
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also seeking to construct a major hydropower facility of its own.22
3. Municipalities
A third local-level water development category is Colorado's cities
and towns. Cities may construct, condemn, purchase, lease, operate,
and maintain their own water supply facilities. 2 Moreover, Colorado's
used by cities and towns as a
constitution acknowledges
.. water
.
225
preferred use, and gives cities the authority to legislate, regulate, and
control the management of water organizations." Further, the "Great
and Growing Cities Doctrine" allows municipalities to acquire water
without having to put the water immediately to use-something that
would constitute illegal speculation for other water users. n7 Because
cities' appropriations are often quite junior, they frequently engage in
In
non-traditional development to ensure reliable water supplies.
addition to the widespread practice of buying more senior agricultural
water rights for conversion to municipal purposes, some cities have
entered into exchange agreements allowing the city to divert an
irrigator's right upstream of the irrigator's point of diversion and
replace it with treated effluent.'2 Cities also lease surplus water to one
another, and if a city's population is greater than 200,000, it may lease
city without a determination of material injury by the
water to another
23 0
water court.
For example, the Board of Denver Water Commissioners
("Denver"), established in 1918, is the largest appropriator of water
rights for municipal use in Colorado, and supplies approximately
265,000 acre-feet of water per year to over 1,080,000 people in the
Denver metro area.2 s3 Denver has acquired, built and operated its
T

223. The A-B Lateral would add winter Gunnison Tunnel diversions and create
power with a run-of-the-river hydropower plant.
224. See, e.g., CORBRIDGE & RicE, supra note 1, § 5.8, at 317. Condemnation is not
typically used as a means of acquiring water rights and will not be addressed here.
225. COLO. CONST.art. XVI, § 6. In times of extreme shortage, domestic use (which
includes municipal use) is preferred, followed by agricultural use, then
manufacturing. See id.
226. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 1. Established in 1918, the Board of Denver Water
Commissioners ("Denver Water") is the largest appropriator of water rights for
See DENVER WATER, A BRIEF HISTORY, at
municipal uses in Colorado.
http://www.water.denver.co.gov/aboutdw/history.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2003);
DENVER WATER, AN OVERvIEw, at

http://www.water.denver.co.gov/aboutdw/aboutdwframe.html
2003).

(last visited Dec. 1,

227. City & County of Denver v. Sheriff, 96 P.2d 836, 842 (Colo. 1939).
228. See H.R. 03-1334, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003) (allowing state
engineer to approve interruptible water supply agreements between water users, like
cities, without a formal adjudication).
229. See HYDRosPHERE RESOURCE CONSULTANTS, supra note 108, § 3.2.2.2, at 69
(1999).
230. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 31-35-201 (2002).

231.

DENVER WATER, DENVER WATER: AN OvERvIEw, at

http://www.water.denver.co.gov/aboutdw/aboutdwframe.html
2003).

(last visited Dec. 15,
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facilities wholly without federal or state financing. Other large Front
Range cities, including Colorado Springs and Aurora, have also built
and now operate extensive water supply and delivery systems. 233s
4. Continuing Development
As noted above, and unlike the Bureau, these local entities, and in
particular the water conservation/conservancy
districts
and
municipalities, are still hard at work developing water projects. Thus,
even if one might have worried that the Bureau's exit from active water
project development created a vacuum in Colorado, there is abundant
evidence that local providers have stepped into the breach. As a result,
a major state entry into the field of water development, as described
below, is no more warranted in the twenty-first century than it was
necessary in the nineteenth or twentieth centuries.
For example, as this article is being written, at least four projects
sponsored by cities and a water district are simultaneously moving
through the National Environmental Protection Act scoping process,
in anticipation of these entities applying for permits and a carriage
contract.
These four projects are: Denver's Moffat Collection
System,5 the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District's Windy
Gap Firming Project, 235 the City of Aurora's Fryingpan-Arkansas Project
carriage contract,236 and the City of Colorado Springs' Southern
Delivery System. 37 Just these four projects would, if developed as
232. "Since its inception, Denver has set rates at a level sufficient to service its debt
and to meet its expenses of operation and maintenance." Id.
233. The components of the City of Aurora's water supply, including the nine
reservoirs that allow the city to supply 137,000 acre feet to its customers, are listed on
their web site. See Water Supply, City of Aurora, at http://www.ci.aurora.co.us (last
visited Feb. 11. 2004).
234. See Intent to Prepare an Environmental Impact Statement for Denver Water's
Moffat Collection System Project, 68 Fed. Reg. 54,432 (Sept. 17, 2003). This project
would provide Denver an additional 18,000 acre-feet of firm yield annually from its
Fraser River/Williams Fork collection system. Id.
235. Windy Gap Firming Project, Colorado-Big Thompson Project, Colorado, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,955 (Sept. 8, 2003). This project would provide an additional 30,000
acre-feet of firm yield annually to the Front Range from the Upper Colorado River.
Id. at 52,956.
236. No scoping announcement for this project appeared in the federal register;
however, the Bureau released a memo seeking scoping comments. Bureau of
Reclamation, Memo to Interested Agencies and Members of the Public Regarding
Proposed Contract Between the Bureau of Reclamation and City of Aurora, Colorado
Acting By and Through Its Utility Enterprise, for the Use of Excess Capacity in the
Fryingpan-Arkansas Project, EC-1340, ENVI-6.00 (undated) (on file w/author). The
Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District and the City of Aurora recently
signed an intergovernmental agreement which puts the total increased amount of
water delivered out of the Arkansas and Colorado River Basins to Aurora at 13,300
acre feet annually. Intergovernmental Agreement between the Southeaster Colorado
Water Conservancy District and the City of Aurora, Oct. 3, 2003, p. 8 (on file with
author). This is the water that would be stored through Aurora's contract with the
Bureau that is the subject of the scoping notice.
237. Southern Delivery System Project, Frying-Pan Arkansas Project, Colorado, 68
Fed. Reg. 52,953 (Sept. 8, 2003). This project would supply 78 million gallons per day,
which translates to over 87,000 acre-feet annually. Id. at 52,954. At least a portion of
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currently described, deliver more than 138,000 additional acre feet of
water to Front Range communities, over one third of which would
come from the Colorado River Basin. m
C. STATE AGENCIES AND THEIR ENLARGED ROLE AS A RESULT OF THE
2003 LEGISLATION.

Historically, state agencies played a minor role in water
development, leaving the financing and construction of water

infrastructure projects to the Bureau and local entities. 2 9 Spurred at
least in part by the drought, the state legislature passed several bills
that open the door to a substantial expansion of the State's role in
water resource development, particularly with regard to planning and
financing projects.
1. Historical Roles.
a. Colorado Water Conservation Board ("the CWCB")
Before 1937, the state engineer had explicit authority to
administer Colorado's water resources and implicit authority to
While the state engineer actively administers
develop them.240
Colorado's water resources, no evidence exists that his office ever
the 1930s 21
engaged in water development. The Dust Bowl drought of
prompted the state legislature to create the CWCB specifically to
encourage water development, leaving the state engineer responsible
242
solely for water administration.
The CWCB's statutory mandate is to "aid[] in the protection and
development of the waters of the state for the benefit of the present
this water will come from increased yield out of Colorado Springs Homestake Project,

which diverts water from the Eagle River drainage to the Arkansas River Basin.
238. Each of the projects involves an increase in yield from existing transbasin
diversions. See, infra, text accompanying notes 261-62 and 264.
239. SeeWnINSON, supra note 16, at 240-41.
240. See Tom I. Romero, Uncertain Waters and Contested Lands: Excavatingthe Layers of
Colorado'sLegal Past, 73 U. COLO. L. REV. 521, 539-40 (2002).
241. Felix L. Sparks, Foreword to COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., WATER
CONSERVATION AGENCIES OF THE STATE OF COLORADO (2d ed. 1963).
242. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., WATER CONSERVATION AGENCIES OF THE STATE
OF COLORADO 2 (2d ed. 1963). Currently, the CWCB comprises fifteen members who
include the executive director of the Department of Natural Resources, the state
attorney general, the state engineer, the director of the CWCB, the director of the
division of wildlife, the commissioner of agriculture, and nine remaining members
appointed by the governor based on geographic location. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60104(1) (2002). The Rio Grande, North Platte, South Platte, Arkansas, Yampa-White,
Colorado, Gunnison-Uncompahgre, and San-Miguel-Dolores-San Juan river drainages
and the City of Denver each has one member. Id. § 37-60-104(2). Historically, the
CWCB conducts on-going water studies, flood control planning and flood plain
designation, funds small project construction, appropriates minimum stream flows,
coordinates water resources with both federal and state agencies, and provides
technical assistance to the WRPDA. Id. §§ 37-60-115, -60-106(1), -60-119, -92-102(3);
CORBRIDGE & RicE, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 212; COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-107 (2002).
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and future inhabitants of the state."24 The CWCB's primary objectives
are to: (1) represent state-wide water interests aimed at creating
efficient water policies, (2) facilitate communication among water
agencies, (3) represent Colorado in interstate water matters and
federal actions that conflict with state 2 44water management goals, and
(4) formulate state-wide water policies. The CWCB's duties include:
(a) conducting water studies for the "unified and harmonious
development of all waters for beneficial use in Colorado,"2 (b)
funding small water development projects, 246 and (c) coordinating
water resources management with the federal government and other
states. 247 More recently, and somewhat ironically, given the CWCB's
clear development mission, the legislature authorized the CWCB as
the sole entity within Colorado to appropriate instream flow rights (i.e.
water rights with no
248 diversion) "to preserve the environment to a
reasonable degree."

The CWCB is most directly involved in water development through
its construction fund program. 2 9 The fund operates on a revolving
basis, with the legislature appropriating money for individual project
expenditures annually. 250 The program receives funds out of general
state appropriations, although the CWCB supplements the fund with
fees it assesses. Subject to certain conditions, the CWCB may also
contract with private sponsors such as individuals, corporations, or
state or federal agencies for the use of water and power supplied by
The CWCB chooses
water projects owned or operated by the State.
projects it decides will "promote the general welfare and safety of the
citizens" of Colorado, incorporate all reasonable water conservation
measures, and benefit multiple, rather than single, purposes.5 5 Grant
recipients must have the power to assess ad valorem taxes to offset
operating and maintenance costs, acquire the land and water rights
needed for the project, pay 50% of the cost of the feasibility study, 256
and repay the CWCB's financial contribution to the feasibility study by
STAT. §
CORBRIDGE& RicE,
COLO. REv. STAT. §

243. COLO. REv.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.

37-60-102 (2002).
supra note 1, § 3.5, at 207.
37-60-115(1)(a) (2002).

Id. § 37-60-119.
Id. § 37-60-109(1).
Id. § 37-92-103(4).
Id. § 3760-121.
Id. § 37-60-121(1)(a).
Id. § 37-60-119(2); see

REsouRcEs,

Coto; WATER CONSERVATION BD., DEP'T OF NATURAL

GUIDELINES FOR ASSISTANCE

IN THE CONSERVATION

AND UTILIZATION OF

COLORADO'S WATER RESOURCES THROUGH TIHE COLORADO WATER CONSERVATION BOARD

CONSTRUCTION FUND (1975).
252. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-122

(2002).
Id. § 37-60-119(2).
Id. § 37-60-119(1); see COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 251, at 2.
COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 251, at 4-5; see also COLO. REV.
STAT. § 37-60-121 (1) (b) (VI), (VII) (2002).
256. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supranote 251, at 4.
253.
254.
255.
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the time project construction begins.2 57 The CWCB secures its
investment by taking all or a substantial portion of the title to the
Finally, the CWCB may
project until the sponsor repays the fund.
"enter into contracts.... necessary for the maintenance and continued
operation of such projects."2 59 The CWCB allocates construction fund
dollars for construction costs, investigations, engineering, or other
expenses. 6 In 2003, the General Assembly authorized $20.8 million in
new spending out of the construction fund. 6'
Effectively, then, the CWCB serves as the State's water policy voice.
This includes its role as the guardian of Colorado's compact rights and
as the defender of the State's allocation system against perceived
federal interference. In addition, the CWCB has a modest role in
water development, through its ability to make grants from the
construction fund. And, the CWCB has the exclusive authority to
appropriate instream flow water rights.
b. Colorado Water Resources and Power Development Authority ("the
Authority")
In 1981, the Colorado General Assembly created the Colorado
Water Resources and Power Development Authority ("the Authority")
with a $30 million appropriation from the CWCB construction fund.262
The Authority can "initiate, acquire, construct, maintain, repair, and
operate projects or cause the same to be operated pursuant to a lease,
sublease, or other agreement with any person or governmental agency
and may issue its bonds and notes payable solely from revenues to pay
the cost of such projects. " 163 The Authority coordinates with the
CWCB. For example, the CWCB performs the feasibility studies for
projects for which the Authority wants to issue bonds; the CWCB also
makes recommendations to the General Assembly regarding such
projects.2 6 Unlike the CWCB, the Authority has no other mission, and
no policy role; it exists solely to provide financing for water
development projects.26
Eligible projects under this statute include, but are not limited to,
water conveyance systems, wells, storage facilities, and necessary
infrastructure for hydropower plants.26 The Authority has the power
257. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-121(1) (b) (III) (2002).
258. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 251, at 4.
259. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-121(1) (2002).
260. Id. § 37-60-121(2).
261. S. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003). Section 2 of the
bill also authorized an additional $13.4 million from the severance tax trust fund
perpetual base account.
262. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-104 (2002); Act of April 9, 1982, ch. 141, 1982 Colo.
Sess. Laws 538, 541.
263. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-102(1) (2002).
264. Id. § 37-95-107() (a)(I)-(II).
265. See D. Monte Pascoe, Plans and Studies: The Recent Quest for a Utopia in the
Utilization of Colorado's Water Resources, 55 U. COLO. L. REv. 391,407 (1984).
266. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-103(10) (2002).
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to issue tax-exempt revenue bonds to pay for these facilities. 267 Since
the principal and interest are payable solely from the revenues
generated by the sale of water and hydropower, the bonds do not
create a debt prohibited by the Colorado Constitution.268
Most of the projects built to date with Authority bonds are
wastewater and drinking water treatment facilities, and for each of
these types of facilities, the Authority operates a revolving fund, 2
replenished both from bond revenue and from federal grants from the
270
Environmental Protection Agency. Until 2002, the Authority needed
legislative approval to issue bonds for more than $25 million; 271 in
2002, the General Assembly removed legislative oversight for projects
less than $100 million, and in 2003, the General Assembly raised the
threshold for legislative oversight to $500 million.2" Still, each year,
the General Assembly passes a joint resolution endorsing the projects
the Authority finances. Aside from wastewater and drinking water
projects, the Authority provided financing for Stagecoach Reservoir, 7
and is involved in providing the7 State's $42 million share of the
Bureau's Animas-La Plata Project.2"
2. The 2003 Legislature Expanded Authority for Selection and
Financing for Water Development Projects.
a. Drought: Driving the General Assembly
News stories and analysis have characterized the summer of 2002 as
the worst single-year drought on record in Colorado. 6 In July 2002,
the governor called the General Assembly into special session to
address fire and drought issues,2 7 although they enacted no significant
drought legislation. 27 By the beginning of 2003, the drought's adverse
267. Id. §§ 37-95-109, -95-115.
268. COLO. CONST. art. XI, § 3; COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-109(2), (8) (2002).
269. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-95-107.6(1), -107.8(1) (2002).
270. See id. §§ 37-95-107.6(2) (a), -107.8(2) (a) (I)-(III).
271. COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-95-103(12.5) (a) (I), -109(1) (2001).
272. H.R. 02-1118, 63d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (codified as
amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-103(12.5)(a)(I)); COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95109(1) (2002).
273. COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-107(1) (a) (2002).
274. Joey Bunch, Owens: No Secret Scheme Behind Water Referendum, DENVER PosT, Aug.
15, 2003.
275. CORBRIDGE & RiE, supra note 1, § 3.5, at 213-14.
276. Lofholm, supra note 2 ("Colorado is in its worst drought in history."); see
generally, Memorandum from Julie Hart to Governor Bill Owens (Apr. 30, 2002), in
WATER AvAnABIary TASK FORCE,

IMPACT TASK FORCE DROUGHT AsSEssMENT AND

RECOMMENDATiONS (2002), at http://www.colostate.edu/Depts/CSFS/govpage.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
277. Exec. Order No. D 020 02 (July 1, 2002) (Proclamation Call for the Third
Extraordinary Session of the Sixty-Third General Assembly),
http://www.leg.state.co.us/2002a/inetc&j.nsf/ouNav?ReadForm&Senate (last visited
Dec. 15, 2003).
278. See, e.g., S. 02S-001, 63d Gen. Assem., 3d Extra. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2002)
(adding COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-123.5). This bill created a drought response fund to
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effect on the economy,"9 coupled with the public angst over a summer
lawns, city parks, and playing fields, pressured the legislature
of brown
28 0
to act.
As noted in the introduction to this article, the legislature adopted
2 1
four resolutions mentioning the drought as the impetus. ' The
General Assembly also invoked the drought in substantive legislationdeclaring, for example, that Colorado was experiencing its fourth
consecutive year of drought and that the state would likely experience
similar drought cycles in the future. The legislature also recognized
that drought cycles reduce both the quantity and quality of water
The
available for Colorado's existing and future water users.
as
infrastructure
water
existing
legislature further declared Colorado's
deficient in its ability to provide sufficient drought relief because it
would not allow the state to use its compact entitlements to the fullest,
requiring the General Assembly to "expedite the development and
improvement of Colorado's water infrastructure."2 4
In response to the drought, the legislature enacted four provisions,
described below, each of which increases state agency authority.
Taken together, these bills conceive a larger role for state agencies, in
terms both of financing water projects and of recommending those
locally-sponsored water projects most in the state's overall interests.
b. Planning: the Statewide Water Supply Initiative ("SWSI") Points to
State Involvement in Identifying Development Projects.
At the request of the CWCB,s the Colorado legislature
appropriated $3 million for the CWCB to conduct a study that, first,
inventories existing water supplies and future water supply needs
make loans available to agricultural organizations for emergency drought-related
water augmentation purposes. The fund is supplied and administered by the CWCB
and the state engineer. Id. Another bill created a temporary state income tax credit
deferral for livestock operators affected by drought conditions. H.R. 02S-1010, 63d
Gen. Assem., 3d Extra. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2002) (adding COLO.REv. STAT. § 39-22128).
279. LUECKE ET. AL., supra note 3, at 13-20, http://www.cotrout.org (last visited Dec.

15, 2003).
280. See Press Release, Office of the Governor, Owens Urges Passage of "Drought
Package" to Address Current and Future Water Needs (Feb. 14, 2003),
http://www.state.co.us/owenspress/02-14-03a.htm (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
281. H.R.J. Res. 03-1015, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); H.R.J. Res.
03-1019, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); H.R.J. Res. 03-1048, 64th Gen.
Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003); S.J. Res. 03-007, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Colo. 2003).
282. S. 03-236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003).
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. See Memorandum from Rod Kuharich, Dir., to Colo. Water Conservation Bd.
(July 12, 2002), http://cwcb.state.co.us/agendas/uly_02/20a-swsi.pdf (last visited
Dec. 15, 2003); see also Memorandum from Rod Kuharich, Dir., to Colo. Water

Conservation Bd. (Sept. 3, 2002), at http://cwcb.state.co.us/ (last visited Dec. 15,
2003). These memoranda illustrate the SWSI was a priority for the CWCB well before
the General Assembly authorized the money to fund the study.
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statewide,2 6 and second, makes a recommendation regarding both
basin-specific and statewide alternatives to meet those needs. The
final product is a report due back to the General Assembly on or
before December 1, 2004.28
The stated objective of the SWSI is to ensure Colorado has
adequate water supplies for its citizens.289 The CWCB has hired a
contractor who has formulated, together with CWCB staff, a statement
of work that structures and defines how the study will proceed.m
With little explicit guidance in the statute,29' the CWCB has
adopted a detailed statement of work covering five different phases of
the investigation, including: (1) an overall public involvement
component; (2) basin and statewide inventories of available needs and
supplies in light both of information known about drought cycles in
Colorado and projected growth data; (3) identification, evaluation and
selection of alternative supply and demand management options for
each basin; (4) development of implementation strategies to package
groups of water projects for financing and development; and (5)
proposing a framework for the CWCB to manage implementation of
its proposed alternative. 92 CWCB staff and the CWCB contractor will
do much of the work for these phases, assisted by basin advisors
consisting of participants selected by the CWCB. 2 Moreover, to roll
basin plans into a single statewide alternative the CWCB members
themselves will take the lead in achieving the statewide consensus for
which the statute calls. 4
What is striking about the SWSI is that it is Colorado's first statewide planning exercise. Previously, Colorado water interests have
operated as if the only state water plan Colorado needed was the prior
appropriations system itself.6 5 Vesting a state agency with the authority
to craft a state-wide water plan and to reconcile the needs of
competing basins, potentially inserts the State into the very center of
the transmountain diversion battles as to which it has always previously
286. S. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., ist Reg. Sess. sec. 14(2) (Colo. 2003).

287. Id. sec. 14(1).
288. Id. sec. 14(1).
289. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., STATEWIDE WATER SUPPLY INITIATIVE 1 (May
28, 2003), http://cwcb.state.co.us/SWSI/SWSISOW.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
290. Memorandum from Rod Kuharich, Director, Colo. Water Conservation Bd., to
Colo. Water Conservation Bd. (Mar. 26, 2003) (announcing Camp Dresser & McKee as
selected consultant and the development of a scope of work for the SWSI),
http://cwcb.state.co.us/agendas/March_03/23.pdf (last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
291. See S. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 14(1) (Colo. 2003).
292. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 289, at 2,16, 34, 43, 48.
293. See id. at 9; Letter from Rod Kuharich, Dir., Colo. Water Conservation Bd., to
Interested Parties regarding Basin Roundtable Nominees 2 (July 23, 2003) (on file
with author).
294. S. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 14(1) (Colo. 2003); see COLO.
WATER CONSERVATION BD., supranote 289, at 34-42.
295. See Justice Gregory J. Hobbs, Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview, 1 U.
DENVy.WATER L. Rzv. 1, 2 (1997). The General Assembly has previously rejected
planning bills. See, e.g., H.R 99-1050, 62d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
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remained on the sidelines. At a time of limited state resources and an
executive branch which espouses limited government, the SWSI is a
dramatic departure in the water arena from past practice and ideology,
a move that can only be understood in light of the pressure the
drought created for State action.
c. A State Water Project? The Colorado River Return Project
("Big Straw")
The Colorado River Return Project is a plan to collect 250,000 to
750,000 acre feet of Colorado River water and pump it from the Utah
border 4500 feet and 200 miles back to the Continental Divide for use
primarily on the Front Range.Y The estimated cost is between $3.7
and $15 billion.297 As originally conceived in the mid-1980s, the Big
Straw would have taken water through an infiltration gallery with a
passive wetland serving to improve the warm, saline and seleniumcontaminated water at Colorado's border with Utah, pump it through
a series of tunnels and pipes mostly along the 1-70 corridor (including
Glenwood Canyon) to Denver's Lake Dillon, and finally through
Denver's Roberts Tunnel for distribution to Front Range water users.
Many who oppose the project believe it is simply infeasible; for
example, one commentator calculated the pumping costs alone as
exceeding $150 million annually and would require a new power plant
just to serve the project.2w
However, at the request of the CWCB, the Colorado legislature
authorized the Board to spend up to $500,000 (a scarce, if small, sum
of money for a state with a budget deficit running into the hundreds
of millions of dollars)'" ° for a technical feasibility study to be
completed in November 2003. 3° ' Proponents of the project note
296. See COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., Scope of Work for a Study of the Colorado
River Return Project (CRRP) 2 (Nov. 7, 2002), http://cwcb.state.co.us; see also Matt
Sura, Address at the Colorado River Return Project Informational Workshop (Dec. 10,
2002), at http://www.crwcd.gov/BigStrawWorkshopfinalreport.pdf (last visited Dec.
15, 2003).
297. Boyle Engineering Corp., Colorado River Return Reconnaissance Study
Summary Report 9 (Nov. 14, 2003),
http://cwcb.state.co.us/SecB/CRRRS-SUMMARY_REPORT.pdf (last visited Dec. 15,
2003). Prior to release of the Reconnaissance Study, when the legislature was debating
the Big Straw, costs were anticipated to be significant. See Steven K. Paulson, Stopping
the Water: 'Big Straw' Project CouldFill Reservoirsfrom ColoradoRiver, ROcKY MOUNTAIN

NEWS,Jan. 2, 2003 (some estimate the cost to be more than $5 billion).
298.

See COLO. TRoUT UNIMITED, THE BIG STRAW, at

http://www.cotrout.org/big-straw.htmn (last visited Dec. 15, 2003); Deborah Frazier,
Mega Water Plan: The Big Straw CouldDrawFrom ColoradoRiver, EaseDrought, ROCKY MTN.

NEwsJuly 25, 2002, at 4A [hereinafter Frazier I].
299. Colorado Trout Unlimited, supra note 298; Bob Ewegan, Utopia, DENVER POST,
Oct. 16, 2002.
300. S. 03-110, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 15(2) (Colo. 2003); see generally
COLORADO FISCAL PoLcY INsrTTuTE, COLORADO'S BUDGET: CHALLENGE, CRISIS, OR TRAiN

(rev. Sept. 2003), at http://www.cclponline.org/pubs/index.htm (last visited
Dec. 15, 2003).
301. Colo. S. 03-110, sec. 15. The CWCB's contractor did so. See, Boyle Engineering
Corporation, supranote 297.
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Colorado has never fully developed its Colorado River Compact
entitlement."s While the exact amount of the undeveloped portion is
the subject of dispute, the General Assembly stated in one of its joint
resolutions in 2003 that a significant amount of Colorado's
entitlement remained undeveloped. s
Big Straw supporters argue
Colorado should not leave more water than the compacts require in
the river for downstream states while simultaneously imposing water
restrictions on Colorado water users.'
With state decision-makers
focused on water policy as a result of the drought, Big Straw
proponents, such as State Commissioner of Agriculture Don Ament,
saw an opportunity to "strike while the iron was hot," and fund the
feasibility study. 35 Supporters embrace the Big Straw as the answer to a
common West Slope argument against new transbasin diversions-that
West Slope interests lose the ability to use water arising on their side of
the mountains simply because more people live east of the Divide.
The General Assembly approved the feasibility study without
indicating how a majority of members felt about the underlying
project, or the many costs and technical hurdles the project would
face. 0 7 The CWCB subsequently hired a contractor to consider
different scenarios for project size (250,000, 500,000, and 750,000 acre
feet) and three different paths for the pump-back, all of which must
start below the confluence of the Gunnison and Colorado Rivers in
Grand Junction.30s
No current water supplier has expressed any interest in building
the project, even if it is feasible. This has led some to wonder whether
the CWCB itself would consider building the project, particularly given
the number of CWCB members who have voiced enthusiastic support
9
for the project&3
Similarly, some wonder whether the Big Straw will
appear in the preferred alternative list of the SWSI if the CWCB deems
it feasible, regardless of whether there is an identified project
proponent.310
302. Colo. State Senator Mark Hillman, End the Water Insanity, Aug. 24, 2003, at

http://www.markhillman.com/results.php3?news_id=409.
303. H.R-J. Res. 03-1011, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2003).
304. See Frazier I, supranote 298, at 4A.

305. See id.
306. See, e.g., Deborah Frazier, Big Straw Project: Who Would Pay?, ROcKY MTN.

NEWS,

June 11, 2003, at 20A [hereinafter Frazier II].
307. It is likely that new dams would need to be constructed, environmental
mitigation costs would be substantial, impacts of moving large amounts of poor quality

water from the state line to high quality waters in the mountains would make treating
the water more difficult and expensive, $168 million would be spent annually on
pump-back costs, and if the region experiences future droughts, there may not be

"excess" water available. If Colorado develops its full compact entitlement in years of
average precipitation, there is only excess water available in years of above average
precipitation. See Frazier II, supra note 306, at 20A; see also Paulson, supranote 297.
308. COLO. WATER CONSERVATION BD., supra note 296, at 2.
309. See Frazier I, supra note 298, at 4A.
310. Cf id. This would be particularly ironic given Mike Serlet's statement that the
project is "a dog" and the environmentalists would eat project proponents alive. Id.
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d. Financing
At the request of the governor and with the full support of the
CWCB and the Authority, the General Assembly adopted three
measures expanding State financing for water projects. The first
raised, from $100 million to $500 million, the cap on Authority
funding not requiring legislative approval.3 1 1 The second, creating two
billion dollars of bonding authority for the CWCB, was referred for a
November 2003 statewide vote.312 Another, less dramatic measure
authorizes the Authority to subsidize the cost of issuance of bonds and
notes for the water projects it finances.13
i. The Authority: Bigger Projects, SWSI Tie-In and Local Assistance
While the Authority has always had as its mission the financing of
water development projects, in 2003 the General Assembly increased
its power by raising the total amount of bonding allowed for "small
water resources projects" from $100 million to $500 million per
project 'proponent, limited to governmental or quasi-governmental
The Authority funds "small water resources projects"
entities.
without approval from the General Assembly,3 5 provided the projects
meet the Authority's other rigorous criteria, such as those that banks
and bond firms employ to ensure project viability. In addition, while
the General Assembly deleted an out-dated statutory directive to fund
three enormous water projects, 3 6 it added a new directive to finance
projects the CWCB identifies in the SWSI, provided the proponents
seek Authority funding and317 the projects otherwise qualify under the
Authority's general criteria.
In a separate bill, the General Assembly also authorized the
Authority to subsidize the cost of issuing bonds and notes for the water
projects it finances. 31 ' This would help prospective project proponents
by providing State underwriting for the financial costs of building a
new project.
ii. Referendum A: CWCB, State Revenue Bonds for Financing Water
Projects
As part of Senate Bill 236, the General Assembly referred to the
voters a provision that, had it been approved in the November 2003
statewide election, would have granted the CWCB authority to issue
311.

S. 03-236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 4 (Colo. 2003) (amending

COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-103(12.5) (a) (I)).

312.
313.
COLO.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.

Id. sec. 1 (adding COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-203).
H.R. 03-1001, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (amending
REV. STAT. § 37-95-109(1)).
Colo. S. 03-236 (amending COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-103(12.5)(a)(I)).
Id. sec. 5 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-107).
Id. sec. 6 (deleting COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-107.5(3) (a), (b), (c)).
Id. (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-107.5(3)).
Colo. H.R. 03-1001, sec. 1 (amending COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-95-109(1)).
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state revenue bonds for water projects.1 9 Referendum A would have
added, for the first time, a bonding mission to the CWCB's policy
role. 2 ' The tax-free bonds, in an amount up to $2 billion, would have
been repaid with up to $4 billion in principal and interest derived
from the bonded321project's revenues, i.e., by project proponents selling
water or power.
Under the terms of Referendum A, the CWCB
could also have issued bonds to build its own projects (e.g., a state
water project) or bonded for projects of public-private partnerships322
In this regard, the bonding authority would have been different from
that of•the Authority,
•
323which cannot bond either for a state agency or a
private corporation.
Another key aspect of Referendum A would have been that the
CWCB would not just have been the financing agency; rather, the
CWCB would have exercised unique power to "identify opportunities
for
water
infrastructure
projects
and
storage
statewide
and ... recommend to the governor water infrastructure projects to be
funded ... through the issuance of [such bonds] .324 Thus, the CWCB
would have both chosen and financed projects, creating a level of state
influence that far exceeds the Authority's.
Referendum A also
established an ambitious timeline: it would have required the CWCB
to recommend two projects in different river basins, with 2005 start
dates,325 from which321
the governor was to have chosen one. 326
Choosing and funding projects pursuant to Referendum A would
have occurred without legislative oversight. 2 7 The CWCB would only
have submitted an annual report to the legislature about its activities;
no legislative confirmation of the selected project, nor approval of the
financing terms, would have occurred.32 Given that the referendum
provided no timeframe either for the issuance of bonds or the terms
for repayment, and no cap on interest rates other than the additional
$2 billion allowed under the Referendum, the measure would have
granted the CWCB significant leeway in fashioning deals.
Coupled with the SWSI, the Referendum A bonding authority
319. Colo. S. 03-236, sec. 1.
320. This new financing authority is an order of magnitude greater than that
afforded the CWCB via the construction fund. See supra note 261 and accompanying
text; cf. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-119 (2002). The CWCB can contract with private
citizens, corporations, and agencies of the state and federal government for use of
water supplied by projects owned by the state. The CWCB charges these entities, and
any amount collected in excess becomes a part of the CWCB construction fund. The
authority of the CWCB to pay for projects through the construction fund is based
upon the need and capital of the sponsor of a water project. Id. §§ 37-60-119 to -121;
see also id. § 37-60-121 (b) (VI), (VII).
321. Colo. S. 03-236, sec. 1 (adding CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-60-203, -206).
322. Id.
323. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-95-107 (2002) (amended 2003).
324. Colo. S. 03-236, sec. 1 (now codified as COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-60-203(2)).
325. Id. (adding § 37-60-203(2) (a)).
326. Id. (adding § 37-60-203(4)).
327. Id. (adding § 37-60-204).
328. Id. (adding § 37-60-208).
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would have radically shifted power to the CWCB from traditional local
water developers. The proponents of Referendum A understood this
shift, as the governor stated in seeking support for the measure.329
Ultimately, Colorado voters rejected Referendum A by a two-to-one
margin.

D. SYNTHESIS.
The State has historically played a minor role in developing
Colorado's water resources. Certainly, the state engineer and the
CWCB have been in the forefront of battles to protect Colorado's
compact entitlements in interstate litigation, 3 ' and to stop federal
resource stewardship actions and policies from reducing the quantities
of water available to Colorado water users-for example on the
endangered species protection,"" reserved rights," and bypass flow
Moreover, the CWCB, through its construction grants
fronts.
program, and the Authority, primarily through its revolving funds for
water and wastewater treatment
3 5 facilities, both have helped finance a
wide variety of small projects.
Still, Colorado has previously shied away from state water planning
and has no State water projects. Neither water planning nor State
projects are necessarily antithetical to the prior appropriation
doctrine. Both the Texas and Wyoming legislatures directed state
water plans in the last decade.2 And, California, of course, has the
California Aqueduct, which is an impressive state water project,
transferring water from the wetter north to dryer southern population
But, until 2003, the Colorado legislature has apparently
centers.33
been satisfied that the prior appropriation system itself, along with the
constitutional protections for diversion to beneficial use, would suffice
as Colorado's water plan 33 8 while local and federal initiatives would
provide Colorado's water projects.'3 9
329. See generally Michael C. Bender, West Slope Interests Not Protectedin Referendum A,
Say Legal Experts, DAILY SENTINEL (Grand Junction), Aug. 7, 2003; Todd Hartman,
Arguments flood Dams Proposa4 ROCKY MT. NEWS, Sept. 15, 2003, at 14A.
330. Jerd Smith, Water Plan Is All Washed Up, RocKt MTN.NEws, Nov. 5, 2003, at 7A.
331. SeeCoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 37-80-104, 37-60-106, -109(1) (2002).
332. Cf COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-121(2.5) (a) (II).
333. Id. § 37-60-121.1.
334. Id. § 37-60-121(2.5) (a) (I).
335. Id. §§ 37-60-119,-95-107.6.
336. S. 1, 75th Leg. § 1.01 (Tex. 1997); WYoMNc STATE WATER PLAN, at
http://waterplan.state.wy.us/ (last modified Dec. 17, 2003).
337. REisNER, supra note 183, at 355-57.
338. Evidenced by no state projects constructed to date and the General Assembly's
past rejection of state planning. See supra note 295.
339. In 2000, SenatorJohn Evans introduced Senate Bill 215. S.00-215, 62d Gen.
Assem., 2d Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2000). Like Senate Bill 236, Senate Bill 215 would have
increased the scope of the CWCB's authority. The bill directed the CWCB to study
possibilities for large-scale, transbasin water infrastructure projects to "plan for the
growth in water supply demands caused by [Colorado's] population growth." Id. sec.
10. Furthermore, the CWCB was to be the bonding entity to finance project
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With the drought as the backdrop, and at the behest of a state
administration that, in virtually all other arenas, wants to cut taxes and
downsize the government, the legislature's adoption of this slate of
legislation transforming the State's role in water development is simply
fascinating. At a time when the state budget is in crisis, the legislature
has funded a massive state water planning effort. At a time when the
state economy generally is struggling, the legislature has prescribed
financing to underwrite a potentially massive public works program of
new water projects. Interestingly, no major water supplier appears to
have asked for this state effort, nor is there any new evidence that
municipal water providers, who are the most active suppliers currently
pursuing new water supplies, are in need of State assistance. The
media is full of reports about new projects that these providers are
developing without State assistance.
So the questions are, "Why," "Why now," and "Will it last?"
Certainly, this is not the first time that the legislature has opened the
door to large-scale financing of water projects. In 1989, the General
Assembly directed the Authority to finance not one but three huge,
controversial water projects: Two Forks, Narrows, and Una.34' None
was built. Second, most water suppliers and managers believe
Colorado's most feasible projects have already been built. But, by
consolidating planning, prioritizing, and financing authority in the
CWCB, perhaps the legislature is signaling a more serious attempt to
push state government into a role that previously only the Bureau has
played in Colorado. Thus, the CWCB ended the 2003 legislative
session with immense authority to determine the focus of a statewide
water study, to study the feasibility of massive transbasin diversions,
and, had Referendum A passed, to have administered a massive new
financing program for unidentified water infrastructure projects.
Certainly if the SWSI produces a list of large projects for the Authority
to finance, building and paying for those projects will last for decades
beyond the drought of 2002.
construction as well. Id. One reason Senate Bill 215 did not pass was the blatant
inequity of its approach, which was limited to targeting one large Colorado or
Gunnison Basin project to store 120,000 acre-feet, two-thirds of which would be
exported to the Front Range for use. Id. By contrast, Senate Bill 236 directs
cooperation, even as it provides the CWCB with much more freedom to act at its
discretion without oversight and subsequent mandatory restrictions from the
legislature. S. 03-236, 64th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1 (Colo. 2003) (now
codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-60-204). For instance, while Senate Bill 215 required
the CWCB obtain approval of the General Assembly for any water development project
that the CWCB recommended, Senate Bill 236 only requires approval by the governor.
See id.
340. See, e.g., Written in Water: The Wrong Fix for Water Woes, DENvER POST, May 11,

2003, at E2; see supra notes 234-238 and accompanying text.
341. COLO. Rav. STAT. § 37-95-107.5(3) (Cum. Supp. 1989).
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IV. CONCLUSION
As Colorado continues to grow, the Damocles' sword of semi-arid
climate and cyclical drought remains pointed at the State's precious
water resource. There is no evidence that the perceived water scarcity
on the Front Range has any effect on the movement of people into the
state. Moreover, many Coloradans, new and native, value the state's
natural beauty, including its rivers, for aesthetic, recreational and
spiritual reasons. For this reason, managing Colorado's water resource
to supply all needs, whether or not traditional, will remain a challenge.
What is interesting about the legislature's response to the 2002
drought was that, in many cases, the legislature turned to state
agencies as the entities most able to "do something" about the
problem, even as it slashed the state budget in response to a deficit
every bit as dire as the drought. It gave the state engineer more power
to determine material injury, and thereby quicken the pace of those
water transfers most likely to help in drought situations. It also
boosted the State's ability to finance new water development, as well as
to engage in state planning that might identify those new water
projects worthy of development. Areas of contention regarding water
policy remain, including whether Colorado's system could use even
more flexibility for transferring water, whether there is a way to
encourage increased development without creating increased
inequities between water rich and water short regions of the state, and
what policies to encourage (or even require) increased water efficiency
would mean. It will be interesting to watch and see whether the
legislature continues to vest more power in the state agencies to solve
Colorado's water future, or whether, decades from now, the 2003
legislative session will stand out as an anomaly in its aggrandizement of
state agency power.

DROUGHT PROOFING WATER LAW
JANET C. NEUMAN*
I.
II.

M.
IV.
V.
VI.
VII.

Introduction.......................................................................
92
What is a Drought? .............................................................
93
Here a Drought, There a Drought, Everywhere a Drought?.... 94
The Impacts of Drought ........................................................
98
Current Legal and Policy Responses to Drought .................. 100
Drought Proofimg the Law: Moving from Crisis
Management to Risk Management ....................................... 105
Conclusion ..........................................................................
110
I. INTRODUCTION

Lake Arrowhead, California, is one of many communities recently
struggling with drought. The small town's population normally
doubles with summer tourists who come to enjoy the Lake Arrowhead
reservoir; however, a lack of water dropped the lake to historic low
levels in the spring of 2003, leaving many boat docks and marinas high
and dry.' The drought also triggered an outbreak of bark beetles in
the surrounding pine forests, causing more trees to die in one year
than in the last 300 years.2 What was once lush and scenic forest
turned into a fire waiting to happen. Drought made the community
tense. Disputes arose over management of the lake's water, including
criticism of the 95% water discount given to the country club and golf
course. 4 The Arrowhead Lake Association filed a complaint against
the local water agency with the State Water Resources Control
Board,5 and a local homeowner filed a lawsuit against the county for
approving several thirsty housing developments without environmental
t Professor of Law, Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, Oregon. The author
would like to thank Steve Osborne, Eric DeiRrick and Jennifer Durham for research
assistance. An earlier version of this paper was prepared for and presented at the
American Bar Association's Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources Fall
Meeting in St. Louis, Missouri, on October 4, 2001.
1.

Louis Sahagun, The Dissension Tlows Freely in Lake Arrowhead, L.A. TIMES, May 19,

2003, at BI.
2. Id. (quoting Richard Minnick, fire ecology professor at University of California,
Riverside).
3. Id. In fact, the wait was not long. The region suffered devastating wildfires as
this article was going to press in the fall of 2003. See, e.g., Gordon Smith & Matt
Krasnowski, Wildfire Pauses Before Arrowhead, SAN DIEc,o UNIoN-TRIBUNE, Oct. 31, 2003,
at A10; Hector Becerra, FireAlters Arrowhead in Ways Big and Small L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8,
2003, at B12.
4. Sahagun, supranote 1.
5. Sahagun, supranote 1.
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reviews. Residents anxious over the fire danger were also concerned
about the impact of the anxiety on business. 6 A local community
leader described the community infighting in response to the drought
as "like arguing over the best deck chair on the Titanic twenty minutes
after hitting the iceberg. " 7
This article explores how to make water law more responsive to the
inevitable reality of drought and less like an argument over the
Titanic's deck chairs-in other words, how to "drought proof" water
law.8 Much of the focus is on the prior appropriation systems of the
more arid states in the West, but many of the changes are equally
necessary and applicable to eastern states. The article first considers
what constitutes a drought, reviews recent drought news, and
examines how droughts affect various sectors of society and the
economy. The article next discusses how the legal system currently
responds to drought and then considers what legal and policy changes
could provide improved resilience in the face of expected increases in
the frequency and severity of drought and the mounting demands on
water supplies generally.
II. WHAT IS A DROUGHT?
The old dictionary on my bookshelf defines a "drought" as a
"prolonged period of dryness." By this definition, most of the western
United States experiences a drought at least once a year. After the
mountain snows melt in spring but before more rain and snow fall in
winter, a prolonged period of dryness occurs; sometimes a few months
pass with almost no precipitation. In fact, since much of the West
receives less than ten inches of precipitation annually,'0 the West as a
whole has experienced drought for eons, beginning when the last
marine life disappeared from the fossil record and the region began its
transition to the landforms and climate we know today.' If an eon or
two does not qualify as a prolonged period of dryness, nothing does.
Furthermore, since nearly 37% of the United States' population now
lives west of the Mississippi River, and an increasing share of the
country's food supply is grown there, the West's aridity affects the
entire country economically. '2
6. Id.
7. Id. (quoting Bill Battison, president of a coalition of eighteen homeowners'
associations).
8. I am talking primarily about the law of water quantity and allocation, and only

indirectly about water quality issues.

WEBSTER'S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DicnONARY 255 (1967).
JOSEPHL. SAXETAL., LEGAL CONTROL OF WATER REsoURcES 5-6 (3d ed. 2000).
11. DONALD WILHITE, NAT'L DROUGHT MITGATION CTR., IMPROVING DROUGHT
MANAGEMENT IN THE WEST: THE ROLE OF MITIGATION AND PREPAREDNESS 6, 8 (report to
W. WATER POuCY REV. ADVISORY COMM'N 1997).
12. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERcE, RESIDENT POPULATION OF THE
50 STATES (Dec. 28, 2000), at
9.
10.

http://www.census.gov/population/cen2000/tab01.pdf. Between 1970 and 1995 the
population of the West increased by 32%, compared with a growth rate of 19% for the
rest of the nation. PAMELA CASE & GREGORYALWARD, U.S. DEP'T OFAGRIc., PATTERNS
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My dictionary's alternate definition of drought is a "prolonged or
chronic shortage." Shortage is inherently a relative term-a shortage
is less than normal, or perhaps more to the point, less than that which
is needed. By this definition, both the normally dry West and even
much of 1the
relatively wet East recently experienced drought
4

conditions.

Although Webster's does its best to provide a lay definition of
drought, there really is no precise and universally accepted scientific
definition of the term 5 For
one reason, because drought is more of a
"creeping phenomenon " 6 than other immediately recognizable
natural hazards like floods or hurricanes, it is more difficult to pin
down.' 7 Droughts also vary greatly in the consequences to various
activities, so different economic sectors and disciplines developed their
own working definitions. 8
A drought may be acute, occurring within a single season or year,
or chronic, stretching over several years. Scientists-though
acknowledging that the extreme conditions are deviations from the
average-recornize both short and long dry periods as quite normal
and expected. Droughts set the lower range of normal or average
just as wet years and floods set the upper range." However, most of us
tend to forget that extremes are always part of the pattern. Nonscientists often think of the good years as "normal" and any deviation
from that as an aberration.
M11.HERE A DROUGHT, THERE A DROUGHT,
EVERYWHERE A DROUGHT?
In the summer of 2003, the United States Geological Survey's "U.S.
Drought Monitor" showed most of the western United States, from the
Great Plains almost to the Pacific, ranging from "abnormally dry" to
severe drought."2' Abnormally dry conditions also prevailed in parts
of the Midwest, Northeast, Alaska, and Hawaii.2 Four years of below
average snowfall in the Rockies wreaked havoc on the Colorado River
or DEMOGRAPHIC, ECONONIC AND VALUE CHANGE IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 7
(report to W. WATER POLICYREV. ADVISORYCOMM'N 1997). In 1920, 50% of all United
States' crops were still grown in the East, but by 1982, more than 66% of the country's
crops were grown in the West. WILLIAM ASHWORTH, NOR ANY DROP TO DRINK 20

(1982).
13. WEBSTER'S DI-rIONARY, supranote 9.
14. See infra Part III.
15. WIL-=T, supra note 11, at2.

16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 3.
19.

Id. at 1, 6, 40.
KATHLEEN A. MRuER, NAT'L CTR. FOR ATMOSPEiuc RESEARcH, CLIMATE,
VARPIAr=, CLIMATE CHANGE, AND WESTERN WATER 1, 10 (report to W. WATER POL'Y
REV. ADVISORYCOMM'N 1997).
21. Nat'l Drought Mitigation Ctr., U.S. Drought Monitor (Sept. 9, 2003), at
http://www.drought.unl.edu/dm/monitor.html/.

20.

22. Id.
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reservoirs, which supply water to 25 million people across seven
states. 23 Lake Mead dropped seventy-five feet over two years and was
only at 63% of capacity last spring; Lake Powell dropped ninety-five
feet and was only half full.24 New Mexico was in the second year of a
gubernatorially declared drought emergency.25 The Phoenix area was
facing its worst drought in 100 years.
In fact, large portions of the country experienced officially
declared drought status for parts of the last few years. In the spring
of 2001, the famously rain-drenched Pacific Northwest found itself in
the midst of one of the worst droughts on record; the winter snow
pack amounted to only 65% of normal, and by early spring, the
Columbia River ran at an unprecedented low flow of 50% of
average. 8 Washington's governor declared an official drought
emergency on March 14, 2001, saying "[t]his is already the worst
drought in our state since 1977, and it's only March.. . ."2 The plight
of the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California that
summer, when the Bureau of Reclamation cut off deliveries of
irrigation water from the federal Klamath Project to approximately
1400 farmers to save scarce water for two endangered fish species,
appeared in the pages of the New York Times.30

23. John Ritter, Vegas DroughtMay Wither Growth, USA TODAY, May 30, 2003, at 3A.
24. Id.
25. Associated Press (Santa Fe), Year-Old N.M. DroughtEmergency Continues (June 12,

2003), at
http://www.ledger-enquirer.com/mld/ledgerenquirer/news/nation/6072974.htm
(last visited Dec. 15, 2003).
26. Charles J. Babbitt, DroughtCreated This Nightmare; It Will End With Patience,
Wsdom, ARIZONA REPUBUC, June 30, 2002, at

http://www.azcentral.coM/news/specials/wldfires/0630charles.html (last visited Dec.
15, 2003).
27.

Nat'l

Drought

Mitigation

Ctr.,

Drought

Impacts

in

the

U.S.,

at

(July 8-Aug. 7,
http://www.drought.unl.edu/risk/us/archives/2001/usjuil0.htm
2001); http://www.drought.unl.edu/risk/us/archives/2002/usjulO2.htm (July 6-Aug.
6, 2002); http://www.drought.unl.edu/risk/us/archives/2003/usjulO3htm Uuly 9Aug. 8, 2003).
28. Mike Lewis, Locke Declares DroughtEmergency, SEATrLE POST-INTELLUGENCER, Mar.
14, 2001, available at http://seattlepi.nwsource.com/local/droughtl4.shtml.
29. Id. In Oregon, Governor Kitzhaber activated the state's Drought Council for
the first time in nearly eight years in anticipation of a severe water shortage. Jeff
Mapes, Kitzhaber Urges Restrained Water Use, THE OREGONIAN, Mar. 22, 2001, at B5,
http://www.oregonian.com/mainindex.html.
30. Editorial, Oregon's Water War, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2001, at 14. By the middle of
the summer of 2001, crops were dying on about 200,000 acres of land. Id. Senator
Gordon Smith unsuccessfully asked Congress to override the Bureau's decision and
deliver water, and the farmers resorted to self-help, breaching the Bureau headgates to
turn water into the irrigation canals. Tom Detzel, SenatorLoses Bid to Release Waterfor
ParchedFarms,THE OREGONIAN, July 13, 2001, at A],

http://www.oregonian.com/mainindex.com; Michael Milstein, FarmersDefy Feds,
EscalateFight, THE OREGONIAN, July 14, 2001, at Al,

http://www.oregonian.com/mainindex.com.
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Recently in the East, parts of Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana
experienced three or four years of drought,3 ' with Florida's 2001
drought its worst in fifty years.32 Dry conditions in Florida sparked
wildfires that closed highways and blanketed areas not far from Disney
World with smoke.33 Dried-up wetlands forced some alligators into
residential swimming pools in search of water.14 GovernorJeb Bush of
Florida wrote a letter to his brother, the President, asking the federal
government for permission to inject untreated rainwater into
groundwater wells to bank the water for future drinking water
supplies. 5 Georgia, too, battled wildfires over thousands of acres, and
restricted homeowners' water use.m The state conducted a "no
irrigation" auction in 2001 and paid $4.5 million to farmers not to
irrigate 33,000 acres of land."
What's going on? Are the frequency, severity, and distribution of
droughts actually on the increase? Climatologists, who take the long
view, point out that drought is a normal and recurrent feature of the
climate throughout the United States, particularly in the West.3 Both
seasonal and multi-year droughts occurred with regularity since long
before humans began measuring and recording droughts. 9 As
population increases (particularly in more arid regions), and the
needs and desires for water increase commensurately, human activities
and the human economy accordingly become more vulnerable to the
effects of drought. 4 Another problem is that record keeping covers a
fairly short period of time, and thus we sometimes remain blissfully
unaware of longer-term patterns.4 ' For instance, although current dry
spells are certainly significant from the perspective of human impacts,
a 50 or even 100 year period is really not that long when trying to

31.

Patrick Peterson, Drought Could Worsen This Summer, Climatologist Says, THE SUN

(Biloxi, Miss.), May 30, 2001, available at http://nl.newsbank.com/nlsearch/we/Archives; David Stooksbury and Pam Knox, Drought Expected to Worsen In
Georgia, Georgia State Climatology Office (Apr. 22, 2002), available at
http://georgiafaces.caes.uga.edu/viewtext.cfm?id=1500; Expert: La. Suffers 'Moderate'
Drought, THE ADvocAT (Baton Rouge), May 22, 2001, at IA.
HERALD

32.

DouglasJehl, Florida,Low on Drinking Water, Asks E.P.A. to Waive Safety Rule, N.Y.

TImES,
33.
PREss,
34.

Apr. 13, 2001, at Al.
Patrick Reyna, FirefightersBattle Blazes Across Drought-StrickenFlorida,AssoCIATED
May 20, 2001, http://associatedpressarchive.com.
Philip Morgan, Stumbling into Suburbia, THE TAMPA TRIBUNE, May 8, 2001, at 1,

http://www.TBO.com.
35. Jehl, supra note 32.
36. Rhonda Cook, South Geoigia Fires Burn 10,000 Wooded Acres, THE ATLANTA
JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, May 27, 2001, at G3; Press Release, Georgia Dep't of Natural

Resources, EPD Does Not Change Current Outdoor Watering Restrictions (May 30,
2002),
http://www.state.ga.us/dnr/environ/gaenviron-files/drought-files/drought-faq.pdf
37. Richard Whitt, Farmers Feel Sting of Water Payoffs, THE ATLANTA JOURNALCONsTrrtnioN, May 2, 2001, at B1.
38.

39.
40.

41.

WiLHrrE, supra note 11, at 6-8.
MILLER, supra note 20, at 1.
WILITE, supra note 11, at 1.
MILLER, supra note 20, at 8.
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discern long-term climatic trends and repeating cycles.42 The lack of
appreciation for the reality of severe recurrent drought is particularly
significant in the western United States, where substantial population
growth and increase in water-dependent activities occurred in the last
few decades, 3a ridiculously short period of time from a climatological
perspective.
As we all learned in grade school, the amount of water on the
earth is finite, although it is always changing form as it moves through
the hydrologic cycle. Approximately 97.5% of the earth's water at any
given time exists in the oceans, too saline for most human
purposes. Another 1.8% of the total is tied up in the polar ice caps
and glaciers, also unavailable for use.45 Less than 0.5% is available as
freshwater for human use. 6 Even so, total freshwater supply in the
continental United States alone amounts to approximately 1400 billion
gallons per day, about fourteen times more than our total national
consumption.4 ' The distribution of the available water supply is highly
variable, however, with the eastern United States receiving twenty to
sixty inches of annual precipitation on average and most of the West
receiving an average of less than ten or twenty inches annually.48 Of
course, an average is just that; variations in any given year can be
considerable.
The fastest growing areas are not those with the most plentiful
water supply. Most of the fastest growing states are located in the
West, with most in the extremely arid intermountain West.4 9 Georgia,
the eastern state with the highest growth rate, is already experiencing
serious water problems, both in terms of overall long-term supply and
due to recent severe drought conditions. s5 Furthermore, even in
relatively wet areas with plenty of water to meet existing needs up to
this point, the demands placed on the finite water supplies are
increasing many-fold.51 Domestic uses and municipal demands,
instream flow needs for recreation and ecosystem purposes, water
quality problems, and long-neglected Indian tribes all clamor for
water.
42. On the other hand, perhaps Arizona can be forgiven for feeling a bit besieged,
since some scientists label the current drought the driest period not just in 50 or 100
years, but in 1400 years, based on studies of growth rings in trees. Patrick O'Driscoll,
Drought ConditionsStill Grip West, USA TODAY, April 28, 2003, at 3A.
43. CASE & ALwARD, supra note 12, at 4-5, 7; MILER, supra note 20, at 4-8.
44. A. DANTARLOCK ET AL., WATER RESOURCE MANAGEMENrr 4 (4th ed. 1993).
45.
46.
47.

Id.
Id.
Id.

48. Id. at 5.
49. CASE & ALWARD, supra note 12, at 4, 29.
50. Id. at 29-30; Whitt, supra note 37.
51. See, e.g., Editorial, Water, Water Everywhere, 10 N.J. LAW: WKLY. NEWSPAPER 814,
April 30, 2001, available atWL 4/30/01 NJLNP 6; see generallyJehl, supra note 32.
52. See id. (amount of water on Earth is fixed; as population grows, shortages will
become more frequent and severe); Edgar Sandoval, DEP Discusses Local Water Woes
and Worries, MoRNING CALL (Allentown, Pa.), Apr. 18, 2001, at B3 (Pennsylvania Dep't
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To top it all off, predictions of climate change complicate the
picture considerably. The scientific community agrees global warming
is occurring; the only remaining questions are how much and how
fast. 3 The specific impacts on water resources vary greatly from place
to place. However, predicted widespread changes in precipitation,
evaporation, and runoff will likely cause both more floods and more
droughts in many regions, both arid and humid.- Global warming
presents a special challenge to water management in arid areas,
because these regions already cope with a great deal of variability and
have very little margin of safety in the water supply.55 Thus, arid
regions are particularly vulnerable to the uncertainties that will
intensify with climate change. 6
Population is growing in the drier regions of the country-both
East and West. Consumptive and instream demands on water supplies
are growing exponentially. Throw in the monkey wrench of global
warming, and the first thing we need to better cope with drought is an
attitudinal change. We need to revise what we think of as "normal" to
include much more drought. Before discussing current drought
responses and how to improve them, the next section reviews the
socioeconomic impacts of drought and highlights the magnitude of
the challenge.
IV. THE IMPACTS OF DROUGHT
The impacts of drought vary greatly among different sectors of
water users. Consider the disparate consequences of a water shortage
to municipal and domestic water users, industrial users, hydropower
producers (and its various customer constituencies), ranchers,
irrigators, foresters, the recreating public, and environmental or
instream needs.57 The agricultural sector often experiences the effects
of a drought first.5 8 Drought increases the chance of fire, and thus also

acutely affects both ranchers and foresters. Domestic supplies may be
affected fairly quickly if the source of supply is flowing surface water,
but when domestic and municipal supplies come from storage facilities
or groundwater wells, that sector will experience a somewhat delayed
of Environmental Protection calls for conservation in face of dramatic increase in
water use for household, industry, recreation, and agricultural purposes); see generally
Frank Clifford, Tapped Out? Shortage of Water Looms as One of the World's Most Critical
Problems in the Next Centuty, Authors Say, L.A. TMEs, Feb. 15, 1996, at B2 (increased
worldwide consumption of fresh water); see also WESTERN WATER POIcv RE IEw
ADVISORY COMM'N, WATER IN THE WEST: CHALLENGE FOR THE NEW CENTURY 3-45 to 3-46
(1997).
53. MILLER, supra note 20, at 12 n.2; see also CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. WATER
RESoURCES 1-2 (Paul E. Waggoner ed., 1990) (predicting global temperature rise).
54. MILLER, supra note 20, at 20.
55. See id. at 1, 4-6, 40.
56. Id. at 1.
57. See id. at 25.
58. WuIAM E. RIEBSAME, ET AL., DROUGHT AND NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT
N THE UNITED STATES, IMPACTS AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1987-89 DROUGHT 44 (1991);
WnjIMn, supra note 11, at 3.
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reaction to decreased precipitation. 59
Large areas of the United States experienced a severe drought
during 1987-1989.6' According to one report, the 1987-1989 drought
created one of the most costly natural disasters in the nation's
history.61 Agricultural relief payments alone totaled over $7 billion;
total losses during just one year of the drought (1988) were estimated
at $39 billion. 62 The drought of 2002, which affected portions of
thirty states in the West, Plains, and East, caused damages preliminarily
estimated at over $10 billion; the western fire season that year caused
another $2 billion in damages, in part due to drought.6 Figures
totaled in the billions of dollars for droughts in 2000, 1999, 1998,
1996, and 1993, with a notable portion of those costs occurring in the
eastern states.64
Loss, like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. However, most
"beholders" probably acknowledge an objective difference between
inconveniences caused by drought-such as urban water users
restricted in the amount of their household use or in their
recreational pursuits-and direct impacts to someone's personal
livelihood, such as an individual farmer dependent on water for
keeping crops or livestock alive from one day to the next. Of course,
an urban water user's recreation may support someone else's
livelihood, as the recreation industry is a significant economic sector in
and of itself.6' In other economic sectors, such as agribusiness,
hydropower, and manufacturing, water shortages may also affect
operations and profits, from moderately to drastically.
But what is absolutely necessary in times of drought? If people do
not have water, they die. The same is true for animals and plants. For
purposes of drinking, regardless of whether you are animal or plant,
water is not fungible with anything else. But for almost every other
purpose-except perhaps fire-fighting, which also requires the
genuine article-money can usually replace water. In fact, for those
animals and plants raised for profit, money can still partially replace

59.
60.
61.
62.
while

See MILLER, supra note 20, at 25-27.
Rtr.BSAME, supra note 58, at 1.

Id. at 43.
Id. at 1, 44. In comparison Hurricane Hugo produced losses of $9 billion,
the Loma Prieta earthquake resulted in losses from $6 to $10 billion. 6 CoMM.
ON NATURAL DISASTERS, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, HURRICANE HuGo 1, 3 (1994); U.S.
GEOLOGICAL SuRVEy, PROGRESS TOWARD A SAFER FUTuRE SINCE THE 1989 LOMA PRiETA
EARTHQUAKE 1 (1999). Another difference between droughts and other natural
disasters is that droughts do not normally produce offsetting economic benefits, such
as the reconstruction booms that follow floods, fires, storms, and earthquakes.
63. TOM Ross & NEAL LoTr, NAT'L CLIMATIC DATA CTR., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
available at
BnLION DOLiAR U.S. WEATHER DisAsTrEs: 1980-2000 (2003),
http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/pub/data/special/billionz.-2003.pdf (Aug. 1, 2003).
64. Id.
65. Associated Press, Deadlock in Colorado Supreme Court Favors Kayakers in Water
Rights Dispute, SHAWNEE NEWS-STAR, May 20, 2003 (noting that rafting and other river
recreation generated $125 million in Colorado in 2001), available at http://www.newsstar.com/stories/052003/New_26.shtml.
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water in the sense that crops can be allowed to die, and crop losses can
then be reimbursed.6 In this country, our food supply is not only
national but even global, and is well able to withstand even severe
regional droughts.
With animals raised as livestock, reimbursement is a little
trickier. Under some drought conditions, some ranchers could sell
livestock, perhaps at a loss, and then receive loss reimbursement
instead of water. The availability of this option depends on a number
of factors, including whether the livestock are raised for sale or are
normally kept for a longer time, whether it is possible to gather the
livestock and move the animals to market, whether a market even
exists at the relevant time, and many other variables particular to each
individual operation. Even accounting for all of these issues, the only
thing truly "needed" in times of drought is water to satisfy the essential
needs of human survival, and some plants and animals as well;
everything else is really a matter of policy choice, loss allocation, and
damage reimbursement.
Drought can also produce harsh impacts to plants and animals that
exist in natural ecosystems, rather than as assets of farming and
ranching, but wildlife and habitat are not directly represented in the
human economy. Nor do most states' water laws leave water for
aquatic
ecosystems
and
other
wildlife
habitat
wellprotected. Therefore, while emergency means may exist for
providing water, or for reimbursing the loss of animals and crops that
are part of the economy, impacts to natural vegetation and wildlife can
be severe, unprotected, and uncompensated.6 The next section
explores in more detail how current law handles drought impacts.
V. CURRENT LEGAL AND POLICY RESPONSES TO DROUGHT
An examination of current drought responses demonstrates the
existing system as a hodgepodge of approaches, primarily consisting of
crisis management and financial relief. Existing law, policy, and
practice seek to provide water during periods of drought, not only for
crucial human survival purposes, but for many other arguably less
critical purposes as well. When it is not possible to provide actual
water, the approach is to provide loss reimbursement in the form of
money. The approach is clearly reactive, rather than pro-active. The
law treats droughts as natural disasters, like floods or hurricanes, and
applies crisis management. After the crisis is over, business as usual
returns, and water users are usually no more ready to cope with the

66. At least this is true for annual crops. In the case of perennial crops that are not
replanted every year, such as nurseries, the damage done by lack of water can be longterm or permanent, and losses may also be correspondingly long-term.
67. See, e.g., Janet C. Neuman, Implementing Instream Flow Protections in Prior
Apprpriations Systems: Continuing Challenges, 7 RIvERs 345 (2000); see also Cynthia F.
Covell, A Survey of State Instream Flow Programsin the Western United States, 1 U. DENV.
WATERL. REv. 177, 180-88 (1998) (reviewing states providing such protection).
68. Neuman, supra note 67, at 345.
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next drought than with the current drought, even though the next
drought is inevitable and may come as soon as the next year. As flood
policy has allowed and even encouraged rebuilding in the flood plains,
thereby assuring that flood damage will occur again and again, our
drought response policy assures that drought disasters continue to
recur because water users return to the same behavior and attitudes as
before.
For example, Oregon law is fairly representative of western prior
appropriation states in its drought management provisions. In
Oregon (as with most states in the West), even in so-called "normal"
years, diminishing water supplies by middle or late summer often fail
to serve all water rights holders. During those times, the prior
appropriation doctrine itself allocates water by cutting offjunior users
one by one until enough water exists for the most senior
users.i However, if the situation progresses beyond the usual summer
and fall low flows, the governor has the authority to declare "that a
severe, continuing drought exists or is likely to exist."70 Once this
occurs, a number of special powers come into play. For example, the
governor may order state agencies and local governments to
implement water conservation or curtailment plans.7 ' The Water
Resources Commission may suspend normal administrative review
procedures to issue temporary permits for emergency use or exchange
of water, to approve changes in existing water right terms, and to more
quickly permit new wells. The Commission may also override existing
priorities to grant use preferences to those holding rights for human
consumption or stock watering use." State and local governments,
public corporations, and other water rights holders may buy or
otherwise obtain an agreement to use any existing water
7 4 right to
replace another water right unavailable due to the drought.
Administrative rules further detail the requirements for obtaining
the emergency permits. Significantly, if the changes allowed during
69. In a riparian doctrine state, in the event of a temporary water shortage,
cutbacks are made on a pro rata basis by all water users.
70. Op. REV.STAT. §§ 536.720, 536.740 (1999). The Water Availability Committee
of Oregon ("WACO"), a group of water experts from state and federal agencies, meets
regularly early in years when conditions such as precipitation, snow pack, and weather
forecasts indicate the possibility of imminent drought. Drought Watch, Or. Water Res.
Dep't, Water Availability Committee of Oregon,
http://www.wrd.state.or.us/drought_watch/waco.shtml. WACO compiles its
information in a report to Oregon's Emergency Management Office
("OEM"). Id. OEM then makes a recommendation to the Drought Council, which in
turn advises the governor of the drought. Id. Upon receiving requests from individual
counties, the governor then may declare a state of emergency due to drought,
pursuant to section 401.055 of the Oregon Revised Statutes, on a county-by-county
basis. Thus, a drought emergency declaration requires federal, state and local
coordination.
71. Id. § 536.720(2)(a).
72. Id. §§ 536.750(1)(a)-(f).
73. Id. § 536.750(1)(c).
74. Id. § 536.770(1)(b). The acquiring user can thus override the place of use and
type of use in the acquired water right.
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the drought result in injury to other water right holders, the
Commission may revoke permits or may require mitigation. 75 The
rules also require that scenic waterway flows and minimum streamnflows
receive protection through permit conditions.76 The rules further
authorize temporary leases to transfer water to other places or
purposes of use, including instream flows, without the normal process
and requirements." However, both statutes and rules state very clearly
that all of these special processes and authority last only while the
drought continues, and terminate when the governor declares the
drought "over." 78
Thus, Oregon's approach, which is fairly typical, clearly manages
drought as a temporary crisis, justifying a temporary suspension of the
usual rules. The overall goal of these statutes is simply to make it
easier for users to find water in a drought-by drilling a new well,
seeking a temporary use permit from a different source, or
transferring water from one place or use to another. For the most
part, the State's role is reactive, to facilitate transferring water to the
users who come forward. The normal procedural reviews, designed to
determine impacts of the activity, are eliminated. The State may only
proactively acquire water from willing water rights holders in order to
dedicate the water to a particular beneficial use, and grant use
preferences for human consumption or stock watering rights, even if it
conflicts with prior appropriation.
Even the State's authority to require conservation and curtailment
of water use is carefully circumscribed and limited to the duration of
the drought.' Once the Water Resources Commission has found a
drought likely to occur, the Commission may order individual state
agencies and political subdivisions to submit water conservation
and/or curtailment plans within thirty days, specifying efforts to curb
water use for nonessential public purposes, and to promote
salvage and reuse of
of waste,
conservation, prevention
water. ' However, the statute explicitly declares, "it is the intent of the
curtailments, adjustments,
Legislative Assembly that [these]
allocations, and regulations... be continued only so long as a
declaration by the Governor of the existence of severe, continuing

75. OR. ADMI. R 690-019-0040(5) (3) (2003),
http://arcweb.sos.state.or.us/rules/OARS_600/OAR_690/690_019.html.

76. Id. 690-019-0040(5)(a). Technically, "minimum streamflows" no longer exist
under Oregon law, but all such flows were converted to instream water rights after
passage of the 1987 instream water rights law. OR. REV. STAT. § 537.346(1) (2001).
77. Id. 690-019-0055(1),-0058(1).
78. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.720(4) (2001); OR. ADMN. R. 690-019-0030(1)-(2),
-0040(5)(d), -0055(4), -0058(4), -0059(6) (2003). The Oregon Drought Council,
upon recommendation from the Water Availability Committee, advises the Governor
as to when the drought is over. See supra note 70.
79. OR. ADmN. R. 690-019-0010(2) (2003).
80. OR. REv. STAT. § 536.780 (2001). This authority of the Commission is in
addition to the governor's authority to order such plans under section 536.720 of the
Oregon Revised Statutes.
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drought is in effect.""'
California law illustrates another approach. Rather than waiting

for a drought declaration to require conservation plans from
municipalities and water suppliers, California requires every "urban
water supplier" to prepare a water management plan that includes a
water shortage contingency plan, complete with draft ordinances to
implement it.82 Such a plan is a prerequisite to receiving drought

assistance from the State. s Even when a shortage plan is not in effect,
conservation
ongoing
considerable
requires
statute
the
efforts. 4 California also directly authorizes local water suppliers to
declare water shortage emergencies and then take action accordingly,
such as restricting consumption in order to conserve water for
domestic use, sanitation, and fire protection, and denying new
applications for water service. 5 Again, these special restrictions
remain in force only during the emergency, until the water supply is
replenished or augmented.'
During the severe drought of the late 1980s and early 1990s,
California also experimented with a drought water bank, which is a
state-run "brokerage" designed to enable and encourage the voluntary
transfer of water rights, primarily from agricultural users to municipal
suppliers. 7 Briefly, the water bank allowed parties to "deposit" water
by selling it to the State; that water was then available for "withdrawal"
by other parties through a purchase from the State." The State set the
price of deposits to the water bank at $125 an acre-foot, and the price
of withdrawals at $175 an acre-foot. 9 The major purpose of the bank
was to encourage farmers, who hold the majority of the state's water
rights, not to irrigate and instead make water available to municipal
users, who hold oftenjunior rights to a much smaller amount of the
state's water, to meet their needs during the drought. '0 Other goals,
however, included acquiring water to meet water quality standards
(diluting salinity in the Sacramento-San Joaquin River Delta), 9'
providing instream flows for fish and wildlife, and acquiring water for
carryover storage for the next year. The general consensus is that the
drought water bank was a success, particularly in the second year of its
81.

Id. § 536.720(4).

82.

CAL. WATER CODE §§ 10620, 10632(h) (West 1992).

83. Id. § 10656.
84. Id. §§ 10630, 10631.

85. Id. §§ 350, 353, 31026 (West 1971 & 1984).
86. Id. § 355 (West 1971).
87. Brian E. Gray, The Market and the Community: Lessons from California'sDrought
WaterBank, 1 WEst-NoRTHWEsT 17, 17, 20-21 (1994); Kevin M. O'Brien & Robert R.
Gunning, Water Marketing in California Revisited: The Legacy of the 1987-92 Drought, 25
PAC. L.J. 1053, 1075-76 (1994). Although a complete discussion of the drought water

bank is beyond the scope of this article, several good analyses-including the
preceding two articles--exist of the bank and its successes and failures.
88. Gray, supra note 87, at 20.
89. Id. at 21, 23.
90.

See id.at 17, 22.

91.

O'Brien & Gunning, supra note 87, at 1054-56, 1060.
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operation after the implementation of some adjustments and
amendments.2 The bank facilitated expedited transfers of water from
those who could manage without water during the drought (and take

cash in exchange) to those who needed additional supplies."9 s

Idaho law also authorizes a water bank for facilitating temporary

water transfers.9 ' In Idaho, the bank is primarily designed to provide
flexibility to irrigators, by allowing irrigators who do not need water in

a particular year or years to provide water to others who need water
without forfeiting their water rights.95 From 1992 to 2005, the
Department of Water Resources may also authorize the use of the
water bank to provide instream flows for salmon migration in the
Snake River." The bank operates regardless of any official drought or
shortage declaration.
Other drought-inspired temporary water markets recently sprang
up as well. As previously mentioned, the State of Georgia paid farmers
not to irrigate . In the Pacific Northwest, during the spring of 2001,
the Bonneville Power Administration ("BPA") offered $30 million to
Columbia Basin farmers not to irrigate over 90,000 acres of land in
order to save both water and electricity. 9 Due to the drought, coupled

with California's energy problems at that time, BPA needed every bit
of hydroelectric power it could generate.9 Buying back electricity
from farmers who would have used it to pump groundwater or surface
water, as well as keeping as much water as possible in the rivers to turn
the turbines, resulted in some fairly hefty payments.
The federal government also gets involved in drought response. In

fact, as many as forty-seven federal programs exist with some type of
drought-related relief, as well as eighty drought-related programs
overall,
scattered
among
numerous
agencies
and
departments.' These programs are not well coordinated or
92.

See, e.g., Gray, supra note 87, at 24.

93.
94.

Gray, supra note 87, at 21-24.
IDAHO CODE § 42-1761 (Michie 2003).

95. The water bank is not expressly limited to use by irrigators, but that has been its
primary focus. Idaho Water Res. Bd., Water Supply Bank (referencing irrigators and
canal companies),
http://www.idwr.state.id.us/waterboard/water%20bank/default.htm (last visited Nov.
20, 2003).
96. IDAHO CODE § 42-1763B. Interestingly, the statute also declares that "[n]othing
in this section shall be construed to alter in any way the existing contractual
obligations of the U.S. bureau of reclamation or to constitute a finding by the
legislature that the rental or use of water storage for augmentation of flows for salmon
migration is a beneficial use of water, that it is in the public interest, or whether such
use injures existing water rights." § 42-1763B(4).
97. See Whitt, supra note 37.
98. Janet Neuman, Editor's Note, Turning to the Market in a Crisis: Winners and
Losers, BIG RivER NEws, Summer 2001, at 2, available at
http://www.lclark.edu/dept/water/objects/brn73.pdf.
99. Id.
100. NAT'L DROUGHT POICY COMM'N, PREPARING FOR DROUGHT IN THE 21sT CENTURY
2-3, 5 (2000), availableat
http://www.fsa.usda.gov/drought/finalreport/execreport/execdownload.htm.
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integrated, however. 1' Most of the federal programs emphasize
financial reimbursement for drought-caused losses, either in the form
of after-the-fact emergency relief payments or through subsidized
insurance programs, such as various federal crop insurance
programs. Although there is currently some movement at the
federal level toward more emphasis on risk management and drought
preparedness, rather than crisis management, this new thrust is not yet
fully codified in federal law or programs.'"
Current laws, both state and federal, thus embody certain clear
policy choices. Droughts are treated as natural disasters requiring
emergency response, not as normal and regular occurrences
integrated into ongoing water management. Understandably, human
consumption is placed at the top of the list of essential water uses, as
are sanitation and fire protection. However, economic water uses are
not far behind and will be accommodated with water or drought relief
cost-benefit
any
overall
without
whenever
possible,
analysis. Procedural reviews are readily dispensed with as impediments
to meeting water users' immediate needs.
How adequate is the existing approach for dealing with future
droughts-droughts of increasing severity, frequency, and duration,
exacerbated by the additional uncertainties of projected climate
change? Existing legal tools for drought management are band-aids
only. Much more preventative work is needed to address the systemic
issue of improving resiliency. New legal tools are needed, or at least
some of the old tools need sharpening in order to deal with the
drought problem. Following are a number of suggestions to improve
the system's resiliency overall, from big-picture changes to incremental
changes made to existing laws to improve coping with drought.
VI. DROUGHT PROOFING THE LAW: MOVING FROM CRISIS
MANAGEMENT TO RISK MANAGEMENT
As I mentioned earlier, we must revise our view of normal to
include many more droughts. Unless both Congress and state
legislatures plan to appropriate large sums of money for the
emergency response approach to drought crises, and suspend the
rules on a regular basis, we also need to adjust our legal drought
response as well. We need less crisis management and more risk
management. We need to build in more resiliency and flexibility and
101. Id. at 6.
102. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. §§ 1471a(a), 1508(a)(1),7333(a)(1) (2000).
103. See generally NAT'L DROUGHT POUCY COMM'N, supra note 100; National Drought
Preparedness Act of 2002, S. 2528, 107th Cong. (2002) (potentially establishing a
National Drought Council with FEMA, to improve national drought preparedness,
mitigation, and response efforts). The bill was introduced in the 107th Congress and
sent to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, which has yet to act
on it. While this proactive bill languished in committee, the Senate passed the Small
Business Drought Relief Act of 2003, S. 318, 108th Cong. (2003), which continues the
reactive approach by expanding federal financial assistance to small businesses that
suffered substantial economic harm from drought.
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decrease our vulnerability to the inevitable droughts, in effect
"drought proofing" the system. What we are really trying to drought
proof is the economy and the livelihoods of those who are vulnerable
to the effects of drought. We need to drought proof and reform the
law in order to cushion the economy.
To start, in order to truly improve the resilience of the system,
both eastern and western states need a much greater appreciation of
water as a precious and finite resource. Water managers must change
their view of the big picture and work with, instead of against, the
available water in each region.
Western states, in particular, must acknowledge the limits of the
natural environment. Much of the West is effectively desert. If the
West is to support a viable and sustainable agricultural industry,
agriculture must become much more desert- and drought-friendly
than it has been in most places. Does it really make sense, or cents, to
produce 66% of the nation's crops in the most arid parts of the
country, particularly when those same areas experience the fastest
10 4
population growth and suffer from severe species degradation?
Although it is sacrilege to ask, would we be better off, as a nation,
investing in redeveloping the eastern and midwestern agricultural
industry rather than continuing to subsidize growing cotton and cows
in the desert?0 5 If policy makers decide to continue subsidizing
western agriculture, they must consider what is "best for the West" in
terms of crops and agricultural practices, such as dry-land hay farming,
high-value produce, or vineyards that take advantage of the natural
climate.
At the very least, American agriculture should become a model of
conservation and efficiency; government spending to that end would
be a wise investment. In addition to emergency relief payments, the
federal government sponsors and funds millions of dollars of
agricultural research annually. Perhaps the federal government
should target a great deal more of this research money to developing
low-water crops and practices. Indeed, perhaps federal spending
ought to be invested in weaning communities away from desert
agriculture and toward more sustainable and diversified economies.
Such large-scale changes are not likely to come overnight, if at
all. Therefore, states should develop comprehensive drought
management plans as a starting point, if plans are not already in
place. The National Drought Mitigation Center publishes a number of
planning aids and protocols, including a detailed description of a tenstep drought planning process.' The planning guidelines encourage

104. Ashworth, supranote 12, at 19-20.
105.

See Michael Lind, The New ContinentalDivide,THE AT.ANIc MoNTHLYJan./Feb.

2003, at 86, 87-88 (suggesting cutting off western irrigation subsidies to drive irrigated
agriculture

back

"eastward

to

states

like

Illinois and

http://www.theatlantic.com/issues/2003/01/lind.htm.
106.

Iowa"),

available at

Donald A. Wilhite et al., The Basics of Drought Planning: A 1"-Step Process, at

www.drought.unl.edu/plan/handbook/process.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
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states to identify the geographic areas and economic sectors most
vulnerable to future droughts, and to outline specific actions before a
drought occurs in order to help reduce the risk.1 7 The only action
examples provided, however, identify new or alternative sources of
water
that
might
increase
resiliency
to
subsequent
droughts."° Significant new water development is not possible or
feasible in many locations.
Furthermore, the planning protocols seem to assume the status
quo in local economies. Of course, it certainly is not the job of the
National Drought Mitigation Center to rethink existing patterns and
practices of water use, but nothing in the suggested planning process
even encourages the states to ask hard questions about whether the
degree of water dependence in local economies is appropriate given
the available water supply. The type of planning suggested is a vast
improvement over no plan, but is essentially "new and improved" crisis
management rather than true drought preparedness. A state would
do well to attempt a more ambitious drought plan that takes
significant steps towards greater sustainability in water use.
Another big-picture item needing further development is
technology and data gathering to support drought planning and
management. Water managers-from individual farmers, to state
water resources department officials, to federal water facilities
managers-need to obtain excellent data (both real-time and
predictive) about water availability, and must possess the ability to
manipulate that data easily to determine the impact of their decisions
and activities. The problem is not a lack of data; the technology of
drought prediction is becoming more and more sophisticated all the
time. The problem, instead, is one of data coordination,
dissemination, and responsibility1 9 Clear, useable data needs to be
available at all levels of decision making on a timely basis, and state
management officials need clearly defined responsibilities for
responding to early drought warning signals.
Comprehensive planning and good data are still only the
beginning, however. Water managers still need to do more to
eliminate bailout as the primary drought policy. What else would help
integrate the reality of regular and recurrent drought into ongoing
water management? Some incremental changes in current law and
practice are also possible. For instance, many states engage in some
kind of water availability analysis as part of the decision to grant water
rights. These analyses should be refined to reflect the regular
occurrence of drought, and to build in cushions and reserves, rather
than handing out every drop to private users based on what might be
available only a portion of the time. When states set minimum
streamflows and instream water rights, drought years need
consideration as well.
107. Id. (Step 10: Post-Drought Evaluation).
108. Id. (Step 5: Develop Organizational Structure and Prepare Drought Plan).
109. RIEBSAME, supra note 58, at 3.
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Water rights should thus come with some kind of a warning label,
noting that nothing guarantees water availability. Water users must
clearly understand the risks they are taking in order to protect
themselves with insurance, if available, or with contingency plans and
agreements for alternate water sources or other coverage, when a
drought does in fact materialize. This seems like a fair and easy
proposition, and is certainly consistent with the prior appropriation
doctrine itself. However, the difficulty in assigning risk to water users
and then making it stick was illustrated in the state of Washington
during a recent drought."0 Since 1980, certain new water rights issued
in Washington were designated "interruptible" rights, because the
rights were subject to minimum streamflows1 ' The rights' terms
specified that if streamflows fell below a certain level, the rights would
not be satisfied."' Yet, when that very thing happened in the spring of
2001, the State bent over backwards to avoid cutting off the
interruptible rights."' If the State assumed the risk in any event, then
what was the point of purportedly assigning the risk to the water rights
holders in the explicit terms of the water right? This is another
example of elevating emergency relief to be the primary policy.
Federal and state water managers should build in cost and pricing
data to foster rational decisions about water use (and land use), both
in and out of drought. Water should be priced like the scarce,
precious, and irreplaceable resource it is, instead of treating water as a
free good available to all private users for their own benefit. If the
idea of putting a price on a good on which we all depend for survival is
too abhorrent, then water should be treated like a true public
resource, available for loan to private parties, but not for exclusive
private ownership. We simply cannot continue to encourage overuse
of water with our pricing policies, especially in the arid regions, and
expect to appreciate and plan for scarcity.
Other incremental changes might involve simply institutionalizing
some of the accepted drought responses on an ongoing basis. For
instance, why wait until a drought is declared before requiring
conservation plans of water suppliers? Tiered conservation plans for
110. Despite Drought, 300 IrrigatorsWill Get Water, THE COLUMBIAN (Vancouver), Apr.
6, 2001, at C2.
111. Id.
112. Id.; Associated Press, Drought 2001: Water Supply Cut Off Early for Some Users,
COLUMBIAN, May 15, 2001.
113. See id. The State Department of Ecology modified the minimum flow
requirement, and also scrambled to find substitute water for the interruptible rights
holders by purchasing water with state funds from other water rights holders. Many of
the interruptible rights holders are nursery growers and orchardists, who could suffer
long-term damage from lack of water, so their plight was compelling. Erik Robinson,
Irrigators to Get Water Break, Relaxing Rules Will Let East-Side Farmers Use River Longer,
COLUMBIAN, Mar. 30, 2001, at Al; see also Mike Lee, Washington, Idaho Farmers Mull
Offers for Land Purchase by Energy Firms, TRi-Cri HERALD (Washington), Apr. 29, 2001
(explaining that growers give water to perennials like vineyards and orchards first
because they are harder to reestablish). But the state seemed all too willing to
completely ignore the very terms of the water rights and shift immediately to a bailout
approach.
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so-called normal years as well as for moderate and severe droughts,
and contingency plans for coping with drastic reductions in available
water supply, should be required of all water suppliers and other large
water users. Such plans should be required of the sectors most
vulnerable to drought as well. States without conserved water statutes
allowing water users to save water without forfeiting their rights,
should adopt them. Conserved water statutes reward people for
conserving and provide the users, the state, and the streams with some
cushion for dry years.'
Another way to "mainstream" emergency responses is to create
ongoing authority for a drought water bank or other state-run
brokerage system of some sort, similar to the Idaho program and the
California water bank of the early 1990s.1 5 In California, an unusual

situation exists, because there is a statewide water delivery
infrastructure that can move water hundreds of miles through the
state, and thus a statewide bank can actually function. Several other
states have at least some available infrastructure that could be used to
facilitate a smaller-scale brokerage, and those states without an
infrastructure could still provide basin-by-basin clearinghouse and
brokerage services. These types of water markets could exist all the
time, even if there was little activity in normal years, so the brokerage
would be ready before the crisis period of a severe drought. Even if
the support did not exist for an ongoing brokerage, if the legal
framework were in place, with specific triggering mechanisms, the
framework could spring into action when necessary. For instance,
predictions of lack of snowpack or reduced rainfall for an upcoming
irrigation season could trigger the activation of water bank operations,
statewide or in smaller localities, setting in motion a series of dry year
lease transactions or other short-term transactions well in advance of a
crisis. Furthermore, since emergency relief and compensation
probably will continue to play a role in drought response, the
programs and terms should be unified and coordinated, with clear
eligibility standards, central points of contact, uniform terms,
streamlined paperwork, and realistic timelines.
In order to make comprehensive drought planning, conservation,
and new pricing policies effective, all water use needs measuring and
monitoring. Because the need to measure water use is such a basic
and obvious point, it is hard to believe measuring is still a political hot
potato. Again, government funding to overcome this resistance would
probably be a sound investment.

114. In this regard, increased federal funding for conservation is promising. See
Press Release, U.S. Dep'ts of Interior & Agric., Initiative Will Help Agriculture
Producers, Communities Hit by Severe Water Shortages (June 5, 2003) (describing
$60 million of funding), http://www.doi.gov/news/030605b.htm; but see Mark
Cromer, Lawyers Debate Land Use, SAN FRANasco DArLyJouRNAL, Feb. 13, 2003.
115. See supra Section V.
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Although I recognized earlier that new water development is not
always feasible, an enlightened storage policy is certainly part of
improved drought resiliency. Enlightened storage means low-tech,
localized storage to the greatest extent possible. Aquifer storage and
recovery programs show promise, though proceeding with caution is
certainly important. Other small, off-stream storage projects designed
to limit evaporation and leakage may also help provide drought
buffers, particularly for smaller water users. Flexible, back-up storage
becomes even more important as efficiency improves, because the
tighter the efficiency, the less slack available in times of shortage.
In summary, we should approach our water situation like a
conservative bank or financial institution. We need sound
investments, lots of reserves, and a rainy-day (or not, in this case)
contingency fund.
VII. CONCLUSION
Droughts are normal. In fact, more drought in the future is
likely. We need to manage our water resources with that reality in
mind. That means expecting and planning for drought; decreasing
our water vulnerability as much as possible ahead of time; recognizing
and readying ourselves for a drought when it is coming; and
responding with as much flexibility as possible, allowing water to move
freely to essential and valuable uses, while maintaining an
environmental baseline of water in place. Incremental changes in
current laws can help prepare the system to respond to the next
drought, but only a major attitudinal overhaul and comprehensive
drought planning will begin to reduce drought's catastrophic losses.
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I. INTRODUCTION

As ground water within Colorado became increasingly exploited in
the late 1940s and early 1950s, the State began taking a closer look at
its ground water resources including the ways to manage them. Prior
to the 1950s, Colorado paid very little attention to ground water and
took the position that all ground water was presumptively tributary
unless the water user could demonstrate otherwise. 1 As a result,
administration of ground water occurred either entirely within or
Additionally, Colorado
outside the prior appropriation system.
historically did not require well permits, 2 and data collected in the
The author has limited this discussion to the development of designated
ground water within the State of Colorado. Ground water law has also developed
under Colorado law in the tributary context and in other areas besides designated
ground water basins.
t Mr. Fronczak is currently employed with the Colorado Division of Water
Resources and is Chief of Water Supply for the division. Mr. Fronczak is also licensed
as a professional engineer and as an attorney within the State of Colorado. The
author would like to thank Dr. Purushottam Dass and Mr. Steve Lautenschlager for
their assistance in the research and preparation associated with this article.
1. Safranek v. Town of Limon, 228 P.2d 975, 977 (Colo. 1951). Ground water
outside the designated basins and Denver Basin aquifers is still presumed tributary
unless shown otherwise.
2. JAMES N.

CORBRIDGE, JR.

§ 2.5, at 77 (rev. ed. 1999).
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State Engineer's office concerning the interaction between ground
water and surface water was incomplete. Therefore, the State did not
regulate ground water withdrawals.' This lack of regulation, coupled
with increased use of ground water within the state, created tension
between ground water and surface water users.
This article examines Colorado's statutory and regulatory
development of designated ground water and how this concept has
endured political and regulatory stresses for over thirty-five years. The
discussion begins with an analysis of the 1957 ground water law and
subsequent Colorado Ground Water Commission ("Commission")
actions. The article then addresses Colorado's primary ground water
regulation: the 1965 Ground Water Management Act. It continues by
analyzing the Act and relevant Commission actions, including the
adoption of ground water policy. Next, the article considers the
resulting legislation, whereby the Colorado General Assembly
attempted to refine the 1965 Ground Water Management Act. Lastly,
the article provides a brief description of current Commission rules
and regulations.
H. THE 1957 GROUND WATER ACT
In 1957, the Colorado General Assembly created the first law
addressing ground water withdrawals and use within Colorado. This
legislation created the first Ground Water Commission and authorized
the Commission to evaluate areas within the state where ground water
withdrawals appeared to have approached, reached, or exceeded the
normal annual rate of replenishment.5 The Commission consisted of
eleven members: (1) eight voting members appointed by the governor,
consisting of two from Water Division One, two from Water Division
Two, two from Water Division Three, one from either Water Division
Four or Seven, and one from either Water Division Five or Six; and (2)
three ex-officio members-the governor, the state engineer, and 6the
director of the Colorado Water Conservation Board-with no vote.
Under this legislation, the Commission could create "tentatively
critical ground water districts" which were areas where ground water

withdrawal resulted in excessive declines in the water table. Creation
of a "tentatively critical ground water district" was important, as it was
the only mechanism by which an entity could regulate ground water

withdrawals. Once the Commission created such a district, it would
immediately close the basin to further development of ground water
3. Minutes, Second Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo.
4-5 (July 12, 1957) (on file with author) [hereinafter GWC Minutes 7/12/57].
4. S. 113, 41st Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1957 Colo. Sess. Laws 863.
5. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 147-19-3(7) (1953 & Supp. 1960) (later codified at COLO.
REV. STAT. § 148-18-3(7) (1963), repealed by S. 367, 45th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess.,
1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246).
6. Id. § 147-19-3(1), (4) (later codified at COLO. REv. STAr. § 148-18-3(1), (4)
(1963), repealedby Colo. S. 367).
7. Id. § 147-19-3(7); see, e.g., GWC Minutes 7/12/57, supra note 3, at 6.
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resources, except for certain small capacity wells.'
Furthermore, the General Assembly desired some aspect of local
control in ground water resource development. The General
Assembly authorized the Commission to initiate elections and select a
local advisory board to assist in the administration, information
gathering, and maintenance of legally equitable and efficient
diversions and use of ground water within a critical district. 9 On
January 10, 1958, the Commission formed the Bijou Creek drainage
area as a tentatively critical ground water district. 0 The district
boundary for the Bijou Creek drainage extended north to south from
just below the Town of Wiggins (Township Three North in Morgan
County) to the Town of Bennett (Township Three South, the southern
boundary of Adams County) and east to west from the county line
between Morgan and Weld county to a point approximately twelve
miles east of Keenesburg."
Water users and the Commission quickly realized limitations to the
1957 Act. These parties viewed the Act as a well registration act and
not as a comprehensive ground water law.' 2 Surface water users
expressed concerns that ground water permits could not be denied
nor ground water use curtailed unless the well was located within the
boundaries of a critical ground water district. Surface water users also
complained they lacked protection against any adverse impacts due to
ground water withdrawals. On the other hand, ground water users
worried that their priority of ground water rights in relation to surface
water rights was unclear, and that they received no real right to their
ground water'withdrawals. 4 Furthermore, many water users felt the
Commission's authority was too broad in regulating the ground water
of the entire state; others felt the Commission lacked proper authority
to regulate ground water since a local advisory board could easily vote
to reverse the formation of a critical ground water district, as
evidenced by the Bijou Creek district in 1959.1 Both classes of water
users extensively debated the formation of critical ground water
districts and, usually, the hearings resulted in non-formation due to

8. CoLo. REV. STAT § 147-19-3(9) (1953 & Supp. 1960) (later codified at COLO.
REv. STAT, § 148-18-3(9) (1963), repealed by Colo. S. 367).
9. Id.§ 147-19-4(1), (6) (later codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-4(1), (6)
(1963), repealed by Colo.S. 367).
10. Minutes, Fourth Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo. 4
(Jan. 10, 1958) (on file with author) [hereinafter GWC Minutes 1/10/58].
11. Id. at 5; see also Map, Colo. Water Conservation Bd., Wiggins Tentatively Critical
Ground Water District (1958) (on file with author).
12. Minutes, Water and Climate Subcomm. Meeting 2 (July 12, 1958) (onfile with
author) [hereinafter WCS Minutes 7/12/58].
13. In re. Determination of a Designated Ground Water Basin in DrainageAreas of the
Northern High Plains of the State of Colorado: Proceedings Before the Colo. Ground Water

Comm'n, Wray, Colo. 3 (Apr. 14, 1966) (statement of Donald H. Hamburg, Attorney,
Assistant to the Chairman).
14. Id.
15. SeeWCS Minutes 7/12/58, supra note 12, at 3-4.
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local opposition. 16 Strong consensus existed to pursue new ground
water law.

M.

THE 1965 GROUND WATER MANAGEMENT ACT

In 1965, the Colorado legislature answered the call of the
Commission and water users and enacted Senate Bill 367, repealing
the 1957 Act.1 7 This new act provided the basic framework still in
existence today regarding the allocation and administration of
designated ground water and Commission authority within Colorado.
This Act is commonly known as the Ground Water Management Act,
but is also frequently called the 1965 Act."' The 1965 Act incorporated
the traditional doctrine of prior appropriation, but recognized that
strict application of the prior appropriation system was unworkable
within certain areas of the state where ground water was the primary
source of water.19 The statute declared, "[w] hile the doctrine of prior
appropriation is recognized, such doctrine should be modified to
permit the full economic development of designated ground water
resources."9 Because of this statutory grant, the General Assembly
freed designated ground water from the constitutional strict
application of prior appropriation and subjected designated ground
21
water to appropriation in accordance with provisions of the 1965 Act.
The 1965 Act created a new Commission consisting of twelve
members.22 The governor appointed nine of the members on the
same basis as was specified in the 1957 Act, plus one new member at
large. 2s The governor, state engineer, and director of the Water
Conservation Board remained members, and were now able to vote.
In addition, the 1965 Act provided a specific definition for
"designated ground water" 5 and gave the Commission the
26
responsibility to create "designated ground water basins."
16. See generally Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver,
Colo. (Jan. 15, 1960) (on file with author); Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground
Water Comm'n, Glenwood Springs, Colo. (Sept. 11, 1959) (on file with author);
Minutes, Third Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo. (Nov. 23,
1957) (on file with author).
17. S. 367, 45th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1965 Colo. Sess. Laws 1246 (codified at
CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 148-18-1 to -38 (1963 & Supp. 1965)).
18. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-38 (1963 & Supp. 1965) (current version at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-101 (2002)).
19. COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-1 (1963 & Supp. 1965) (current version at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-102(1) (2002)).
20. Id.
21. Id,; see also Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993
P.2d 1177, 1182 (Colo. 2000).
22. COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-3(1) (1963 &Supp. 1965) (current version at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-104(1) (2002)).
23. Id.
24. Id. § 148-18-3(4) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-104(4) (2002)).
25. Id. § 148-18-2(3).
The definition of designated ground water remains
essentially the same today, with the exception of the mention of Denver Basin Aquifers
in the current definition. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(6) (2002).
26. COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-5(1) (1963 & Supp. 1965) (current version at COLO.
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Furthermore, the 1965 Act specified that any persons desiring to
appropriate ground water in a designated basin must first submit an
It also directed the Commission to
application to the Commission.
publish the application, conduct administrative hearings on any
objections, and set forth the standards for issuance of new well permits
by determining that water was available for appropriation and the new
use would not create unreasonable waste or unreasonably impair
existing water rights.28 The 1965 Act outlined new standards for the
termination of "conditional" well permits, procedures for "final" well
permits, and protocol for determining priority and quantifications of
the actual beneficial use of designated ground water.
The 1965 Act provided procedures for instituting local control
over designated ground water resources through the formation of
Designated Ground Water Management Districts ("Districts")30 and
regulation of elections for the board of directors of such Districts.3 1 It
gave Districts the authority to adopt "control measures"2 and develop
standards to levy taxes necessary for financing the Districts' activities."
Provided they afforded applicants a hearing in front of the board, the
Districts also possessed authority to prohibit the use of ground water
outside District boundaries. 4 Finally, the 1965 Act exempted certain
wells from the Commission's permitting procedures."
Under the provisions of this new law, the Commission held its first
meeting on May 26, 1965.s6 At this meeting, the Commission voted to
seek funding for four positions: geologist/hydrologist, engineer,
technician, and stenographer, as it had no regular staff at that time."
The Colorado Water Conservation Board ("CWCB") offered to
continue funding any on-going studies of basins with potential for
The
designation, but limited funding to study new basins.3
Commission spent the initial meetings discussing how to implement
the new law; however, discussions about designating new basins

§ 37-90-106(1) (2002)).
Id. § 148-18-6(1) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107(1) (2002)).
28. Id. § 148-18-6(2)-(5) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-107(2)-(5)
(2002)).
29. COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 148-18-7, -8 (1963 & Supp. 1965) (current versions at
COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-108 (2002)).
30. Id. §§ 148-18-17 to -24 (current versions at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-118 to
REv. STAT.

27.

-125 (2002)).

31. Id, §§ 148-18-25, -26 (current versions at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-126, -127
(2002)).
32. Id. §§ 148-18-29(2), -30 (current versions at COLO. REv. STAT. §§ 37-90-130(2),
-131 (2002)).
33. Id. § 148-18-31 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-132 (2002)).
34. Id. § 148-18-29(2) (g) (1963 & Supp. 1965) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT.
§ 37-90-130(2) (f) (2002)).
35. Id. § 148-18-4 (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(1) (2002)).
36. Minutes, First Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n 1 (May 26, 1965)
(on file with author) [hereinafter GWC Minutes 5/26/65].
37. Id. at 2.

38. Id. at 3.
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continued 9 In late 1965 and early 1966, discussions focused upon the
formation of the Kiowa-Bijou and Northern High Plains designated
basins. In 1967, the Commission met monthly for several months and
later reduced meetings to a bi-monthly schedule lasting for two days.
The increased meeting times resulted from the increased submission
of data and reports for the formation of various basins. By 1968, the
Commission had approved the Kiowa-Bijou, Northern High Plains,
Southern High Plains, Upper Black Squirrel Creek, and Camp Creek
designated basins.4' It also approved the North Kiowa-Bijou district as
well as six Districts within the Northern High Plains designated basin.4
Additionally during this time, water users from the San Luis Valley
pushed the Commission for a ground water basin study in the valley.
However, the complexity of surface water and ground water
interactions, and the potential impact on the Rio Grande River
Compact, hampered efforts to complete such a study and form a
designated ground water basin. 43 The following table provides
a
44
timeline of formation of the basins and the associated Districts:
Designated Basin and Associated Management
District(s)
Northern High Plains Basin
Basin amended
Plains District
Sand Hills District
Arikaree District
Frenchman District
District Amended
Central Yuma District
W-Y District
East Cheyenne District
Marks Butte District
Kiowa-Bijou Basin
North Kiowa-Bijou District
Southern High Plains Basin
Southern High Plains District

Formation
Date
5/13/66
9/15/67
1/27/67
12/9/66
12/13/67
5/22/67
4/21/77
5/22/67
5/22/67
5/24/73
8/5/77
2/11/66
3/27/67
9/15/67
8/16/74

39. See generally Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver,
Colo. (Aug. 27, 1965) (on file with author); Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground
Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo. (July 30, 1965) (on file with author); GWC Minutes
5/26/65, supra note 36.
40. See generally Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver,
Colo. (May 13, 1966) (on file with author); Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground
Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo. (Feb. 11, 1966) (on file with author) [hereinafter GWC
Minutes 2/11/66]; Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver,
Colo. (Nov. 5, 1965) (on file with author) [hereinafter GWC Minutes 11/5/65].
41. Map, Office of the State Eng'r, Colorado Designated Ground Water Basins and
Ground Water Management Districts (Mar. 22, 1988) (on file with author)
[hereinafter GWC Map].
42.

Id.

43. See GWC Minutes 2/11/66, supra note 40, at 13-14.
44. GWC Map, supra note 41.

Issue 1

DESIGNATED GROUND WATER

Designated Basin and Associated Management
District(s)
Upper Black Squirrel Creek Basin
Upper Black Squirrel Creek District
Lost Creek Basin
Lost Creek District
Camp Creek Basin
Upper Big Sandy Basin
Basin amended
Big Sandy District
District Amended
Upper Crow Creek basin

Formation
Date
4/26/68
12/4/79
4/26/68
2/8/74
5/13/68
12/8/72
3/22/88
10/22/76
11/8/94
2/20/87

IV. INITIAL POLICIES TO MANAGE DESIGNATED
GROUND WATER
After forming the majority of the designated basins, the
Commission started adopting policies to manage designated ground
water.4 Similarly, the formation of management districts also resulted
in the adoption of district control measures. From March 27, 1967, to
the adoption of written policies in 1969, the Commission established
various policies through consensus during its regularly scheduled
meetings.
For instance, in March 1967, the Commission resolved to stop
granting large capacity well permits within the Kiowa-Bijou basin
In May 1967, the
except for permits for replacement wells. 6
Commission developed policies to appropriate ground water and
manage ground water mining within the Northern High Plains
designated basin. 7 The Commission limited the appropriation for
irrigation wells in the Northern High Plains Basin to two and one-half
acre-feet per acre of water, and a pumping rate of ten gallons per
minute per acre of irrigated land. " It also adopted a policy that
limited the depletion of the Northern High Plains aquifer to forty
percent over a twenty-five year period.4 9 According to the testimony of
county agents and bankers within the High Plains area, loan terms of
twenty-five years were generally used to finance irrigation systems.'"
Therefore, to ensure a return on their investments, these entities
requested that the Commission establish a depletion policy that would
provide for an economic life of the aquifer that would last until they

45. Commission policies evolved over time, as necessary, to address its needs and

remain in compliance with the statutory changes.
46. See Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Colorado Springs,
Colo. 1 (Mar. 27, 1967) (on file with author) [hereinafter GWC Meeting 3/27/67].
47. See Minutes, Regular Meeting of Second Quarter of the Colo. Ground Water
Comm'n, Denver, Colo., at addendum, item 5-A (May 22, 1967) [hereinafter GWC
Minutes 5/22/67].
48. Id. at 2.
49. Id. at addendum, item 5-A.
50. Id.
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could at least recoup their loans.5' To implement this policy, the
Commission utilized a three-mile radius as the area of influence
The
around a proposed well for their depletion calculations. 5
Commission preferred a three-mile radius to a one-mile or five-mile
radius; one mile did not encompass enough wells to apply the
depletion criteria properly, and five miles encompassed so many wells
that computing the depletion criteria became unreasonable."
In 1969, an irrigator in the Northern High Plains challenged the
Commission's policy of only allowing forty percent depletion over
twenty-five 5years
as an unreasonable measure of ground water
The challenge made its way to the Colorado Supreme
availability.
Court, where the Court evaluated the matter and found the policy
reasonable. 5 Nevertheless, the Commission's implementation of this
policy continued to improve through the development of additional
hydrogeologic data from the Northern High Plains designated basin
and the continued guidance of the Colorado courts.-6
Finally, on September 15, 1969, the Commission upheld a "well to
well" spacing requirement to alleviate "well to well" interference. After
denying a well permit application, the Commission established that it
would not approve any well permit applicant within one-half mile of a
previously approved or registered well permit unless geologic or
hydrogeologic information indicated otherwise.
V. SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ACTION
NEEDED TO CLARIFY AND CORRECT PORTIONS
OF THE 1965 ACT
While the Commission designated new basins and established
policy with respect to ground water withdrawal, water users and the
Commission identified various deficiencies in portions of the 1965 Act.
To resolve some of these deficiencies the General Assembly enacted
51. Id. The forty percent depletion of the saturated thickness of the Northern
High Plains aquifer was considered adequate to meet the economic life of the Ogallala
aquifer.
52.

Administrative HearingAD-312 Before the Ground Water Comm'n, Burlington, Colo.

9 (Dec. 12, 1967) (testimony of William R Smith, Deputy State Eng'r).
53. Id. at 14-15.
54. Fundingsland v. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, 468 P.2d 835, 837 (Colo. 1970).
55. Id. at 840 (upholding the Commission's denial of Mr. Fundingsland's
application for new appropriation within the Northern High Plains designated basin).
The court found the three-mile circle policy was both factual and administrative, and
was reasonable. Id. This was a case of first impression for the Colorado Supreme
Court regarding the three-mile circle policy.
56. The Colorado Supreme Court, in two separate decisions involving the threemile circle policy, ruled any portion of the permit not put to use in time expired. See
Peterson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 579 P.2d 629, 632-33 (Colo. 1978);
Thompson v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 575 P. 2d 372, 377-78 (Colo. 1978)
(holding the Commission should consider only the quantities of conditionally
permitted water actually applied to beneficial use when estimating the amount of
"existing claims" within a three-mile circle).
57. Minutes, Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Colorado Springs,
Colo., at items 5C-4, 24-6 (Sept. 15, 1967).

DESIGNATED GROUND WATER

Issue I

House Bill 10075' in 1967 to further clarify certain provisions of the
1965 Act. House Bill 1007 defined a replacement well, 59 established
requirements for abandonment of the original well upon completion
of the replacement well,' and provided authority for the Commission
to issue replacement well permits. 6 House Bill 1007 also provided an
avenue for well users to late register their wells and associated
beneficial uses by allowing the well owners to record their well's
beneficial uses occurring prior to May 17, 1965.62 However, to alleviate
abuse, the General Assembly limited late registration allowance to
recordings received on or before December 31, 1968.63
Except for a few more minor policy changes,64 the 1965 Act and
associated Commission actions remained unchanged until 1971. In
1971, the General Assembly enacted House Bill 1008, which
restructured the Commission and modified the 1965 Act. House Bill
1008 addressed additional deficiencies resulting from continued
ground water development and increased knowledge with respect to
the withdrawal of designated ground water.6 5
Historically, the Commission refused to delegate its authority.
However, House Bill 1008 authorized the Commission to delegate
some functions to its Executive Director.66 However, the Executive
create. a .designated
Director could not
..
.
67 basin, a management district,
or establish water right priority claims. In a meeting held on October
1, 1971,6 the Commission adopted a resolution delegating certain
58. H.R- 1007, 46th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1967 Colo. Sess. Laws 275.
59. Colo. HR. 1007, sec. 2 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-182(18) (1963 & Supp. 1967); current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-103(13)
(2002)).
60. Id.
61. Id. sec. 4 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-10(1) (d) (1963 &
Supp. 1967); current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-111(1)(c) (2002)).
62. Id. sec. 11 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-39 (1963 & Supp.
1967); current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-139 (2002)).
63.

Id.

64. On May 5, 1969, the Commission adopted its first policy dealing with the
approval of changes to existing water rights. Memorandum from D.H. Hamburg,
Counsel, Division of Water Resources, to C.J. Kuiper, State Engineer, (May 5, 1969)
(on file with the author). On October 27, 1969, the Commission adopted policy on
the criteria for issuance of new irrigation wells within the Southern High Plains. Colo.
Ground Water Comm'n, General Policy Guidelines 5 (Oct. 27, 1969) (on file with the
author). On May 15, 1970, the Commission, during their regularly scheduled
meeting, established a ban on the issuance of permits for wells within three miles of
the live flow of Chief Creek and the North Fork of the Republican River. Minutes,
Second Annual Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Denver, Colo. 7 (May 14
& 15, 1970) (on file with the author). On February 26, 1971, the Commission adopted
the policy that power coefficients were an adequate alternative to flow meters for the
measurement of ground water withdrawals. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, General
Policy Guidelines 3 (Feb. 26, 1971) (on file with the author).
65. H.R. 1008, 48th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1311.
66. Colo. H.R. 1008, sec. 3 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-3(6)
(1963 & Supp. 1971) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-104(6) (2002)).
67. Id.
68. See Minutes, Third Regular Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water Comm'n,
Denver, Colo. 1 (Sept. 30 & Oct. 1, 1971) (on file with the author).
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authority to its Executive Director:
1. Granting or denying well permit applications if clearly within
the Commission policies;
2. Implementing recommendations of the hearing officer if no
objection is filed with the Commission within the time allowed;
3. Granting or denying a ninety-day extension request to
complete wells if a request is filed prior to the permit
expiration;
4. Granting or denying one-year extension requests to put water
requests are made prior to the
to beneficial use if such
69
expiration of the permit.
House Bill 1008's additional changes included:
1. Revisions to the definitions of designed ground water and
aquifers; 70
2. New definitions of a resident agriculturist, an alternate point of
diversion well, and a supplemental well;7
3. Clarification requiring that designated ground water only is
used on land specified in the application without authorization
of the Commission, and requiring the Commission to
preliminarily determine if the application might be considered
favorably before publication; 72
4. Requiring well owners to provide certain evidence of the actual
well pumping rate prior to final permit grant;73
5. Providing new powers to the Commission allowing it to control
waste, to measure diversions, and to deny alternate point of
diversion wells and supplemental wells if any depletion caused
by such a well would exceed the rate of ground water depletion
prescribed by the Commission; 74
6. Modification to the publication requirements; 75
7. Specifying that hearings for actions taking place within the
water management district be held
boundaries of a ground
76
within such district;

69. Id. at 2-3.
70. Colo. H.R- 1008, sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-182(3)-(4) (1963 & Supp. 1971) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(2),
(6) (a), (6) (b) (2002)).
71. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-2(20)-(22) (current
version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-103(1), (14), (17) (2002)).
72. Id. sec. 5 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-6(1)-(2) (current
version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-107(1)-(2) (2002)).
73. Id. sec. 6 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 148-18-7(1) (current
version at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-108(1) (b) (2002)).
74. Id. sec. 8 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-10(1)(f)-(1)(g), (2) (current
version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-111(1)(f), (2) (2002)).
75. Id. sec. 9 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-18-11(1)-(2) (1963 &
Supp. 1971) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-112 (2002)).
76. Id. sec. 10 (codified as amended at § 148-18-12(1) (current version at COLO.
REv. STAT. § 37-90-113(1) (2002)).
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8. Clarification as to how parties could file objections to
Commission7 actions, other than actions on a well permit
application;1
9. Giving the management districts the authority to require
devices, procedures, measures, or methods to administer the
quantity of water extracted from any aquifer within their
boundaries;"
10. Specifying how affected parties (including the Commission)
appeal from management district decisions on administration
of designated ground water."
Furthermore, in 1971 the General Assembly, under House Bill
1010,0 required six of the appointed Commission members be
resident agriculturists from existing designated ground water basins,
since agriculture accounted for a major use of designated ground
water.8 ' However, the General Assembly also wanted other sectors of
the state to be represented and involved with the Commission.
Therefore, the General Assembly determined that one appointed
member would be a resident agriculturist from Water Division Three
and two appointed members would be from the municipal and
industrial sectors of the state. 2 Furthermore, the General Assembly
envisioned a Western Slope perspective on the Commission, and
accordingly directed a Western Slope representative to fill one of the
Finally, the General
municipal and industrial member slots.ss
Assembly's restructuring of the Commission placed the executive
on the Commission,
director of the Department of Natural Resources
84
instead of the Natural Resource Coordinator.
A. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE COMMISSION AND LOCAL DISTRICT
AuTHoRITy
To carry out the General Assembly's directive of retaining some
aspect of local control, the Commission adopted a policy in 1971
whereby it deferred to district rules and regulations if the district rules
and regulations applied to a specific water situation within the

77. Id. sec. 11 (codified as amended at § 148-18-13 (current version at COLO. REV.
§37-90-114 (2002)).
78. Id. sec. 13 (codified at § 148-18-29(2) (h) (current version at COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 37-90-130 (2002)).
79. Id. sec. 14 (codified as amended at § 148-18-30(1)-(2) (current version at
COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-131(1)(b)-(c), (2) (2002))).
80. H.R. 1010, 48th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws 1319.
81. Colo. H.R. 1010, sec. 2 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 148-183(3)(b) (1963 & Supp. 1971) (current version at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-104(3)(b)
STAT.

(2002))).
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. sec. 4 (codified as amended at § 148-18-3(4) (current version at COLO. REV.
STAT.

§ 37-90-104(4) (2002))).
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district.85 The Commission determined that the local district knew the
ground water resource better within their respective boundaries, and
therefore should be the authority regarding new designated ground
water appropriations and changes in water rights.
However, in the mid to late 1970s, conflict between well users, the
Commission, and the districts arose as a result of the aforementioned
Commission policy.
In 1979, the General Assembly responded by
Senate Bill 69 solved the problem
enacting Senate Bill 69. s7
concerning the roles assigned to the Commission and districts with
respect to new appropriations and changes in water right in all
designated basins. The General Assembly added language to the
statute confirming the authority of the Commission to grant changes
of water rights in all designated basins,8 and directing the Commission
to confer and consult with the districts within the designated basins
prior to any rule promulgation or action on any application for a
replacement well or change in water right. 9 Senate Bill 69 amended
the statute by affirming the Commission's powers to administer and
enforce water rights within the designated basins, except when similar
authority vests in the districts.90
The General Assembly amended the authority of the districts by
limiting their power to regulate the use, control, and conservation of
designated ground water only after the issuance of a final permit by
the Commission." However, the legislation granted districts the power
to exercise other administrative and regulatory authority, otherwise
exercised by the Commission.2 The bifurcation of authorities clarified
for the first time that the Commission was the only entity authorized to
issue new well permits and changes of water right."s Senate Bill 69 also:
1. Amended the final permit statute to allow any owner of an
existing valid conditional permit issued before July 1, 1978, to
file an amended statement of beneficial use with the
Commission on or before December 31, 1979, for changes to
the conditional permit, provided such change occurred and was

85. See Memorandum from C.J. Kuiper, State Engineer, Division of Water
Resources, to Members of the Ground Water Commission 4 (Dec. 29, 1971) (on file
with the author).
86. Confusion arose as to the authorities of the districts and the Commission with
regard to issuance of new well permits and changes of water rights within a
district. The confusion centered upon which entity's rules and regulations would
apply to the issuance of new permits or changes in water rights. Nevertheless, the
Colorado Supreme Court upheld the district authority. See generally N. Kiowa-Bijou
MgmL Dist. v. Ground Water Comm'n of Colo., 505 P.2d 377 (Colo. 1973).
87. S. 69, 52d Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 1371.
88. Colo. S. 69, sec. 4 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(1) (g) (1990)).
89. Id. sec. 5 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-111(3) (1990)).
90. Id. sec. 5 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-111(4) (1990)).
91. Id. sec. 8 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-130(2) (1990)).
92. Id. (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-130(2) (j) (1990)).
93. See Upper Black Squirrel Creek Ground Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Goss, 993 P.2d
1177, 1187 (Colo. 2000).
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94
approved on or before August 5, 1977;
2. Declared that the Administrative Procedures Act applied in
venue
judicial review of Commission actions, except that proper
95
is in the county where the water rights were located;
3. Clarified procedures for notice, publication, and appeal of
district adopted control measures.

B. COMMISSION'S INITIAL POLICY WITH RESPECT TO DESIGNATED
DENVER BASIN GROUND WATER

In 1973, Colorado became concerned about proposals to
ground water within
97
quantities• of non-tributary
•
withdrawal significant
•
and outside the Denver Basin aquifers. The General Assembly
responded by enacting Senate Bill 213.3' Senate Bill 213 mandated
that non-tributary ground water inside and outside the Denver Basin
aquifers be allocated based upon land ownership and an aquifer life of
100 years."6 While the General Assembly directed this bill specifically
at non-tributary and Denver Basin ground water development outside
the boundaries of the designated basins, the Commission decided, for
consistency, to handle allocations of Denver Basin ground water within
the designated basins similarly.'00 Therefore, on November 19, 1973,
the Commission adopted a policy to follow the requirements of Senate
Bill 213 verbatim.'0'
The Commission continued to follow legal developments
associated with Denver Basin ground water outside the boundaries of
the designated basins through policy adopted in 1985. In 1985, the
General Assembly enacted Senate Bill 5 revising the well permitting
and water rights statutes regarding appropriations of non-tributary
ground water and ground water in the Denver Basin aquifers outside
Even though this legislation did not affect
designated basins.
designated ground water directly, the Commission adopted new policy
guidelines in 1985 whereby applications for appropriations from the
Denver Basin aquifers within the designated basins were evaluated
according to similar criteria used to evaluate aquifers outside the

94. Colo. S. 69, sec. 2 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-108(3)(c)
(1990)).
95. Id. sec. 7 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-115 (1990)).
96. Id. sec. 9 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-131(1)).
97. Denver Basin aquifers are the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox
Hills aquifers.
98. S. 213, 49th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1973 Colo. Sess. Laws 1520.
99. Colo. S. 213, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. 148-18-36(5) (1973)).
100. See Memorandum from CJ. Kuiper, State Engineer, Division of Water
Resources, to Members of the Ground Water Commission 4 (Feb. 1, 1974) (on file
with the author); see also Minutes, Fourth Regular Meeting of the Colo. Ground Water
Comm'n 5 (Nov. 19, 1973) (on file with the author).
101. See Memorandum from CJ. Kuiper to Division of Water Resources, supra note
100.
102. S. 5, 55th. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1160.
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designated basins.'03
VI. FURTHER STATUTORY AND REGULATORY EVOLUTION
Other than the actions taken by the Commission with respect to
local ground water management districts and allocations from the
Denver Basin Aquifers, the 1965 Act and Commission regulatory
activity with respect to designated ground water remained essentially
unchanged from 1973 until 1975, when the General Assembly enacted
Senate Bill 134.04 Senate Bill 134 required the Commission give notice
by certified mail to conditional water right holders who have not
submitted evidence of beneficial use before expiring the conditional
well permit.'0 5 The notice allowed conditional water right holders the
in order to prevent the expiration of the
ability to late file evidence
1 6
1
conditional water right.
In 1985, the General Assembly enacted two bills that affected
designated basins, House Bill 1173 and House Bill 1322.
House Bill 1173 modified the definition of designated ground
water to include the Laramie-Fox Hills formation in the proposed
Upper Crow Creek designated basin. 01 7 House Bill 1322 amended the
designated basin statutes in the following ways:
1. The small capacity commercial well statute allowed commercial
uses in only one commercial business. 010
2. The final permit statutes allowed conditional permits to remain
valid provided the user put water to beneficial use three years
after the conditional well permit issuance date.'09
3. The change in water right statute clarified how the
Commission would evaluate changes in water rights. "0
4. The statutes clarified procedures for appealing actions of the
Commission and State Engineer, other than denials or
objections to published applications."'

103. See Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Policy Guidelines 6 (May 12, 1989) (on file
with the author). Senate Bill 5 of 1985 went into effect on July 1, 1985, and applied to
appropriation of ground water outside the designated basins. Colo. S. 5. Senate Bill 5
required two percent relinquishment from the use of non-tributary ground water, and
required four percent or a full replacement, as applicable, for use of not non-tributary
ground water. Colo. S. 5., sec. 3 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-137(9)(c)
(1990)). The Commission utilized the same criteria for appropriation of Denver Basin
ground water within the designated ground water basins including the requirement of
two percent replacement ground water for non-tributary, and four percent or full
replacement water for not non-tributary ground water. See Colo. Ground Water
Comm'n, Policy Guidelines 6 (May 12, 1989) (on file with the author).
104. S. 134, 50th Gen. Assen., 1st Reg. Sess., 1975 Colo. Sess. Laws 1394.
105. Colo. S. 134, sec. 1 (codified at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(4) (1990)).
106. Id.
107. H.R. 1173, 55th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1, 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1170.
108. H.R 1322, 55th Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., sec. 1, 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1172
(codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-105(1) (c) (1990)).
109. Id. sec. 2 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(4)).
110. Id. sec. 5 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-111(1) (g) (1990)).
111. Id. sec. 6 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-114 (1990)).
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5. The statutes repealed the requirement that the Commission
develop a priority list for water rights in the designated
basins.
6. The statutes set forth information to be included in a final
permit publication.'
In 1988, the General Assembly provided the Commission with
statutory authority to allocate designated ground water within the
Denver Basin aquifers based on the ownership of the overlying land
and an aquifer life of 100 years, similar to the Denver Basin aquifers
outside the designated basins. "4
Between 1988 and 1992, the Commission adopted various policies
addressing issues such as replacement plan criteria," 5 replacement
water requirements for the Denver Basin aruifers," 6 and revisions to
the Northern High Plains depletion criteria.
In 1992, the General Assembly enacted a housecleaning bill
revising the wording of the statutes regarding ground water
administration to increase the consistency of ground water
administration inside and outside of the designated basins. "' The
1992 Bill also changed and added to the definitions section of the
1965 Act."9 The legislation further amended the final permit statute
to eliminate the requirement of publication for late filing evidence of
well construction and beneficial use.
In 1994, the General Assembly passed House Bill 1289, which
clarified the Commission's authority to adopt rules to effectively
perform the provisions of the 1965 Act. 121 Additionally, House Bill
1289 clarified the process for judicial review of those rules.'2 Well
users were allowed a one-year extension for well permit construction
instead of the previous six months extension.' Furthermore, the bill
eliminated the requirement, for Denver Basin aquifer wells only, that
ground water be placed to beneficial use within three years from the

112.

Id. sec. 14.

113. Id. sec. 2 (codified as amended COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(5) (1990)).
114. H.R. 1173, 56th Gen. Assem., 2d Reg. Sess., sec. 1, 1988 Colo. Sess. Laws 1238;
see also S. 5, 55th. Gen. Assem., 1st Reg. Sess., 1985 Colo. Sess. Laws 1160.

115. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Policy Guidelines 6-7 (Nov. 18, 1988) (on file
with the author).
116. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Policy Guidelines 6-7 (May 12, 1989) (on file
with the author).
117. Colo. Ground Water Comm'n, Policy Guidelines 4 (Nov. 9, 1990) (on file with

the author).
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

H.R. 1008, 58th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1992 Colo. Sess. Laws 2297.
Id. sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. RPv. STAT. § 37-90-103 (1992)).
Id. sec. 3 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(4) (1992)).
H.R. 94-1289, 59th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 1746.
Colo. H.R. 94-1289, sees. 3-4 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 37-

90-111(1) (h), 37-90-115 (1990 & Supp. 1995)).
123. Id. sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(1)(c) (1990 &
Supp. 1995)).
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date of well permit issuance. 24 The statute only required Denver Basin
aquifer wells to be constructed timely, followed by the well owner filing
a notice of commencement of use with the State Engineer when the
well use commenced. 25
The most significant modification to the 1965 Act, with regard to
designated ground water, occurred in 1998 when the General
Assembly enacted House Bill 1151.126 This legislative action was one of
the largest modifications to the designated basin portion of the 1965
Act since the enactment of the Ground Water Management Act in
1965. House Bill 1151 modified the 1965 Act in the following ways:
1. Defined a "replacement plan;"'"

2. Clarified 2the
authority that may be delegated to the Executive
8
Director;

3. Defined what constitutes a commercial business under the
small capacity well statute;'2
4. Placed a five acre-feet annual limit on small capacity wells and
empowered the districts to adopt rules to vary this limit;'*"
5. Required the calculation of the cumulative effect of small
capacity wells within a subdivision in determining material
injury to other vested water rights; 1
6. Provided for the grandfathering of small capacity wells in use
prior to January
1, 1996, within confined animal feeding
2
operations;,

7. Required the issuance of a determination of water right prior
to obtaining a well permit for the construction
of large capacity
133
wells in the Denver Basins aquifer;
124. Id. sec. 1 (codified as amended at COLO. Rv.STAT.
Supp. 1995)).

§ 37-90-108(2) (a) (1990 &

125. COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(2) (d) (1990 & Supp. 1995).
126. H.R. 98-1151, 61st Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1998 Colo. Sess. Laws 1211.
127. Colo. H.R. 98-1151, sec. 2 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90103(12.7) (2002)).
128. Id. sec. 3 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-104(6) (2002)).
129. Id. sec. 4 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(1)(c)(II)
(2002)).
130. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(3) (b) (2002)).
131. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(3) (c) (2002)).
132. Id. (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-105(4) (b) (2002)).
133. Id. sec. 5 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107(7) (2002).
Prior to the addition of this statute, determinations for available water from these
aquifers could not be granted within the designated basins.
This lack of
determinations created a big hindrance in planning water supply for new subdivisions,
because the only way to determine available water required establishing a well water
right, and then completing the well prior to the permit expiration date. If well
construction was not completed in time, the permit expired and a new application
with public notice was required prior to issuance of a permit, even if the requested
permit was the same as the expired permit. This new notice could result in filing of
new objections and potential litigation. Under the provisions of this new statute, once
a determination is approved, well permits could be issued later in accordance with
terms and conditions of approval of the determination without the need for another
public notice. The statute greatly helped landowners in planning a legal water supply
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8. Added a new section on replacement plans, requiring
publication of said plans within sixty days of receipt of a
complete application;!4
9. Specified that a final permit is not required for a well with a
conditional permit issued on or after July 1, 1991, withdrawing
ground water from the Denver Basin aquifers;'"
10. Required, unless otherwise agreed by all parties to a hearing or
hold a
so ordered by the Commission, that the Commission
36
hearing within 180 days of filing a hearing request;
to enforce any violations of
11. Authorized management districts
terms and conditions;
small capacity well permit
12. Authorized management districts to administer the large
capacity wells after the issuance of a conditional permit by the
Commission.'3
VII. COMMISSION LEGISLATIVE RULES
As aforementioned, in 1994 the legislature passed House Bill 1289,
which granted the Commission the authority to promulgate rules to
carry out the provisions of the article."9 However, the Commission
adopted its first set of rules on February 7, 1992.1" Even though the
Commission adopted the rules without legislative authority, the
Commission possessed the foresight to utilize the formal rulemaking
process
as required under the Colorado Administrative Procedures
14 1
Act.

Prior to adoption of these rules, the Commission Staff routinely
processed applications for (1) new well permits to appropriate ground
water; (2) permits to replace existing wells; and (3) approval of any
changes to existing water rights pursuant policies, guidelines, and
other written and unwritten evaluation procedures. The new rules
replaced most of the previously adopted Commission policies,
guidelines, and procedures.
Designated Ground Water Basin Rules 5, 6, and 7 addressed the
Commission's evaluation criteria concerning appropriations of
designated ground water.'" Rule 5 focuses on new appropriations of

without necessarily constructing a well.
134. Id. sec. 6 (codified as amended at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-107.5 (2002)).
135. Id. sec. 7 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-108(3)(a)(II)
(2002)).
136. Id. sec. 10 (codified as amended at COLO. R~v. STAT. § 37-90-113(2) (2002)).
137. Id. sec. 13 (codified as amended at COLO. REv. STAT. § 37-90-130(4) (2002)).
138. Id. sec. 13 (codified at COLO. REV. STAT. § 37-90-130(2) (2002)). Previously, the
district could only exercise such authority after the Commission issued a final permit.
139. H.R. 94-1289, 59th Gen. Assem., 2nd Reg. Sess., 1994 Colo. Sess. Laws 1746
(codified as amended at § 37-90-111 (1) (h) (1990 & Supp. 1995)).
140.

Rules and Regulationsfor the Management and Control ofDesignatedGround Water, 2

CODE REGS. § 410-1 (1992). The rules took effect on May 1, 1992.
141. COLO. REv. SLAT. § 24-4-101 (2002).
142. See2 COLO. CODEREGS. § 410-1, Rules 5-7.
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designated ground water.44 Rule 6 concentrates on replacement well
permits. 1 44 Rule 7 deals with changes to existing water rights.'*
Additionally, Rule 11 allows the Commission to grant variance from
any rule in any specific case where strict
4 6 application of any provisions
of these rules causes unusual hardship.
The Commission continually reviews these rules for any
required revisions.147 Most of the previous revisions occurred in 1997
and 2001 and involve changes to Rule 7 governing changes of water
rights. Some of the revisions include: (1) limiting temporary change
of water right approvals for emergency situations only; 4 (2) limiting
changes in well locations within the Northern High Plains designated
basin to a move of no more than 300 feet from the original well
location; 9 (3) allowing well owners to register their wells in a
Commission water conservation program and avoid "use it or lose it"
situations; 5 0 (4) requiring a reduction in the future average annual
withdrawal from a well to reflect the effect of declining water levels at
the well site;'
(5) removing the sunset provision from Rule
7.10.4(b);' and (6) reforming Rule 11, the variance rule. 53
VIII. CONCLUSION
The State of Colorado took a proactive approach in administering
its ground water resources.
Since 1965, the State developed
designated ground water basins for maximum economic development
of ground water. However, the development of designated ground
water continuously changed as new information became available and
as development of the water resource expanded. As even further
development occurs, the 1965 Act may yet again be improved.
However, the general theme of the statute, as originally developed,
remained constant for over thirty-five years.

143. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, Rule 5.
144. 2 COLO. CODE EGS. § 410-1, Rule 6.
145. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, Rule 7.
146. 2 COLO. CODE KEGS. § 410-1, Rule 11. Authority to grant variances from
Commission rules is vested with the Commission and is not delegated to its Executive
Director.
147. Revisions to the rules occurred on the following dates: March 30, 1995, April 1,
1997, and February 1, 2001. 2 COLO. CODE REGS. § 410-1, at title page.
148. Id. Rule 7.2.1. This revision occurred on April 1, 1997.
149. Id. Rule 7.3.4. This revision occurred on April 1, 1997.
150. Id. Rule 7.10.4(a). This revision occurred on April 1, 1997.
151. Id. Rule 7.7. This revision occurred on April 1, 1997.
152. Id. Rule 7.10.4(b). This revision occurred on February 1, 2001.
153. Id. Rule 11. This revision occurred on February 1, 2001.

BOOK NOTE
DANIEL MCCOOL, NATIVE WATERS: CONTEMPORARY INDIAN WATER
SETrLEmENTs AND THE SECOND TREATY ERA, The University of

Arizona Press, Tucson (2002); 23 7 pp; $45.00; ISBN 0-8165-2227-8,
hardcover.
Native Waters evaluates the cultural, economic, and ecological
effects of Indian/Anglo water settlements. The "second treaty era"
refers to settlement agreements between tribes and their Anglo
neighbors over Indian water rights reserved during the creation of
tribal reservations. Typically during settlements, tribes have given away
a portion of their water rights in exchange for money that may enable
tribes to develop their remaining water rights. Native Waters addresses
the potential benefits of settlements over litigation, whether these
benefits are in fact attainable, and even if the benefits are attainable
whether they are goals participants should seek.
In the introductory chapter, McCool establishes
that while
settlements may bring about many positives, settlement participants
must recognize unforeseen impacts on Indian culture. Here McCool
tells the story of the Navajo people and the effect of the Navajo water
rights settlement and the Glen Canyon Dam on the neighboring
traditional Navajo culture. Primarily, the dam transformed the local
Navajo community from a traditional ranching economy to one of
"real jobs" located in nearby Page, the power plant, or at the dam. In
essence, the effects of the Glen Canyon Dam were far more reaching
than simply creating accessible water-it transformed the local
economy to the detriment of the traditional way of life.
Additionally, the introductory chapter presents the span of cases
that predated the settlement era and established the legal policy
known as the Winters doctrine. Essentially, during western expansion,
Anglo settlers assumed they alone possessed water rights in the arid
western states, operating under the theory that the routine
government priority of white objectives over Indian rights would
trump any Indian claims to water. Winters v. United States was the first
of a series of cases where the Court addressed whether, when creating
the reservations in the initial treaty era in 1888, the United States
reserved water rights for Indians. In its seminal 1908 decision, the
Court concluded the government reserved Indian water rights at the
time it created reservations. Although the Winters doctrine seemed to
secure Indian water rights, tribes rarely saw any actual water due,
mainly, to a lack of funding to develop their adjudicated water rights.
The primary outcome of the Winters doctrine was ceaseless litigation,
with attorneys the primary benefactors.
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In chapter two, McCool introduces the settlement policy, which
eventually became the predominant method of resolving Indian water
rights. The settlement process began under the Carter administration
as an alternative to lengthy, costly, and fruitless litigation. The
settlement process offered Indians and Anglos many desired objectives
not attainable through litigation: decreased costs, certainty, finality,
monetary settlements that enabled Indians to develop their water
rights, and comity between Indians and their neighbors. While
settlements offered many positives, they presented negatives as well.
Specifically, Indians renegotiated water rights that Indians and Anglos
already negotiated in the first settlement era.
Chapter three addresses whether the settlement process is in
actuality a preferable alternative to litigation, addressing the real costs
and the typical outcomes. Overall, the settlement process probably
costs the same as litigation. However, instead of Bureau of Indians
Affairs' spending going to lawyers, money now goes directly to people
in the West, enabling development of water rights. Hence, settlements
have provided direct funding for tribal and Anglo development of
water in the west.
In chapter four, McCool evaluates whether the settlement process
has delivered the finality, and whether finality is an advantageous goal
at all. Due to imprecise settlement language, of fourteen evaluated
settlements, less than half had been implemented. Thus, many
settlements have failed to deliver finality. Further, finality may not be
desirable because what may be good water policy today may be
outdated one hundred years from now.
Next, McCool investigates whether the settlement process has
provided "wet water" to Indians. Wet water is water actually delivered
and used by Indians as opposed to "paper water," which refers to
adjudicated rights that the Indians could not develop due to lack of
funding. The author estimates that the settlement process has
doubled the amount of water that Indians actually receive. In essence,
settlements have resulted in trade-offs in which Indians have given up
some water rights for money to develop water programs. McCool
concludes by speculating that with the inevitable increasing demand
for water in the West such a permanent trade may be ill advised.
Chapter six addresses whether the settlement process has delivered
the goal of comity between Indians and their neighbors. While all
parties desire mediation, inadequate mediation procedures have
hampered the objective of comity. Overall, in successful settlements
Indians and Anglos have achieved comity at local levels. However,
McCool believes the settlement process alone cannot bridge the
cultural rift created by centuries of conflict between the Indians and
their neighbors.
The environmental impact of settlements and the development of
water in the West is evaluated in chapter seven. Through the
settlement process, participants can address environmental goals,
whereas through litigation courts can only resolve the immediate
dispute between the two parties. Indians have frequently displayed a
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desire to preserve environmental goals, especially through using
instream flow for protecting fisheries. While Indian goals typically
complement environmental objectives, the author recounts Indian
attempts to develop their water rights that have conflicted with
environmental policies.
In chapter eight, McCool discusses the idea of water marketing.
Essentially, water marketing allows Indians to sell surplus water. Water
Geography, population
marketing is a complex process.
concentrations, and the location of diversion rights affect the viability
of water marketing. While there is certainly the demand for water
marketing, there are also obstacles, such as the legality of water
marketing and the ability of users to pay for the water. Further, an
added difficulty is that because tribes often hold significant quantities
of upstream water from large population concentrations, tribal water
marketing may disrupt water delivery or availability to those
population centers. Despite obstacles, many settlement provisions
enable water marketing. Water marketing provisions typically require
approval by the secretary of Interior, limit marketing to local areas,
and subject Indians to state water laws. Hence, if Indians market water
off tribal lands they become subject to state regulations.
McCool concludes by outlining how to improve the settlement
process so participants can obtain desired goals as well as account for
the unforeseen effects on tribal culture. Primarily, McCool advocates
that Indians must maintain independence through gaining proficiency
in developing water and legal expertise in negotiating advantageous
water settlements. While water settlements may offer numerous goals
such as certainty and finality, these goals may be a double-edged
sword. In essence, the primary unspoken goal of settlements is
survival, providing water to tribal lands so tribes can survive on the
reservations created in the initial treaty era. While the second treaty
era may provide certainty to tribal survival by providing much needed
water, without care the second treaty could result in tribal cultural
extinction.
HeatherChamberlain

COURT REPORTS
FEDERAL COURTS
UNITED STATES CIRCUIT COURTS
THIRD CIRCUIT
Raymond Proffitt Found. v. United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 343
F.3d 199 (3d Cir. 2003) (holding that Congress granted the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers broad discretion for implementing the Water
Resources Development Act's environmental protection mission at
specific water projects).
The Raymond Proffitt Foundation and the Lehigh River Stocking
Association (collectively the "Foundation") sued the United States
Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps") in the United States District Court
for Eastern District of Pennsylvania, claiming the Corps violated the
Water Resources Development Act of 1990 ("WRDA").
The
Foundation alleged the WRDA required the Corps to release
additional flows from the Walter Dam in order to improve the aquatic
environment downstream. The Corps asserted the WRDA's subject
provisions were discretionary, committed to the agency by law, and
unreviewable under the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). The
district court concluded there was no "law to apply" to the facts and,
therefore, the Corps' actions were not subject to judicial review under
the APA. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit disagreed and
held the WRDA contained specific obligatory provisions and the
Corps' actions were subject to judicial review. Nevertheless, the court
of appeals affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment,
stating the Corps' actions were not arbitrary, capricious, or in violation
of the law.
The Foundation consisted of members who recreated (including
fishing, hunting, boating and rafting) on the Lehigh River
downstream of the Walter Dam in Northeastern Pennsylvania. The
Corps operated the Walter Dam by replicating the natural
hydrograph-flows that would naturally occur if the dam was not
present-of the river. In order for the anglers, canoeists, and rafters
to have better recreating opportunities, the Foundation wanted the
Corps to augment the low summer flows by releasing additional water
and asserted the WRDA required the Corps to do so.
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The court of appeals first evaluated whether the Foundation's
allegations were subject to judicial review. The Foundation's first
claim-that the Corps failed to take action to include environmental
protections as one of their "missions" at the dam-was subject to
judicial review because the WRDA imposed an affirmative obligation
on the Corps to include these protections as a "primary mission."
Specifically, the statute stated the Corps' objectives "shall include
environmental protections." Due to this mandatory language, the
court of appeals disagreed with the district court and held that there
was specific law to apply to the facts, thus the claim was subject to
judicial review.
The second claim-that the Corps was not fulfilling its mission of
environmental protection at the dam-was also subject to judicial
review because no clear and convincing evidence existed that the
Foundation's interpretation of the WRDA was contrary to legislative
intent. The Foundation construed the WRDA as prohibiting the Corps
from implementing any policies causing harm to aquatic life. The
court determined this colorable interpretation was not clearly contrary
to legislative intent, hence the claim was also reviewable.
After concluding the Foundation's claims were reviewable, the
court analyzed the validity of each claim. It was undisputed that the
WRDA required the inclusion of environmental protections as a
"primary mission" of the Corps; however, the court stated it was within
the Corps' discretion to determine the appropriate level of
environmental protections for each specific water project. Applying
these principles, the court found that the Corps had in fact included
environmental protections as one of their missions, both at the overall
Corps level and specifically at Walter Dam. In 1996, the Corps revised
its environmental restoration and protection policies in response to
the WRDA. In 1994, the Corps' Walter Reservoir Water Control
Manual described environmental protections for the Walter Dam. The
court concluded that even though the primary objective of the Walter
Dam remained flood control, the Corps' 1996 and 1994 actions were
evidence of the Corps' intent to include environmental protection as a
primary mission. The court of appeals held that these measures
satisfied the minimum action required of the agency under the APA.
Lastly, the court concluded that the Corps did not violate the
WRDA by refusing to operate the dam in the manner requested by the
Foundation. Under the APA, a reviewing court can set aside an agency
action as arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not
in accordance with the law unless the agency action is committed to
agency discretion by law. The WRDA vested broad discretion with the
Corps; therefore, the court held that the agency's decision to
reproduce the natural hydrograph did not violate the APA.
Overall, the appellate court concluded the WRDA included
specific laws for the judiciary to apply, the Corps complied with those
laws by taking actions to facilitate the implementation of
environmental protections, and lastly, the Corps had broad discretion
for determining the type of environmental protection at each water
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project. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of
summary judgment for reasons different than those offered by the
district court.
Lisa M. Thompson

FOURTH CIRCUIT
Am. Canoe Ass'n, Inc. v. Murphy Farms, Inc., 326 F.3d 505 (4th Cir.
2003) (holding that plaintiffs bringing a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act satisfied the injury in fact and traceability requirements for
Article III standing by showing (1) concerns regarding water quality
affecting their recreational, aesthetic, and economic interests; (2)
testimony that a defendant discharged pollutants within the specific
geographic area of concern; and (3) evidence the pollutant was
capable of causing kind the of injuries plaintiffs alleged).
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision addressed whether
Canoe Association, Professional Paddlesports
the American
Association, and Conservation Council of North Carolina
("Environmental Groups") had standing to sue two jointly operating
North Carolina hog farms in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina under the Clean Water Act's
("CWA") citizen suit provision. Specifically, the Environmental
Groups claimed that D.M. Farms of Rose Hill LLC and Murphy Farms
Inc. ("Hog Farmers") violated the CWA by discharging swine waste
into Six Runs Creek without a National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System ("NPDES") permit. Prior to this suit, the Hog
Farmers operated under a North Carolina Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Animal Waste Management Plan
("State Plan") that prohibited animal waste discharges to surface
waters. As a result, the Hog Farmers had not applied for an NPDES
permit. However, on two occasions while operating under the State
Plan, the Hog Farmers discharged animal waste into waters of the
United States without an NPDES permit.
The Environmental Groups sued the Hog Farmers for failing to
obtain an NPDES permit and for discharging waste without an NPDES
permit. The district court granted the Environmental Groups' motion
for preliminary injunction, thereby requiring the Hog Farmers to
apply for an NPDES permit. The district court also granted partial
summary judgment to the Environmental Groups on the claims that
the discharges violated the CWA. The Hog Farmers appealed. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remanded the
preliminary injunction issue to the district court for a mootness
inquiry and declined to review the partial summaryjudgment ruling.
On remand, both parties entered into a consent decree,
contingent on the Environmental Groups prevailing over the Hog
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Farmers' motions challenging the Environmental Groups' jurisdiction
and standing to sue under the CWA's citizen suit provision. The
Environmental Groups prevailed on the motions and the district court
entered a final judgment in accordance with the consent decree. The
Hog Farmers appealed again, and in this decision the Fourth Circuit
ruled whether the Environmental Groups (1) had standing to sue, and
(2) had shown the Hog Farmers' violations were ongoing at the time
of suit.
The Hog Farmers argued the Environmental Groups lacked Article
III standing because the Environmental Groups' members lacked
standing in their own right. The Fourth Circuit's analysis began with
the test outlined in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, which held an association establishes standing when "(a)
its members would otherwise have standing to sue in their own right;
(b) the interests it seeks to protect are germane to the organization's
purpose; and (c) neither the claim asserted nor the relief requested
requires the participation of individual members in the lawsuit." The
Hog Farmers focused on the first prong of the test and claimed the
Environmental Groups' individual members lacked standing in their
own right because the Environmental Groups' members were not in
an area impacted by the discharges, and discharges from other farms
caused any injuries the plaintiffs might have suffered.
The court held the Environmental Groups had standing to sue.
An individual must demonstrate three requirements for Article III
standing: an injury in fact, traceability, and redressability. The Hog
Farmers claimed the Environmental Groups lacked injury in fact and
traceability. The court relied upon Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Environmental Services and Friends of the Earth v. Gaston Cpper Recycling
Corporation as authority for resolving the factual issue of whether
members of the Environmental Groups had standing to sue. The
Fourth Circuit noted that although this case presented fewer
discharges than both the Laidlaw and Gaston Copper cases, the
testimony of members established an injury in fact because the
members alleged harm to their recreational, aesthetic, and
commercial interests and were within the area around the time of the
discharges.
The Fourth Circuit also addressed the traceability issue. To show
addressability, the Environmental Groups needed to show the Hog
Farmers' discharges caused or contributed to the kinds of injuries that
the members alleged in the specific area of concern. The Fourth
Circuit noted it was uncontroverted that the Hog Farmers discharged
large quantities of hog waste, and that hog waste can cause the type of
The court also relied on the
injuries the members alleged.
Environmental Groups' expert testimony in holding that the Hog
Farmers discharges reached the geographic area of concern. The Hog
Farmers' argument that the Environmental Groups could not prove
traceability because other farmers who lived upstream might have
caused the contamination failed to persuade the Fourth Circuit. In
holding the Environmental Groups showed traceability, and ultimately
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had standing to sue, the Fourth Circuit noted that while other farmers
may have discharged upstream, the upstream discharges did not
negate the fact that the Hog Farmers' discharges might have harmed
the Environmental Groups.
Finally, the Fourth Circuit addressed the issue of continued
violations. A plaintiff seeking to sue under the citizen suit provision of
the Clean Water Act must prove that the defendant's CWA violations
were ongoing at the time of suit. The Fourth Circuit held that the
district court erroneously decided the Environmental Groups had
CWAjurisdiction and that the district court made its decision without
the requisite factual development. Thus, the Fourth Circuit vacated
the district court's decision and remanded the continued violations
issue to the district court.
Ad-riano Martinez

Treacyv. Newdunn Assocs., 344 F.3d 407 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act
applies to any branch of a tributary system which eventually flows into
a navigable body of water).
The Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"), pursuant to its authority
under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), brought a civil enforcement
action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia to prevent Newdunn Associates, Orion Associates, and
Northwest Contractors (collectively "Newdunn") from ditching and
draining wetlands on forty-three acres near Newport News, Virginia.
The Virginia State Water Control Board ("Board") initiated a separate
enforcement action in state court, premised on the Virginia Nontidal
Wetlands Resources Act of 2000 ("Virginia Act").
Newdunn
successfully removed the state action to federal court, which
consolidated the two cases and denied the Board's motion to remand
for lack of jurisdiction. The district court ruled for Newdunn in both
cases, finding that the Corps lacked jurisdiction over wetlands on the
Newdunn Property under the CWA, and that the jurisdictional reach
of Virginia law was coextensive with federal law.
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals first considered
whether a federal question existed to provide a proper basis for
removing the Board's case to federal court. Because the Newdunn
property contained land that satisfied both the Virginia and federal
definitions of "wetlands," the court held there was no tension between
the two laws, and thus, there could be no federal question jurisdiction
based on Virginia's decision to adopt the Corps' definition of
"wetlands." Moreover, the Virginia Act gave jurisdiction over all of the
state's waters to the Board, underscoring the lack of federal
involvement.
Newdunn argued that the Board and Corps' jurisdiction was
coextensive because Virginia code stated that certain state permits
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satisfied certification under the CWA. However, the court observed
that overlap between state and federal permitting procedures did not
mean the state's jurisdictional reach turned on an interpretation of
the CWA. So long as the state's permitting program was at least as
stringent as the federal discharge elimination process, it could stand in
place of the federal regulations. Finding that it lacked jurisdiction
over the Board's action, the court reversed the ruling of the district
court and remanded the Board's enforcement action to the Virginia
state court.
Turning to the Corps' civil enforcement action premised on the
CWA, the court held that the Corps' jurisdiction depended on
whether the waters in question were "navigable," as contemplated by
A holding that such waters met the
the United States Code.
.navigable" definition would provide jurisdiction to the Corps
pursuant to section 404(a) of the CWA. The court determined that
waters contained by Newdunn's ditching efforts were navigable under
the CWA, because pollutants added to both the manmade and natural
waterways on the Newdunn property would inevitably find their way to
the waters Congress sought to protect. Thus, the Corps' jurisdiction
was proper.
For these reasons, the court remanded the Board's state
enforcement action to Virginia state court, and the Corps'
enforcement action to federal district court for further proceedings
not inconsistent with its opinion.
Curtis Graves

United States v. Deaton, 332 F.3d 698 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding (a) the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers' tributary regulation fit comfortably
within Congress' authority to regulate navigable waters, (b) the Corps'
regulation of a roadside ditch under the Clean Water Act did not
exceed Congress' authority, and (3) the Corps' interpretation of its
own regulation was reasonable).
In 1989, the Deatons purchased a twelve-acre parcel ("Deaton
Parcel") on the Delmarva Peninsula, which separates the Chesapeake
Bay from the Atlantic Ocean. To make the Deaton Parcel suitable for
development into a small residential subdivision, the Deatons needed
to drain a large wetlands area in the middle of the property. The
Deatons hired a contractor in early 1990 who dug a drainage ditch
through the property. In the process of digging, the contractor
excavated dirt to either side of the drainage ditch in the wetlands area.
The drainage ditch flowed into a roadside ditch, which emptied into
the tributary system of the Chesapeake Bay.
In July 1990, the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps")
became aware of the Deatons' ditch and initiated regulatory action.
After a series of unsuccessful negotiations, the United States filed a
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civil complaint alleging the Deatons violated the Clean Water Act
("CWA") by discharging fill material into a wetland without a permit.
The United States District Court for the District of Maryland dismissed
the complaint. The government appealed and on appeal, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case. On
remand, the Deatons asked the district court to reconsider the Corps'
jurisdiction in light of the Supreme Court's recent decision in Solid
Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("SWANCC"). In SWANCC, the Court held the Corps did
not have authority under the CWA to regulate an isolated, intrastate
water-filled gravel pit used by migratory birds. The district court
denied the motion and the Deatons appealed to the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
The Deatons first argued the CWA did not cover the roadside ditch
into which their ditch flowed. The Deatons argued this in two ways.
First, they claimed the Corps' interpretation of the CWA-through its
regulation granting CWAjurisdiction over the roadside ditch-pushed
the limits of Congressional authority under the Commerce Clause, and
subsequently raised a constitutional question the court should avoid.
Second, the Deatons claimed that even if Congress did authorize the
Corps to regulate the roadside ditch, such authorization exceeded the
limits of Congress' Commerce Clause power.
The court began with the question of Congress' authority over the
roadside ditch under the Commerce Clause. Comparing regulation of
the ditch to regulation of other channels of commerce, such as the
transportation of women for immoral purposes, the court concluded
Congress' authority to regulate waters to prevent their "immoral and
injurious use" was just as powerful as Congress' authority to regulate
highways and other channels of commerce. The court then reasoned
that Congress could regulate the roadside ditch, as a matter of water
quality, to prevent its use for injurious purposes. Having concluded
this, the court held the Corps' interpretation of the CWA to regulate
the roadside ditch did not approach the outer limits of Congress'
power, alter the federal-state framework, nor raise a serious
constitutional question.
Second, the Deatons argued the CWA did not cover the roadside
ditch because even if the CWA allowed the Corps to regulate nonnavigable tributaries of navigable waters, the roadside ditch did not
meet the definition of tributary in the Corps' regulations. The
Deatons also argued that if the ditch did meet the definition of
tributary in the Corps' regulations, the regulation was an unreasonable
interpretation of the CWA. The court disagreed with the Deatons on
both arguments, concluding that the Corps' interpretation of its
regulation to include the roadside ditch was not clearly erroneous
because it was a reasonable interpretation of the term "tributary." The
court then concluded the regulation was a reasonable interpretation
of the CWA because there was a significant nexus between a navigable
waterway, its non-navigable tributaries, and adjacent wetlands.
The Deatons also contested the Corps' choice of indicator for
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wetland hydrology in the area where the Deatons excavated the
drainage ditch dirt onto wetlands. The court dismissed this argument
by deferring to the Corps' use of visual observation in its
determination that water saturated the ground within twelve inches of
the surface.
Finally, the Deatons disputed the district court's remediation order
requiring them to fill in the drainage ditch. The Deatons argued the
CWA only regulated the deposit of excavated dirt into wetlands, not
the taking of dirt from them. The Deatons claimed the proper remedy
was to remove the dirt to a non-wetlands portion of the property. The
court found the district court did not abuse its discretion in the
remediation order because of the district court's findings that (1)
removing the excavated dirt to another part of the property would do
more environmental harm, and (2) requiring the Deatons to move the
dirt would allow the Deatons to benefit from the CWA violations.
Thus, the court sustained the remediation order.
JamesParrot

SIXTH CIRCUIT
United States v. City of Detroit, 329 F.3d 515 (6thCir. 2003) (holding:
(1) Administrative Procedure Act can waive sovereign immunity for
non-monetary claims even in cases brought under different statutes;
(2) consentjudgment between federal government and municipality
imposed obligations pursuant to law serving as basis for entry of
injunction under All Writs Act; (3) Administrative Procedure Act
provided jurisdiction for suit in absence of exceptional circumstances;
and (4) Corps decision requiring environmental assessment must be
reviewed under arbitrary and capricious standard).
Pursuant to a consent judgment between the City of Detroit
("Detroit") and the United States Army Corps of Engineers ("Corps"),
Detroit was obligated to dredge and dispose of sediment from Conner
Creek contaminated by discharges from the city's sewage treatment
facility. Detroit sought a declaratory judgment from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan ordering the Corps
to accept dredge material from Conner Creek at a confined disposal
facility it was operating on behalf of the State of Michigan ("State").
The district court issued an injunction requiring the Corps to accept
the Connor Creek sediment to prevent frustration of the consent
judgment. The Corps appealed, and the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit vacated the district court's order and
issued an unpublished opinion that the district court both lacked the
authority and abused its discretion in issuing the injunction. Detroit
then filed a petition for rehearing. The court granted the petition,
reheard the case, held the district court had the authority to bind the
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Corps to an injunction to prevent the frustration of the consent
judgment, and remanded the case on two issues.
First, the Sixth Circuit examined whether sovereign immunity
precluded Detroit's declaratory judgment claim and held that under
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), the government waived its
immunity from non-monetary claims. The Sixth Circuit also held that
waiver of sovereign immunity under the APA can be applied in cases
brought under statutes other than the APA. Therefore, even though
Detroit did not bring its original claim under the APA, the Sixth
Circuit found the federal government had waived sovereign immunity
because the remedy sought was non-monetary.
Second, the Sixth Circuit investigated whether the district court
properly relied on the All Writs Act ("AWA") for asserting its
jurisdiction in the matter. The court noted that Detroit could have
brought this suit under the APA but instead relied on securing a
remedy through the AWA. The court relied on a recent United States
Supreme Court ruling that exceptional circumstances can prove the
inadequacy of the properly applied statue, thus providing a proper
case for application of the AWA. Because the district court failed to
consider whether Detroit should have brought the suit under the APA,
or if exceptional circumstances allowed the claim to be brought under
the AWA, the court remanded for determination of APA applicability.
Next, the court of appeals determined whether the district court
had the power under the AWA to issue the injunction compelling the
Corps to accept for disposal the dredged Conner Creek materials, and
noted that the AWA authorizes federal courts to issue commands
necessary to prevent the frustration of orders previously issued-a
power that extends to nonparties in certain situations. The consent
judgment against Detroit imposed legal obligations pursuant to the
AWA. Because the AWA makes no distinction between consent
judgments and orders, the court held that the district court had the
authority to issue the injunctive order under the AWA.
Finally the Sixth Circuit determined whether the district court
abused its discretion when issuing the injunction against the Corps by
evaluating four factors used to determine whether a writ issued to a
nonparty under the AWA lies within a district court's discretion, along
with an additional fifth factor for review asserted by the Corps. The
factors included: (1) the nonparty's relationship to the controversy,
(2) the burden cooperation would impose on the nonparty, (3) the
nonparty's interest in not providing assistance, (4) the importance of
the nonparty's assistance to fulfilling the goals of the order, and (5)
whether the district's court order was agreeable to usages and
principles of law.
With respect to the first and third factors the court held the Corps
was in a position to assist and had a substantial interest in taking care
of the contamination in a timely matter. Consequently, the court
concluded the Corps was not so far removed for assistance to be
compelled, and it did not possess a substantial interest in
noncompliance with the writ. As to the second factor the court
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determined that compliance with the writ would not impose a
substantial burden upon the Corps because Detroit agreed to both pay
all costs associated with disposal and indemnify the Corps for any
additional liability. With respect to the fourth factor, the court held
that the Corps' assistance was necessary because of the lack of feasible
alternatives and exigent circumstances. Finally, with regard to the fifth
factor the Corps argued that the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") required an environmental study even though the district
court found otherwise. The Sixth Circuit then held that to review the
Corps claim the district court should have applied the arbitrary and
capricious standard. Because the district court did not apply this
standard to the instant case, the Sixth Circuit remanded the case to
determine whether the Corps decision to perform an environmental
assessment was arbitrary and capricious.
Karen L. Golan

United States v. Rapanos, 339 F.3d 447 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding
wetlands adjacent to a drain and hydrologically connected to navigable
waters established jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act).
John Rapanos owned one hundred and seventy-five acres of land in
Bay County, Michigan. Wetlands on the property, which were the
subject of this dispute, lie between eleven and twenty miles from the
nearest navigable-in-fact water. In 1988, Rapanos made plans to clear
the trees from the land and eradicate the wetlands on his property. In
an effort to sell the plot to developers, Rapanos proceeded to destroy
wetlands that thrived on his property. The Michigan Department of
Natural Resources ("Department") informed him that a permit would
be necessary for development on the area. Later, Rapanos sought to
destroy any paper evidence that reported wetlands on his property.
Despite Department and Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
warnings, Rapanos began destroying the wetlands. The EPA charged
Rapanos with knowingly discharging pollutants into the waters of the
United States without a permit-a violation of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). The EPA alleged that these wetlands were connected to
"navigable waters," which the CWA protects. Rapanos argued that the
wetlands on his land were not "navigable waters" because they are not
directly adjacent to navigable waters. Rapanos' first trial ended in a
mistrial and the second trial in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Michigan concluded with a guilty verdict. After
granting Rapanos' motion for a new trial, the district court found that
the court committed plain error. The United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit reversed this holding, remanding the case to the
district court for sentencing. The district court sentenced Rapanos to
three years probation and a fine of $185,000. After appealing the
conviction, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and
remanded the case to the Sixth Circuit, which remanded back to the
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district court. The district court then dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction under the CWA. The United States appealed, claiming
CWAjurisdiction existed.
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit first examined whether the district
court correctly interpreted Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v.
Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC"), where the Supreme Court held
that non-navigable wetlands, if adjacent to navigable water, are under
the jurisdiction of the CWA. Because Rapanos' land was proximate
but not connected to wetlands, the Sixth Circuit also relied on a
Fourth Circuit decision in United States v. Deaton. The Deaton court
determined that a small area between wetlands and navigable waters
constituted a "significant nexus" and therefore was within CWA
jurisdiction. The Sixth Circuit used this holding to show that Rapanos'
land similarly had a "significant nexus" to wetlands, thus establishing
CWAjurisdiction.
Next, the court turned to a disputed jury instruction defining the
term "waters." Since Rapanos did not object to the instruction, the
court reviewed the instruction for plain error. The Sixth Circuit
determined that SWANCCs interpretation of the CWA jurisdiction
clause did not invalidate the agency's regulation upon which the
instruction was based, concluded that the district court jury could not
have based its decision on impermissible grounds, and held that
Rapanos' rights could not have been affected by the jury instruction.
Concluding the CWA applied to Rapanos' land and that the jury
instructions were sufficient, the court reversed the decision of the
district court, reinstated the conviction, and remanded the case to the
district court for sentencing.
Becky Bye

SEVENTH CIRCUIT
Home Builders Ass'n of Greater Chicago v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 335 F.3d 607 (7thCir. 2003) (holding a government agency
can enter into a coordination agreement with other regulatory
agencies for the purpose of correlating federal regulations under the
permit requirements of the Clean Water Act so long as the
coordination agreement does not increase the agencies' regulatory
authority beyond that granted by Congress).
The Home Builders Association of Greater Chicago ("Home
Builders") filed three successive complaints in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Illinois seeking injunctive
and declaratory relief against the United States Army Corps of
Engineers ("Corps"). The catalyst for the suits was an Interagency
Coordination Agreement ("ICA") between the Corps and various local
water-regulating agencies. Home Builders claimed adoption of the
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ICA lacked sufficient notice and comment and impermissibly
extended the Corps authority under both the Clean Water Act
("CWA") and the Rivers and Harbors Act. In response to Home
Builders' fourth attempt to amend their complaint, the district court
held the claim was nonjusticiable because Home Builders had failed to
identify a concrete injury caused by the Corps. The district court thus
dismissed the action. Home Builders appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the district
court's decision.
The purpose of the ICA was to coordinate federal regulation of soil
erosion and sediment flows under the permit requirements of the
CWA. The provisions of the ICA included both authorization for
consultation with specified local agencies regarding soil erosion and
sediment control plans and review of the implementation of these
plans through onsite inspections. Under the ICA, all signatories were
to remain independent. The Corps specifically retained the right to
make final decisions regarding opinions, actions, or findings within its
jurisdiction.
The controlling issue was whether the Corps' adoption of the ICA
was a final agency action within the meaning of the Administrative
Procedures Act ("APA"). The APA permits judicial review of "final
agency actions for which there is no other adequate remedy in a
court." Home Builders sought such review and claimed the Corps
used the ICA as a means to improperly leverage its regulatory authority
beyond that given by Congress.
Furthermore, Home Builders
complained the ICA would produce delays through additional
procedural hurdles and conflicting requirements. The court held that
although the provisions of the ICA included substantial discretionary
elements and represented a definitive pronouncement of Corps policy,
it only provided a procedural framework under which the Corps
operated. In support of this, the court identified express provisions of
the ICA granting the Corps the right to make final decisions.
Additionally, the court acknowledged the possibility that the ICA
would actually reduce, rather than increase, the costs and delays of the
permitting process, and held the ICA did not "impose new legal
requirements on regulated parties, or alter the legal regime to which
Home Builders' members were subject." The court concluded that as
long as the Corps did not leverage its regulatory authority using the
ICA "beyond that provided for by statute" (which the court found it
had not), entering the ICA was not a final agency action subject to
judicial review.
The court briefly addressed Home Builders' claim that the Corps
lacked statutory authority to enter into the ICA in the first place by
noting that the language of the CWA permitted such coordination
with local authorities. The appeals court then affirmed the judgment
of the district court, dismissed Home Builders' complaint, and denied
further leave to amend.
Brian M. Forbush
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United States v. Rueth Dev. Co., 335 F.3d 598 (7th Cir. 2003)
(affirming district court ruling rejecting a motion to void a consent
decree based on a later Supreme Court decision).
In January 1999, the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"),
Rueth Development Company and Harold Rueth (collectively
"Rueth") entered into a consent decree after the EPA issued an
administrative compliance order finding that Rueth had illegally
discharged fill material into wetlands adjacent to water flowing into
navigable waters of the United States. Rueth agreed to restore the
wetlands under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), paid a civil penalty, and
agreed to additional civil penalties if he failed to perform milestone
Although Rueth eventually
tasks within prescribed deadlines.
completed the wetland restoration, he failed to meet deadlines for
performing several of the milestone tasks. The government then
sought enforcement of the stipulated-penalties provision of the decree
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of
Indiana.
Prior to the district court's ruling, Rueth moved for modification
of the consent decree based on Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
In
County v. United States Army Corps of Engineers ("SWANCC').
SWANCC, the Supreme Court held CWA jurisdiction did not "extend
to isolated intrastate waters solely because they are used as habitats by
migratory birds." However, since the EPA did not use the "Migratory
Bird Rule" as its basis for jurisdiction in the present case, the district
court found the consent decree valid and granted the government's
motion to enforce the consent decree with penalties.
Rueth then moved to alter the judgment claiming there was no
evidence the wetlands were adjacent to a navigable waterway. The
district court consented that the issue of adjacency remained open to
dispute and thereby vacated that portion of the prior order.
Rueth additionally argued the consent decree did not allow
separate penalties for each uncompleted or delayed milestone. The
district court upheld its award of these penalties and held the
government's regulatory jurisdiction remained because Rueth, in
voluntarily entering into the consent decree, waived the right to
contest. Rueth appealed to the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Rueth's SWANCC argument. Rueth then argued there was a lack of
adjacency jurisdiction because the government had not provided
evidence the wetlands were adjacent to navigable waters, the district
court order assumed the wetlands were isolated rather than adjacent,
and the wetlands' link to the navigable waters was too attenuated to
establish adjacency. The court rejected these arguments stating that
because both parties agreed upon the consent decree, the need to
provide such information was not necessary for unanticipated future
litigation. The court also held that Rueth previously waived his right
to litigate this issue by signing the consent decree.
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Rueth then argued it would be unfair for the court to hold him to
the terms of the consent decree because at the time of the original
settlement, unlike the time of the appeal, the government still had the
ability to enforce jurisdiction over isolated waters. The court rejected
this argument stating that at the time of the consent decree, Rueth
weighed his options, calculated the chances of success, and voluntarily
settled the case. The court referred to United States v. Krilich as the
basis for rejecting this argument. In Krilich, the court rejected Krilich's
motion to vacate a consent decree based on SWANCC because the
court believed that to vacate the decree would discourage the
negotiation of settlements and would undermine the finality of such
agreements.
Next, Rueth argued the consent decree's language imposed
cumulative stipulated penalties not for each uncompleted milestone,
but rather for each day of noncompliance, regardless of the number of
violations. The court rejected this argument, stating that the clear
intent of the consent decree was to mandate a restoration in a short
period of time and that if the court were to accept Rueth's
proposition, there would have been no incentive to complete
unfinished milestones if already in violation of others.
The court also rejected Rueth's final arguments that: (1) the
penalties violated due process, (2) the district court erred by failing to
examine whether the EPA consented to the delays, and (3) the district
court should have considered the CWA's statutory criteria for
determining penalties because Rueth voluntarily signed the consent
decree. Thus, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.
GerrittJames Koser

NINTH CIRCUIT
County of Okanogan v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., No. 02-35512,
2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 16748 (9th Cir. Aug. 14, 2003) (holding Forest
Service had authority to restrict the use of rights of way to protect
endangered fish under Federal Land Policy and Management Act,
National Forest Management Act, Organic Administration Act, and
Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of 1960).
The United States Forest Service ("Forest Service") restricted the
use of the Early Winters Ditch and the Skyline Irrigation Ditch to
maintain instream flow levels for the protection of fish under the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"). The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Washington held that the Forest Service had the
authority to place restrictions on rights-of-way permits.
On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit, Okanogan County, a company, a partnership and three
individuals (collectively "Okanogan") sought review of the district

WATER LAWREVEW

Volume 7

court's ruling.
Okanogan argued the Forest Service was not
authorized to comply with the ESA and did not have the authority to
condition the use of the rights-of-way in a national forest on the
maintenance of instream flows because such restrictions would deny
them their vested water rights under state law.
In affirming the district court's holding, the Ninth Circuit
reasoned that ditch rights-of-way granted over federal land, from their
inception, were subject to termination at the discretion of the federal
government through its designated agent. The Ninth Circuit noted
that the Forest Service had the authority to restrict the use of the
rights-of-way to protect the endangered fish, and that the permits
themselves, from their inception, provided the government with
unqualified discretion to restrict or terminate the rights-of-way.
Furthermore, the court held the Federal Land Policy and
Management Act ("FLPMA"), National Forest Management Act,
Organic Administration Act, and Multiple Use Sustained Yield Act of
1960 granted the Forest Service authority to restrict the use of the
rights-of-way to protect the endangered fish. FLPMA specifically
authorized the Forest Service to restrict such rights-of-way to protect
fish and wildlife and maintain water quality standards without any
requirement that the Forest Service defer to state water law.
Therefore, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
Regan H. Rozier

Friends of the Wild Swan v. EPA, No. 00-36001, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
15271 (9th Cir. July 25, 2003) (holding a district court may utilize
equitable power to tailor remand requirements, tailor its remand
order with a timeframe for compliance, prohibit the Environmental
Protection Agency from issuing new permits, but may not prevent a
state from delisting water quality limitation segments).
The primary controversy in this case concerned whether the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and the State of Montana
violated the Clean Water Act ("CWA") because Montana failed to meet
deadlines for submitting pollution control limits. The CWA requires
states to identify water quality limitation segments ("WQLSs")-water
bodies where technology-based effluent limitations alone are not
stringent enough to implement the applicable water quality
standards-and set total maximum daily loads ("TMDLs") for each
WQLS. Montana submitted revised lists of WQLSs in 1992, 1994, 1996,
and 1998 (identifying approximately 900 WQLSs in 1998), but only
submitted one TMDL in 1996 and 130 TMDLs in 1998. Displeased
with Montana and the EPA's progress, several environmental groups
commenced an action in the United States District Court for the
District of Montana, Missoula Division. The district court found that
the EPA violated the CWA when it approved Montana's list. The
district court required the EPA to approve or establish TMDLs for all
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WQLSs on Montana's 1996 list by May 5, 2007 and develop a schedule
with Montana for developing all TMDLs by May 5. The district court
also noted that if the EPA did not comply with the timeline then the
district court would construe noncompliance as a final agency action,
barred the EPA from issuing new permits, and prohibited Montana
from delisting any WQLSs. The EPA appealed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court had
equitable powers to tailor the requirements of the remand order
because courts retain the power to grant equitable remedies. Second,
the court concluded the timeframe the district court ordered was
appropriate, noting that district courts have wide discretion to
administer equitable relief in order to ensure an appropriate remedy.
Here, the district court found the CWA had a strict deadline for
submission of TMDLs. Although initial TMDLs were due in 1979,
Montana did not submit TMDLs until 1996. The court held the EPA
failed to require Montana to timely submit TMDLs. Hence, the Ninth
Circuit found tailoring the remand order with a timeframe was
necessary to ensure Montana complied with the CWA. However, the
Ninth Circuit determined the district court abused its discretion by
specifying if the EPA failed to comply with the timeline, then
noncompliance would constitute final agency action.
Third, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order
prohibiting the EPA from issuing new permits until Montana and the
EPA established all required TMDLs because Federal regulations
prohibit issuing new permits where a permit would violate water
quality standards. Hence, the court held that the district court's order
complied with federal regulations and was permissible.
Finally, the Ninth Circuit concluded the district court's order
prohibiting EPA and Montana from delisting any WQLSs was an abuse
of discretion. Both Federal and Montana laws allow Montana to revise
its list, removing WQLSs when it receives better data or if it finds an
error in the original list. Hence, the district court's order conflicted
with state and federal law and was therefore an abuse of discretion.
For the foregoing reasons, the court concluded setting a timeline
for Montana to submit TMDLs and prohibiting the EPA from issuing
new permits was proper. However, the Ninth Circuit held the district
court abused its discretion by specifying a failure to meet timelines
would constitute final agency action and prohibiting Montana from
delisting any WQLSs.
HeatherChamberlain
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Northern Plains Res. Council v. Fidelity Exploration & Dev. Co., 325
F.3d 1155 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding coal bed methane discharge water
constitutes a pollutant under the Clean Water Act and the Clean Water
Act does not give Montana the authority to create state law exemptions
for such discharges).
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the United States
District Court for the District of Montana's grant of summary
judgment to Fidelity Exploration & Development Company
("Fidelity") on an appeal made by the Northern Plains Resource
Council ("NPRC"). The NPRC had filed a citizen suit under the Clean
Water Act ("CWA") alleging Fidelity unlawfully discharged pollutants
into navigable waters of the United States. On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit considered (1) whether coal bed methane ("CBM") discharge
water constituted a pollutant under the CWA, and (2) whether
Montana state law could exempt Fidelity from obtaining National
Pollution Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permits under the
CWA. After holding CBM discharge water constituted a pollutant
under the CWA, the court then held Montana could not create a state
law exemption to the CWA for CBM discharge water.
Fidelity extracted coal bed methane from deep coal seams beneath
the Powder River Basin in Montana. The process involved releasing
unaltered groundwater into the surface waters of Squirrel Creek and
the Tongue River. The unaltered groundwater contained several
chemical constituents identified as pollutants by the EPA and had
characteristics that could degrade soil, making it unfit for irrigation.
While Fidelity added nothing to this water, the resulting discharge had
a "salty" quality from its high sodium absorption ration ("SAR"),
making it a threat to water quality standards and irrigated land.
Nevertheless, the district court found CBM water was not a pollutant
and granted summaryjudgment for Fidelity.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit held CBM discharge water fell within
the definition of pollutant either as "industrial waste" or discharges
"of, pertaining to, or derived from industry." Furthermore, the
"produced" character of water drawn up from the "hydro-carbon
bearing strata" and then discharged into surface streams compelled
the court to find such water constituted a pollutant under the CWA.
Finally, the court referred to a portion of the definition of pollutant
characterizing it as a "man-made alteration of the chemical, physical,
[or] biological... integrity of water." Because CBM discharge water
fit all the above definitions, the court held it constituted a pollutant
under the CWA.
Second, Fidelity argued Montana state law exempted CBM water
from the permitting requirements of the CWA. Before this case, the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") already had approved
Montana's state permitting system, including the provision Fidelity
cited in its exemption argument. That section set forth criteria for
discharges that would not require a permit, and the CBM discharge
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water met these criteria. The court of appeals believed the district
court viewed the EPA's approval of the Montana state permitting
system as an implicit grant of authority to Montana to amend the
CWA's permitting system, and admonished that belief stating, "only
Congress may amend the CWA to create exemptions from regulation."
Thus, the EPA cannot allow a state like Montana to create a CBM
exemption because the EPA cannot delegate to a state more power
than it has under the CWA.
Thus, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment for
Fidelity and remanded with instructions to enter summary judgment
for NPRC.
Dan Wennogle

State Eng'r v. S. Fork Band of Te-Moak Tribe of W. Shoshone Indians,
339 F.3d 804 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that: (1) under the doctrine of
prior exclusive jurisdiction, federal district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over contempt action arising out of state water right
decree; (2) the McCarran Amendment applies to disputes involving
water rights acquired before its enactment; and (3) the McCarran
Amendment did not repeal the doctrine of prior exclusive
jurisdiction).
The controversy in this case arose over efforts by the State of
Nevada ("State") to administer a 1935 decree adjudicating water rights
on the Humboldt River ("Humboldt Decree"). The Humboldt Decree
defined water rights appurtenant to land purchased by the federal
government to create a reservation for the South Fork Band of the TeMoak Tribe of Western Shoshone Indians ("Tribe"). The Tribe held
the right to use the water rights, while the federal government
retained fee ownership of the land. Initially, the federal government
paid county water right assessments on behalf of the Tribe, but ceased
doing so in 1997. The Tribe made payments for a short period, but
soon passed resolutions challenging the State's authority to administer
the river within its reservation, and eventually charged a state water
commissioner with trespass. After failing to persuade the Tribe to
rescind its resolutions, the State initiated contempt proceedings in
state court, alleging the Tribe violated the Humboldt Decree. The
United States joined as a necessary party and removed the action to
the United States District Court for the District of Nevada pursuant to
the federal removal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442. The district court
concluded it possessed concurrent jurisdiction over the contempt
action, but abstained under Colorado River Water Conservation District v.
United States ("Colorado River"). The parties appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Both the Tribe and the
United States challenged the district court's abstention ruling; the
State challenged the district court's finding of concurrentjurisdiction.
As a threshold matter, the Ninth Circuit examined the question of
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concurrentjurisdiction. The federal removal statute merely permitted
removal of an action to a federal district court; it did not establish that
court's jurisdiction or trump jurisdictional bars. Here, the Ninth
Circuit found a jurisdictional bar existed in the common law doctrine
of prior exclusive jurisdiction.
Rooted in principles of comity and avoiding piecemeal litigation,
the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction recognizes that separate
courts cannot exercise jurisdiction over property at the same time.
Under the doctrine, once a court of competent jurisdiction obtains
possession, custody, or control of a particular property, another court
may not disturb that possession. The doctrine operates not as a
discretionary abstention rule, but as a mandatory jurisdictional
limitation. The Tribe and the United States argued the doctrine was
inapplicable on two bases: (1) that the underlying contempt actions
were in personam in nature, rather than in remn; and (2) under Colorado
River the McCarran Amendment ("Amendment") repealed the
doctrine in the arena of federal water rights.
Weighing first the argument that the contempt action was best
categorized as in personam in nature, the court observed that the
contempt action was brought to enforce a decree over a res, the
Humboldt River. In addition, the Tribe's property interest in the res
provided the state court's basis for jurisdiction. Also noting that the
Tribe's obstruction of water administration potentially affected other
users' property rights, the court characterized the contempt action as
quasi-in rem and found the doctrine fully applicable.
Next, the court turned to the question of concurrent jurisdiction.
Given that concurrent jurisdiction under ColoradoRiver relied upon an
interpretation of the Amendment, the court first considered whether
the Amendment applied retroactively to the Humboldt Decree.
Congress enacted the Amendment in 1952, but the Humboldt Decree
dated from 1935. Because the Amendment waives sovereign immunity
where the United States "is the owner" of water rights, and does not
state that it shall apply henceforth, the court held Congress intended
for the Amendment to apply retroactively. Moreover, the court noted
that applying the Amendment prospectively would impair state efforts
to adjudicate and administer water rights. Hence, the court held the
Amendment waived the United States' sovereign immunity in disputes
involving water rights acquired before its enactment.
Although finding the Amendment applicable, the court rejected
the United States' argument that under ColoradoRiver the Amendment
repealed the doctrine of prior exclusive jurisdiction. In the court's
view, Colorado River held that before a res is seized, both state and
federal courts possess concurrent jurisdiction over suits for the
determination of water rights of the United States, i.e., the
adjudication phase. Because the doctrine is only triggered after a
court seizes a res, and due to the presumption that statutes do not
overturn the common law unless stating so expressly, the court held
that the Amendment affirmed the doctrine, rather than repealed it.
Finding the doctrine fully applicable, and given the State's prior
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exercise ofjurisdiction over the Humboldt River, the court ruled that
the district court erred in concluding it possessed concurrent
jurisdiction over the contempt action. Thus, the court affirmed the
district court order remanding the case to state court, but on the basis
of lack of subject matter jurisdiction, not abstention. In doing so, the
court also affirmed the primacy of state jurisdiction over matters
relating to water rights administration.
Arthur R. Kleven

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 340 F.3d 903 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that Nevada rules on forfeiture and abandonment did
not provide an exemption for interfarm transfers were not exempt
from, and conveyance of water in dirt lined ditches does not provide
the basis for a water right to the adjoining land).
This suit involved water rights granted under the Newlands
Reclamation Project ("Newlands Project"), withdrawn in 1903 under
the Reclamation Act of 1902 ("Act"), and intended for use irrigating
land in Nevada. The Newlands Project diverted water from the Carson
and Truckee Rivers and allowed landowners to use that water for
irrigation. However, this diversion reduced the water held in Pyramid
Lake, granted to the Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe ("Paiutes") as a part of
their reservation. During the 1980s, many Newlands Project water
rights holders applied to the Nevada state engineer for transfers to
change the place of use of their water rights. The Paiutes objected,
alleging the holders forfeited, abandoned, or failed to perfect their
rights. The Nevada state engineer granted all but seven of the transfer
applications, based on a finding that Nevada state law exempted
interfarm transfers of rights from abandonment or forfeiture by users,
and that application of water to a "beneficial use" includes conveying
that water through a dirt-lined supply ditch. The District Court for the
District of Nevada affirmed the findings of the state engineer. The
United States, the Paiutes, and three applicants appealed the district
court decision. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part
and reversed in part. It reversed the district court decision affirming
portions of the state engineer's opinion based on interfarm transfer
exemptions, and dirt-lined ditches constituting a beneficial use. The
Ninth Circuit affirmed the portions of the district court decision
affirming the state engineer's use of substantial evidence for factual
findings regarding abandonment.
The Ninth Circuit first examined whether Nevada law exempted
interfarm transfers from state forfeiture and abandonment rules and
found that United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. controlled its
decision. In that case, the court held that Nevada state law created no
exemption from forfeiture or abandonment for interfarm transfers.
Finding an exemption would require the court to infer that the
government approved owners' transfer applications prior to
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submission.
The landowners raised three arguments: (1) the court should not
apply forfeiture and abandonment doctrines because they merely
altered the place of usage, and because they only discovered that they
owned water rights in 1983; (2) interfarm transfers should be exempt
from the doctrines of forfeiture and abandonment because a
government moratorium prevented the landowners from legally
transferring their rights; and (3) the court should uphold an equitable
exemption because the United States knew of, or should have known
of, the transfers prior to application.
The court rejected the landowners' first and third arguments
because the United States lacked the authority to approve interfarm
transfers under the Act and because allowing an exemption for
interfarm transfers would create an exemption for all informal
transfers, an approach rejected in prior court decisions. The court
dismissed the second argument because prior holdings rejected an
exemption from forfeiture and abandonment based on the
moratorium. In some cases, no period of non-use corresponded with
the moratorium. Additionally, the court held the Reclamation Act did
not displace state water law, and therefore required landowners,
despite the moratorium, to attempt to file or actually file transfer
applications.
The court next reviewed the state engineer's findings on
forfeiture, holding that landowners would qualify for equitable relief if
they could prove they attempted to make transfers during the period
of non-use, but that attempt failed because of the government's
moratorium. Appropriations with a priority date before 1913 are
exempt from forfeiture. The water rights in question lacked a priority
date equal to the Newlands Project date, meaning the state engineer
should determine the priority date on a case-by-case basis. Substantial
evidence supported the state engineer's findings on the priority dates,
so the court upheld those findings. However, the court remanded the
decisions for findings of fact on equitable considerations, including a
balancing test comparing considerations in favor of allowing the
transfers against possible damage to the Paiutes from additional water
diversion.
The court next evaluated the state engineer's findings on
abandonment, and concluded equitable considerations did not apply
to the doctrine of abandonment, and remanded the case for a case-bycase determination of whether the landowners possessed intent to
abandon. The court held that (1) intent to abandon required the
state engineer to consider all relevant circumstances, (2) landowners
could overcome abandonment claims by demonstrating continuous
use and attempted transfer, and (3) proof of lack of intent to abandon
would rebut claims of abandonment.
Landowners argued they retained their water rights because the
state engineer found the landowners put water to beneficial use in
locations other than the original place of use. Because water rights
run appurtenant to irrigated land under both state and federal law,
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the court held that the beneficial use of water must occur on the
parcel where use originally occurred. Therefore, the state engineer
erred in making the determination that use of water on the transferee
Due to the state engineer's
parcel overcame abandonment.
transfers, the court held that
interfarm
on
the
law
misapplication of
insufficient evidence existed to affirm the applications. The court
remanded the applications to the state engineer for findings of fact
consistent with its interpretation of the law.
Finally, the court evaluated the state engineer's finding that
conveyance of water in ditches within an irrigable area constituted a
beneficial use, granting a transferable water right to the owners of the
land. Even if the ditches constituted part of an irrigable area, the
court held they conveyed no transferable water right to the
surrounding land. Before obtaining a transferable water right, water
rights appurtenant to a parcel of land must be put to a beneficial use
and perfected. While the court found irrigation could constitute a
beneficial use, the right to water used for irrigation attaches to the
irrigated land, not to every piece of land through which the ditch runs.
The state engineer's conclusion that a dirt-lined ditch conveyed a
transferable water right to the surrounding land was erroneous.
The court remanded all of the transfer applications granted by the
state engineer, affirmed the state engineer's decisions regarding the
dates of the water rights, upheld findings of no forfeiture for
appropriations prior to 1913, and remanded findings of no forfeiture
for appropriations after 1913 to determine whether clear and
convincing evidence demonstrated non-use. The court also directed
the state engineer to consider the evidence to ensure continuous use
and whether the applicant attempted to file for a change in the place
of use unsuccessfully. In conclusion, the court reversed the state
engineer's finding that transfer of water through dirt-lined ditches and
later used for irrigation did not establish a transferable water fight on
the parcels of land containing the ditch.
JaredEllis

United States v. Alpine Land & Reservoir Co., 341 F.3d 1172 (9th Cir.
2003) (holding that the state engineer has wide discretion in
evaluating the affects on the public interest resulting from the transfer
of place of use of water rights under Nevada state law, and the state
engineer has no obligation to evaluate the adequacy of studies
prepared in compliance with NEPA where there are no parallel
provisions in state law).
The county of Churchill, Nevada ("Churchill") and the City of
Fallon ("Fallon") appealed the decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Nevada upholding the Nevada state engineer's
approval of eight water right transfers for the point of usage by the
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United States Fish and Wildlife Service ("USFWS"). The Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the case de novo. Churchill and Fallon
alleged the transfers were detrimental to the public interest as defined
by Nevada state law. Additionally, Churchill and Fallon claimed that
the state engineer erred by not making a determination on the
compliance with the National Environmental Policy Act's ("NEPA")
requirement for an Environmental Impact Statement ("EIS") by the
USFWS on the affects of current and future water right transfers.
Alternatively, Churchill and Fallon argued that the state engineer
should have withheld action on the water right transfers while an
appeal regarding the USFWS' compliance with NEPA was pending.
The USFWS purchased the water rights and successfully petitioned
the state engineer to transfer the point of use for the water rights as an
initial step toward the restoration of part of the endangered Lahontan
Valley wetlands in the Stillwater Wildlife Refuge. The wetlands are
located on the Carson River in Churchill County and became
endangered when the Reclamation Act of 1902 provided for the
conversion of lands in the arid West to productive agricultural land.
The wetlands were historically recharged each year by spring
floodwaters in the Carson River. The floodwaters are largely contained
today behind an irrigation water storage dam. The Fallon Paiute
Shoshone Indian Tribes Water Rights Settlement Act ("Settlement
Act") requires the restoration of 25,000 acres of the wetlands. The
eight water rights in question provide only 2855 acre-feet of water of
the approximately 75,000 acre-feet of annual diversion needed to
restore the wetlands in accordance with the Settlement Act.
Fallon, along with other Churchill residents, received its entire
water supply from wells in an aquifer system in the Carson Desert.
Churchill and Fallon contended that the USFWS' proposed change in
place of usage of the water rights would have a detrimental effect on
the recharge of the aquifer. The aquifer system is primarily recharged
by precipitation and seepage from the Carson and Truckee Rivers.
However, significant recharge of the system results by seepage from
irrigation ditches and application of irrigation water to the cultivated
fields. The USFWS' intended diversion point is at the head gates of
the irrigation ditches. Fallon and Carson alleged the loss of seepage
recharge from the water traveling through the ditches and infiltration
from irrigation would have a significant effect on the water table and
the water quality in the aquifer system and therefore be detrimental to
public interest.
Nevada law requires the state engineer to deny any water right
transfers detrimental to public interest. However, the state engineer
has wide discretion in determining what effects a point of use transfer
will have on the public interest. The state engineer is limited only by
the provisions listed in the many Nevada statutes related to water
rights. Further, under Nevada law, the state engineer has complete
discretion in determining the necessity of requiring environmental or
other relevant studies.
Churchill and Fallon contended the state engineer did not have
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sufficient evidence to determine the effects the transfers would have
on the hydrological system; therefore, the state engineer should have
required the USFWS to conduct further studies. The court of appeals
agreed with the district court, holding that the state engineer had
substantial evidence to consider, including two groundwater studies
prepared by the United States Geological Survey and an EIS for the
eight transfers prepared by the USFWS as required by the Settlement
Act. Evidence also showed that two of the water rights at issue were in
an area that was not a significant geological recharge zone and that the
remaining six rights were from an area no longer suited for
agricultural use. Considering all of the evidence available, the court
held the state engineer acted well within his authority in choosing not
to require any further studies, granted the transfer permits, and
dismissed Fallon and Churchill's protests.
Churchill and Fallon also contended that each transfer should
have been contemplated in relationship to the effects that all planned
transfers for the wetlands restoration would have on the hydrological
system; therefore, the state engineer erred in only considering the
transfers on an individual basis. The court pointed out that Nevada
law only requires the state engineer to make an assessment of a
proposed transfer on an individual basis and to hold otherwise would
expand the discretionary authority of the state engineer beyond the
limits listed in applicable state statutes.
Finally, Fallon and Churchill asserted the state engineer should
have determined the adequacy of the EIS prepared by the USFWS in
compliance with NEPA. Alternatively, they asserted the state engineer
should have put any action on the transfer petitions on hold while
litigation was pending before the court of appeals on the USFWS'
compliance with NEPA. With no parallel provision in Nevada law, the
court held that the state engineer correctly ruled he had no authority
to determine compliance with a federal statute. With regard to
delaying action on the water right transfers, the state engineer did not
issue the transfers until after the district court had ruled in favor of the
USFWS. By the time this case came before the court, the appellate
court had already affirmed the district court's decision regarding the

EIS, making the issue moot. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals thus
affirmed the district court's ruling upholding the validity of the water
right transfers granted to the USFWS.
Sean . Biddle
United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that
dispute seeking to clarify both Klamath Tribes' water rights and assess
propriety of water rights standard not ripe for federal adjudication).
Over the last twenty-five years, the United States, the Klamath
Tribes ("Tribes"), and numerous individual landowners have sought to
determine water rights to the Klamath River Basin ("Basin") in
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Oregon. In 1979, the United States District Court for the District of
Oregon announced standards for prioritizing how water is applied to
fulfill water rights granted by treaty to the Tribes, but left to Oregon
the task of allocating water to each of the Basin claimants. After the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the
district court's findings, Oregon developed and executed a
comprehensive administrative adjudication of over 5000 claims to
those rights.
Although adjudication was incomplete, the United States and the
Tribes initiated this action seeking a declaratory judgment that the
Tribes had a water right to support the gathering of plants and asking
the district court to clarify the nature and scope of the standards
announced in its earlier decision.
The district court issued a
declaratory judgment holding the Tribes had a water right to support
resources the Tribes gather, and announcing a two-part standard for
quantifying the water right. Oregon and several individual defendants
(collectively the "Brarens") appealed.
On appeal, Oregon argued the dispute was not ripe and that the
district court should have abstained from exercising its jurisdiction;
the Brarens appealed the district court's declaration of the two-part
standard for quantifying water rights. The court agreed with Oregon
that the dispute was not ripe and as a result did not address the
Brarens appeal.
In reaching its decision, the court outlined two components for
the determination of ripeness: constitutional ripeness and prudential
ripeness.
The court held that the facts sufficiently alleged
constitutional ripeness. A dispute is constitutionally ripe when there is
a "substantial controversy" between parties with adverse legal interests.
The court held that the conflict between Oregon and the Tribes
constituted a constitutionally ripe dispute. Oregon did not allege
otherwise.
The court, however, held the case did not satisfy the prudential
ripeness standard. To satisfy prudential ripeness, a party must show:
(1) fitness of the issues for judicial decision, and (2) hardship to the
parties should the court deny consideration.
Analyzing these
standards, the court found that this case failed both prongs of the
prudential ripeness requirement. First, the United States alleged that
the adjudication embraced a standard contrary to the Tribes' rights,
even though adjudication was nowhere near completion. However,
the court held the issues unfit for judicial decision because Oregon
had not officially adopted a standard to apply to federal water claims.
Second, the court found no resulting hardship to the United States
and the Tribes in waiting for additional factual developments. The
court stated that even if the district court's declaratory judgment were
enforced, the United States and the Tribes must nonetheless wait for
completion of adjudication to ultimately realize the relief sought.
The court thus held that the dispute was not ripe for federal
adjudication. The court vacated the district court's judgment and
remanded the case to the district court for entry of an order staying all

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

federal proceedings pending completion of adjudication and related
appellate review.
Kyle K Chang
TENTH CIRCUIT
Rio Grande Silvery Minnow v. Keys, 333 F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003)
(holding the Bureau of Reclamation has discretion to reduce
previously contracted water deliveries to comply with the Endangered
Species Act; diversion of water for the protection of endangered
species constitutes a beneficial use; and delivery contracts between the
Bureau of Reclamation and the water district did not create a
perpetual and exclusive right to the water by the district).
This action was the culmination of twelve years of litigation
between non-profit environmental and conservation groups and the
federal agencies charged with administering water diversion and
storage facilities along the Middle Rio Grande. The basis of this action
was to determine whether the federal agencies had the discretion to
reduce deliveries of available water under its contracts with various
water districts in New Mexico to comply with the Endangered Species
Act ("ESA").
Defenders of Wildlife, Forest Guardians, National Audubon
Society, New Mexico Audubon Council, Sierra Club, and Southwestern
Environmental Center (collectively "Environmental Groups") initiated
the litigation leading to this appeal. The Environmental Groups, on
behalf of the Rio Grande silvery minnow and the Southwestern willow
flycatcher,' sued John W. Keys, III, Commissioner of the United States
Bureau of Reclamation ("BOR"), the United States Army Corp of
Engineers ("Corps") and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service
("FWS") (collectively "Federal Agencies") for violations of the ESA in
the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico.
The ESA created a process by which federal agencies must ensure
that no harm comes to endangered or threatened species or their
habitat. After the FWS proposes a species for listing and identifies its
habitat, the ESA is triggered. The ESA prohibits any action that would
irreparably harm or jeopardize an endangered or protected species or
destroy or adversely modify its habitat. Environmental Groups alleged
the federal agencies, by fulfilling their contracts with various water
districts, jeopardized the endangered Rio Grande silvery minnow.
The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
1. Both species were named in the original complaint. The district court noted
that the Southwestern Willow Flycatcher had increased in total numbers, prompting
the parties to concentrate solely on the Silvery Minnow. The Tenth Circuit
subsequently confined their discussion to the Silvery Minnow.
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allowed the State of New Mexico ("State"), the City of Albuquerque
("City"), the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District ("MRGCD"),
and the Rio Chama Acequia Association ("RCAA") (collectively
"Intervenors") to intervene in this action. While waiting for a hearing
on the merits, the Environmental Groups sought a preliminary
injunction to compel the BOR to maintain a sufficient river flow
during drought to avoid jeopardy to the endangered Rio Grande
silvery minnow. The district court granted the motion, and the
Federal Agencies and the Intervenors appealed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals.
Environmental Groups questioned whether the district court order
was ripe for review. The federal agencies and the Intervenors urged
the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to make a decision on the merits.
The court took a functional approach in determining the ripeness
question by balancing the need for the decision against the risks of
making a premature decision. The scale tipped in favor of the
importance of the interests at stake-possible irreparable harm to an
endangered species, the federal agencies' contract obligations, and the
potential harm to water users. The court further held the litigation
below had fully developed the record and the issues presented were
purely legal, so review would be de novo.
The court stated that two acts of Congress authorizing major
projects in the Middle Rio Grande-the San Juan-Chama Project
("SJCP"), enacted in 1962, and the Middle Rio Grande Project
("MRGP") of 1948 and 1950-overarched the entire action. The SJCP
created a transbasin diversion from the Colorado River to the Rio
Grande. A tunnel through the Continental Divide moved water from
the San Juan River, a tributary of the Colorado River, to the Rio
Chama, a major tributary of the Rio Grande. Congress charged the
Secretary of the Interior with operating the project. The purpose of
the SJCP was to furnish water supplies in times of drought to the Rio
Grande Basin and the MRGCD for municipal, domestic, and industrial
uses, and provide recreation and fish and wildlife benefits.
Under this congressional authorization, the secretary of the
interior entered into a contract with the City in 1963, pursuant to
reclamation laws. The purpose of this agreement was to furnish the
City with 101,800 acre feet ("a.f.") of available project water from the
Heron Reservoir for municipal, domestic, industrial uses and other
beneficial purposes. In return, the City agreed to repay the costs
incurred by the United States in constructing the reservoir complex.
The repayment contract specified that annual operation and
maintenance costs attributable to the fish and wildlife function would
be paid by the federal government and that title to all project works
and facilities would remain with the United States until Congress
provides otherwise. The contract also qualified the allotment of
available water during periods of scarcity. When the available water
supply was less than the "firm yield" of 101,800 a.f., the City would
share in the available yield based on its apportionment. The contract
also gave the City a vested right to renew the contract indefinitely, after

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

all supply costs were paid in full on the condition that a water supply
was available.
A 1965 amendment to the contract authorized the Secretary to
make water available for a permanent pool for fish and wildlife and
recreation purposes at Cochita Reservoir. Under this amendatory
contract, the City agreed to release a portion of their SJCP water for
the Cochita Reservoir. Subsequent contracts between the BOR and
other New Mexico cities, towns, and water districts incorporated the
essential terms of the City's repayment contract.
Congress approved the MRGP under the Flood Control Acts of
1948 and 1950. The purpose of the MRGP was to stabilize the
economy of the Middle Rio Grande Valley, and to rescue and
rehabilitate the MRGCD. To facilitate this, the United States agreed to
acquire the MRGCD's obligations and forgive all its debt in exchange
for MRGCD assigning title and ownership of all of its property rights in
its reservoirs, dams, canals, flood control works, and water rights
(upwards of 1,872,000 a.f.) to the United States. This plan also
included provisions for fish and wildlife features. The MRGP charged
the BOR with reservoir improvements, channel rectifications, and the
rehabilitation of the project's irrigation, drainage, and extension
works. The Corps was to construct three dams and a reservoir in
addition to levees for local flood protection.
A repayment contract in 1951 between the MRGCD and the
United States provided that the United States agreed to maintain and
operate MRGP works in exchange for MRGCD's agreement to pay for
the reimbursable construction, operation and maintenance costs.
Subsequent contracts in 1953, 1955, 1956, and again in 1963, after
enactment of the SJCP to secure supplemental supply of water from
The 1963
SJCP water, amended the 1951 repayment contract.
amendment incorporated the fish and wildlife provision allocating
costs to the United States unless unusual circumstances arose to throw
the allocation out of balance-a Water Shortage Clause, which is
triggered in case of "drouth or other causes." The amendatory
contract also provided an Other Uses Clause authorizing water for
irrigation, municipal uses, and provided water for recreation and
wildlife benefits. As a consequence of these contracts, all the SJCP
water was appropriated.
In their appeal, the BOR contended the repayment contracts
(both the SJCP and MRGCD contracts, hereinafter "Repayment
Contracts") defined their obligations under the ESA. The BOR
maintained that because the Repayment Contracts did not expressly
permit a reduction of project water below the specified amounts, the
BOR lacked discretion to comply with the ESA. Under this reading,
the Water Shortage Clause applied only in circumstances when it was
impossible to deliver the fixed contractual water, not in circumstances
in which the BOR created the shortage for purposes of compliance
with ESA. Moreover, the BOR contended that, because the MRGP did
not mention fish and wildlife, and the SJCP plan expressly excluded
this use in a later report, use of the previously committed water was
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beyond the BOR's legal authority to constitute a reasonable and
prudent alternative under the ESA.
The court held that federal law controls the interpretation of a
contract entered pursuant to federal law when the United States is a
party. The Repayment Contracts limited the BOR's liability in case of
drought or "other causes" that might affect the amount of available
water. During times of scarcity, when the actual water available is less
than "firm yield," the non-federal parties would share in that available
water. The court also noted the Repayment Contracts expressly
provided water for fish and wildlife. These elements taken together
establish that the BOR determined the water available for allocations.
Additionally, the court held that preventing a threat to an endangered
species is an "other cause" by which the BOR can alter allotments.
The State, as an intervenor, offered its interpretation of the
Repayment Contracts, claiming Congress enacted the SJC project to
"provide sufficient water for human needs through times of drought."
The State contended that water for municipal, domestic, and
industrial uses was the principal purpose of the act, and that
recreation and fish and wildlife goals were incidental. The State
maintained the "drouth and other causes" clause was boilerplate found
in all BOR contracts to protect the government against liability in
unforeseen circumstances.
The court rejected the State's interpretation, holding that
diverting project water to prevent jeopardy to the silvery minnow is a
beneficial use under New Mexico law and the SJCP. The SJCP
includes the use of project water for fish and wildlife as a beneficial use
and does not delineate between principal and incidental uses.
As an intervenor, the City contended that reallocation of project
water to protect the silvery minnow exceeded the BOR's authority
under the ESA. As discussed above, the court held that under the
terms of the Repayment Contracts, the BOR may limit deliveries for
"drought or other purposes," which may include fish and wildlife. The
court further held that although the Repayment Contracts gave the
City a permanent right to the use of its allocations, the terms of the
Repayment Contracts conditioned this right. The BOR may reallocate
project water for the protection of the silvery minnow as contemplated
under the Repayment Contract.
The MRGCD asserted both that 217,000 a.f. of the water in
question are native, non-project waters and 20,900 a.f. are SJCP waters,
and that the BOR cannot curtail private water rights based on
obligations under the ESA. The court, in response, pointed out that
the MRGCD accepted the federal government's financial rescue in
exchange for conveying all their water rights to the federal
government and agreed to the BOR's management of project works.
In 1974, the BOR transferred the operation and maintenance of its
entire irrigation works, except for El Vado Dam and Reservoir, the San
Acacia Diversion Darn and those channelization and flood protection
works operated by the Corps. The MRGCD filed a cross claim for a
quiet tide action to MRGP works. The district court did not address
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the cross claim. Because this claim had not yet come properly before
the district court, the court did not address the quiet title action, but
focused its resolution of the MRGCD's appeal on the BOR's
obligations under the ESA. The court concluded that the BOR's
authority to manage the MRGCD and SJCP works triggered its ESA
obligations.
RCAA appealed on the grounds that the district court's standard
for granting injunctive relief afforded endangered species the highest
of priorities while completely ignoring "traditional equitable
principles." The court, quoting Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill,stated
that it is "beyond a doubt that Congress intended endangered species
to be afforded the highest of priorities," confirming the district court
application of the proper standard for granting preliminary relief.
Concluding that the BOR has discretion to reduce allotments of water
under its contact to comply with the ESA, the court affirmed the
district court's order.
Jason V. Turner

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Alabama Rivers Alliance v. FERC, 325 F.3d 290 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(holding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission should have
required power company to obtain water quality certification from
state before replacement of turbine generators that significantly
altered the dissolved oxygen level, volume, intensity and timing of
water flow into navigable waterway).
Alabama Power produces electricity with turbine generators at its
Martin Dam project located on Alabama's Tallapoosa River. Three of
its generators began commercial operations in 1927 and over time fell
into disrepair. Alabama Power, in December 2000, filed a license
amendment application with the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission ("FERC") to replace these generators. Alabama Power
estimated the replacement turbines would increase the flow of water
into the Tallapoosa by roughly 900 cubic feet per second ("cfs"), an
increase of 8.6%.
Alabama Rivers Alliance ("ARA") and two other organizations
subsequently moved to intervene in the application hearing, arguing
section 401(a) (1) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") required state
water quality certification for FERC to amend the license. FERC
rejected ARA's argument and approved Alabama Power's proposed
license agreement, reasoning the replacement of the existing
generators was "not an activity which may result in discharge within the
meaning of [s]ection 401 (a) (1)" since the existing generators would
release water in essentially the same manner as the replacement
generators.
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ARA subsequently filed a petition for rehearing, which FERC also
denied. The ARA then appealed FERC's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, claiming FERC
improperly approved the license amendment when it failed to require
Alabama Power to obtain water quality certification from the State of
Alabama.
On appeal, the court focused its analysis on section 401 (a) (1) of
the CWA and whether FERC properly authorized Alabama Power's
amended license. Specifically, the court addressed whether Alabama
Power's replacement generators would "result in any discharge in the
navigable waters."
ARA contended the operation of the new generators would create
significantly different "volume, timing and intensity" of water flow as
well as increase the flow of low dissolved oxygen water. According to
ARA, such differences required Alabama Power to obtain state water
quality certification in order to amend its license under section
401 (a) (1).
Conversely, FERC argued the generator replacement
would alter but not increase the amount of water passing through the
generators because of reductions in the daily runtime of the
generators.
The court disagreed with FERC's argument, stating such a
distinction lacked any basis in the statutory language of section
401 (a) (1).
Furthermore, the court explained the term discharge
contemplates the addition of a substance or substances into navigable
waters and that the replacement generators would cause an additional
900 cfs of water to flow into the river. Accordingly, low level dissolved
oxygen would be released into the river at an increased rate of 900 cfs.
The court therefore concluded the installation and operation of the
replacement generators was an activity that "results in discharge."
Finally, under section 401 (a) (1) of the CWA the court held
Alabama Power was required to obtain water quality certification from
the State of Alabama prior to approval of the license amendment
authorizing replacement of three of its generators at the Martin Dam
Project. Thus, the court vacated FERC's prior approval of the license
amendment because no certification existed at the time of the
amendment's approval.
J Reid Bumgarner
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Chippewa & Flambeau Improvement Co. v. FERC, 325 F.3d 353 (D.C.
Cir. 2003) (holding the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (1)
was not barred by issue preclusion from reexamining the status of nonnavigable waters, (2) did not abuse discretion in determining that a
reservoir was necessary and appropriate for the operation of other
plants, and (3) reasonably treated four closest downstream plants as a
"complete unit" for measuring the effect of a reservoir).
Chippewa and Flambeau Improvement Company ("Chippewa")
owned a reservoir on the Flambeau River in northern Wisconsin. The
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") decided that
Chippewa must obtain a Federal Power Act ("FPA") license for its
Turtle-Flambeau reservoir, although the specific reservoir was not
electricity generating. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit denied Chippewa's petition for review. In
1924, FERC determined that the Flambeau River was not "navigable"
under the FPA and that the reservoir in question would not otherwise
affect interstate commerce. Although the reservoir did not generate
electricity, seasonal releases increased electric generation downstream
at other hydroelectric plants owned by Chippewa's shareholders.
FERC determined that the operation of the Turtle-Flambeau reservoir
increased the total generation at plants on the Flambeau River by five
to six percent, and that the non-electricity generating reservoir was
"necessary and appropriate" for the operation of the licensed power
plants downstream and should be subject to licensing under the FPA.
Chippewa petitioned the court for review of FERC determination.
First, the court examined Chippewa's issue preclusion argument as
to whether FERC was bound by a previous determination that the
reservoir was not subject to federal licensing requirements. The court
first determined that FERC was free to reexamine its findings in order
to take account of changes in findings and governing law. The court
also held that issue preclusion is applicable only to issues actually
litigated in a prior proceeding; FERC never considered whether the
Turtle-Flambeau reservoir should be licensed. The court determined
that the downstream river plants were changes in the river structure
sufficient to justify FERC's reassessing the Turtle Flambeau reservoir.
Next, the court assessed Chippewa's contention that FERC's
assertion ofjurisdiction did not adequately identify how the reservoir is
"necessary or appropriate" to the maintenance and operation of the
electric generating plants. The court examined the impact from the
reservoir on the electricity generating reservoir and determined that it
was reasonable for FERC to deem the reservoir "necessary or
appropriate" to the operation and maintenance of the other plantsthe emphasis upon the effect on the power generation of other plants
was consistent with the purpose of the FPA.
Finally, the court determined whether FERC arbitrarily limited its
analysis to the top four plants closest to the reservoir, thereby inflating
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the electricity-generating effect from the operation of the TurtleFlambeau reservoir. The court first deduced that the most significant
impacts of the reservoir were on the four of the eight units that FERC
used in its findings. FERC used these four plants because they are
"physically and operationally interrelated" with the Turtle-Flambeau
reservoir. Because the Clean Water Act does not define the "complete
unit" of development for FERC's finding, the court held that FERC's
deference was not unreasonable. Concluding that the FPA supported
the required license for Chippewa's non-electricity generating
reservoir, the court denied Chippewa's petition for review.
Becky Bye

Friends of the Earth v. EPA, 333 F.3d 184 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding
Circuit Courts of Appeals lack original jurisdiction under the Clean

Water Act to review total maximum daily load decisions by the
Environmental Protection Agency).
The District of Columbia ("District") developed water quality
standards under the Clean Water Act ("CWA") for the Anacostia River
addressing both dissolved oxygen and turbidity. Because the Anacostia
violated these water quality standards, the District developed Total
Maximum Daily Loads ("TMDLs") for the river pursuant to the CWA,
which limited the maximum pollution input allowed into the water
body. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") approved the
District's TMDL for dissolved oxygen in December 2001 and approved
the TMDL for turbidity in March 2002. Following these decisions,
Friends of the Earth ("FOE") filed suit in the District of Columbia
Circuit Court of Appeals, claiming the standards were insufficient to
protect water quality. The EPA moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that
the court of appeals lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review
TMDLs because they are governed by section 1313 of the CWA.
Section 1369(b)(1) does not expressly authorize courts of appeal
to review TMDL determinations under section 1313. As a result, the
EPA argued that the court could not review the decision, while FOE
argued that approval of TMDLs fell within section 1369(b) (1) (E) of
the CWA.
The court of appeals ultimately held it lacked original jurisdiction
to review EPA approvals of TMDLs, dismissed the petition for review,
and transferred the case to the district court for consideration of
whether the action could be reviewed under the Administrative
Procedure Act. In reaching its holding, the court of appeals looked at
the plain language of the statute and held that 1369(b) (1) of the CWA
governed the limited original jurisdiction of federal courts of appeal
reviewing EPA actions.
The court noted the statute explicitly
authorized a court of appeal to review the approval of effluent
limitations under sections 1311, 1312, 1316 or 1345 of the CWA, but
was silent regarding the ability of a court of appeals to review approval
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of TMDLs falling under section 1313.
The court of appeals next focused on Longview Fibre Co. v.
Rasmussen. In Longview, the Ninth Circuit held it could not review
TMDLs because it lacked original jurisdiction. The Longview court
considered whether it could review TMDLs under the language of
section 1311, and determined that Congress' exclusion of section 1313
from the list of reviewable sections meant that Congress did not intend
for courts of appeals to originally review TMDL decisions. The
Long-view court also found that Congress drew distinctions between the
effluent limitations in section 1311 and section 1313 in other parts of
the CWA, thus indicating TMDLs could not constitute effluent
limitations under section 1311. Finally, the Longview court found the
listing of section 1312 also supported its argument that Congress did
not intend for appellate jurisdiction over reviews of TMDLs, because
1311 would subsume section 1312.
FOE encouraged the court to instead consider the Supreme Court
decision in Public Utility District No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington
FOE argued that the Supreme Court
Department of Ecology.
interpretation in Public Utility District incorporated section 1313
effluent limitations into section 1311, making TMDL determinations
reviewable by a court of appeals. However, in this case, the court of
appeals found the short reference in Public Utility District could not
overcome both the plain language of the CWA and the Ninth Circuit
opinion in Longview. The court argued FOE ignored the context of
the incorporation statement. The Supreme Court originally based the
incorporation statement on legislative history, but the court of appeals
argued legislative history provided no explanation of incorporation in
this context, and was therefore irrelevant. Because of the paucity of
explanation in Public Utility District,the court found the plain language
of the statute and the decision in Longview to mean it possessed no
original jurisdiction to review the EPA's TMDL decision. Thus, the
District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the case.
JaredEllis

COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
Norman v. United States, 56 Fed. C1. 255 (Fed. Cl. 2003) (holding (1)
Court of Federal Claims lacked jurisdiction over an illegal exaction
claim; and (2) Government's motion in limine improperly barred the
Normans from challenging validity of the wetlands redelineation that
effected a taking, insofar as it sought to prevent developer from
directly challenging the validity or authorization of the government's
actions).
Don Roger Norman and Roger William Norman (the "Normans")
filed a complaint against the United States Army Corps of Engineers
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("Corps") in the United States Court of Federal Claims seeking
invalidation of a wetlands redelineation. The Normans alleged the
Corps affected a permanent taking of 193.11 acres by issuing a section
404 permit under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and claimed a taking
of the entitlement to develop residential units on their ranch property.
In the alternative, the Normans argued the Corps illegally exacted
approximately 220.85 acres of land at their ranch. The Corps then
filed a motion in limine to bar the Normans from challenging the
validity of the government action that affected a taking.
In December 1988, the Normans acquired a portion of the Double
Diamond Ranch ("Ranch") in Reno, Nevada to develop commercial
and industrial office space. Prior to the Normans' purchase of the
land a delineation team from the Corps, using the 1987 version of the
Corps Wetlands Delineation Manual ("1987 Manual"), concluded the
Ranch property contained 28 acres of jurisdictional wetlands. As a
result of heavy criticism by both public and private parties, in October
1990 the Corps informed the Normans that the 1988 wetlands
delineation of the Ranch was no longer valid. In April 1991, the Corps
then commenced a new delineation of the Ranch property. Applying
procedures detailed in the 1989 version of the Corps of Engineers
Wetlands Delineation Manual ("1989 Manual"), the Corps identified
230 acres ofjurisdictional wetlands on the Ranch property, as opposed
to the prior identified 28 acres.
In August 1991, before the Corps could relay the results of the
1991 redelineation to the Normans, Congress enacted the Energy and
Water Development Appropriations Act of 1992 ("Act"). The Act
forbade the use of funds to identify or delineate wetlands under the
1989 manual. Because the Corps had started but not completed the
process of delineating the Ranch pursuant to the 1989 Manual at the
time of the Act's passage, the Normans had the option to elect a new
delineation under the 1987 Manual. The Normans accordingly
informed the Corps that they did not want to request a redelineation
of the Ranch under the 1987 Manual. In August 1999, the Corps
issued a section 404 permit to the Normans. The permit authorized
disturbance, for purposes of development, on a total of 74.09 acres of
wetlands and .70 acres of other waters of the United States, 61.56 acres
of which were wetlands designated by the 1991 delineation.
Additionally, the permit required the Normans to dedicate
approximately 220 acres of land on the Ranch as a wetland and wildlife
habitat.
The Normans sued, alleging that as a result of the section 404
permit the United States took for public use approximately 193 acres
of the Normans' commercial property, and that the United States took
for public use the Normans' entitlement to build residential units. In
the alternative, the Normans claimed an illegal exaction, contending
that the section 404 permit, predicated on the 1991 redelineation of
the Ranch completed by the Corps in violation of the Act, required the
Normans to dedicate their land for public use in violation of the Act
and the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
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The court first addressed the illegal exaction claim, and found that
under illegal exaction jurisprudence the Normans could not seek
recovery for the Corps' redelineation of the wetlands as a violation of
the Act. Ruling it only possessed jurisdiction of an illegal exaction due
to a misrepresentation or misapplication of statutes, the court
determined that the Corps did not misapply the Act to the
redelineation of the Ranch even though the Act may have been
violated through expenditure of funds. Since the court lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to hear the illegal exaction claim, the court
dismissed the complaint.
Next, the court addressed the United States' motion in limine to
both bar the Normans from challenging the validity of the Corps'
redelineation of the Ranch in the context of a regulatory takings
action and to prevent the Normans from introducing related evidence
at trial. The court noted that engaging in a factual inquiry of what
constitutes a taking under the Fifth Amendment requires the
examination of three factors: (1) the economic impact of the
regulation, (2) the extent to which the regulation interferes with
reasonable investment-backed expectations, and (3) the character of
the government action.
Noting the complexity of the case, the inability of the court to
decide what facts are relevant in this case of first impression, and
having no set formula for determining when justice and fairness
require that economic injuries caused by public action be
compensated by the government, the court denied the Corps' motion
in part, except insofar as it sought to prevent the Normans from
challenging the validity or authorization of the government actions.
D.M. Shohet

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS
Allstate v. City of Chicago, No. 02 C 5456, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6180
(N.D. IMl. Apr. 10, 2003) (dismissing insurance company's subrogation
claim under the Clean Water Act for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction).
Allstate Insurance Company and various insurance carriers
("Allstate") sued the City of Chicago and Harza Environmental
Services (jointly "Chicago") alleging violations of the Clean Water Act
("CWA"). Allstate alleged that Chicago's faulty sewer system design

resulted in flooding and sewer discharge into basements and navigable
waters, and exceeded wastewater discharge allowed under the CWA.
Allstate maintained a subrogation claim of relief regarding the alleged
violations of the CWA, nuisance and trespass, based on property
damage sustained and insured's loss of use and enjoyment of the
ecosystems affected by the discharges. Chicago argued that Allstate
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requested inappropriate relief and moved for dismissal of the CWA
claims for lack of both adequate notice and standing. Chicago further
argued for and established discretionary immunity for the other
counts.
Allstate attempted to proceed under the doctrine of associational
standing as measured in Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising
Commission, allowing an association to sue on behalf of its members if
(1) the individual members otherwise had standing to sue, (2) the
individual's participation was not required, and (3) the association's
interest in the suit is "germane to the organization's purpose." The
court rejected this argument citing Group Health Plan, Inc. v. Philip
Morris Inc., where the court found that an insurance company did not
qualify as an association, those insured did not qualify as members,
and thus their relationship did not support an assertion of
associational standing. The court stated that even if Allstate had
fulfilled the criteria for associational standing, the interests that
Allstate sought in the present case were not germane to the
organization's purpose. The court stated that Allstate's purpose was to
collect, pay out and recoup claims, not to prevent discharges as
regulated by the CWA or to protect their clients' desire for a clean
ecosystem.
The court ruled that Allstate's subrogation claims allowed for only
flood damages and similarly related damages and refused to apply the
subrogation doctrine to either the CWA claim or the claim for loss of
The court
recreational use of water affected by the discharge.
therefore dismissed the CWA claim for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction.
GerrittJamesKoser

Friends of the Everglades, Inc. v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., No. 02-

80309, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13827 (S.D. Fla. July 1, 2003) (granting
joint emergency motion for immediate stay when the United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the same issue of whether an
NPDES permit under the Clean Water Act was required to operate
pumps that do not themselves add pollutants to U.S. Waters, but pump
water from sources containing preexisting pollutants).
Friends of the Everglades ("Friends") brought suit in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida against the
South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD") for discharging
pollutants into Lake Okeechobee through pumps S2, S3, and S4 by
back pumping water containing pollutants from canals south of the
Lake into the Lake. Friends argued that the Clean Water Act ("Act")
required National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")
permits because the back pumping constituted a discharge of
pollutants from point sources into navigable water of the United
States. Both parties moved the court for an immediate stay of
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proceedings.
In a related case, South FloridaManagementDistrict v. Miccosukee Tribe
of Indians, the United States Supreme Court had granted certiorari to
decide the same issue of whether the conveyance of water by SFWMD
from one body of water to another body of water, where the transfer of
water would not otherwise occur, through a pump that does not itself
add pollutants to the receiving water, constituted an "addition" of a
pollutant from a point source under the Act, thus requiring an NPDES
permit.
Because district courts are justified in granting a "stay pending the
resolution of a related case in another court" the court granted the
stay of proceedings pending the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Miccosukee Tribe
Regan Rozier

Kan. Natural Res. Council, Inc., v. Whitman, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1208 (D.
Kan. 2003) (granting summary judgment and holding the
Environmental Protection Agency must meet statutory deadlines
under the Clean Water Act for promulgating proposed regulations).
Kansas Natural Resources Council, Inc. ("KNRC") filed suit in the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas in an action to
compel the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
to promulgate regulations proposed to correct the State of Kansas'
deficient water quality standards in a timely manner as mandated by
the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). Both parties moved for summary
judgment.
On February 19, 1998, the EPA determined certain water quality
standards filed by the State of Kansas failed to comply with the CWAmandated plan for the reduction and eventual elimination of water
pollution. On August 10, 1999, Kansas submitted revisions in an
attempt to comply with the CWA. Shortly thereafter KNRC filed this
action. While the suit was pending, the EPA approved some of the
One group of
revised quality standards submitted by the State.
deficient quality standards remained, regarding 1456 water bodies.
Due to a May 19, 2000, consent decree, the EPA published proposed
water quality standard regulations on July 3, 2000, correcting Kansas'
remaining deficient standards. The EPA failed to promulgate the
regulations by October 1, 2000, as required by section 1313(c) (4) of
the CWA, mandating promulgation within ninety days after proposal.
The EPA contended the July 2000 proposal generated a high level of
interest resulting in an increased number of public hearings regarding
the proposal and that an extended public comment period, past the
ninety-day requirement, was necessary to ensure all interested parties
received sufficient opportunity to comment. The EPA further argued
the information received by these public hearings demonstrated a
need to perform use attainability analyses on all 1456 bodies of water, a
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process with proposed deadlines ofJuly 14, 2006.
KNRC sought an immediate promulgation of the July 2000
standards by the EPA due to the failure to follow the CWA's original
ninety-day requirement. The EPA responded that the court had
discretion to allow the proposed schedule of attainability analysis to
continue. The court, in examining the CWA, determined the EPA had
a duty to follow the ninety-day guideline, unless the state corrected the
quality problem prior to the EPA's promulgation of its standards. Due
to this exception, the court ruled that all corrections by the State of
Kansas after July 2000 overrode the previous EPA standards for
proposed promulgation.
The court then examined its jurisdiction over cases involving a suit
against the EPA for failure to perform its duty. The court concluded
the plain language of relevant statutes allowed only the jurisdiction "to
order the EPA to perform such act or duty" and no further discretion.
The court next examined whether the purpose of the CWA, "to
provide water quality that is fishable/swimmable," was attainable with
respect to the remaining 1456 water bodies. The EPA argued the
public comments in response to the July 2000 proposal showed that
the designation of fishable/swimmable was not attainable for all of the
bodies of water. The court disagreed, stating the EPA previously
established procedures to implement the CWA. The court further
stated the EPA overlooked the rebuttable presumption that all bodies
of water are to be placed under the fishable/swimmable designation
unless the State could demonstrate such a designation was
unattainable. The court held the State of Kansas could seek to remove
particular bodies of water from the fishable/swimmable designation.
The EPA argued that the present case was analogous to Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, where the plaintiffs sought to enjoin the United
States Navy's operations of discharging ordinance into water
surrounding Puerto Rico. The discharges would be permissible if the
Navy obtained a permit. The court in that case determined the district
court was not required to immediately enjoin all actions violating the
The court additionally emphasized that
permit requirements.
injunctive relief should be used "sparingly and with discretion." KNRC
argued that the present case was more analogous to Forest Guardiansv.
Babbitt, where the United States Department of the Interior missed a
deadline for designating a critical habitat under the Endangered
Species Act and claimed it lacked the funds to make the designation.
The court in that case rejected the argument and maintained the
statutory deadline imposed a mandatory duty upon the Department of
the Interior. The court here found that Forestwas more applicable to
the present case than Weinberge because in Forest, as in the present
case, the agency failed to comply with a specific statutory deadline
established by Congress.
The EPA offered several equitable arguments, which the court
refused to address due to its limited ability to weigh equitable factors.
The court additionally declined to address KNRC's request for
attorney fees under relevant statute because neither party briefed the
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issue.
Therefore, the court ordered the EPA to take final action and
comply with the CWA's ninety-day requirement commencing at the
date of the court order.
GerrittJames Koser

Nat'l Wildlife Fed'n v. Nat'l Marine Fisheries Serv., 254 F. Supp. 2d
1196 (D. Or. 2003) (holding agency issuing a biological opinion in
accordance with the Endangered Species Act must consider all areas
that directly or indirectly affect the endangered species due to the
proposed action and notjust the immediate action area).
The dispute in this case arose over whether a biological opinion
issued by the National Marine Fisheries Service, a sub-agency of the
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration ("NOAA"),
properly considered all of the effects that the Federal Columbia River
Power System ("FCRPS") would have on endangered and threatened
salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River basin. The United States
District Court for the District of Oregon held that NOAA's report was
arbitrary and capricious.
FCRPS consists of fourteen dams located in the Snake River basin
and the upper and lower Columbia River basin. On December 21,
2000, following consultation in accordance with section 7 of the
Endangered Species Act ("ESA"), NOAA issued a biological opinion
("2000BiOp") that addressed effects FCRPS's future actions would
have on endangered salmon and steelhead in the Columbia River
basin. NOAA's opinion concluded that FCRPS's proposed actions
would indeed jeopardize several endangered and threatened species of
salmon and steelhead; however, NOAA proposed another action
FCRPS could pursue that would not further jeopardize the
endangered fish. The 2000BiOp included short and long-term federal
actions to modify hydro-power operations to improve the survival of
salmon passing through the dams, as well as short and long-term
federal actions that would decrease FCRPS's impact on habitat,
hatchery, and harvest of the endangered fish. NOAA also developed
its 2000BiOp considering the effects of FCRPS's operations in
coordination with other ongoing Federal and regional processes. The
action area in NOAA's 2000BiOp included only the immediate area
where FCRPS's actions would directly affect the endangered salmon;
NOAA's action area did not include areas where FCRPS's actions
NOAA further
would indirectly affect the endangered salmon.
concluded that if the recommendations failed to limit the negative
impact on the fish, referring back to consultation under section 7
would be necessary. National Wildlife Federation ("NWF") along with
several environmental and conservation organizations filed suit against
NOAA, arguing that NOAA's "no-jeopardy" conclusion was arbitrary
and capricious.
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NWF argued that (1) NOAA failed to consult under section 7 for
several of the federal mitigation actions; and (2) the states, regions,
treaty tribes, and private parties were not certain to act in accordance
with 2000BiOp as NOAA asserted. NWF further contended that the
2000BiOp did not rationally connect NOAA's "no-jeopardy"
conclusion with available information.
NOAA argued that NWF
defined the action area too broadly, that consultation was only
necessary in regards to the immediate action area which the NOAA
narrowly defined, and the proposed federal action occurred outside
the action area and did not require section 7 consultation. NOAA
further contended that any non-federal actions do not need to be
reasonably certain to occur.
The court stated that 50 C.F.R. Section 402.02 required NOAA to
assess the biological impact of FCRPS's operations on "all areas to be
affected directly or indirectly by the Federal action and not merely the
immediate area involved in the action." Based on this regulation, the
court held that even though it must give a great deal of deference to
NOAA, more than just the immediate action area would be directly or
indirectly affected by FCRPS's proposed actions; therefore NOAA's
defined action area was arbitrary and capricious. The court also stated
that NOAA specifically relied on off-site federal actions that had not
undergone section 7 consultation and non-federal mitigation actions
that are not reasonably certain to occur, and that the ESA required
NOAA to rely solely on mitigation actions that have already undergone
section 7 consultation. Thus, the court granted NWF's motion for
summary judgment on the claim that the no-jeopardy conclusion in
the 2000BiOp was arbitrary and capricious, and remanded the case in
order to give NOAA the opportunity to reevaluate its plan and
consider only mitigating actions that are reasonably certain to occur,
as well as actions that have already undergone section 7 consultation.
BretJohnson

NewJersey v. Gloucester Envtl. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d
165 (D.N.J. 2003) (enforcing consent decree and directing finalization
of a permit for pretreated landfill effluent to be discharged through a
groundwater extraction system).
At issue in this case was the enforcement of a consent decree for
closure and remediation of a landfill located in Gloucester Township,
NewJersey. The GEMS Phase II Trust ("Trust"), established to oversee
remediation of the Gloucester Environmental Management Services,
Inc. ("GEMS") landfill, moved to enforce the consent decree
concerning remediation of the landfill in the United States District
Court for the District of New Jersey. Pursuant to the consent decree,
the Trust constructed a groundwater extraction system and sought to
discharge pretreated effluent through the sewage collection system for
final treatment at Camden County Municipal Utilities Authority's
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("CCMUA") offsite sewage treatment facility. Gloucester Township
Municipal Utilities Authority ("GTMUA"), as administrator of the
sewage collection system, opposed the motion and contended the

Trust breached the Sewer Service Agreement ("SSA") set forth in the
consent decree. Also opposing the motion, CCMUA asserted it could
not receive pretreated effluent from the GEMS landfill without a legal
mandate.

The consent decree, entered on June 27, 1997, expressly provided
a method of remediation for the GEMS landfill. This method
included construction and operation of a Groundwater Extraction
("GWE") and On-Site Groundwater Pre-Treatment system ("OSPT").
The SSA provided for treated effluent from the landfill to flow
through GTMUA's sewage system for a $400,000 connection fee in
Although the Trust paid the
addition to annual service fees.
connection fee, CCMUA discovered the effluent contained low levels
of radioactive contaminants prior to its discharge into the sewage
collection system. Accordingly, CCMUA issued a cease and desist
order to prevent further contamination. CCMUA also adopted more
rigid standards for acceptable discharge from the GEMS landfill. As a
result, the Trust added a solids removal process to its OSPT system to
eliminate suspended solids from the effluent. This measure reduced
radioactive contaminants in the effluent below levels required by the
CCMUA.
Opposing the Trust's motion, GTMUA specifically argued the
Trust failed to provide GTMUA with drawings and specifications of the
GWE and OSPT within a 12-month period as required by the SSA.
Indeed, the Trust failed to submit the specifications and drawings until
March 1998. However, the Trust claimed GTMUA failed to seek timely
rescission since the breach, if any, occurred in 1998. Moreover, the
Trust stressed any breach was immaterial since GTMUA accepted
$400,000 as a connection fee after the alleged breach.
The court explained that under New Jersey law, if a party fails to
perform essential obligations under a contract, the other party may
terminate. However, a breach is material if it tends to defeat the
purpose of the contract. The court then recognized that GTMUA
received a $400,000 connection fee and expected future annual fees.
Further, the Trust received no benefit since it was unable to discharge
any of its wastewater as provided in the consent decree. Nonetheless,
the court found that the Trust's failure to submit timely drawings and
specifications did not defeat the purpose of the SSA, and ultimately
concluded GTMUA had elected to treat the SSA as valid and binding.
In sum, the court rejected GTMUA's arguments that the Trust
materially breached the SSA, and granted the Trust's motion to
enforce both the consent decree and the SSA. Finally, the court
directed NJDEP and CCMUA to draft a permit for CCMUA to receive
pretreated effluent from the GEMS landfill.
J Reid Bumgarner
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Pacific Coast Fed'n of Fishermen's Ass'ns v. United States Bureau of
Reclamation, No. C 02-2006 SBA, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13745 (N.D.
Cal. July 16, 2003) (granting in part and denying in part motions for
summary judgment on issue agency action violating Endangered
Species Act, where action was partly based on relevant factors and
partly arbitrary and capricious; denying temporary restraining order
against action not irretrievably committing resources; denying motions
for summaryjudgment on breach of federal fiduciary duty to Indian
tribes where evidence remained in controversy).
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
California considered multiple motions and cross-motions for
summary judgment and a motion for injunctive relief in a case
concerning the Endangered Species Act ("ESA") and the Bureau of
Reclamation's ("Bureau") fiduciary duties toward Indian tribes. The
Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen's Associations ("PCFFA"). moved
for summary judgment on the issue of ESA compliance of an opinion
the National Marine Fish Service ("NMFS") produced in response to a
Bureau proposed plan of operations for its Klamath Reclamation
Project ("Project"). The PCFFA also filed for a temporary restraining
order to prevent the Bureau from implementing the NMFS opinion's
proposed short-term flow rates. The Bureau and NMFS filed crossmotions for summary judgment on the aforementioned issues. The
Yurok and Hoopa Valley Tribes ("Tribes") moved for summary
judgment on the issue of whether the Bureau had breached its
fiduciary duty toward them in its 2002 Project operations. The court
granted in part and denied in part the PCFFA's, NMFS', and Bureau's
motions for summary judgment. It denied PCFFA's request for a
temporary restraining order and denied the Tribes' motions for
summary judgment.
The Klamath Reclamation Project's operations affected the
interests of area farmers and of the Tribes. The Project area also
encompassed critical habitat of the coho salmon, a species listed as
threatened under the ESA. The ESA prohibited the Bureau from
taking any action likely to jeopardize the continued existence or
adversely modify the habitat of the threatened coho. The NMFS
opinion was likely to jeopardize the coho's existence if it could
reasonably be expected to appreciably reduce the species' chances for
recovery.
The Bureau produced an operating plan for the Project for 20022012, which it submitted to the NMFS for review. Finding that the
long-term flow rates did not comply with the ESA, the NMFS issued a
"reasonable and prudent alternatives" opinion to address its
deficiencies. The Bureau indicated it would adopt the opinion as its
operating plan. The PCFFA moved the court to declare the NMFS
opinion, and its accompanying "incidental take statement," arbitrary
and capricious and in violation of the ESA.
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Where a federal agency action may affect a threatened species, the
Administrative Procedures Act directs a reviewing court to determine
whether the action was arbitrary and capricious. An action is arbitrary
and capricious if it is not based on relevant factors. PCFFA asserted
that NMFS acted arbitrarily and capriciously in proposing flow rates
that the record did not show were adequate to support the coho. It
also asserted the proposed long-term flow rates were arbitrary and
capricious because they depended on unsecured future actions of nonfederal third parties.
The NMFS relied primarily on two studies with some conflicting
results in determining its short- and long-term flow proposals. One
study recommended increased minimum flow rates to protect fish
populations. The other study found the evidence insufficient to justify
In
higher minimum flows from those adopted for 1990-2000.
composing its opinion, the NMFS attempted to strike a reasonable
balance between the two studies.
The opinion proposed a three-phased plan of operations for 20022012. The plan embraced incremental increases in minimum flow
rates over the course of its operation, to be accomplished through
The final flow rates depended largely on the
various devices.
cooperation of state, tribal, and local entities. When the Bureau
agreed to adopt the plan, PCFFA moved the court to declare it
arbitrary and capricious and to order NMFS to rescind it.
Pending a final report from NMFS, the Bureau adopted an interim
operating plan. PCFFA then filed for a declaration that the interim
plan violated the ESA and for an injunction preventing its
implementation. The tribes joined PCFFA, adding the allegation that
the Bureau had breached its trust responsibilities.
The court found that NMFS' proposed short-term flows were not
arbitrary and capricious. PCFFA contended that comparison to the
greater long-term flows demonstrated the deficiency of the proposed
short-term flows. The studies on which NMFS relied, however,
indicated that the lesser short-term flows posed a threat to the coho
only if continued for a period longer than the plan's first phase. The
two studies were also the best available data, since no more recent
completed reports were available. The court found that NMFS relied
on relevant factors and denied PCFFA's motion for summary judgment
on that part of the issue.
The court also denied PCFFA's motion for a temporary restraining
order. The order PCFFA sought required it to show the Bureau's
actions, if allowed, would irretrievably commit resources. The NMFS
opinion itself, already accepted as valid by the court, refuted PCFFA's
contention that the interim plan irretrievably committed the resource
in question, the coho salmon.
The court found, however, that the proposed long-term flows were
arbitrary and capricious. The Administrative Procedures Act required
NMFS, in determining future flow rates, to consider only those nonfederal actions that were reasonably certain to occur. Contrary
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interests among the entities in question made the requisite level of
certainty impossible. The court granted summary judgment against
NMFS. Since the NMFS could cure the deficiency before it would have
any impact, however, the court held it unnecessary to set the entire
opinion aside and remanded it to the agency for amendment.
PCFFA also asserted the incidental take statement was deficient
because it failed to specify the amount or extent of the take. NMFS
claimed that no meaningful estimate was possible on the available
scientific and commercial data. The ESA, however, requires an
incidental take statement to quantify the potential take as precisely as
is scientifically practicable. It does not forego quantification because it
is imprecise. The point of quantifying the potential take is to impose a
threshold of liability on the acting agency. The court found that the
incidental take statement, lacking such a threshold entirely, was
arbitrary and capricious. It remanded the statement for amendment.
The Tribes moved the court to declare the Bureau in breach of its
fiduciary duty toward them. As trustee to Indian Tribes, the United
States has a fiduciary duty to protect the Tribes' rights and resources.
The Bureau was bound to preserve Tribal resources within the Project
area, including the coho salmon. The Tribes contended that the
Bureau breached its duty to protect their resources by failing to release
flows adequate to support fish populations. They alleged the low flow
rates directly contributed to large fish kills in 2002. However, the
court held that ajury could find for the Bureau based on the evidence.
The court denied the Tribes' motions for summary judgment.
Owen Walker
United States v. Michigan, 261 F. Supp. 2d 906 (E.D. Mich. 2003)
(ordering creation of the Southeast Michigan Consortium for Water
Quality to assist the court in solving regional water quality problems).
In 1977 and 1987 the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA")
brought two cases against both the Detroit Water and Sewerage
Department and the communities it served, and the Wyandotte
Wastewater Treatment Plant and the communities it served. These two
cases both resulted in consent judgments, which the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan approved and
oversaw, addressing a range of problems affecting water quality in
southeast Michigan. A related complex water quality case concerned
the Rouge River Watershed.
The court noted that while the
communities involved in the Rouge River Watershed case had utilized
several innovations to reduce their adverse impact on water quality,
more needed to be done by all of the impacted Southeast Michigan
communities to improve the region's water quality.
To assist in this task, the court invited forty governmental leaders
to join the Southeast Michigan Consortium for Water Quality
("Consortium") help solve regional water problems. The court
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asserted jurisdiction over the Detroit Water and Sewage Department
under the Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1367,
and had oversight over the Wyandotte Wastewater Treatment Plant
based on the previously ordered consentjudgments. Finally, the court
noted the goal of the Consortium would be to address problems of
water quality on a regional basis in Southeast Michigan.
Karen L. Golan

United States Pub. Interest Research Group v. Ad. Salmon of Maine,
LLC, 261 F. Supp. 2d 17 (D. Me. May 9, 2003) (holding that federal
common law is the choice of law under the Clean Water Act and
piercing the corporate veil is appropriate where (1) a parent controls a
subsidiary, (2) a parent uses that control to evade a court order, and
(3) declining to pierce the corporate veil would result in failure to
enforce the Clean Water Act); United States Pub. Interest Research
Group v. Ad. Salmon of Maine, LLC, 257 F. Supp. 2d 407 (D. Me. May
28, 2003) (awarding damages for violations of the Clean Water Act,
enjoining defendants from running a salmon farm until they obtain a
permit, and permanently prohibiting stocking non-native species
where environmental degradation was not permanent, defendants
would not gain monetarily from violations, violations were, in part, due
to lack of agency guidance, defendants did not act in bad faith, and
defendants had successive non-profitable years); United States Pub.
Interest Research Group v. Ad. Salmon of Maine, LLC, 273 F. Supp.
2d 126 (D. Me. July 25, 2003) (denying motion for partial stay of
damages for violating the Clean Water Act because success on the
merits was not likely as defendants had litigated all issues and allowing
further operations risked irreparable environmental harm).
Defendants Atlantic Salmon of Maine ("ASM") and Stolt Sea Farm
("SSF") own several salmon farms in Maine's Machias, Cobscook, and
Pleasant bays. Additionally, ASM wholly owns its subsidiary, Island
Aquaculture Company ("IAC"). IAC also owns three salmon farms.
Since 1990, ASM and SSF treated their nets and feed with chemicals
that the ocean current washed out of the pens. ASM and SSF also
stocked their pens with non-North American salmon that periodically
escaped. During this time, the Environmental Protection Agency
("EPA") undertook little enforcement action of salmon farms'
discharges under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"). In 2001, the EPA
delegated permitting authority under the CWA to the State of Maine;
however, at the time of these decisions, Maine had yet to institute a
permitting system for salmon farms.
The United States Public Interest Research Group ("USPIRG")
sued ASM and SSF under the citizen-suit provision of the CWA,
claiming ASM and SSF violated the CWA by releasing pollutants from
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their fish farms. In February 2002, the United States District Court for
the District of Maine found that ASM and SSF had violated the CWA,
required ASM and SSF to obtain a discharge permit, and scheduled a
future hearing to determine damages. In February 2003, the court
prohibited ASM and SSF from introducing any new class of fish into
their net-pens until they obtained a permit. Nonetheless, in April
2003, ASM stocked a new class of fish in IAC's Scragg Island Salmon
Farm.
On May 9, 2003, the court examined whether ASM was in
contempt for violating the court's February 2003 order prohibiting
ASM from stocking any new class of fish. First, the court ruled it must
apply federal common law because the CWA is a federal statute
requiring uniformity. Next, the court addressed whether it should
pierce the corporate veil and attribute LAC's actions-stocking a new
class of fish-to ASM.
The court found a lack of corporate
independence between ASM and LAC because ASM's management
controlled IAC and all of IAC's transaction were with ASM. Further,
the court found ASM acted with fraudulent intent because ASM
stocked IAC's pens solely to evade the February 2003 order. Finally,
the court held failure to pierce the corporate veil would result in a
manifest injustice because the February 2003 order enforced the CWA,
and the CWA is in the public interest. Thus, the court found ASM in
violation of the February 2003 order. The court enjoined ASM from
stocking any new class of fish, set deadlines for removing deposited
fish, and set fines for any further failure by ASM to follow the court's
orders.
On May 28, 2003, the court determined the appropriate damages
for ASM and SSF's violations of the CWA. First, the court addressed
whether Maine had primary jurisdiction because it was developing
discharge permits under the CWA. After commenting that ideally the
EPA should address the instant ecological and scientific issues, the
court recognized that the EPA had delegated its permitting authority
to Maine and that Maine had not taken any action. Hence, the court
ruled prolonging resolution of this matter inappropriate given the
agency's delay. Second, the court determined the statute of limitations
for citizen suits under the CWA was not at issue because ASM and
SSF's violations of the CWA were ongoing.
Next, the court applied the CWA's factors for determining civil
penalties. First, the court concluded that the seriousness of ASM and
SSF's violations was nominal because, with the exception of the nonNorth American salmon escaping and adversely affecting endangered
species, the environmental degradation was not permanent. Secondly,
the court's order would abate any economic benefit ASM and SSF
might have accrued from violating the CWA. Third, the court could
not attribute ASM and SSF's violation of the CWA solely to ASM and
SSF because the EPA and the State of Maine left them in limbo
regarding permitting requirements.
Fourth, ASM and SSF had
addressed the most negative findings and responded to the EPA.
Fifth, the court concluded awarding a large penalty would severely
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affect ASM and SSF because their salmon farms had been unprofitable
in the two pervious years. After assessing these factors, the court fined
ASM and SSF fifty thousand dollars each.
Finally, the court addressed USPIRG's request for injunctive relief.
The court found that ASM and SSF's salmon farms threatened
immediate irreparable harm because escaping non-North American
species threatened endangered species and salmon farm discharges
degraded the environment. Hence, the court enjoined defendants
from stocking their pens until they obtained a permit. The court also
permanently enjoined defendants from stocking any non-North
American salmon species.
On July 25, 2003, the court addressed ASM and SSF's motion to
stay the court's May 28, 2003 order. The court concluded ASM and
SSF did not have a strong likelihood of success on the merits as they
had previously litigated all issues. Further, any harm to ASM and SSF
derived from their own failure to comply with the CWA. Finally, the
court concluded granting a stay would cause great environmental
harm, which vastly outweighed ASM and SSF's assertion of economic
hardship. Hence, the court denied ASM and SSF's motion for a stay of
the May 28, 2003 order.
HeatherChamberlain

STATE COURTS
CALIFORNIA
Cent. & W. Basin Water Replenishment Dist. v. S. Cal. Water Co., 135
Cal. Rptr. 2d 486 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that, along with the
water resources of the State of California, available storage capacity in
a ground water system must be utilized for the greatest public welfare
and is subject to management by the appropriate state agency).
Appellants, including several municipal, commercial, private, and
industrial interests ("Pumpers"), hold groundwater rights in the
Respondent Water
Central Valley area near Los Angeles.
Replenishment District of Southern California ("WRD"), a state
agency, was created by the California legislature to monitor the
Central Valley groundwater basin. The majority of the Central Valley
is located within the Los Angeles metropolitan area. The Pumpers
claim to hold half of the allowable water rights in the Central Basin
and to supply over I million residents and businesses in the Los
Angeles area. The Pumpers motioned the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County to qualify and allocate the storage rights for the basin
left undetermined after the adjudication of their water rights. The
WRD contended the storage capacity of the Central Valley
groundwater basin was a public resource and was within the WRD's
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authority to regulate for the greatest public welfare. The trial court
agreed with the WRD and denied the Pumpers' request for the
allocation of the storage capacity to the private water right holders.
The Pumpers appealed to the California Court of Appeals.
The Pumpers' water rights were adjudicated when the predecessor
of the WRD brought an action in the 1960s to have all water rights in
the Central Valley basin reduced to a level that would prevent an
overdraft in the system. An overdraft allows seawater to infiltrate into
the basin and contaminate the groundwater system with salt water. All
groundwater users agreed to have the water rights in the basin based
on the percentage that each was extracting at the time of the
adjudication. The final agreement gave each then current water right
holder a prorated portion of the maximum allowable extraction that
would prevent an overdraft.
The Pumpers claimed to be in the best position to manage the
available groundwater storage capacity. They pointed to the principal
of conjunctive use, which allows for the combined use of both surface
water and groundwater for the greatest efficiency. In support of
conjunctive use, the Pumpers claimed to be able to conserve the scarce
water resources of the state by purchasing and using surface water
rights in lieu of groundwater before the surface water was lost to
outflows or evaporation. Additionally, by allowing the Pumpers to use
the groundwater system to store their purchased surface water rights,
evaporation from surface water systems or storage would further be
decreased. Furthermore, the Pumpers claimed to already have a
vested right in the storage capacity of the groundwater system. They
relied mainly on their established carryover rights and the principle of
mutual prescription as conferring vested rights in the groundwater
storage capacity in the Central Valley basin. Finally, the Pumpers
claimed that by making the storage capacity a fully transferable private
asset vested in the current water right holders, the market would
ensure the most efficient and beneficial use of the water by allowing
the party who valued the resource the most to purchase and control
the resource.
Carryover rights allow water right holders to leave a portion of
their allowable extractions in the basin for a given period of time while
retaining the right to later pump the water in addition to their
normally allowed quantity for that latter period. The Pumpers claimed
their carryover rights already granted them the right to utilize the
available storage capacity. However, exercising the carryover rights for
all parties entitled to extract groundwater from the basin would
consume only 45,000 acre feet of the approximately 645,700 acre feet
of available capacity. The court addressed this argument by noting
carryover rights are limited to their defined bounds and are not an
expansive right to utilize the entire storage capacity of the system. The
court continued, explaining that at best the Pumpers' argument might
have supported an expansion of their carryover rights; however, the
motion did not request such an action.
Alternatively, the Pumpers claimed the principles of mutual
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prescription used in setting their water rights applied equally to the
right to utilize the storage capacity in the basin. A required element in
proving mutual prescription is the possession and use of the property
to the exclusion of all others with a right to the property. By
definition, the unused storage capacity of the ground water basin was
not being possessed in a manner excluding all others. Accordingly,
the court rejected this claim because the Pumpers did not establish the
elements of mutual prescription, and private entities cannot gain
possession of a public resource by prescription.
Next, the Pumpers claimed the right to extract ground water and
the right to use the storage capacity were hydrologically and legally
linked. Looking at the link between extraction and storage, the court
noted that the Pumpers failed to offer any evidence of a legal link
between the two processes. The court went on to explain that the
processes are physically distinct and a hydrological connection is not
sufficient to establish a legal link. The court also pointed out that the
WRD has a right to replenish the level of water in the basin but lacks
any right to extract water.
In their final claim, the Pumpers argued that by making the right
to use the storage capacity of the basin a fully transferable private asset,
the free market would ensure the greatest beneficial use of the
resource. The court rejected this argument by pointing out the lack of
any safeguard for the public welfare. California law requires the use of
all water resources in the state in a manner promoting the greatest
public benefit. Domestic use is the top priority, followed by irrigation.
The storage capacity of groundwater systems falls within the definition
of water resources of the state. The court went on to explain that the
most efficient use is not necessarily the most beneficial use with regard
to the public welfare. The WRD's function is to monitor the
groundwater basin to ensure its maintenance as a public asset;
therefore, the court ruled the WRD was the proper entity to manage
the storage capacity of the Central Valley basin.
The WRD questioned the court system's jurisdiction to decide this
case because the courts have no authority to create new water rights.
The court dismissed this argument, holding that this action was not an
adjudication of new water rights. Furthermore, the court reserved
jurisdiction in this matter at the original adjudication of the water
rights in order to address any future circumstances that might
jeopardize the agreed prorated allocations. Thus, the court affirmed
the trial court's ruling that the available storage capacity was a public
resource under the managerial authority of the WRD.
Sean R. Biddle
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Comms. for a Better Env't v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 1 Cal. Rptr.
3d 76 (Cal. CL App. 2003) (holding water quality based effluent limit
for dioxin discharges need not be numeric in all cases, and need not
be numeric in present case where three administrative agencies
properly approved the non-numeric limitation as a valid means of
pollution control).
Tesoro Refining and Marketing Company ("Tesoro") operated the
Golden Eagle Refinery ("Refinery") on the shores of the Suisun Bay
near Avon, California to produce gasoline and diesel fuel. With a
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES") permit
from the Regional Water Quality Control Board of San Francisco
("Regional Board") the Refinery was able to discharge regulated
amounts of dioxins into Suisun Bay. Dioxins are dangerous and toxic
compounds, which are unavoidable byproducts of combustion and the
use of some chlorinated chemical compounds. This case revolved
around the Regional Board's June 2000 amendment to the Refinery's
permit, which eliminated the previous "water quality based effluent
limit" ("WQBEL") of 0.14 picograms per liter ("pg/L") because it was
no longer appropriate for the Refinery. The Regional Board noted
numerous reasons for this conclusion, such as the need for a "region
wide cross media assessment of the dioxin problem," the Refinery's
reduction in dioxin discharge, and the fact that complying with a
numeric WQBEL would place a heavy economic burden on the
Refinery. The amended permit replaced the numeric limitation with a
performance-based interim effluent limitation based on facility
performance and the actual concentrations of dioxins in the Refinery's
discharge. It also contained numerous provisions for monitoring
compliance.
Two organizations, Communities for a Better Environment
("CBE") and San Francisco BayKeeper, challenged the amendment on
grounds that it neglected to establish the requisite numeric WQBEL
for the Refinery's dioxin discharges. The Regional Board reviewed the
matter on administrative appeal but decided to reissue the amended
permit. The State Water Resources Control Board ('State Board")
upheld that decision. CBE then appealed to the Superior Court of the
City and County of San Francisco with a petition for writ of mandate
asserting the 2000 permit's omission of a WQBEL for dioxins violated
the Clean Water Act ("CWA").
The superior court granted the
petition, acknowledging the 2000 Amendment violated the CWA by
omitting the necessary numeric WQBEL. Furthermore, the superior
court held performance-based limitations were not sufficient for a
WQBEL. Tesoro appealed and brought this case before the California
Court of Appeals, presenting two central issues: (1) whether a WQBEL
must be numeric; and (2) whether the permit at issue contained any
WQBEL, numeric or otherwise.
On the first matter, the court applied the EPA regulation that
established the limitation system for NPDES permits in compliance
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with the CWA. Section 122.44(d)(1)(vi)(A) of the Code of Federal
Regulations provided one method for a permitting authority to
establish effluent limits was to use "calculated numeric water quality
criterion for the pollutant" in order to maintain water quality criteria.
Noting it must give considerable deference to administrative agencies'
interpretations of regulations involving its expertise, the court
analyzed the precise language of section 122.44(d).
The court found the word "numeric" only modified "water quality
criterion," not "effluent limitation."
Furthermore, the CWA's
definition of "effluent limitation" included "any restriction" without
requiring it to be numeric, and section 122.44(k) (3) permitted nonnumeric WQBEL's where numeric ones were not feasible. In addition,
the court noted limited case law revealed Congress' intent was to
create a flexible approach to regulating pollution discharges rather
than requiring a numeric effluent limitation in all cases. Thus, the
court held the WQBEL need not be numeric under all circumstances.
In response, CBE raised the second issue for review, contending
the amended permit contained no WQBEL at all, numeric or
otherwise, because the effluent limitations depended on the future
completion of a total maximum daily load ("TMDL") and failed to
provide any current limitations.
The court first discussed the
Refinery's unique position as a minor contributor of dioxin discharges
in comparison to the natural sources, out of the Refinery's control,
which were the primary source of dioxins in Suisun Bay. In this light,
the court analyzed the permit's rigorous schedule of compliance
requiring the Refinery to either comply with a dioxin waste load
allocation ("WLA) in the completed TMDL or reduce its dioxin
discharges to zero by the termination of the TMDL preparation
period. Noting water quality planning is a dynamic process that must
vary over time, the court held these two limitations qualified as
WQBEL's for the 2000 permit, emphasizing that three separate
administrative agencies had approved this approach. Therefore, the
court reversed the superior court's decision and remanded for
determination of other issues.
JessicaL. Grether

Friends of the Eel River v. Sonoma County Water Agency, 108 Cal.
App. 4th 859 (Cal. Ct.App. 2003) (holding that the trial court erred in
denying appellant's writ of mandate vacating water agency's
certification of an Environmental Impact Report and approval of a
proposed project because the Environmental Impact Report was
inadequate).
Friends of the Eel River ("Friends") appealed the Sonoma County
Superior Court's denial of their petition for a writ of mandate vacating
the Sonoma County Water Agency's ("Agency") certification of its
Environmental Impact Report ("EIR") and approval of its proposed
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project. The Agency certified the EIR and approved a project to
increase the Agency's diversion of water from the Russian River from
75,000 acre-feet of water per year ("a.f.y.") to 100,000 a.f.y. The
Agency designed the project to meet the future demands of its
customers. Friends first challenged the EIR at the administrative level;
they asserted that the EIR was insufficient and failed to comply with
the California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). The Agency
rejected their arguments, certified the EIR, and approved the project.
Friends then petitioned the superior court for a writ of mandate
vacating the Agency's certification and approval. The superior court
denied the petition. Friends then appealed to the Court of Appeal of
California, First Appellate District, Division One. The court reviewed
the Agency's decision de novo, using a standard of review whereby the
court could only overturn the Agency's decision upon a finding of an
abuse of discretion. The appellate court concluded that the EIR did
not contain a sufficient discussion of the cumulative impacts of the
proposed project, contained a deficient discussion of alternatives,
failed to adequately describe the proposed project's environmental
setting, and inadequately responded to several comments. The court
also held that the E1R did comply with applicable planning laws.
However, because of the deficiencies in the EIR, the court reversed the
trial court's decision and remanded the matter to the trial court with
directions to grant Friends' petition for a writ of mandate.
The court first determined whether the EIR's cumulative impacts
analysis was flawed. CEQA guidelines require an agency to consider
past, present, and probable future projects producing related or
cumulative impacts; and reviewing courts must determine if inclusion
of such projects was reasonable and practical and whether, without
their inclusion, the severity and significance of the cumulative impacts
were reflected adequately. Friends contended that the EIR was flawed
because it failed to include several proposals pending before the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to curtail the
diversion of water from the Eel River into the Russian River. The court
found that the amount of water available to the Agency for diversion
from the Russian River directly depended on the diversion of water
from the Eel River into the Russian River. Since every proposal before
FERC suggested a decrease in this diversion, the court concluded that
the failure of the Agency to include these proposals in the EIR
rendered the EIR an inadequate informational tool for the public and
for decision makers regarding the cumulative impact of the project on
minimum stream flow requirements and the Agency's ability to satisfy
customer demands. The court rejected the Agency's argument that
the proposals before FERC were speculative, and therefore not
required to be included in the EIR. The court determined that since
the Agency initiated the federally-mandated Environmental Impact
Statements ("EIS") for the FERC proposals, and since it actively
participated in the FERC proceedings, the proposals were reasonably
foreseeable and the Agency was therefore required to discuss the
proposals in the EIR.
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The court then considered the adequacy of the EIR's alternatives
analysis. An EIR must include a discussion of reasonable alternatives
which could feasibly attain the goals of the project, and which are
capable of reducing or eliminating any significant adverse
environmental impacts of the project. The court determined that the
EIR's alternatives analysis was based on the EIR's cumulative impact
analysis; the court reasoned that because the cumulative impacts
analysis was flawed, the alternatives analysis was flawed as well.
Next, the court evaluated the EIR's description of the project's
environmental setting. An EIR must include an accurate description
of the physical environmental conditions in the vicinity of the project
to accurately assess the environmental impacts of the project. The
court found that the EIR failed to address both the impact of
increased diversion of water from the Eel River on the salmonid
species in that river, and the FERC proposals to curtail the diversion of
water from the Eel River in order to prevent harm to these species.
Furthermore, the court determined that the EIR focused on the
southern portion of the water supply system at issue, and omitted any
discussion of the northern portion-including the diversion of water
from the Eel River. Therefore, the court concluded that the EIR's
description of the project's environmental setting was inadequate.
The court then evaluated whether the EIR adequately responded
to several public comments. The CEQA requires an agency to respond
to the most significant environmental questions presented and to
respond to these questions adequately, completely, and with a good
faith effort at full disclosure. The court determined that the EIR failed
to comply with this requirement with regard to several comments, and
that a revised EIR must include adequate responses to these
comments.
Lastly, the court addressed whether the Agency complied with
certain planning law requirements in connection with its project.
Friends first argued that the Agency's project failed to comply with
applicable building and zoning ordinances; however, the court
determined that the pertinent Government Codes only contemplate
compliance; they do not mandate such compliance. Secondly, Friends
contended that the applicable government codes required the Agency
to submit its project to the planning agencies in all of the counties in
which its water supply system is located. The court rejected this
argument and read the Government Codes as requiring the Agency to
submit its plan only to the planning agencies of Sonoma County,
which the Agency did. Lastly, Friends argued that the Agency's EIR
was in direct conflict with the Sonoma County general plan. The
record was insufficient for the court to conclude whether this conflict
existed, but the court concluded that a revised EIR must include a
discussion of any such inconsistencies.
Kate 0. Lively
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San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Ctr. v. Regents of the Univ. of
Cal., No. F041622, 2003 WL 21457054 (Cal. Ct. App. June 24, 2003)
(holding University of California's final Environmental Impact Report
for the long range development of the proposed University of
California, Merced campus legally adequate where it sufficiently
identified, assessed and mitigated impacts of supplying water to the
proposed project).
San Joaquin Raptor/Wildlife Rescue Center ("Center") appealed
the Merced County superior court's ruling approving the certification
by the regents of the University of California ("Regents") of the final
environmental impact report ("EIR") for a project known as the Long
Range Development Plan ("LRDP") for the University of California,
Merced ("UC Merced").
In 1988, the Regents authorized the
president of the University to initiate planning for additional
University of California campuses. The Regents approved eight
"factors" upon which to base their eventual decision for selecting a site
for the new campus; one such factor addressed the status of obtaining
an adequate water supply.
After reviewing a site selection
environmental impact report, the Regents selected an area just outside
the city of Merced, California. The University prepared a detailed EIR
for the UC Merced LRDP Plan. The EIR alerted the University to the
environmental effects of approval of the LRDP. In January 2002, the
Regents approved and certified the EIR for the LRDP. Filing suit in
superior court, the Center contended that the EIR inadequately
analyzed the impact of water delivery to UC Merced under the
California Environmental Quality Act ("CEQA"). The superior court
rejected this contention and concluded that the EIR was more than
sufficient as an informational document of water delivery impact. The
Center appealed to the California Court of Appeals, contending the
EIR inadequately addressed the treatment of water delivery impacts.
The court found the EIR, with a sufficient degree of analysis,
provided decision makers with information enabling them to make a
decision which intelligently considered environmental consequences.
The court then determined that its ability to set aside an agency's EIR
under the CEQA extended only to prejudicial abuse of discretion.
Abuse of discretion exists if the agency does not proceed in a manner
required by law or if the determination or decision is not supported by
substantial evidence. Under this standard, the court found it could
not rule upon the correctness of the EIR's environmental conclusions,
but only upon its sufficiency as an informative document.
The court held that the final EIR did not violate CEQA. The court
determined that the EIR sufficiently stated information regarding the
impact on water delivery. Specifically, the court found the EIR
identified the supplier of water to the university, the location and
quantity of wells needed, and source of the water supply; properly
quantified the amount of water to be supplied; assessed potential
impact on agriculture and on adjacent well yields; and identified the
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methods used in citing and designating groundwater wells, which
together sufficiently stated the impact of water delivery to UC Merced.
The Center also presented four more arguments: (1) the EIR had
no reliable information on which to base any claim that no question
exists with respect to the feasibility of additional wells, (2) the EIR did
not identify the sites of the recharge basins, (3) the Regents' reliance
on the 2001 Merced Water Supply Update as a guarantee of adequate
water supply was unwarranted, (4) and Stanislaus Natural Heritage
Project v. County of Stanislaus and Santiago County Water District v. County
of Orange required reversal of judgments. The court rejected these
arguments, ruling that differing opinions arising from the same pool
of information cannot invalidate the EIR as inadequate. Therefore,
the court affirmed the superior court's ruling.
D.M. Shohet

S. Yuba Water Dist. v. Hofman, No. C039687, 2003 Cal. App. Unpub.
LEXIS 4462 (Cal. Ct. App. May 2, 2003) (holding that, presuming the
trial court reviewed extrinsic evidence as necessary to analyze the
meaning of a water right agreement, the trial court did not err as a
matter of law in its interpretation of the disputed agreement).
The South Yuba Water District ("District") filed suit to extinguish
all prior water rights claimed by Frances Hofman, Emma Hofman and
the Hofman Ranch (the "Hofinans") and to acquire easements across
the Hofnan's property. The Superior Court of Yuba County found
the Hofmans did not hold claimed water rights. The Hofmans
contended on appeal that the trial court had erred by not considering
extrinsic evidence supporting the prior water rights agreement. The
California Court of Appeals affirmed, finding the lower court did not
err in its consideration of extrinsic evidence.
The Hofmans owned two tracts of land. The Hofman Ranch tract
was located within the District while the Johnson Ranch was outside
the District. The 1985 agreement between the Hofmans and the
District allowed the use of surplus irrigation water transferred from
within the District to the Johnson Ranch tract outside of the District.
The parties referred to the rights conveyed by this agreement as "put
and take" rights.
The District filed suit in July 1992, seeking to acquire and
extinguish these rights. The superior court first heard evidence
regarding the agreement during phase one of a bifurcated trial. The
court found the agreement unclear as to the water rights conveyed,
resulting in a tentative holding that the District retained the disputed
water rights. During phase two of the trial, the court held it could not
rely on the tentative phase one holding. The phase two court found
the agreement allowed the Hofmans to convey water to areas outside
the District via the District's facilities. However, the agreement did not
give the Hofnans any additional water rights. The parties reached
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settlement during trial providing $37,600 to the Hofmans for the value
of the physical taking of the easements and $5,000 stipulated severance
damages. The final judgment extinguished all "put and take" rights
under the agreement.
On appeal, the Hofmnans claimed the trial court erred by not
considering extrinsic evidence related to the agreement, and argued
that, as a result, the trial court incorrectly found the Hofmans held no
"put and take" rights to continue using District water on the Johnson
Ranch tract. The appellate court could not determine whether the
trial court considered extrinsic evidence. Presuming the trial court
did review the evidence, the appellate court rejected the Hofman's
extrinsic evidence claim on appeal.
Next, the appellate court reviewed the trial court's interpretation
of the agreement.
The appellate court applied the substantial
evidence test in evaluating conflicting evidence regarding the meaning
of agreement. The substantial evidence test upholds any reasonable
construction of the agreement when it is supported by substantial
evidence. The appellate court found the trial court based its opinion
on substantial evidence submitted at trial. Therefore, the appellate
court held the trial court did not err in its interpretation of the
agreement.
Chris Wittenbrink

COLORADO
Simpson v. Bijou Irrigation Co., 69 P.3d 50 (Colo. 2003) (holding (1)
State Engineer did not have authority to promulgate and enforce
regulations allowing State Engineer to approve ongoing out-of-priority
groundwater diversions, (2) State Engineer did have authority to
promulgate regulations pursuant to the South Platte River Compact
because the compact was deficient in providing standards for compact
compliance within Colorado, and (3) State Engineer rules and
regulations will not take effect until water court hears and resolves all
protests).
On May 31, 2002, the State Engineer filed "Amended Rules and
Regulations Governing the Diversion and Use of Tributary Ground
Water in the South Platte River Basin, Colorado" ("Amended Rules").
In the Amended Rules, the State Engineer granted itself the authority
to unilaterally approve "replacement plans" for out-of-priority
groundwater depletions by pre-1972 wells. The rules prompted a
barrage of protests. The protesters claimed, and the water court
found, that the State Engineer lacked both statutory and interstate
compact authority to promulgate the rules. The protestors also sought
a motion, which the court granted, finding that the Amended Rules
could not become effective until the water judge had heard and
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resolved all protests. The Colorado Supreme Court held the State
Engineer lacked statutory authority but did have interstate compact
authority-subject to statutory limits on the State Engineer's
rulemaking authority-to promulgate the Amended Rules. The court
also held that State Engineer rules and regulations may not take effect
until the water court has heard and resolved all protests.
The supreme court's analysis focused on two grants of power to the
State Engineer. Under Colorado Revised Statute ("C.R.S.") Section 3792-501 (1), the State Engineer has the power to adopt rules and
regulations to assist in the duties of "administering, distributing, and
regulating the waters of the state." Under C.R.S. Section 37-80-104,
the State Engineer can adopt regulations to ensure compliance with
interstate water compacts, but only when the compact is deficient in
establishing intrastate standards for complying with the compact.
In analyzing the State Engineer's power under C.R.S. Section 3792-501 (1) ("Water Rule Power"), the court focused largely on
legislative history, and ultimately held the water courts, not the State
Engineer, had authority to approve replacement plans for out-ofpriority groundwater diversions, except in four statutorily defined
situations. The court noted that in 1969 and 1977, the General
Assembly rejected proposals to grant the State Engineer authority to
approve ongoing out-of-priority groundwater diversions because the
proposals would grant the State Engineer overlapping administrative
and judicial authority and an inordinate amount of power.
Furthermore, in 2002, the General Assembly outlined four situations
in which the State Engineer could approve ongoing out-of-priority
groundwater diversions (these exceptions are codified at C.R.S.
Section 37-92-308). In consideration of both sets of legislative action,
the court held the water courts, not the State Engineer, had the
exclusive authority to approve ongoing out-of-priority groundwater
diversions, except as specifically outlined in C.R.S. Section 37-92-308.
The court also held that the state engineer had the authority to
promulgate regulations subject to its power outlined at C.R.S. Section
37-80-104 ("Compact Rule Power"). The State Engineer's Compact
Rule Power provides authority for the promulgation of regulations
when the interstate compact does not define procedures for intrastate
compliance with the compact. The court noted that the South Platte
River Compact was deficient because the compact did not provide for
administration of water rights outside of the priority system. When
curtailing groundwater pumping under the priority system, it is
incredibly difficult to determine when and the extent to which
limitations on pumping will affect surface flows. The State Engineer,
as a result, must evaluate multiple factors when curtailing diversions or
augmenting supplies to ensure Colorado's compliance with its
compact obligations. Because the South Platte River Compact only
contemplated curtailment of surface diversions based upon the
priority system, the court held the State Engineer had the authority,
under its Compact Rule Power, to promulgate regulations to curtail
groundwater diversions.
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However, neither the Compact Rule Power nor the South Platte
River Compact define procedures for promulgating rules to comply
with compact requirements. The court previously addressed such a
problem and limited the State Engineer's Compact Rule Power to its
Water Rule Power. Thus, if promulgating regulations pursuant to its
Compact Rule Power, the State Engineer could not approve ongoing
out-of-priority groundwater diversions, except in the four situations
outlined in C.R.S. Section 37-92-308. The court held that regardless of
whether the State Engineer was acting pursuant to its Water Rule
Power or its Compact Rule Power, it did not have the authority to
promulgate its Amended Rules.
Finally, the court affirmed the water court's decision that the State
Engineer's rules and regulations do not become effective until the
water court has heard and resolved all protests. Sections 37-92-304 and
37-92-501 provide the hearing procedures for those interested in
protesting state engineer rules and regulations. The court examined
these procedures and concluded they established safeguards against
the unreasonable exercise of administrative discretion by the State
Engineer. As a result, the court held State Engineer rules and
regulations will not become effective until any protests are judicially
heard and resolved.
Merc Pittinos

Colo. Ground Water Comm'n v. N. Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Mgmt.
Dist., 77 P.3d 62 (Colo. 2003) (holding that (1) an owner of land
overlying the Denver Basin Aquifers and located within a designated
groundwater basin possessed a statutorily-created, inchoate right to
apply to the Colorado Ground Water Commission for a determination
of use rights to groundwater without having to drill a well to obtain the
determination; (2) the Colorado Ground Water Commission, not the
Ground Water Management District, properly reviews applications to
determine use rights; and (3) landowners' applications are subject to
the anti-speculation doctrine, requiring either a beneficial, nonspeculative use on the applicant's land or a contract with a third party
for a beneficial use if the use will occur on land other than
landowner's).
The Bradbury family filed applications to the Colorado Ground
Water Commission ("Commission") for a determination of use rights
to groundwater in Denver Basin Aquifers underlying tracts of land
located within the Kiowa-Bijou Designated Ground Water Basin. The
applications sought groundwater rights for future industrial,
commercial, irrigation, stock, and domestic uses but did not petition
for well permits. The North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Management
District ("District") contested the applications and argued that,
according to its regulations, all landowners must first submit
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applications to the District prior to Commission review. The District
also contested the applications due to lack of evidence supporting
beneficial, non-speculative intended uses.
An administrative hearing officer reviewed the District's objections
and concluded that under Colorado law, the Commission, not the
District, must receive and review all applications for designated
groundwater use rights. Thus, the Bradburys correctly submitted their

applications to the proper authority to obtain use rights. The officer
also ruled the anti-speculation doctrine applied for use rights to
designated Denver Basin groundwater and, in a separate hearing,
heard evidence to establish non-speculative intent for the proposed
water uses. The Bradburys submitted evidence to show their intent for

beneficial uses, including development plans and testimony by a land
economist, a groundwater geologist, and Thomas Bradbury, one of the
landowners. On appeal by the District, the Commission affirmed the
administrative decision, and further concluded that the Bradburys'
purposes,
non-speculative
demonstrated
adequately
evidence
regardless of whether the anti-speculation doctrine applied.
The District then appealed the Commission's decision to Adams
The district judge initially decided that
County District Court.
Colorado law authorized the Commission to determine a use right, but
then reversed by limiting the interpretation of statutory authority to
determinations of amounts of groundwater available, not for use
rights. According to the district judge, landowners must instead
submit well permits for the Commission to determine water use rights.
Based on the district judge's rulings, the Commission, the Bradburys,
and the District appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court.
The Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the districtjudge's holding
that the 1998 amendment to the Colorado statute vested authority in
the Commission to manage and control designated groundwater
resources within Colorado and did not violate the Colorado
Allocation and administration of designated
Constitution.
groundwater located within the Denver Basin Aquifers was not subject
Instead, authority over
to the doctrine of prior appropriation.
designated groundwater rested in Colorado law and the General
Assembly, exercising plenary authority, designated the Commission
the authority to manage groundwater within the designated basins.
Additionally, the Colorado Supreme Court reversed the district
judge's decision that Colorado law only gave the Commission the
ability to determine amounts of groundwater available for use.
Instead, the Commission's authority included the ability to determine
a use right for withdrawal of water from designated Denver Basin
groundwater for both owners of land located in the Denver Basin and
third party contracts for withdrawal on overlying lands with landowner
consent. As established by the General Assembly, the Commission not
only determined use rights, but retained authority to adjust this
amount based on tests and readings of aquifer renewal rates. Further,
the court held that ground water management districts possessed no
statutory authority to determine an applicant's water use right. Only
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after the Commission grants a use right does the District have
authority to assist in the enforcement of Commission rules regarding
the management of that district.
Finally, the court ruled that the anti-speculation doctrine applied
to applications to the Commission for groundwater use rights. The
court rationalized that since groundwater in deep Denver Basin
Aquifers was a finite public resource, it was inconsistent to require a
showing of beneficial use for surface waters replenished seasonally, but
not for groundwater within aquifers easily exhausted. A landowner
like the Bradburys possesses only an inchoate, statutory right to use of
underlying groundwater and therefore, must make a threshold
showing of a beneficial, non-speculative use without waste.
Alternatively, a landowner must establish a contract demonstrating
beneficial use by a third party for uses not occurring on landowner's
property.
In conclusion, the court held the Bradburys had a right to apply to
the Commission for a determination of a use right for groundwater in
aquifers underlying their land in the Kiowa-Bijou Designated
Groundwater Basin and did not need to drill a well to obtain a use
right. Additionally, the court found that under Colorado law, the
Commission has proper authority to determine a use right for Denver
Basin designation groundwater, not the North Kiowa-Bijou
Groundwater Management District. Finally, the court remanded the
case to the district judge to reinstate the finding that the Bradburys'
applications were not speculative based on evidence previously offered
during the administrative hearing.
DaraLum

East Twin Lakes Ditches & Water Works, Inc. v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs of Lake County, 76 P.3d 918 (Colo. 2003) (affirming water
court's holding that the water right at issue was not abandoned
because the owner adequately rebutted the presumption of
abandonment created by failure to apply water to a beneficial use for a
period of ten years with evidence sufficient to demonstrate an intent
not to abandon).
In 1998, East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works, Inc. ("ETLD")
filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the water right in Derry
Ditch No. 1 ("ditch"), owned by Lake County Board of County
Commissioners ("Lake County"), had been abandoned. The court in
Water Division Two held that ETLD failed to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the water had been abandoned.
ETLD appealed, alleging abandonment due to thirty years of non-use
and that the decision by the predecessors of Lake County to not line
the ditch was affirmative proof of that abandonment. Lake County
conceded a presumption of abandonment; however, Lake County
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argued that it successfully rebutted the presumption with sufficient
The Colorado
evidence demonstrating intent not to abandon.
Supreme Court explained it would not overturn the water court's
decision unless the record was "wholly insufficient to support the
decision."
The water right associated with the ditch was a senior water right
for four cubic feet of water per second ("c.f.s") for the irrigation of a
two-acre parcel of land, commonly known as Hallenbeck Ranch
("Hallenbeck"). In 1972, Twin Lakes Recreation Land Investment
Company ("TLR") purchased Hallenbeck and its associated water
rights with the intent to resell it for residential development. During
the time TLR owned Hallenbeck, the property manager was unable to
transport water in the ditch due to its porous nature. The manager
informed TLR that in order to transport and apply the water, the ditch
must be lined. However, TLR was unable to secure funds to line the
ditch. Despite this failure, TLR took other actions demonstrative of an
intent not to abandon. For instance, during its ownership, TLR filed a
statement of opposition to a water rights application because it
believed it might conflict with its own water rights, and filed an action
in 1995 to correct a discrepancy between the decreed and actual
points of diversion for the ditch. Despite repeated efforts, TLR was
unable to resell the property for development, and in 1998, Lake
County bought the ranch. Lake County purchased Hallenbeck with
knowledge of the ditch's status and testimony indicated that Lake
County made the purchase in part because it could use the water right
associated with the ditch to create wetlands in the event Lake County
successfully accomplished a land swap with the federal government.
The court reviewed the record to determine if it supported the
water court's decision that the water right was not abandoned. A
finding of abandonment depends on the existence of two elements: a
sustained period of non-use and intent to abandon. The objector
must prove abandonment by a preponderance of the evidence;
however, since intent is difficult to prove, Colorado law provides that
failure to apply water to a beneficial use for a period of ten years
creates a rebuttable presumption of abandonment. To rebut this
presumption, the water right owner must introduce objective and
credible evidence sufficient to excuse the non-use or demonstrate
intent not to abandon. In evaluating whether an owner intended to
abandon his or her water right, Colorado courts examine seven factors
whose cumulative weight may be enough to rebut a presumption of
abandonment. These factors include: (1) repair and maintenance of
the diversion structure; (2) attempts to put the water to beneficial use;
(3) active diversion records and non-appearance of the water right in
the State Engineer's abandonment list; (4) diligent efforts to sell the
water right; (5) filing documents to protect, change, or preserve the
water right; (6) leasing the water right; and (7) economic or legal
obstacles to exercising the right.
The court then examined the facts according to these factors. The
court found that both TLR and Lake County engaged in maintenance
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and repair of the ditch, that the TLR property manager made a series
of attempts between 1972 and 1998 to put the water to beneficial use,
and that the ditch never appeared on the state engineer's
abandonment list. Furthermore, the court found that TLR and Lake
County took legal actions during their ownerships that were consistent
with the use and protection of their water rights, including the
investigation of water rights applications, TLR's 1995 filing of a
statement of opposition to an application, TLR's application to correct
invalid points of diversion for the ditch, and Lake County's 1998joint
filing with the City of Aurora requesting the ditch be used as an
alternate point of diversion in a change case. Additionally, the court
found evidence in the record of TLR's ten-year lease of the ditch to
Box Creek Mining Company beginning in 1980, and also determined
that TLR's repeated efforts to sell the ranch demonstrated the
partnership's intent not to abandon. Lastly, the court found that
TLR's inability to secure funds to line the ditch represented an
economic obstacle to exercising the water right. In summary, the
court found support in the record for six of the seven factors showing
intent not to abandon, and held that the cumulative weight of these
factors was sufficient to rebut the presumption of abandonment.
Thus, the Colorado Supreme Court affirmed the water court's
decision.
Kate 0. Lively

Groundwater Appropriators of the S. Platte River Basin, Inc. v. City of
Boulder, 73 P.3d 22 (Colo. 2003) (holding the Colorado Rules of Civil
Procedure do not authorize imposition of attorneys' fees in cases
dismissed with prejudice, and finding the opponent's requested
injunction inapplicable in the present case).
Groundwater Appropriators of the South Platte River Basin
("GASP"), a corporation owning more than 3000 wells, filed
applications for conditional water rights in 1995, 1996, and 1998.
Various interested parties, including the City of Boulder ("Boulder")
and local irrigation companies, filed statements of opposition to at
least one of GASP's applications. GASP filed for partial summary
judgment, requesting the District Court for Water Division One to not
require GASP to identify augmented well depletions as a qualification
for the conditional water rights sought. Boulder joined the irrigation
companies in a cross-motion for summaryjudgment, seeking either an
outright denial of GASP's applications, or alternatively, a requirement
that GASP identify potential depletions and submit plans for
augmentation. Boulder and the irrigation companies also sought an
injunction to prevent GASP members from out-of-priority pumping.
The water court granted GASP's motion for partial summary
judgment.
Before trial on the remaining issues, GASP filed a motion to
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dismiss its 1995 and 1996 applications with prejudice. The irrigation
companies and Boulder argued the water court should only dismiss
the applications if it would also order GASP to pay the companies' and
Boulder's attorneys' fees associated with their opposition to GASP's
1995 and 1996 applications. The water court granted the motion to
dismiss, and ordered GASP to pay the requested attorneys' fees. GASP
appealed to the Colorado Supreme Court on the issue of attorneys'
fees, and the irrigation companies and Boulder cross-appealed the
Division One's failure to address their out-of-priority pumping claim.
Addressing the issue of attorneys' fees, the Colorado Supreme
Court looked to federal case law regarding the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure and the virtually identical provision in the Colorado Rules
of Civil Procedure. Based on federal authorities, the court held the
Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure did not authorize the imposition of
attorneys' fees in cases dismissed with prejudice, except in cases of bad
faith. The court reasoned that if a plaintiff were subject to attorneys'
fees upon moving to dismiss its own claims, there would be little
incentive to dismiss such claims rather than pursuing litigation.
On the issue of the requested injunction, the court agreed with the
water court, finding the request outside the scope of the current
proceeding. Under Colorado law, statements of opposition filed
regarding the adjudication of water rights or conditional water rights
may only "set forth facts as to why the application should not be
granted or why it should be granted only in part or on certain
conditions." Boulder and the irrigation companies had requested an
injunction regarding GASP members' out-of-priority pumping-a
subject not at issue in the present case. Thus, the Colorado Supreme
Court reversed the water court's order imposing attorneys' fees, and
affirmed the water court's denial of the motion for injunction.
KatharineJ.Ellison

Vought v. Stucker Mesa Domestic Pipeline Co., 76 P.3d 906 (Colo.
2003) (affirming water court's decision that pipeline company satisfied
requirements for obtaining conditional water right decree prior in
time to absentee landowner).
The dispute in this case arose between Peter Vought ("Vought")
and Stucker Mesa Domestic Pipeline Company ("Stucker Mesa")
concerning which party gained an earlier appropriation date for the
right to use water from several springs located on Vought's property.
The Colorado Supreme Court held Stucker Mesa obtained an earlier
appropriation date because it satisfied all of the requirements to
obtain a conditional water right decree before Vought.
Vought, an absentee land owner, applied for a conditional water
right decree in the Division Four Water Court on October 23, 2000.
Vought stated he first intended to use several springs on his land for
domestic use in 1970; however, he did not act on that intent for
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another two decades. On October 22, 1996, Vought instructed his
foreman to clean up debris on a road that led to one of the springs.
Three years later, the same foreman spoke with an employee at the
Colorado Division of Water Resources about possibly applying for a
conditional water rights decree. In October 1999, Vought's foreman
claimed that he put stakes into the springs with the date "1999 Oct"
written on each one. Finally, in Fall of 2000, Vought's foreman dug
holes around one of the springs in order to improve the flow and
install equipment necessary to measure and increase the water flow.
Stucker Mesa, a non-profit organization that supplies water to local
establishments, experienced a shortage in its water supply, and after
inspecting the springs on Vought's land and establishing the global
positioning system ("GPS") location of the springs, also applied for a
conditional water right decree. The water court held Stucker Mesa
obtained an earlier appropriation date. Vought appealed the water
court's decision to the Colorado Supreme Court.
To obtain a conditional water right in Colorado, an applicant must
demonstrate compliance with two major requirements: the "first step"
test and the "can and will" requirement. The court stated that the
"first step" test requires that the appropriator satisfy two requirements:
showing intent to appropriate the water for a beneficial use, and
performance of an overt act that (1) manifests an intent to appropriate
the water, (2) demonstrates taking a substantial step toward applying
the water to a beneficial use, and (3) notifies interested parties of the
nature and extent of the proposed demand upon the water supply.
Applying these rules, the court found that Vought and Stucker
Mesa both satisfied all of the requirements in the "first step" for
obtaining a conditional water right decree; however, Stucker Mesa
satisfied the requirements earlier than Vought. The court noted that
Vought satisfied the first part of step one, an intent to appropriate
water, in 1970 when he first planned on appropriating water from the
springs for domestic use. The court found that Vought satisfied all
elements of the overt act requirement, but not until he filed the
application for a conditional water right.
Specifically, Vought
manifested his intent to appropriate the water in 1970; however, he
did not take a substantial step toward appropriating the water until his
foreman dug around the spring and installed pipes and a barrel in fall
of 2000. Furthermore, the court noted that Vought failed to notify any
interested parties of the demand upon the water supply until he filed
his application on October 23, 2000. Further, the court found the
foreman's actions of talking to an employee about possibly applying
for an appropriation as well as allegedly posting stakes in the springs
were insufficient to satisfy this final requirement. Therefore, the court
held that Vought did not satisfy all of the requirements of the "first
step" until October 23, 2000.
Addressing Stucker Mesa's application, the court found Stucker
Mesa satisfied the requirements of the "first step" test on October 6,
2000. Specifically, Stucker Mesa successfully completed the first two
prongs of the "first step" requirement when it fixed the GPS location
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of the springs; however, like Vought, it failed to put others on notice
until it filed its application for a conditional water rights decree on
October 6, 2000. Therefore, the court held Stucker Mesa did not
satisfy all of the elements of the "first step" requirement until October
6, 2000.
The court then addressed the second step in obtaining a
conditional water right in Colorado, the "can and will" requirement.
The "can and will" test requires an applicant to prove that he or she
will not only diligently complete an appropriation, but also put water
to a beneficial use within a reasonable amount of time. Vought
challenged Stucker Mesa's ability to satisfy the "can and will"
requirement because he never gave the company a right of access onto
his property. However, since Stucker Mesa proved that it possessed the
need and the ability to construct the necessary equipment for water
appropriation, the court invoked the right of private condemnation,
which gives water rights owners a right-of-way through the lands which
lie between the point of diversion and point of use. Therefore, the
court held Stucker Mesa fulfilled the "can and will" test by invoking
the right of private condemnation over Vought's land.
Finally, Vought contended that the court should dismiss Stucker
Mesa's application due to Stucker Mesa's alleged trespass onto
Vought's land. However, the court found that there was no basis for
the trespass claim, and dismissed the argument. Thus, the Colorado
Supreme Court concluded that while Vought and Stucker Mesa both
satisfied all of the requirements for obtaining a conditional water right
decree for the springs, Stucker Mesa satisfied the requirements earlier
than Vought.
BretJohnson

CONNECTICUT
Rocque v. Biafore, No. CV000800791S, 2003 Conn. Super. LEXIS
1323 (Conn. Super. Ct. Apr. 21, 2003) (holding that property owners
who did not cause contamination are nonetheless strictly liable and
therefore subject to both injunctive and civil penalties under the
Connecticut Water Pollution Control Act for discharges of hazardous
materials from owner's property into state waters).
Arthur Rocque ("Rocque"), Commissioner of the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection ("DEP"), sued Joseph
Biafore, Jr., Nicholas Biafore, and companies they owned and
controlled ("Biafore") for violations of the Connecticut Water
The six-count complaint alleged
Pollution Control Act ("Act").
for discharging
responsible
was
Biafore
property owner
polychlorinated biphenyls ("PCBs") without a permit into state waters
from their property located in Stratford, Connecticut ("site"). Rocque
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sought an injunction restraining Biafore from further discharges and
requiring remediation of the site. He also sought monetary penalties.
The Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Hartford found
Biafore was strictly liable for all claims and awarded the injunctive and
civil penalties sought by Rocque.
Biafore leased property to a foundry where a fire occurred in May
1993.
Fire officials responding to the site notified DEP of
environmental concerns.
The DEP noted the presence of
transformers and other potential PCB-containing equipment. Biafore
and DEP separately investigated the site following the fire and
detected PCB contamination levels exceeding state standards. These
site investigations indicated that releases of PCBs to the soils
contaminated the ground water and threatened to contaminate nearby
surface water.
DEP issued a Notice of Violation ("NOV") to Biafore requiring
remediation of the PCB contamination. Biafore undertook further
site investigations in response to the NOV, and found extremely high
levels of PCB contamination in site soils and ground water.
Subsequently, Biafore refused to conduct remedial activities at the site,
claiming a lack of economic ability. Because Biafore failed to comply
with the remediation terms of the NOV, Rocque filed suit against
Biafore under the Act.
Under the Act, property owners are responsible for contamination
and associated releases from their property even if they themselves did
not cause the pollution. The court separately evaluated liability for the
Biafores as individual site owners and Joseph Biafore's corporate
officer role in managing site activities. First, the court analyzed the
liability of Joseph and Nicholas Biafore as individuals. The court
found PCB contamination existed on the Biafore-owned property and
noted Biafore did not remediate the contamination as ordered.
Because the Act imposes strict liability for any violation, these findings
were sufficient to demonstrate Biafore's individual liability.
Next, the court applied the responsible corporate officer doctrine
in analyzingJoseph Biafore's liability for PCBs released from property
owned by a Biafore-held company. According to the doctrine, a
corporate officer may be liable under the Act when: "(1) the officer is
in a position to influence corporate policies and activities; (2) there is
a nexus between the officer's actions and the violation; and (3) the
officer's actions resulted in the violation." The court found Joseph
Biafore was in a position to address environmental compliance issues;
he was in charge of regulatory contacts and had authority to make
financial decisions.
Therefore, applying the corporate officer
doctrine, the court found Joseph Biafore liable for violations of the
Act. The court granted injunctive relief to prevent further releases of
PCBs based on its findings of liability against Biafore and the serious
threat to human health posed by ongoing discharges from the site.
Rocque also asked the court to impose civil penalties of $55,000 as
allowed under the Act. The court applied seven factors used by the
Connecticut Supreme Court in its analysis of civil penalties of this type:
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(1) the size of the business, (2) the effect of the penalty, (3) the gravity
of the violation, (4) good faith efforts to comply with regulations, (5)
the economic benefit, (6) the deterrence effect, and (7) the fair and
equitable treatment of the regulated community. The court found
reasonable a penalty for violations of the Act in the amount sought.
In summary, the court found the property owners liable in their
capacity as individuals and as a corporate officer for violations of the
Act. The court then awarded injunctive relief and civil penalties for
$55,000.
Chris Wittenbrink

IDAHO
Asarco Inc. v. State, 69 P.3d 139 (Idaho 2003) (holding Idaho's
Department of Environmental Quality total maximum daily load
standard constituted a rule where the limitation had wide coverage,
general and uniform applicability, prospective application, dictated a
legal standard or directive not provided by the enabling statute, stated
agency policy not stated before, and interpreted law).
Asarco Inc. ("Asarco") and two other mining companies filed a
complaint in the Kootenai District Court against Idaho's Department
of Environmental Quality ("DEQ"). Asarco claimed that DEQ failed to
follow the formal rule-making requirements of the Idaho
Administrative Procedure Act ("IAPA") when DEQ established the
total maximum daily load ("TMDL") standard for the Coeur D'Alene
River Basin. The TMDL determines the maximum amount of a
pollutant that may be deposited into a body of water. The federal
Clean Water Act and the state's counterpart require DEQ to regulate
water quality within the state. Both the federal and state acts require
DEQ to take three steps to control water quality: (1) DEQ must
develop water quality standards, (2) DEQ must identify water bodies
that fail to meet these standards, and (3) DEQ must establish the
TMDL standard for those bodies of water that do not meet the
established water quality standards. The Coeur D'Alene TMDLs,
established by DEQ caused a modification in two of the mining
companies' NPDES permits. These companies sought judicial review
and declaratory relief in district court to void the rule because DEQ
did not follow the IAPA rule-making procedures. DEQ moved for
dismissal claiming the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because Asarco failed to exhaust its administrative remedies. Asarco
opposed and moved for summary judgment. The district court ruled
in favor of Asarco and voided the TMDL standards. The court also
held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction, and DEQ violated the
JAPA because it did not follow the required rule-making procedure.
DEQ appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court.
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On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court found the TMDL standard
to be a rule. The court paraphrased the statutory definition of an
administrative rule by stating that agency action becomes a rule when
the agency's statement applies generally and implements law. The
court adopted the factors the district court used to determine whether
the TMDL standard formed a rule. Those factors included "(1) wide
coverage, (2) applied generally and uniformly, (3) operates only in
future cases, (4) prescribes a legal standard or directive not otherwise
provided by the enabling statute, (5) expresses agency policy not
previously expressed, and (6) is an interpretation of law or general
policy." The court applied all of these factors to the TMDL standard
and found that each factor was present; therefore, the TMDL standard
was a rule. Because DEQ did not follow the IAPA statutorily required
rule-making procedures, the court then voided the rule.
In addition, the court held that Asarco properly sought declaratory
relief before exhausting administrative remedies. The IAPA states that
when an administrative agency interferes with or impairs the rights of a
party, that party may seek judicial review and declaratory relief. DEQ's
application of the TMDL standard modified permits of two of the
mining companies. Because DEQ interfered with Asarco's rights, the
court permitted Asarco to seek declaratory relief without exhausting its
administrative remedies. Therefore, the court affirmed the district
court's findings and awarded costs on appeal to Asarco.
Robert E. Wells

Sagewillow v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 70 P.3d 669 (Idaho 2003)
(holding water resource department improperly applied the
resumption of use doctrine, and remanding for water resource
department to reconsider resumption of use as well as to reconsider
whether plaintiff forfeited some of its water rights through nonuse).
Appellant Sagewillow, Inc. ("Sagewillow") filed seven groundwater
transfer applications, seeking a change in the places of use of those
rights. Respondents James Mays, Mays Land and Livestock, and the
Blaine County Canal Company (collectively, "Mays") protested
Sagewillow's applications. Mays claimed Sagewillow forfeited its rights
due to nonuse. The Department of Water Resources ("Department")
granted some of Sagewillow's transfer requests, but held Sagewillow
either partially or completely forfeited the remaining rights. After the
District Court for the Seventh Judicial District affirmed the
Department's ruling, Sagewillow appealed to the Idaho Supreme
Court. The Idaho Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding
the Department misapplied the resumption of use doctrine and
directing the Department to reconsider and issue findings as to
whether the evidence supported the Department's forfeiture finding.
In 1989, Sagewillow purchased four properties: Knollin Ranch,
Bird Ranch, North of Road Place, and Homestead Place. In 1993,
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Sagewillow purchased one additional property, known as Frew Place.
The water rights appurtenant to the Knollin Ranch and Bird Ranch
properties consisted of fifteen surface water rights and two
groundwater rights, with priority dates ranging from 1906 to 1957.
The North of Road Place and Homestead Place properties each
included one groundwater right, with priority dates of 1959 and 1960,
respectively. Frew Place included two groundwater rights, with priority
dates of 1959 and 1972.
After Sagewillow purchased the properties, it began increasing the
number of acres irrigated on those properties. The water rights for
the five properties were capable of irrigating 2383 acres. However, for
twenty years before Sagewillow's purchase, the previous owners only
irrigated 1412 acres. After Sagewillow purchased the properties, it
began increasing the number of irrigated acres, to 2000 acres in 1991,
2100 acres in 1992, and 2390 acres in 1993.
As it increased the number of acres irrigated on the properties,
Sagewillow also filed transfer applications.
In 1990, it filed an
uncontested transfer application to change both the place of use and
point of diversion for one groundwater right. The Department
granted that application in 1992. In 1994, Sagewillow filed seven
additional transfer applications, to which Mays objected.
The
Department held proceedings to determine whether some of
In its ruling, the
Sagewillow's water rights had been forfeited.
Department held some of Sagewillow's rights partially forfeited and
others totally forfeited, and limited Sagewillow's irrigation to 1412
acres.
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed four issues: (1)
whether the Department correctly applied the resumption of use
doctrine, (2) whether "substantial and competent" evidence supported
the Department's forfeiture finding, (3) whether the Department
erred in voiding the transfer application it originally granted in 1992,
and (4) whether the Department could be a party to a review of its
decision.
The court first addressed whether the Department correctly
applied the resumption of use doctrine. The resumption of use
doctrine allows a party to avoid forfeiture after a five-year period of
nonuse if the party resumes its use prior to a claim of right by a third
party. The Department argued resumption of use only applied if no
junior appropriators existed "in the same or an interconnected water
source." Further, the Department argued, where such a junior
appropriator existed, that junior need not have done anything to
assert a claim of right; the existence of the junior right by itself was
sufficient. The court disagreed. The court held that, in addition to
holding a junior right, the user must also "have used the water for a
beneficial purpose." In its ruling, the Department failed to include
findings supporting ajunior's use of Sagewillow's water for a beneficial
purpose. The court directed the Department to do so upon remand.
The court then addressed, as a matter of first impression, what
constituted a "claim of right." The court cited to and discussed the
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only three cases in which it applied the resumption of use doctrine.
Based on those cases, the court held that a party makes a claim of right
if the party "has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture,
or has obtained a valid water right authorizing the use of such water
with a priority date prior to the resumption of use, or has used the
water pursuant to an existing water right." The court directed the
Department to reconsider these criteria upon remand.
The court next addressed whether evidence supported the
Department's forfeiture finding. The party asserting forfeiture must
prove it by clear and convincing evidence. Although the Department
made findings that Mays established forfeiture of two of the water
rights by clear and convincing evidence, the Department failed to
include findings of clear and convincing evidence for the other water
rights.
Further, a water right is not forfeited if nonuse is due to
Sagewillow argued no
circumstances beyond the user's control.
evidence existed to show water had been available during the five-year
period of nonuse. Because the Department failed to find water had
been available to juniors during the period of nonuse, the court
directed the Department to review this issue on remand.
The court then addressed whether the Department erred in
voiding, during the underlying proceeding, one of Sagewillow's
transfer requests the Department originally approved in 1992. The
Department voided that transfer after finding the right forfeited prior
to its approval of the transfer. Sagewillow argued it could not void the
approved transfer due to res judicata and collateral estoppel. The
court disagreed. Such a ruling would require the Department to
investigate forfeiture each time a party filed a transfer application, a
substantial burden. Because no party actually raised forfeiture during
the original transfer proceeding, the court held that the Department
did not err in voiding its original approval.
Finally, Sagewillow argued the Department could not participate in
the appeal. The court looked to the statutory definitions of "party,"
which included "a person or agency," and "person," which included a
"governmental subdivision or agency," and held that the Department
was properly a party to Sagewillow's appeal.
For the above reasons, the Idaho Supreme Court vacated the
Department's order and remanded the case to the Department for
further proceedings consistent with its opinion.
Brian L. Martin
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KENTUCKY
Camenisch v. City of Stanford, No. 2002-CA-000962-MR, 2003 WL
22025457 (Ky. Ct. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding water supply clause in
deed, lacking written grant consistent with the formalities of a deed
and a condition subsequent, was not an easement or a future interest
creating a right of entry or a possibility of reverter, but rather a
covenant that runs with the land).
In 1892 the Rochesters transferred a portion of their property
containing a spring to the Howe Pump and Engine Company
("HPEC"). As consideration for the transfer, HPEC covenanted to
supply water to the Rochester household. The Camenisches were the
Rochester's successors-in-interest. The City of Stanford ("City") was
HPEC's successor-in-interest. In 1996, the City stopped supplying
water to the Camenisches. The Camenisches then filed a complaint
against the City in the Lincoln Circuit Court and moved for summary
judgment. The City answered and also moved for summary judgment.
The Camenisches argued the water supply clause in the deed created
an easement for water rights. The City claimed the water supply clause
either created a condition subsequent or a covenant. The circuit court
granted summary judgment in favor of the City holding the clause
created a condition subsequent and not an easement. In addition, the
circuit court held the Camenishes position taken in a prior suit
estopped them from arguing for anything other than a condition
subsequent. The Camenisches appealed the circuit court decision.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals considered whether the clause
created an easement, condition subsequent, or a covenant. The court
disposed of the easement and condition subsequent arguments by
finding that the water supply clause lacked formalities consistent with a
deed or a condition subsequent; therefore, the water supply clause did
not create an easement or a future interest. With respect to the
interest the water supply clause created, the court held the clause
created a covenant. The City argued that the language in the deed
intended to create a private covenant between only the grantor and
grantee. The City further claimed the language bound the grantees
and not the grantor. The City contended that in order to make a
covenant running with the land the deed must bind the grantor as
well. According to the court, the criteria for deciding if the covenant
runs with the land are: (1) the parties' intent, (2) whether the
covenant must affect or concern the land with which it runs, and (3)
whether privity of estate exists between the party claiming the benefit
and the party who rests under the burden. The court found the deed
language, "as appurtenan [sic] to the land," indicated that the water
supply covenant was intended to run with the land. The court also
noted that even though it is customary to use words of inheritance to
create a covenant that runs with the land, it is not necessary. The
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court concluded that the covenant ran with the land.
The court also reversed the circuit court's holding that the
Camenisches were precluded from arguing anything other than a
condition subsequent. The City claimed the Camnisches argued, in
earlier litigation, that the interest was a condition subsequent and that
the City relied to its detriment on that argument. The City contended
the Camenisches could not now change their position. The court
found in favor of the Camenisches on this issue, holding the City had
every right to its own interpretation of the clause and did not rely to
their detriment on the Camenisches interpretation. Therefore, the
court held the clause created a covenant that ran with the land,
vacated the circuit court's judgment, and remanded the case for the
circuit court to hear other defenses the City intended to employ.
Robert E. Wells

MISSOURI
Edmonson v. Edwards, 111 S.W.3d 906 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003) (affirming
circuit courtjudgment awarding riparian owner injunctive relief and
damages for injuries sustained when upstream owner of a neighboring
property dammed a stream that flowed through both pieces of land).
R.G. Edmonson and Doug Edwards owned adjoining parcels of
real estate through which a stream flowed. A spring originating north
of both properties fed the stream, which flowed through Edwards's
land across and onto Edmonson's land. Edwards constructed a dam
on the stream to fill two ponds on his property for recreational use.
The dam effectively stopped water flowing to Edmonson's property, as
it completely diverted stream water into the ponds on Edwards's
property. Edmonson filed suit against Edwards in the Barry County
Circuit Court. The circuit court granted Edmonson damages and a
permanent injunction ordering Edwards to dismantle the dam.
Edwards appealed the circuit court's decision.
Edwards asserted on appeal that (1) the circuit court's judgment
denied him reasonable use of the stream, (2) injunctive relief was
improper because Edmonson did not incur any harm, and (3)
Edmonson was not entitled to damages. The Missouri Court of
Appeals initially found that Edwards's brief did not explain how the
legal reasons for his appeal supported the claim of reversible error, as
mandated by Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 84.04(a). However, the court stated that
it nonetheless could look to the argument portion of the brief to
determine whether the circuit court committed plain error that may
have resulted in manifest injustice.
The court first analyzed whether the injunction deprived Edwards
of a reasonable use of the stream by virtue of his riparian ownership.
The court found that what constitutes a reasonable use is a question of
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fact depending on the circumstances of the specific case. Here,
Edwards's dam deprived Edmonson of water for livestock. Edmonson
farmed and worked on his property for over fifty years. To his
knowledge, throughout those fifty years the stream never lacked
sufficient water for his farm. The court found that Edwards's dam
harmed Edmonson, as he needed to move his livestock from his
property to another location. Furthermore, the court found that
Edwards did not have exclusive tifle to, or control of, the stream's
water, even while it was on his land. The court stated an owner of land
through which a nonnavigable stream flows could not divert the
stream's water to the exclusion of others. Because Edwards diverted
the stream to the exclusion of Edmonson, the court found that
Edwards's use of the stream unreasonable. The court also concluded
Edwards's unreasonable use of the stream damaged Edmonson, and
therefore the circuit court correctly awarded Edmonson injunctive
relief.
Finally, Edwards argued that if Edmonson was entitled to
injunctive relief, such relief barred him from collecting damages.
Because evidence showed Edmonson incurred monetary damages in
addition to irreparable harm, the court held he was entitled to seek
both damages and injunctive relief. Since the court found no error, it
affirmed the circuit courtjudgment.
Kyle K Chang
NEVADA
Preferred Equities Corp. v. State Eng'r, 75 P.3d 380 (Nev. 2003)
(holding (1) an application to change water diversion point was moot
due to forfeiture and failure to appeal forfeiture within thirty days; (2)
application to change place and manner of use of water rights did not
toll the forfeiture period; and (3) equitable relief was unavailable to
water rights holder who did not make beneficial use of water rights).
In 1988, Preferred Equities Corporation ("PEC") applied to the
State Engineer for a change in the diversion point and usage of PEC's
water rights. The State Engineer did not immediately act on that
application and, in 1992, began forfeiture proceedings on the same
water rights. In 1996, concluding PEC had not utilized the water
rights for a period exceeding five years, the State Engineer declared
the rights in forfeit. PEC did not appeal. In February 1997, the State
Engineer issued a ruling denying the 1988 application to change the
diversion and usage of the forfeited rights. In May 1997, PEC sought
judicial review of the February ruling. The Fifth Judicial District Court
agreed with the State Engineer that PEC's appeal was an impermissible
attempt to review a finally adjudicated forfeiture. The court also
agreed the State Engineer's properly denied the application to change
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diversion and usage because PEC failed to make use of the water rights
within the prescriptive time. Dissatisfied with the district court's
finding, PEC appealed to the Nevada Supreme Court.
In its decision, the court (examined three points: (1) mootness,
(2) the tolling of the forfeiture period, and (3) PEC's request for
equitable relief. In addressing mootness, the court found that by
failing to appeal the forfeiture ruling within thirty days, PEC allowed
its water rights to revert to the public. The reversion became
permanent in the period between PEC's 1988 application to change
the diversion point of its water rights and the State Engineer's 1997
denial of that application. Therefore, because PEC no longer owned
the water rights its application to change the diversion point and usage
was moot.
Next, the court examined PEC's claim of tolling the forfeiture
period. PEC argued it could not have made beneficial use of the water
right without changing its diversion point, thus it would have been
wasteful to require PEC to continue to use the water while it waited for
the State Engineer's decision. However, the court noted that under
Nevada law a proper process existed for requesting an extension of the
five-year prescriptive period. Moreover, PEC should have timely
responded to the forfeiture ruling and argued that its application to
change the diversion point and usage tolled the forfeiture
proceedings. PEC did neither; thus, the court rejected its tolling
claim.
Finally, regarding PEC's request for equitable relief, the court said,
"[t]he preeminent public policy concern in Nevada regarding water
rights is beneficial use." The court said it has consistently applied
water statutes strictly. Accordingly, because PEC did not use its rights,
the court refused to grant equitable relief. Thus, the Nevada Supreme
Court affirmed the district court's decision.
Jeff Gillio

NORTH CAROLINA
Murphy Family Farms v. N.C. Dep't. of Envtl. and Natural Res., 585

S.E.2d 446 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003) (holding that a violation of dissolved
oxygen and fecal coliform levels over eight days of testing consisted of
eight violations, and that pumping excessive sand and grit from a
disposal system did not trigger the notice requirements under the
waste disposal permit).
Murphy Family Farms ("Murphy") challenged an assessment of
civil fines by the Water Quality Division of the North Carolina
Department of Environment and Natural Resources ("DENR") for
violations of its waste management system permit. Murphy requested a
hearing in front of an administrative law judge ("ALJ"). The ALJ
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reduced the civil penalties, enforcement costs, the number of dissolved
oxygen ("DO") violations, and the amount of the penalties for the
fecal coliform bacteria and DO violations. In addition, the ALJ found
Murphy did not violate the notice requirements under its permit.
Murphy and DENR appealed the ALJ decision. The Environmental
Management Commission ("EMC") did not accept all of the ALJ's
recommended decisions. Instead, EMC found eight violations of the
DO levels, assessed two notice violations, and reduced the fines
because of miscalculation. Murphy filed a petition for review in the
Duplin Superior Court. The court held there had been only one
violation for DO and fecal coliform levels and that there had been no
notice violations. DENR appealed to the North Carolina Court of
Appeals.
The DENR assessed civil fines in the amount of $40,650.33 against
Murphy for violations of its permit. Murphy obtained this permit for a
"closed loop system," a disposal system that treated the waste and then
recycled the water back into the hog operations. The permit provided
that if the system failed, Murphy could temporarily divert the waste
into its lagoons. Sand and grit accumulated in the treatment system
and Murphy pumped 170,000 gallons of waste water into one of its
lagoons. The lagoon breached and over one million gallons of
wastewater entered the Cape Fear River Basin. DENR tested the river
basin for eight days and found violations of dissolved oxygen and fecal
coliform bacteria standards on each day.
The court of appeals first addressed whether the lower court
correctly found that there had been only one violation for DO and
fecal coliform levels. The appellate court looked to a North Carolina
statute that allowed DENR to assess a penalty for each day a violation
continued because Murphy continued to allow the waste to be
intermixed with State waters. Thus, the appellate court concluded that
the trial court erred in reducing the number of discharge violations.
The appellate court next addressed whether Murphy violated its
notice requirements under the permit. The appellate court looked to
the permit and determined that a failure or interruption "that cause(s)
the emergency action plan to be initiated" requires notice. Although
the pumping of sand and grit consisted of an interruption, this
situation did not cause the initiation of the emergency action plan.
The court found that the emergency action plan only needed
implementation when waste leaked, overflowed, or ran off site. The
DENR assessed a notice violation for the period when the sand, grit,
and wastewater was transferred to the lagoon. The appellate court
found that this action could not be classified as waste leaking,
overflowing, or running off site. Thus, the appellate court affirmed in
part and reversed in part the judgment of the trial court.
Adriano Martinez
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OREGON
Kerivan v. Water Res. Comm'n, 72 P.3d 659 (Or. Ct. App. 2003)
(holding Water Resources Department was not required to initiate
forfeiture proceedings where the underlying water rights had already
been cancelled in connection with transfers from irrigation to
instream use).
In September 1999, the Kerivans requested Oregon Water
Resources
Department
("Department")
to initiate forfeiture
proceedings to cancel various senior water rights in Sucker Creek. In
their request, the Kerivans claimed the owners of the rights forfeited
the rights due to nonuse for five years. In Department proceedings
with notice and without protest, the Department refused to cancel the
water rights, stating that previous transfers from irrigation to instream
use cancelled the rights. The Department found the portion of an
originating water right changed by a transfer order is not subject to
forfeiture once the order's appeal period expires. The Kerivans then
filed a petition for judicial review in the Josephine County Circuit
Court and requested a declaration that the Department was required
to conduct cancellation proceedings. The Department moved to
dismiss for lack ofjurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The circuit
court dismissed the petition and complaint and entered judgment for
the Department. The Kerivans appealed the judgment to the Oregon
Court of Appeals.
On appeal, the Kerivans first argued that the circuit court erred in
dismissing their declaratory judgment complaint. The court held that
section 183.490 of the Oregon Statutes, which provides that a court
may compel an agency to act where it unlawfully has refused to make a
decision, provided the exclusive mechanism to review the
Department's refusal to act. Therefore, the circuit court properly
found it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to provide declaratory relief.
Next, the court addressed the Kerivans' petition for judicial review.
The Kerivans argued that the Oregon statutes require the Department
initiate cancellation proceedings "whenever it appears that a right has
been forfeited." Specifically, the Kerivans claimed (1) the transfer
orders did not justify refusal to consider evidence of nonuse prior to
the date of transfer, and (2) failure to challenge the transfers did not
preclude their ability to request forfeiture proceedings where the
transfers did not injure their rights. The Department argued the
Kerivans were obligated to challenge the transfers when pending
because the transfers required consideration of cancellation for
nonuse, and since the Department published notice, the Kerivans'
claim constituted an untimely collateral attack on the transfer orders.
Interpreting the transfer statutes, the court found that whether a
right is forfeited may be an issue in transfer proceedings and the
Kerivans could have protested on that basis, allowing the Kerivans to
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raise the forfeiture issue in the transfer proceedings. The court then
examined whether the Kerivans' failure to protest the transfers
precluded them from requesting the Department to initiate the
forfeiture proceedings. The Kerivans argued the transfer orders did
not affect their ability to seek forfeiture, claiming (1) the statute
provides "whenever" a right appears forfeited, the Department shall
initiate cancellation proceedings; and (2) the transfer application
must show either water was used or is not subject to cancellation.
Ultimately, the court held the transfer orders were "conclusive
evidence of the priority and extent of the appropriation therein," and
therefore the Department was not obligated to initiate forfeiture
proceedings. Thus, the court upheld the circuit court's judgment
dismissing the Kerivans' petition for judicial review and declaratory
relief complaint.
JaredB. Briant

Owen v. Div. of State Lands, 76 P.3d 158 (Or. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that depositing fill material on the existing footprint of a submerged
farm road to raise it above water level is "farm road maintenance"
under Oregon state law).
In 1987, Owen, through the nonprofit Redding Foundation, Inc.
("Redding"), purchased property zoned for exclusive farm use in
hopes of protecting wetlands on the property. A road through the
marsh provided the only access to the non-wetland portion of the
property. The road, approximately 500 feet long, existed since 1978.
Owen used the road several times a year and maintained it so that it
was passable to four-wheel drive vehicles. In late 1999 or early 2000,
part of the road became permanently submerged due to a silt
constriction in the Williamson River. Owen hired a contractor to raise
the roadbed above the water level by adding some 2600 cubic yards of
fill material.
On October 20, 2000, the Division of State Lands ("DSL") issued a
cease and desist order, directing Owen to stop fill activities on the
portion of the road that crossed the marsh on his property. DSL held
a hearing on April 3, 2001. On October 16, 2001, DSL issued its final
order, which adopted the findings of the hearing officer and
concluded that no permit exemption applied. Owen sought judicial
review of the DSL final order. Owen argued the fill was exempt from
permit requirements under Oregon law, which allowed maintenance
of farm roads as long as the maintenance did not significantly and
adversely affect wetlands. DSL argued the wetland statute controlled
and only exempted emergency reconstruction of "recently damaged
parts of currently serviceable roads," and because the road was
submerged, it was not currently serviceable, thus excluding permit
exemption.
The Oregon Court of Appeals first considered the meaning of the
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term "maintenance" as used in the wetland statute. The court
determined that maintenance, as used in the statute, means "keeping
something in a state of repair or efficiency." This, the court said,
suggested a functional baseline condition; in this instance, a road
above the water line.
Next, the court examined the meaning of "reconstruction" as used
in the statute. Here the court determined that, while reconstruction
differs from maintenance, there is an overlap in their meanings. The
court noted that reconstruction generally requires the nonexistence of
the object being rebuilt. However, because both words can mean
"repair," and, because the road was merely submerged, not
nonexistent, even if the fill work was reconstruction it was
reconstruction in the repair sense of the word.
Finally, the court noted that because the statute contains no
requirement that the road be serviceable, "the legislature's intention
was to treat farm roads differently from other roads." Serviceability,
the court determined, was not the distinguishing factor under the law.
Based on the legislative record, the court concluded that maintenance
as used in the statute included restoration to the "previously sound
and efficacious condition ...that [had] recently been lost."
Accordingly, the court reversed the DSL final decision.
Jeff Gillio

TEXAS
City of San Marcos v. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, No. 03-0200724-CV, 2003 WL 22024663 (Tex. App. Aug. 29, 2003) (holding
discharged effluent lost its distinguishable qualities when commingled

with the San Marcos River, therefore becoming part of the river
watercourse).
San Marcos River Foundation and Dr. Jack Fairchild
("Foundation") appealed the district court's ruling to uphold the
Texas Commission on Environmental Quality's ("Commission")
decision granting the City of San Marcos ("City") a permit to convey
discharged wastewater effluent in the San Marcos River and then to
divert water from the river three miles downstream from the discharge
point. At the time of the controversy in question, Texas Code
required that no person appropriate or divert state water without first
obtaining a permit from the Commission. The City, believing it only
used the river as a vehicle to transport its privately owned water and
thus did not use state water, did not seek an appropriation permit in

their original application.
In 1997, while the City's original
application was still pending, the Texas Legislature passed the
comprehensive statewide water plan known as Senate Bill 1. Although
the Bill related directly to the types of reuse allowed in Texas, all
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parties agreed the Bill's grandfather clause rendered it inapplicable.
Because the Texas Code did not explicitly provide for the type of
permit the City applied for, the Commission determined it had
authority to decide the legal character of the water, and then
determined that the water remained privately owned by the City
throughout the transportation process. The Foundation appealed the
Commission's determination to the Texas Court of Appeals, believing
that once the City discharged the effluent, the water became state
water and thus the City needed an appropriation permit to divert. The
issue of whether an appropriation permit was needed to divert water
three miles downstream from the point of discharge hinged on
whether, once discharged, the effluent remained private property of
the City not needing a permit or became state water needing a permit.
The court noted the rule of capture governs Texas law regarding
ownership of property. A landowner may dig in her land, capturing as
much water as she chooses, without regard to downstream water rights.
Texas law further categorizes surface water into two categories: diffuse
surface water and water in a watercourse. Diffuse surface water
belongs to the landowner on which it is found, as long as the water is
gathered before it reaches a watercourse. On the other hand, water in
a watercourse belongs to the State, and is held in a trust for the public.
The court declared San Marcos River a watercourse.
Relying on City of Corpus Christi v. City of Pleasanton and Denis v.
Kickapoo Land Co., the City and Commission argued that the rule of
capture included the right to convey captured water down a
watercourse and later divert that same water, if the City clearly
However, the court
intended to reuse the discharged effluent.
concluded this reliance was misplaced, as both cases were decided on
different issues. The court in Corpus Christi held that a private owner
has the right to transport captured groundwater to 'the place of use.'
In the present case, the court noted the City was not transporting the
effluent to 'the place of use,' but rather to a new water treatment plant
three miles downstream where it would be treated and then sent to
'the place of use.' By allowing the effluent to travel three miles
downstream, the discharged effluent mixes with the cleaner river water
and loses its independent characteristics. Thus, at the point of
diversion, the released effluent is no longer differentiable from the
river water. Because the City's cleansing program relied on this
mixing process as part of their water treatment program, the court
found the discharge was not intended solely for transportation, but
largely for cleaning.
The court further concluded that because the effluent was defined
as municipal waste, which is not within the Texas Code's definition of
water, the effluent was not fungible with the river water. The court
held that by intentionally discharging their effluent into the river,
where it lost its independent characteristics and became part of the
river, the City abandoned the water as a matter of law. The court
found the common-law right to transport must be based on physical
control rather than subjective intent to maintain control.

WA TER LAW REVLEW

Volume 7

Because the effluent was not fungible with the river water, the
court reversed the district court's conclusion, holding that the effluent
became state water once discharged into the San Marcos River. Unless
the owner of the effluent can identify the effluent in the watercourse
and divert it before it commingles with the state water, the water is
presumed to become the watercourse. Therefore the court found if
the City wishes to reuse water, it must do so within the framework of
Senate Bill 1.
Aimee Wagstaff

Watts v. State, No. 14-99-00811-CR, 2003 Tex. App. LEXIS 6396 (Tex.
App. July 24, 2003) (holding trial court's improper instruction and
taking ofjudicial notice as to whether waters in drainage ditch were
waters of the State constituted harmless error where jury could not
reasonably reach a different conclusion than the instruction).
The State of Texas charged John Watts with water pollution, a
misdemeanor. A jury sitting for the Fifteenth County Criminal Court
in Harris County found Watts guilty. The Fourteenth District Court of
Appeals affirmed Watt's conviction. However, the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals reversed the conviction based on a jury instruction
given by the trialjudge. The appellate court then remanded the case
to the intermediate court of appeals to apply the harmless error rule to
the trial judge's instruction. The Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth
District then found the Judge's instruction harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The State prosecuted Watts for discharging sewage within 150 feet
of a drainage ditch. The Texas criminal water pollution statute
provided that knowing discharges into or adjacent to "waters in the
state" constituted a misdemeanor offense. Therefore, the critical issue
regarding Watts' guilt was whether water in the drainage ditch
constituted "waters in the state." The trial court took judicial notice of
American PlantFood, a past Texas Court of Appeals case, and instructed
the jury that water in a drainage ditch was "waters in the state." On
appeal, Watts argued this instruction deprived him of his right to ajury
trial regarding an essential question of fact.
The court reviewed the instruction and held beyond a reasonable
doubt that the instruction did not contribute to the conviction. The
court reasoned that the instruction was harmless error because no
juror could have reasonably interpreted the water pollution statute so
that the broad and inclusive term, "waters in the state," would not
include water in a drainage ditch located in the state. The court also
rejected Watts' argument that the trial judge's instruction that the
drainage ditch was a type of surface water the legislature meant to
protect under the statute prejudiced Watts because the instruction
should have regarded water in the drainage ditch and not the drainage
ditch itself. The court reasoned that water must be in the ditch by
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implication because a dry ditch could not reasonably be encompassed
within the term "waters of the state." Therefore, the court held the
improper instruction constituted harmless error and affirmed the
judgment of the trial court.
Holly Shook

VIRGINIA
Jenkins v. Bay House Assocs., 581 S.E.2d 510 (Va. 2003) (holding
failure of pleadings to put ownership of pond's waters in issue
precluded circuit court from considering the issue as within general
prayer for relief).
This case involved a dispute regarding ownership of Gaskins Pond,
including the bed and water within the pond. Bay House Associates
("Bay House") owned the pond bed in fee simple. Formerly, a small
strip of land separated the pond from Chesapeake Bay. In recent
years, a small opening within the pond bottom created an outlet
allowing the waters to flow freely between Gaskin Pond and
Chesapeake Bay. As the opening of the pond grew bigger, many of the
neighboring landowners constructed piers grounded in, and
extending into, the once isolated pond.
Claiming these piers
trespassed onto its land, Bay House sent letters to its neighbors
requesting immediate removal of the piers. The neighbors did not
comply; thus, Bay House sued seeking injunctive relief in the Circuit
Court of Northumberland County.
Although Bay House only sought injunctive relief to force removal
of the base of the piers from the pond bed, the circuit court granted
unrequested relief by finding Bay House to own in fee simple the pond
bed and the waters of the pond. The issue on appeal to the Virginia
Supreme Court was whether the circuit court had authority to grant
unrequested relief. The court held a litigant's pleadings are essential
as his or her proof, and a court may not award particular relief unless
it is substantially in accord with the case asserted in the pleadings.
Furthermore, every litigant is entitled to be told by her adversary in
plain and explicit language the grounds of complaint or defense,
especially when the respondent has the burden of proof involved in an
affirmative defense, such as the case here. Here, the court noted that
Bay House requested both specific and general prayers for relief, and
further asserted that enjoining the neighbors from using the water of
Gaskins Pond was not inconsistent with the specific prayer request
regarding land ownership; therefore, the injunction should be upheld.
However, a general prayer will support relief only for those matters
placed in controversy by the pleadings and, thus, any relief granted
must be supported by allegations of material facts in the pleadings that
will sustain such relief. Therefore, because Bay House's request for
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relief did not put the ownership of Gaskin Pond's waters at issue, the
court held the circuit court erred in granting Bay house fee simple
ownership of the waters within Gaskin Pond.
The court ultimately held Bay House's failure to allege ownership
of the pond water within the pleadings precluded the circuit court
from making a decision on the issue. Viewing the substance of the
litigant's pleading with paramount importance, the court reversed the
circuit court's holding regarding the water ownership.
Aimee Wagstaff

State Water Control Bd. v. Crutchfield, 578 S.E.2d 762 (Va. 2003)
(holding the Virginia Court of Appeals abused its discretion in
denying a request to amend a petition, where the request was timely
and the record lent no support to the denial).
Frances B. Crutchfield and her son, Henry R. Broadus (collectively,
"Crutchfield"), filed an appeal asking the Circuit Court of the City of
Richmond, Virginia, to invalidate a permit the State Water Control
Board ("Board") granted to Hanover County. The permit allowed
Hanover County to discharge up to ten million gallons per day of
treated wastewater into the Pamunkey River adjacent to Crutchfield's
In response, the Board filed a demurrer asserting
property.
Crutchfield lacked standing to pursue an appeal.
The circuit court overruled the demurrer, holding the petitioners
alleged standing by claiming injury to the historic sites located on their
However, the court then dismissed the appeal with
property.
prejudice on the ground that Crutchfield failed to establish standing,
because she could not demonstrate any actual or imminent injury.
The Virginia Court of Appeals reversed the judgment and remanded
the case for a hearing on the merits of the petition, holding
Crutchfield had standing to challenge the Board's issuance of the
permit. The Board and Hanover County appealed from the court of
appeals' judgment, and the Supreme Court of Virginia granted
certiorari.
Before alleging that Crutchfield lacked standing, the Board
attempted to disqualify Crutchfield's appeal on procedural grounds.
The Virginia Supreme Court declined to adopt this view, holding the
trial court had subject matter jurisdiction in spite of Crutchfield's
failure to serve Hanover County as a necessary party at the time she
filed her petition for appeal. While the Board urged the court to view
this defect as fatal to the case, the court ruled Crutchfield's timely
filing of original petition and notice of appeal served to preserve
jurisdiction in the court of appeals, which had the discretion to grant
leave to amend.
The court next considered the Board's contention that the court
of appeals abused its discretion by granting Crutchfield leave to amend
the allegations of her original petition in defiance of a local rule
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mandating that the original petition state why Crutchfield believed the
Board's activities were unlawful. The Board argued Crutchfield failed
to allege harm to her recreational enjoyment as a result of the
permitted discharge.
The Virginia Supreme Court found the
argument unpersuasive. A letter attached to the original petition
satisfied the local rule's pleading requirement by detailing the ways in
which recreational enjoyment would suffer as a result of the discharge.
The court noted that the local rule the Board cited vested the
authority to grant or deny a request to amend in the court of appeals,
but that a refusal to allow such an amendment-when timely filed and
in no way prejudicial to the Board-must find support in the record.
The court found no such support existed.
The Board next argued that the court of appeals erred in
determining Crutchfield had standing. The court observed that the
location and nature of Crutchfield's property easily allowed her to
allege two elements necessary for standing: actual or imminent injury
fairly traceable to a Board decision.
Finally, the court observed that the court of appeals could have
redressed Crutchfield's harm with a favorable decision, thereby
satisfying the third requirement for standing. The court remanded
the case to the court of appeals for a trial on the merits.
CurtisGraves

WASHINGTON
Pruitt v. Douglas County, 66 P.3d 1111 (Wash. Ct. App. 2003) (holding
that where a county's improvements made properties valuable,
homeowners had a cause of action against the county for subsequently
making improvements which flooded and destroyed homeowners'
properties).
In the 1930s, Douglas County made certain road improvements,
which reduced the natural flow of water across properties owned by
the Fletchers and the Pruitts (collectively, "Homeowners") from fifteen
cubic feet per second ("c.f.s.") to one to two c.f.s. A developer built
Homeowners' homes in 1967. In 1986 and 1993, Homeowners
purchased their properties. Between 1995 and 1997, the county made
certain road improvements, which resulted in flooding of
Homeowners' properties in 1997. Homeowners sued the county on
the basis of negligence, strict liability, trespass, and inverse
condemnation. The county motioned for summaryjudgment, and the
Superior Court for Chelan County granted this motion. Homeowners
appealed to the Washington Court of Appeals, Division Three
("court"). The court reviewed de novo the trial court's grant of the
county's motion for summary judgment and noted that the moving
party's burden in summary judgment is to show, in the light most
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favorable to the non-moving party, no material issue of fact existed for
trial.
The court held that when a road collects and discharges water onto
adjoining lands in quantities greater than the lands' natural flows,
liability on the part of the municipality that built the road can arise
under three possible exceptions to the common enemy doctrine. The
exceptions are "(1) blockage of a natural drain or waterway; (2)
collection and discharge of a water onto adjoining lands in quantities
greater than, or in a manner different from, its natural flow; and (3)
failure to exercise due care in preventing unnecessary damage."
The court held that the lower court's grant of summary judgment
was improper because if Homeowners had proven that water flow
across their properties was one to two c.f.s. before the county's 19951997 improvements, the county would have been liable for damages.
The court reasoned that regardless of the county's negligence or lack
thereof, this liability resulted from the "collection and discharge"
exception to the common enemy doctrine. Its basis for this reasoning
was that the floodwater which damaged Homeowners' properties in
1997 was quantitatively and qualitatively different than that which
flowed over the properties prior to the 1930s improvements. The
court also held summaryjudgment was also improper under the "due
care" exception, which requires that property owners exercise due care
by "acting in good faith and by avoiding unnecessary damage to the
property of others." The court found the homeowners failed to
present any evidence of bad faith, but presented evidence on the basis
of which ajury could find the county failed to limit harm to necessary
harm. The court also held summary judgment was improper because
where the county negligently failed to maintain storm drains, the
causal relationship behind the county's negligence and damage to the
homeowners' properties was an issue for trial.
The court also held summary judgment was improper on the
homeowners' claim of inverse condemnation. The court reasoned the
homeowners stood to recover the full value of their property if they
could prove that the government (1) diverted "waters from the
direction in which they would naturally flow" onto the claimant's land,
or (2) the government increased the amount of water flowing onto the
claimant's land. Thus a material issue of fact existed.
The court denied the homeowners' request for fees and costs
because they provided inadequate argument and legal grounds on
which to base such a request.
James Parrot

Issue 1

COURT REPORTS

S. Naches Irrigation Dist. v. Brewer, No. 20782-0-I, 2003 Wash App.
LEXIS 963 (Wash. Ct. App. May 15, 2003) (holding that a water right
derived from a United States patent that includes the right to maintain
ditches or canals for irrigation also includes a secondary easement for
access to and maintenance of the channel and headgate).
The South Naches Irrigation District ("District") maintained a
waterway and headgate built in 1917. In 1975, the Brewers purchased
the property on which the Scott ditch headgate was located. After a
period of compromise when the District traveled over the Brewers'
property in order to maintain the ditch headgate, relations between
the parties deteriorated. The District then brought suit in the
Superior Court of Yakima County seeking an immediate temporary
injunction preventing the Brewers from interfering with the
maintenance of the headgate and waterway. The District argued three
possible theories supporting the injunction: (1) a water right through
government patent; (2) an easement by implication; or (3) a
prescriptive easement to maintain and improve the waterway and
headgate.
The District claimed the easements existed by virtue of the water
right and time, and included the right to bring heavy equipment
across the Brewers' property for maintenance of the Scott ditch. The
superior court denied that a reserved water right implied an easement
to gain access to and maintain the ditch associated with the right.
Additionally, the superior court noted that no heavy equipment had
gone over the Brewers' land in at least thirty years; therefore, the
superior court limited the easement to six feet and foot traffic only,
expressly denying the District's right to bring heavy equipment
through the easement. Both parties appealed.
The Washington Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a
reserved water right includes a secondary easement for maintenance
and repair of waterways and headgates. The court found the District
had a prior vested water right based on the reservation language in the
initial deed and in 43 U.S.C. § 661 (1986), which provides that a water
right includes the right to build ditches and reservoirs. Based on the
statute and case law holding that a water right includes a right to
maintain the channel or waterway associated with it, the court
reasoned that a secondary easement for maintenance and repair is
implicit in a water right. Thus, the court remanded the case to the
superior court to determine the extent of the easement.
Holly Shook
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ToUefson v. State, No. 27768-9-11, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 2075

(Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 16, 2003) (holding that evidence of flooding on
private land without proof of causation or legal duty is insufficient to
withstand a municipality's motion for summaryjudgment).
Herbert and Eve Tollefson ("Tollefsons") brought suit against
multiple defendants including the State of Washington and Pierce
County, Washington ("County") for trespass, nuisance, inverse
condemnation, regulatory taking, and entitlement to damages for
violation of constitutionally protected rights by one acting under color
of state law. The Tollefsons argued the County was negligent in
designing and installing a drainage system and sewage lines, and in
They further claimed the
maintaining neighboring waterways.
County's negligence caused water to flood their property. The County
moved for summary judgment, which the Superior Court of Pierce
County granted. After the trial court denied the Tollefsons' motion
for reconsideration, they appealed to the Washington Court of
Appeals. The court held the Tollefsons did not provide evidence of a
duty for the County to prevent such flooding, nor did they offer any
evidence to show that the County caused the flooding.
On appeal, the Tollefsons relied on a report produced by a
wetlands expert who attributed the flooding to a neighboring drainage
ditch that frequently backed-up because of the small size of its culverts.
The Tollefsons claimed the expert's report was evidence that the
County caused the water to trespass on their land, raising a triable
issue of fact. Additionally, the Tollefsons asserted the County's failure
to act on the report and poor maintenance of the ditch was evidence
of nuisance. The County responded that no evidence suggested that it
installed the culverts or had any duty to update the drainage system.
To succeed on trespass and nuisance theories, the Tollefsons needed
to show the County had a duty to prevent such flooding and that the
County's breach of the duty caused damages to the Tollefsons'
property. The court held the Tollefsons failed to prove legal causation
because there was no evidence the County built, owned, or had a duty
to maintain the ditch.
Next, the court considered the trial court's disposition of the
Tollefsons' inverse condemnation claim. The elements of inverse
condemnation include "(1) a taking or damaging; (2) without just
compensation; (3) of private property; (4) for public use; (5) by
governmental entity that has not instituted formal proceedings." As
evidence of their inverse condemnation claim, the Tollefsons
produced photos that showed flooding. The County argued that no
evidence proved it owned the ditch, caused the water to flood the
Tollefsons' property, or anticipated the flooding. The appellate court
held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment because
Tollefsons failed to identify County conduct that interfered with their
use and enjoyment of property.
Finally, the Tollefsons maintained that they met the requirements
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of their violation of constitutional rights claim because the County
acted under color of state law when it used its power to divert water
onto the Tollefsons' property in an unduly oppressive manner. The
County replied that the Tollefsons failed to show a policy or custom,
causation or deprivation as required for a constitutional claim.
However, the Tollefsons countered that by ignoring the expert
recommendations, the County followed a policy of deliberate
indifference. The court concluded that the County had no clear duty
to the Tollefsons, who failed to provide evidence that an official
sanctioned the decision not to follow the recommendations.
Additionally, the court found "no evidence showing a causal
connection between the alleged policy and a deprivation of the
Tollefsons' constitutional rights." Accordingly, the court of appeals
affirmed the summaryjudgment decision of the trial court.
Brian M. Forbush

Upton v. Goff, No. 27948-7-H, 2003 Wash. App. LEXIS 1744 (Wash.
Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2003) (holding that: (1) neither water certificates nor
other real estate transaction documents conveyed ownership interests
of subdivision's water system to the lot owners; (2) water system did
not transfer with the land, but was personal property; and (3) intent of
the developer could determine if the water system qualified as a real
property fixture).
The Uptons commenced a lawsuit against Goff and five other lot
owners in the Superior Court of Clallam County, Washington. The
Uptons sued to quiet tide to the subdivision's water system, enjoin the
lot owners from interfering with the water system, and for trespass and
conversion damages. The superior court concluded no issue of
material fact existed, the Uptons owned the water system, and the lot
owners could not interfere with the Uptons' ownership of the water
system. Thus, the superior court granted summary judgment in favor
of the Uptons. The lot owners appealed the superior court's grant of
summary judgment to the Uptons and the denial of their crossmotions for summary judgment. The Washington Court of Appeals
affirmed the superior court's decisions.
In 1994, Cascade Investment Properties ("Cascade") recorded an
eight-lot subdivision plat, which included six residential lots.
Additionally, Cascade created a lot owners' association and granted
the lot owners an easement. Cascade developed and owned the water
system along the easement. When Cascade sold the six residential lots,
water certificates issued to the buyers. In December 2000, Cascade
sold the subdivision's water system to the Uptons for $2000. The
Uptons then sued the lot owners after the lot owners denied the
Uptons access to the water system.
On appeal, the lot owners first relied on the word "share" in the
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water certificates to assert that the certificates granted the lot owners
fractional water system ownership interests. Conversely, the Uptons
maintained the water certificates conveyed no ownership interest and
only permitted each lot to receive water from the system. The court
concluded the lot owners misused the term "share," and the water
certificate did not suggest or imply a transfer of partial ownership
interest in the water system. Furthermore, the court found that no
other documents involved in the lot sales transferred any type of water
system ownership. Therefore, the court held the water certificates and
the other real estate documents did not transfer ownership interests to
the lot owners.
The lot owners also claimed the water system improved the
property and thus passed with title to each lot. In opposition, the
Uptons asserted personal property ownership of the water system. The
Uptons also argued that Cascade created an easement by implication
to operate the water system. The court stated a three prong test for
deciding whether a fixture to real property permanently follows the
tide: (1) actual annexation to the property, (2) application to the use
or purpose to which that part of the property with it is connected is
appropriated, and (3) the intention of the party making the
annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. The court
listed several facts showing the developer's lack of intention to transfer
water system ownership with the title: lack of sales documents
referencing a conveyance, agreements which suggested that the
developer considered himself the water system's owner, public
documents identifying the developer as the owner, lot owner interest
in purchasing the water system from the developer, and lot owners'
payment to the developer of a monthly fee for use of the water system.
While finding some evidence of annexation and use of the water
system by the lots, the court ultimately found that the developer lacked
intent to transfer ownership interests. Accordingly, the court held the
Uptons owned the water system as personal property and the water
system did not attach to the property as a fixture.
Further, the court determined the water system represented a
typical community water system created to deliver water to each lot.
Because the components of the water system did not improve the lot
owners' property, the court held the water system did not qualify as an
improvement that runs with the land.
Finally, the Uptons raised the doctrine of equitable estoppel on
appeal. However, the court refused to address the equitable estoppel
issue, since the court had already granted summary judgment in favor
of the Uptons.
Susan Curtis
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Willowbrook Farms LLP v. Dep't of Ecology, 66 P.3d 664 (Wash. Ct.
App. 2003) (holding that correction of an incomplete legal description
in a water rights claim constituted an amendment to correct a
ministerial mistake, where the claimant had a mandatory duty to
complete the form correctly).
The State of Washington's 1967 water rights registration and
relinquishment act required those claiming water rights predating the
1917 water code to register their claim with the Department of Water
Failure to
Resources, the Department of Ecology's predecessor.
register before July 1974 constituted waiver. A 1987 statute allowed
amendment to a water rights claim for, among two other reasons, a
In 1973, Paul Harrel, Willowbrook Farms'
ministerial mistake.
predecessor in interest, filed a water rights claim on a state form.
When filing the form, Harrel incorrectly described his "place of use"
and failed to describe the entire field he irrigated. Later, Willowbrook
Farms discovered Harrel's mistake and amended the claim form,
adding the omitted section. The Department of Ecology ("Ecology")
rejected the amendment. Willowbrook appealed to the Pollution
Control Hearings Board, and the board granted Ecology's motion for
summaryjudgment. Willowbrook then appealed to the Kittitas County
Superior Court. The superior court reversed. Ecology appealed to the
Washington Court of Appeals and argued that since Harrel
deliberately wrote the legal description, he made an erroneous choice,
not a ministerial mistake.
Using de novo standard of review, the court concluded that
because determining what constitutes "ministerial" when filing a
required government form did not require the administration board's
expertise, the court retained ultimate authority to interpret the statute.
The statute did not define the word "ministerial." Looking to prior
case law, the court noted, "[a]n act is ministerial if the individual is
performing a duty that is mandatory for the person to perform and
there is no discretion in how the act is performed." The court also
noted, "If a ministerial act is performed improperly.. . there is a duty
to correct the error... correction of the error is itself a ministerial
act." The court reasoned that concluding Harrel made a ministerial
error meant concluding he did not make ajudgment error. If Harrel
made a judgment error, then he elected to claim only a portion of the
field he irrigated. This would have made his claim incorrect in other
ways because he would not have irrigated the number of acres he
stated, and he would not have had a valid claim for the amount of
water he claimed to use. Because Harrel correctly identified the field
regarding both acreage and quantity of water, the court held Harrel
did not make a judgment error. Therefore, by logical necessity, when
Harrel filled out the incorrect legal description, he made a clerical
error. Hence, seeking to amend the incorrect legal description was
ministerial. The court explained their interpretation fit nicely within
the statutory scheme, which seemed to contemplate inexact or
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incomplete information and allow amendment for resolving
imperfections.
Since the 1987 statute contained three subsections, each
describing when to allow amendment, Ecology asked the court to
apply the statutory construction canon of ejusdem generis. The court
declined because employing the canon required finding the other two
subsections identified a class of amendments, and no class existed.
Elizabeth Frost

WISCONSIN
Howe v. Neenah Springs, Inc., 02-1657, 2003 Wisc. App. LEXIS 940
(Wisc. Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2003) (affirming ajudgment of the trial court
that a bottler of water was not required to make royalty payments to
well owners for the bottling of their well water upon learning that the
well on the owners' former property did not confirm to applicable
governmental regulations).
In 1988, J. Ronald and Janice Howe ("Howes") built a bottling
operation to package and sell drinking water from a well located on
their property, and then sold the bottling operation and real estate to
Alvin Klawitter. Pursuant to the sale agreement ("1988 Agreement"),
the Howes would receive twenty years of royalty payments based on the
amount of water sold. The Howes kept a mortgage on the property to
secure royalty payments. In 1991, Klawitter sold the property to
Neenah Springs, Inc. ("Neenah") and they amended the royalty
agreement on March 28, 1991 ("1991 Agreement"). Under this new
agreement, Neenah's obligation to pay royalties to the Howes
immediately terminated "in the event the supply of water from the well
stops or if water directly from the well does not meet standards for
bottled water of the FDA or any other applicable governmental
authority." In 1997, a Wisconsin state official found that the Howes'
well did not meet the state's Department of Natural Resources
("DNR") requirements for high-capacity wells. Instead of risking
sanctions by using the old well, Neenah decided to drill a new well and
ceased paying royalty payments to the Howes on March 1, 1999,
because it was no longer bottling water from their well. The new well
water, however, came from the same aquifer.
In March of 2000, the Howes sued Neenah in the Circuit Court for
Marquette County, Tennessee, alleging three causes of action for
breach of contract. First, the Howes claimed that Neenah could not
terminate its obligations under the royalty agreement because the
water quality from the existing well complied with applicable DNR
standards that applied to water discharged at a slower rate. More
stringent state government standards applied to water from highcapacity wells. Second, the Howes argued that Neenah owed them
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royalties from water discounted for promotional reasons. Finally, the
Howes asserted that Neenah's termination of royalty payments equaled
default on the mortgage that secured the royalty obligations. Neenah
requested summary judgment, stating there was no breach because it
was entitled to stop paying royalties after learning that the well did not
comply with the applicable DNR standards. Neenah further argued
that the agreement did not require royalties for discounted water sold
as promotions, and, regardless of any such provision, this claim was
barred by the doctrine of laches. The trial court granted summary
judgment and the Howes appealed to the Fourth District Court of
Appeals of Wisconsin, reasserting their first two claims.
On appeal, the Howes contended that the trial court erred when it
determined that Neenah could drill a new well and terminate royalty
payments upon notification that the existing well did not meet the
applicable standards under the 1991 Agreement. The Howes argued
that to determine the intent of the parties, the 1991 Agreement must
be read contemporaneously with other contracts executed between
themselves and Klawitter. However, the court found that the 1991
Agreement with Neenah contained an integration clause that
supplanted provisions from the 1988 Agreement between the Howes
and Klawitter pertaining to the royalties for water from the Howes'
well. The court held a new contract consists of new terms and any
terms of the original that were not altered by the modification. As the
transfer altered the royalty terms, the court found that the trial court
correctly limited its inquiry to the 1991 Agreement.
The court then considered whether the 1991 Agreement entitled
Neenah to drill a new well and terminate royalty payments to the
Howes. The Howes contended that (1) the water would have been fit
for consumption had it been extracted from the well more slowly, (2)
that they should have had an opportunity to fix the problem instead of
Neenah having the sole discretion to provide a remedy, and (3) that
Neenah breached its duty of good faith when it drilled a new well and
stopped paying royalties. After evaluating the 1991 Agreement, the
court found that regardless of the water extraction speed, the failure
of the well to meet DNR specifications provided a valid basis for
Neenah's ceasing the royalty payments, and that Neenah did have
discretion to drill their own well. Also, the court found no implied
duty of good faith from the 1991 Agreement requiring Neenah to give
the Howes an opportunity to fix their well. The court stated, "where
the contracting party complains of acts of the other party that are
specifically authorized in their agreement, we cannot see how there
can be any breach of good faith and fair dealing."
The Howes further asserted that Neenah breached its contractual
obligations regarding royalties for water distributed before March 1,
1999, and that the doctrine of laches did not bar their claim. To
account for free promotional water, Neenah discounted entire
invoices to represent water that was given away, but did not record the
discounts given for particular sales. The Howes argued that this
process led to discounted water, instead of free water, and therefore,
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Neenah owed them royalties from this discounted water. Neenah
asserted that the doctrine of laches precluded the Howes from
bringing this action. The trial court determined that under the 1991
Agreement, the Howes received Neenah's quarterly sales records, and
in 1995, were aware of potential problems with Neenah's
compensation for water sales. However, by waiting until 1999 to bring
a claim related to this activity, the Howes satisfied the doctrine of
laches. Thus, the Howes were precluded from bringing this breach of
contract claim, and the appeals court affirmed the trial court's
summary judgment ruling for both breach of contract claims.
David W. Hall
WYOMING
Wilson v. Lucerne Canal & Power Co., 77 P.3d 412 (Wyo. 2003)
(holding court's procedural due process requirements met,
concerning injunction and proceedings, where injunction merely
reiterates known obligations under preexisting injunction, and
holding that, where appellant has not met burden of producing
evidentiary record, and record not otherwise available, court assumes
findings at trial based on sufficient evidence).
In the Wyoming District Court for Goshen County, Lucerne Canal
and Power Company ("Lucerne") filed for an injunction preventing
Thomas and Helen Wilson ("Wilsons") from interfering with its
easements on their land. During earlier litigation, between 1988 and
1990, the Wilsons filed a Consent to Entry of a Preliminary Injunction
with the court. The parties settled the litigation without trial in 1990
through a consent degree, which contained a permanent restraining
order restraining the Wilsons from interfering with Lucerne's
easements. In 2002, Lucerne filed again for a restraining order, which
the district court granted. The Wilsons appealed to the Wyoming
Supreme Court, alleging procedural deficiencies and abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial judge.
Lucerne was a private irrigation company that delivered water from
the North Platte River to its members. Some of Lucerne's facilities lay
on the Wilsons' land. According to the 1990 consent decree,
Lucerne's easement and right-of-way for its canal and associated
facilities dated to an 1894 federal grant, and ran with the land.
The original consent to preliminary injunction, the 1990 consent
decree's permanent injunction, and the 2002 permanent injunction all
enjoined the Wilsons from interfering in any manner with Lucerne's
use of its easements, which included easements on the river and on a
roadway. Each document ensured Lucerne full access to operate,
maintain, and renovate both its easements and its facilities thereon for
the purpose of making its water deliveries. By the beginning of
litigation in 1988, the Wilsons had a history of interfering with
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Lucerne's ability to make its deliveries by capturing water upstream of
Lucerne's diversion facilities.
Appealing the 2002 injunction, the Wilsons alleged that the trial
judge abused his discretion by failing to enter an order consolidating
the trial on the merits with the proceedings for injunction. The
Wilsons asserted the court's procedural failure deprived them of
notice, prejudicing their argument and violating their right to due
process. They premised their argument on the additional assertion
that the 2002 injunction contained terms different from those in the
1990 consent decree, and was therefore a different injunction. The
Wilsons further challenged the injunction for insufficient factual basis
and lack of specificity.
The court acknowledged that the Wilsons correctly cited the rule
directing trial courts in Wyoming to consolidate trials with hearings for
injunction, but found that the rule's applicability involved
considerations specific to the case. The purpose of the rule was to give
notice of application for injunction and prevent prejudice to the
parties. The court found, though, that the 2002 injunction reiterated
the 1990 consent decree, requiring nothing not already required.
That being so, the 1990 decree constituted notice to the Wilsons as to
their rights. Furthermore, since the 1990 decree had determined the
rights at issue, they were resjudicata,and could not be retried in 2002.
The trial court's procedural conduct could not have prejudiced the
Wilsons as to issues previously determined and not before the court.
The Wilsons asserted that language concerning duration of the
easements, differing between the two injunctions, resulted in different
injunctions. The 1990 injunction provided that Lucerne's easements
remained as long as it operated its irrigation facilities thereon. The
2002 injunction provided for Lucerne's perpetual use of the easement
for its irrigation facilities. The court rejected the Wilsons' assertion,
since the easements would logically cease to exist, in each instance, in
the event Lucerne ceased to operate its irrigation facilities. The court
also rejected the Wilsons' due process allegation, since the 2002
injunction did not alter their rights.
The court next addressed the Wilsons' allegation that the trial
court's findings lacked sufficient factual basis. The court examined
the issue without benefit of facts from trial, which were not recorded.
The Wilsons also did not produce a record of the facts in accordance
with their burden as appellants. Given no indication to the contrary,
the court assumed that the facts before the trial court provided
sufficient basis for its findings.
Finally, the court rejected the Wilsons' assertion that the
injunction lacked required specificity. The purpose of the specificity
requirement, the Court said, was to prevent uncertainty and confusion.
The 2002 injunction was effectively identical to the 1990 injunctionin effect for twelve years. The Wilsons could not claim uncertainty and
confusion as to rights and restrictions long since decided and in force.
Owen Walker

CONFERENCE REPORTS
WATER, CLIMATE, AND UNCERTAINTY: IMPLICATIONS FOR
WESTERN WATER, LAW, POLICY, AND MANAGEMENT
Boulder, Colorado

June 11-13, 2003

Short-term climate variability as well as long-term climate change
impact natural resources in many significant ways. One of the most
important in the West is the impact climate can have on our precious
water supplies. For the past several years drought has been a focus of
our public attention, and the thought of a more permanent long-term
climate change raises challenges that are even more serious. Current
advances in climate sciences offer increasingly valuable insights into
what we may face in the future, and just as importantly how our laws,
institutions, and societies might need to adapt.
Water, Climate, and Uncertainty: Implications for Western Water,
Law, Policy, and Management, the three-day, 2 4 "hAnnual Conference
of the Natural Resources Law Center in Boulder, Colorado, provided a
forum for discussing these challenges. The conference provided
resource management professionals an opportunity to learn from each
other and from leading scientists and researchers in climatology,
ecology, and related fields.
DAY ONE
Doug Kenny, Research Associate with the Natural Resources Law
Center and conference organizer, began the conference by welcoming
the speakers and attendees. Mr. Kenny's opening remarks explained
the main goal of the conference was to promote multiple perspectives
on climate change issues facing resource managers throughout the
West. The organizers accomplished this by having such a great
number of distinguished presenters in various aspects of water
management, law, policy, and science.
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SESSION ONE: THE FUTURE ISN'T WHAT IT USED
TO BE... OR IS IT?
WESTERN CLIMATE HISTORY
A HISTORY OF CLIMATE VARIABILITY AND CHANGE IN THE AMERICAN

WEST

Kelly Redmond, the Regional Climatologist for the Desert
Research Institute's Western Regional Climate Center (WRCC),
opened this session by presenting a history of climate variability and
change in the American West. Mr. Redmond discussed the extremely
variable nature of western climate. He noted this variability combines
with the topography and general aridity of the West to create a unique
hydrology in which differences in elevation, seasonal precipitation,
and population distribution separate the supply and demand for water
in the West. Mr. Kelly also presented information on climate
variability patterns and their possible changes, such as the Pacific
Decadal Oscillation, a long-lived El Nifio-like pattern versus the El
Nifio/Southern Oscillation, which tend to be shorter in nature. He
suggested that climate changes could magnify the extreme weather
already associated with the West. This greater variability could have
great impacts on natural resource management and possibly act as a
catalyst for institutional change. He concluded by emphasizing the
importance of understanding climate history as well as the continued
observation and monitoring of climate.
THE ROLE OF CLIMATE IN SHAPING WESTERN WATER INSTITUTIONS

Next, Justice Gregory Hobbs, Jr. of the Colorado Supreme Court
presented The Role of Climate in Shaping Western Water Institutions, an
article included in this issue of the Water Law Review. Justice Hobbs
provided insight into the antiquity of man's struggle with climatic
uncertainty, and more specifically his struggle with the aridity of the
West. Justice Hobbs presented the paleohydrological research of Ken
and Ruth Wright in the Mesa Verde region of Colorado that suggests
the Anasazi constructed large-scale water projects in the American
Southwest as early as A.D. 750. Justice Hobbs also discussed the
establishment of the acequia water-management system in the
southwest by Spanish settlers and the establishment of the prior
appropriation doctrine in Western water law. He offered that this
history of institutional water conservation demonstrates drought is not
a new phenomenon for human populations in the West, and that the
unreliability of the climate and the availability of water have played a
major role in shaping the social institutions responsible for water
conservation.
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WESTERN CLIMATE FUTURE
How LONG Do WE LOOK BEFORE WE LEAP?
SCIENTIFIC UNCERTAINTY AND POLICY MAKING

Jerry Mahlman, a Senior Research Fellow at the National Center
for Atmospheric Research (NCAR), presented "Global Warming
Dilemma," discussing the scientific uncertainty of climate change and
the affects it can have on environmental policymaking.
Mr.
Mahlman's argument suggests that policy makers often do not
sufficiently address the necessary but difficult institutional changes
required to reduce global warming because the effects of increases in
greenhouse gases are not immediately apparent. This policy of nonaction assumes the oceans have been able to absorb much of the
increased heat resulting from past and current greenhouse effect of
certain gasses. However, as the oceans reach their heat holding
capacity, future temperature increases and climatic change will
inevitably occur. Based on this theory, Mr. Mahlman offered that the
large part of climate change due to the emission of greenhouse gasses
would not occur for another thousand years; however, he argued this
fact could also prevent policy makers from proactively addressing the
dauntingly difficult process of reducing such emissions.
FUTURE WATER AVAILABIIJTY IN THE WEST:

WI.L THERE BE ANY?
Mike Dettinger, a hydrologist for the United States Geological
Survey, began the Wednesday afternoon session by addressing the
subject of the future availability of western water. Mr. Dettinger's
research focused on the natural variations of water availability,
projected greenhouse effects, and various scientific uncertainties and
management strategies.
Mr. Dettinger first compared current
conditions to the much more severe droughts that occurred in the
West throughout previous centuries, and noted that modem water
management, based on 20' century data, does integrate these "megadroughts" into its understanding of water availability. Mr. Dettinger
continued by suggesting some greenhouse warming effects, such as
earlier snowmelts, are already visible and examined their effects on
water
infrastructures
and
institutions,
especially
reservoir
management. He suggested the more extreme precipitation, and
larger winter floods predicted by many climate change models could
result in a conflict between managing water as a resource and as a
natural hazard. Mr. Dettinger finished by stressing that climate
models share many certainties and that flexibility and robustness
should be the focus of modem water management policy.
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Is THERE A DUST BowN IN OUR FUTURE?
PROJECTIONS FOR THE EASTERN ROCKIES
AND CENTRAL GREAT PLAINS

The final presentation of Day One was by Dennis Ojima, the
Senior Research Scientist at the Natural Resource Ecology Laboratory,
Mr. Ojima examined
Colorado State University (NREL/CSU).
projections of aridity for the Eastern Rockies and Central Great Plains.
Mr. Ojima posed the question of what we should do in response to
these projections with their inherent uncertainties. He examined
current stresses on resources such as climate variability, the loss of
biodiversity, and air and water pollution, and examined their role in
the decision making process of policy. To respond to these inevitable
but uncertain stresses, Mr. Ojima suggested coping strategies that
emphasize better preparation for extremes, flexible management
strategies, diverse practices that maximize opportunities and reduce
risk, increase efficiency of water storage, and promote ongoing policy
discussion. He concluded by emphasizing the connection between
impacts on natural systems and social systems and the need to focus on
"win-win" solutions to face these impacts.
PANEL DISCUSSION: MODELS, PROJECTIONS
AND PROBABILITIES: How SERIOUSLY
SHOULD WE TAKE THIS INFORMATION?

Completing the First Session was a panel discussion, moderated by
Martyn Clark of the Center for Science and Technology Policy
Research at the University of Colorado. The discussion included Kelly
Redmond, WRCC; Dennis Ojima, CSU; Roger Pielke Sr.,
Professor/State Climatologist, CSU; and Marty Hoerling, Climate
Entitled, Models, Projections and
Diagnostics Center/NOAA.
Probabilities: How Seriously Should We Take This Information?, the
discussion provided the panelists an opportunity to discuss the
complexity of climate change models and the uncertainties they
produce as well as answer questions posed by the attendees regarding
this topic and the earlier presentations.
POSTER SESSION AND RECEPTION
Day One of the conference ended with a Poster Session and
Reception. Researches, water managers, and others shared their work
with the conference audience by presenting posters that described
their involvement in fields such as water policy and climatology.
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DAY TWO
SESSION TWO: SCIENCE, POLICY, LAW AND

EXTRA-STRENGTH TYLENOL

NOAA's APPuED RESEARCH
The second day of the conference began with a presentation by
Harvey Hill, the Program Manager of the Regional Integrated Science
Assessments (RISA) program, within the NOAA Office of Global
Programs. Mr. Hill discussed the interface between science and
decision-making, focusing on the program objectives of the RISA
program (RISA dedicates 70% of its budget to water issues). Mr. Hill
commented on the limited social and political attention drought
receives, and the tendency policy makers have to forget about drought
planning as soon as drought conditions are not present. He
emphasized the importance of integrating research, information, and
policy and demonstrated the roles science, economy, and policy play
in developing competent resource management structures.
EVALUATING THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTH PLATTE
BASIN: COMPETING SCENARIOS

The research topic continued with Lee Rozaklis of Hydrosphere
Resource Consultants and his work with the Western Water
Assessment's evaluation of the future of the South Platte River. The
evaluation focuses on the combined impacts of climate change and
population growth on South Platte water. Mr. Rozaklis described these
factors, explaining the pressures various uses place on the two million
acre feet of water supplied by snow melt annually. He also discussed a
management model for the South Platte developed to provide
feedback regarding various possible future scenarios including
population growth and climate change. Mr. Rozaklis explained the
importance of including drought data into such management models
to insure maximum accuracy and prepare for all future possibilities.
Finally, he discussed water exchanges between agriculture and
municipal users, conjunctive use of ground and surface depending
upon current availability, and market sources' effects on water use and
demand.
IMPROVED DROUGHT PLANNING IN ARIZONA

Next Barbara Morehouse, an associate research scientist at the
University of Arizona's Institute for the Study of Planet Earth and
manager of the NOAA supported Climate Assessment for the
Southwest (CLIMAS), presented a joint project prepared by herself
and Katharine Jacobs, the Special Assistant for Policy and Planning at
the Arizona Department of Water Resources. The project, Improved
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Drought Planningfor Arizona, described actions taken by the Arizona
Governor's 2003 Drought Task Force such as an emergency potable
water plan, a conservation plan, and a long-term drought plan. Ms.
Morehouse described the collaborative efforts made in Arizona's
drought plan. These efforts included social science elements, such as
enhanced stakeholder input and new communication techniques, in
addition to the physical science elements like improved monitoring
techniques and methods of value-added interpretation of data. In
closing, Ms. Morehouse discussed the range of sentiments, from panic
to apathy, the public shows regarding drought, and explained how
these responses challenge policy makers.
How DoEs THE WORLD'S FIFTH LARGEST
ECONOMY AVOID DRYING UP? LONG-RANGE

WATER RESOURCES PLANNING IN CALIFORNIA
Following Ms. Morehouse, Dan Cayan of the Scripps Institution of
Oceanography spoke on the topic of California water and climate
change. Focusing on long-range water resources planning, Mr. Cayan
described California's water infrastructure and its vulnerability to
climate variability and change. He described the population growth of
California and it effect on the water supply system and explained the
effects climate change, such as variability and drought, could have on
water quality and hydroelectric generation in California. Mr. Cayan
also provided insight into the role CALFED, a Federal/State multiagency program in California, has played in addressing water quality
issues in the San Francisco Bay/Delta. By including greater amounts
of more accurate climate information and utilizing more flexible
management techniques, CALFED aims to improve the reliability of
water supplies, and water quality, and restore ecosystems.
BALANCING DROUGHT AND FLOOD IN

THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST
Following a short break, Doug McChesney of the Washington
Department of Ecology's Water Resources Program presented his
perspective on the challenge of climate change in the Pacific
Northwest as a balancing of drought and flood. Specifically, Mr.
McChesney discussed how commonly predicted effects of climate
change could lead to increased risks of winter floods, earlier and lower
peak flows resulting in less in stream flows for salmon, and lower
Mr. McChesney
summer flows with higher water temperatures.
explained that these effects would call for adaptation in the form of
individual change, institutional response, and planning, and inevitably
acceptance of new conditions. In conclusion, he supported activities
exploring water storage options, changes to water management, and
participation in continuing research projects to promote the ability to
adapt and face the uncertainties of the future.
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MODERATED PANEL DISCUSSION AND AUDIENCE Q&A

Another panel discussion concluded Session Two. Susan Avery,
the Director of the Cooperative Institute for Research in
Environmental Sciences (CIRES) at the University of Colorado,
moderated a panel discussion including Lee Rozaklis, Hydrosphere;
Barbara Morehouse, CLIMAS; Dan Cayan, Scripps; and Doug
The panelist
McChesney, Washington Department of Ecology.
addressed the strengths and weaknesses of applied climate research,
and answered questions on related topics at the morning
presentations.
SESSION THREE: BASINS AND BORDERS
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERSTATE COMPACTS,

WITH AN EMPHASIS ON THE COLORADO

RIvER BASIN
Beginning the afternoon session, James Lochhead, Senior Counsel
at Brownstein Hyatt & Farber, P.C., reviewed the subject of interstate
water compacts, emphasizing the Colorado River Basin. Mr. Lochhead
began by describing the instruments used to apportion water among
several states and then briefly discussed the history of the Colorado
River Compact and how it divides the water of the Colorado River. By
looking at historical data, Mr. Lochhead demonstrated the stresses the
Compact will place on Upper Basin states. Because the Compact
requires the Upper Basin to deliver a set amount of water to the Lower
Basin, and only then divide the remainder among its constituent states,
Mr.
shortages of water primarily affect the Upper Basin states.
Lochhead explained further that because the Compact presumed the
amount of water available in the Colorado River to be greater than
actually exists, the requirements the Compact creates could prove
difficult if not impossible to meet in prolonged drought conditions.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND US/MEXICO WATER
CONFLICTS: MILD, MEDIUM OR HOT?

Following Mr. Lochhead's presentation, Alberto Szekely,
Ambassador for Border Water Affairs with the Mexican Foreign
Service, provided insight into how climate change could affect
U.S./Mexico water conflicts and transboundary water disputes in
general. Beginning with a brief history of water between the United
States and Mexico, Mr. Szekely discussed the tendencies both
countries show in mismanaging the water of the shared rivers. In
response to this, Mr. Szekely discussed developing a bi-national
sustainable plan that would help remove jurisdictional obstacles that
complicate transboundary water issues.
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WHAT DOES CLIMATE CHANGE MEAN FOR
COLD WATER FISHERIES: DO WE ALL

HAVE TO BECOME BASS FISHERMEN?

After a short afternoon break, Stan Bradshaw of Trout Unlimited,
Montana delivered a presentation on the projected impacts climate
change could have on cold-water fisheries. Although projections differ
as to the extent of this impact-estimates of habitat loss range from
21% to 40% by 2090-all concur that temperature increases would
mean a reduction in habitat and adverse affects on cold-water species.
In response to such predictions, Mr. Bradshaw outlined an approach
that uses region and basin-specific responses to preserve cold-water
fisheries habitat along with watershed conservation. An example of
this prioritized approach is the Blackfoot River watershed in Montana.
Mr. Bradshaw described how local landowners and water right holders
on the Blackfoot River have cooperated with fisheries interests to meet
particular challenges in protecting this watershed and its valuable coldwater fish habitat.
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE Rio GRANDE
IN NEW MEXICO: THROWING GASOLINE
ON THE FIRE?

Finishing the afternoon session was a presentation by Ms. Denise
Fort discussing climate change and the Rio Grande in New Mexico.
Ms. Fort first explored the meaning of "normal" climate conditions in
a region of long periods of drought such as the West. Secondly, she
introduced the timely issue of the endangered silvery minnow in the
Rio Grande and discussed the difficulties of the modern practice of
managing water during drought for "biological results" such as species
preservation. Ms. Fort also briefly provided another perspective on
water resources competition between the United States and Mexico.
Focusing on the region of Las Cruces, New Mexico, El Paso, Texas,
andJuarez, Mexico, Ms. Fort described the tensions of competing uses
and over-extended treaty obligations of the Rio Grande/Rio Bravo.
Ms. Fort explained that these conditions could lead to rapid
groundwater depletion, a resource not covered by a current
U.S./Mexico treaty. She concluded by stating that we must respond to
these conditions with true democratic discussion regarding what water
uses are most viable to our society, and not just continue doing what
we have always done.
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EVENING KEYNOTE LECTURE: WATER RESOURCES ALLOCATION AND

MANAGEMENT IN AN ERA OF SCARCITY

On Thursday evening, Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Water
and Science, Bennett Raley, delivered the keynote lecture in which he
presented the Department of the Interior's Water 2025. Intended to
focus attention on the demands population, the environment, and
agricultural uses place on the West's limited water availability, Water
2025 recognizes that in some areas supplies will inevitably beinadequate to meet demands, and provides the basis for public
discussion in advance of such crises. The framework it describes for
this discussion consists of the Six Principles that the Interior
Department follows in addressing water problems, the Five Realities
that exacerbate water crises, and Four Key Tools to promote proactive
The Assistant Secretary
management of scarce water resources.
described that this framework of Water 2025 would facilitate forwardlooking focus on areas of the country facing water shortages, help to
improve the management of water supplies to meet growing demands,
provide added environmental benefits, and minimize water crises in
critical watersheds by providing a balanced approach to water
management.
DAY THREE
SESSION 4: ADDITIONAL PERSPECTIVES
CLIMATE CHANGE IN THE PACIFIC NORTHWEST:
DOES CLIMATE CHANGE FORCE A CHOICE

BETWEEN SALMON AND ELECTRICITY?

The final day of the conference began with a presentation byJohn
Volkman, Stoel Rives, LLP. Mr. Volkman addressed competing needs
of different water uses in the Pacific Northwest such as the current
conflict between the conservation of salmon and the generation of
hydroelectricity on the Lower Snake River. Mr. Volkman also briefly
described the hydrological effects climate change could have on the
rivers of the Northwest and how these changes would likely narrow the
range of ecologically workable choices to accommodate both species
conservation and human uses.
THE TRIBAL PERSPECTIVE: Do TRIBES
GET LEFr HOLDING THE BAG?

Next, Carl ("Bud") Ullman, the Director of the Water Adjudication
Project for the Klamath Tribes in Chiloquin, Oregon, presented a
Tribal perspective on climate change and water resources. Mr. Ullman
began by providing insight into the role indigenous peoples play in
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global institutions that address climate change and explained how they
are often the victims of over allocated and degraded natural resources.
Mr. Ullman also examined land use change and forestry, and how
sustainable methods of resource management can work to benefit
multiple interests. He described the Lummi Tribe's Arlecho Basin
Land purchase in northern Washington, which benefits industrial
interests such as carbon dioxide sinks and simultaneously cultural and
environmental interests by preserving endangered species habitat and
providing a sanctuary for Lummi traditional religious practices.
A WATER MANAGER'S PERSPECTIVE:

A VIEW FROM THE FIELD
Following Mr. Ullman and a short morning break, Jeffrey
Kightlinger, General Counsel for the Metropolitan Water District of
Southern California (MWD), discussed the conditions of water
resources in southern California and changes that have occurred in
water availability and quality due to reduced imported water supplies.
As California strives to live within its Colorado River Compact
allocations, Mr. Kightlinger explained how the MWD strives to meet
these current challenges by exploring opportunities such as more
efficient water storage and transfer infrastructure, enhanced
conservation measures, and developing additional local resources.
RISK MANAGEMENT: WATER BANKS,

TEMPORARY TRANSFERS, INCENTIVES,
AND RELATED STRATEGIES

Before breaking for lunch, Bonnie Colby, a professor of
Agricultural and Resource Economics at the University of Arizona,
delivered a speech on water banks, temporary transfers, incentive, and
other strategies for managing risks and costs of water supply variability.
Due to present difficulties of delivering customary water quantities and
complying with environmental regulations, Ms. Colby explained the
costs of water can be extremely variable. To manage this, she
suggested resource management programs should include progressive
acquisition strategies such as dry-year water leases from agriculture to
municipal users that include compensation for lost crop revenues, and
regional and interstate water banks that allow more flexibility in
storing water right allotments for future use and temporary trades.
Ms. Colby continued by looking at other arrangements that water
managers use to firm up supplies such as one-time, "spot market"
leases of specific quantities of water negotiated between the involved
parties with set, low transfer costs. She concluded by discussing the
need to increase the efficiency of agricultural uses of water and
reasonable employment of land fallowing practices.
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SESSION FIVE: TYING IT ALL TOGETHER
LINKING IMPERFECT SCIENCE TO THE
MANAGEMENT OF UNCERTAIN WATER

RESOURCES: Is WESTERN WATER LAW
UP TO THE CHALLENGE?

Following lunch, Dean David Getches of the University of
Colorado School of Law concluded the presentations by discussing the
challenges of linking the imperfect science of climate change to the
management of uncertain water resources. Dean Getches focused on
the uncertainty of water throughout the world and described how
western institutions have reacted to this uncertainty by developing
property laws to regulate water resources. Yet these legal fictions of
ownership over an ephemeral natural resource can lead to systemic
breakdowns, as when water right holders continue to demand their
full shares even when not available. In response to such uncertain
availability supplies and constantly growing demand for water, Dean
Getches suggested western water policy must incorporate scientific
knowledge and adapt based upon our experiences, and ultimately
accept the uncertain nature of water in the West.
PANEL DISCUSSION: WATER,
CLIMATE, AND UNCERTAINTY

The final discussion panel of the conference, moderated by Doug
Kenney, NRLC, included as panelists Harvey Hill, NOAA; Roger
Pielke, Jr., CSTPR, University of Colorado/CIRES; Roger Pulwarty,
Climate Diagnostics Center/NOAA; Denise Fort, University of New
Mexico; and Shaun McGrath, of the Western Governor's Association.
Ms. Fort began the discussion by posing the question of how much
scientific certainty is necessary for policy changes to occur. In
response to this, Mr. Pielke explained that asking climate scientists for
certainty is not feasible. He continued by pointing out that policy
makers typically respond to immediate concerns, leaving other
problems like climate change unaddressed. Mr. McGrath agreed with
this, noticing that there is presently no proactive federal policy to
address drought. In light of this, Mr. Pulwarty emphasized the need
for policy makers to recognize the wrong lessons learned in the past,
such as overdependence on uncertain precipitation. In response to
the question of what specifically policy makers should do in the short
term, Mr. Pielke suggested they approach the uncertainty of water
availability as a resource management problem and not one caused by
climate. The other panelist generally agreed and added the need to
develop regional and national drought policy, and clarify relationships
between federal, state, and local agencies involved in water
management. In concluding the discussion, the panelist suggested
that looking at how we manage drought could serve as window into
how we might cope with more permanent climate change.
Mark Shea
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AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
SECTION OF ENVIRONMENT, ENERGY, AND RESOURCES
1ITH SECTION FALL MEETING
Washington, DC

October 8-12, 2003

Every year hundreds of natural resource, environmental, and
energy attorneys from across the country join at the ABA Section of
Environment, Energy, and Resources annual conference. For water
attorneys, the focus of the 11th section meeting was squared upon the
intersection of water quality and water quantity. As population and
demand for water increases, and businesses and municipalities
increase their use of water, an interesting conflict develops.
Environmental laws, written to address quality, are increasingly being
used to address quantity issues. As the pressures on water useespecially in the East-grow, the conflicts between environmental laws
and the doctrines of prior appropriation and riparianism will continue
to provide some of the most interesting fluctuations and adaptations in
natural resources and environmental law.
DAY ONE
AGRICuLTuRAL ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT OF WATER IMPACTS
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS: AN UNSATISFACTORY
SET OF NEW REGULATIONS

Barclay Rodgers of the Sierra Club spoke about concentrated
animal feeding operations ("CAFOs") and some potential problems
with new EPA regulations that may limit the enforcement of the CWA
with respect to these entities. The crux of Mr. Rodgers' presentation
centered on new EPA regulations regarding agricultural storm water
exemptions that may provide a loophole for CAFOs whose operations
produce bacteria and nutrients that end up in rivers and streams. Mr.
Rodgers noted that bacteria and nutrients are classified as pollutants.
He also noted that, while the term CAFO is not defined in the CWA, it
does expressly designate those entities as point sources and subjects
them to regulation and NPDES permitting requirements.
Mr. Rodgers stated that the old regulations forbade discharges by
CAFOs without a permit, regardless of whether the discharge came
from the animal feeding facility itself or came as a result of storm water
washing animal waste off the land where the CAFO disposed of it.
However, Mr. Rodgers called attention to provisions in the current
regulations that exempt such storm water discharges so long as the
CAFO has complied with its nutrient management plan. The new
regulations hold CAFOs to a "best management practices" standard
with respect to the disposal or application of animal waste to land.
This requires the CAFO to draft a nutrient management plan and
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comply with its provisions. The new regulations apply the agricultural
storm water discharge exception to storm water discharges when
CAFOs dispose of their waste in accordance with their nutrient
management plan.
Mr. Rodgers claimed the EPA lacks authority to interpret the
agricultural storm water exemption in this manner. In essence, he
argues, the CAFO, as a point source, must be regulated and the EPA
cannot interpret the law in a way that causes inconsistent enforcement.
Specifically, he argues that if a CAFO is a point source, including when
it disposes of waste on land, then it must be regulated as such. To
provide an exemption simply because the CAFO disposed of the waste
in accordance with the CAFOs own management plan strips the law of
its force and meaning. Mr. Rodgers also questioned the propriety and
effectiveness of the new regulations' nutrient management plan
process and discharge minimization requirements in controlling waste.
CONCENTRATED ANIMAL FEEDING
OPERATIONS REGUIATIONS

Don Parrish of the American Farm Bureau provided a different
viewpoint on the agricultural storm water discharge exemption for
discharges from CAFO animal waste disposal sites. Mr. Parrish first
contextualized the issue by providing statistics about poultry and
livestock production and a glimpse of the market forces at play in
these industries. Mr. Parrish then posited that the states currently
regulate agricultural storm water discharges sufficiently and the EPA
regulations could only add an unnecessary level of regulation and cost.
As for the agricultural storm water exemption for CAFOs, he claimed
the EPA lacked the authority to define "discharge" broadly or to
narrow the exemption.
Essentially, Mr. Parrish argued that regulation of storm water
discharges containing animal waste from CAFOs fell within the
province of the states and that EPA could tread only lightly in this
area. This provided a contrasting view to the one put forth by Mr.
Rodgers, but at the root of both presentations was the EPAs
interpretation and application of the agricultural storm water
exemption, which remains undefined in the Act and subject to
considerably different interpretations.
DON ELIvRIO'S Cow: DEL MONTE,
ISO, AND WATER IN COSTA RICA

Ott6n Solis from the University of Costa Rica spoke about the Del
Monte fruit company and how its large pineapple plantation affects
the water and the community of a small Costa Rican town. Mr. Solis
explained that the company's presence brought both benefits and
problems for the people of the town. He identified two major
problems with respect to water: (1) Del Monte planted on sloped
ground above the town causing changes in soil and water composition,
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quality and quantity for the people below; and (2) the problem of
scarcity and pineapple harvesting as a water intensive activity. The
citizens of the town must cope with drought conditions in the summer
and floods in the winter, as well as changes in water quality because of
Del Monte's operations.
After identifying the problems, Mr. Solis explained the legal
He noted that the Costa Rican system required
recourse.
reconciliation for harm it had caused, and that Del Monte had
complied. However, Mr. Solis felt the reconciliation measures were
ineffective at addressing local concerns, and cited a disconnect
between local needs and legislation as the reason why local farmers
had begun to organize and demand greater regulation over Del
Monte. He felt the government regulators in the country's capital
were too far removed, and too unconcerned with the farmer's plight,
to regulate effectively, but noted that ad hoc regulation defined the
Costa Rican system. This, he feels, leaves many with inadequate
recourse to their water problems.
Mr. Solis then proposed that the regulation process should be
standardized to provide environmental control pursuant to the
purpose and mandate of ISO 14000. ISO 14000 is an environmental
management system comprised of methods and standards, formed by
the Organization de Standards International (ISO), to be used by
multinational corporations to address environmental problems
worldwide. Companies can use the guidelines in ISO 14000 to help
address environmental problems, and can be certified by the ISO if in
compliance. ISO 14000 is not the law of Costa Rica, and compliance
by leaders of industry is voluntary. Mr. Solis nonetheless thinks ISO
14000 provides a good framework for a more effective regulatory
system in Costa Rica.
DAY TWO
RIPARLANISM: NEW CHALLENGES

FOR AN OLD DOCTRINE

Increasing population, pollution, and demand together pressure
riparianism in new and diverse ways. Water quality increasingly has
effects upon water quantity. The panelists addressed these problems
in the context of the changing doctrine of riparian water law.
TMDL AND ESA CONTRoLS OVER
WATER BODIES IMPACTED BY
FLOW AND TEMPERATURE PROBLEMS

As Mark A. Ryan, Assistant Regional Counsel for EPA Region Ten,

noted in his introduction, "temperature and flow problems pose
daunting obstacles to restoring the health of affected ecosystems while
allowing agriculture and development that depends upon the use of
impacted water bodies." Mr. Ryan focused his presentation on the
Pacific Northwest where government agencies have confronted the
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challenges of species protection, pollution, and prior appropriation.
Throughout the West, rivers are often over appropriated. The
impacts on ecosystems are two-fold. First, diversion can reduce and
even eliminate habitat. Second, with less water in the stream,
pollution and temperatures increase and have greater impacts upon
habitat. Mr. Ryan explained the efforts of the EPA, the National
Marine Fisheries Service, and the United State Fish and Wildlife
Service to streamline the requirements of the Clean Water Act, the
Endangered Species Act, and the doctrine of prior appropriation. As
he explained, decreased flow rates increase both temperature and
effluent concentration. These increases can have serious impacts
upon endangered species. As a result, in states like Oregon, farmers
are being required to reduce appropriations to allow greater flows for
salmon runs.
THE CLEAN WATER ACT AND THE ROLE
OF FLOW IN STATE WATER QUALITY
STANDARDS AND

NPDES

PERMITTING

Like Mr. Ryan, Ms. Williams, from the EPA Office of Regional
Counsel, Region One, focused her presentation on the intersection of
water quality and quantity. She highlighted four problems with
inadequate flows. First, stream flow reductions have adverse effects on
aquatic species because lower flows eliminate fish passages, reduce
protective cover, increase predation and temperatures, and reduce
spawning habitat. Second, reduced flow increases aquatic organisms'
exposure to toxic concentrations of chemicals from wastewater
discharge. Third, with less habitat and smaller food supplies, native
species can weaken and become more susceptible to disease. Fourth,
reduced flow results in greater concentrations of pollutants and
increases the difficulty of meeting water quality standards.
As Ms. Williams noted, the Clean Water Act contains no provisions
for flow. She explained the New England Region's efforts to address
flow rates through various provisions of the Clean Water Act. These
provisions include the adoption and implementation of state water
quality standards, National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permitting, establishment of Total Maximum Daily Load
limits ("TMDLs"), section 401 certifications of federal permits and
licenses, and section 404 permitting.
Vermont, for example, has implemented stream flow protections
that prohibit all aggregate uses from diminishing natural flow in Class
A streams by more than 5 percent. Additionally, the NPDES program
provides an incentive for discharges to increase flows, especially on
streams with the lowest flows. Discharges can face huge compliance
expenses in meeting water quality standards on streams and rivers with
low flows. Although the NPDES permitting does not directly address
flow rates, discharges may take measures to increase flow rates so they
do not have to treat pollution. Finally, the New England states are also
using section 401 certifications to impose minimum stream flow
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conditions on section 404 permits and FERC licenses.

Ms. Williams

noted that these certifications are playing an especially important role
since the deregulation of electricity production in New England.
Deregulation has brought an onslaught of natural gas power plants
that have and will continue to impact adversely flow rates throughout
the region.
The problems New England faces are not unique. Increasing
pressure on water supplies is affecting water quality. New England's
small states, many rivers, and growing population, however, have
created unique opportunities for solving flow problems that will be
mirrored across the country.
THE RISE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
REGULATION AND THE DECLINE

OF THE COMMON LAW RIPARIAN
DOCTRINE
George A. Somerville, Troutman Sanders, LLP, called for a
"comprehensive re-evaluation of the enormously detailed, complex,
costly, and time-consuming regulatory structure that has been erected"
and impedes public water supply development. He points out that
environmental statutes and regulations have made the riparian
doctrine almost irrelevant and predicts the cumulative nature of the
regulations impose and will continue to create a hurdle far more
stringent than the limitations of reasonable use. After discussing the
various environmental laws affecting public water supply development,
Mr. Somerville concluded with a call for moderation, recognition of
competing uses, and the need to accommodate the development of
public water supplies.
CLEAN WATER ACT UPDATE-JURISDICTION AND PROGRAMS
CLEAN WATER ACT UPDATE, AUrUMN 2003

Margaret Strand, of Venable, Baeter, Howard & Civiletti, LLP,
discussed the limitations of the Clean Water Act ("CWA") in
addressing certain environmental problems faced by society today.
She posited that the CWA might not be flexible enough to deal with
these problems. First, she noted that while geographically broadreaching, the CWA has jurisdiction over a limited number of activities.
She reiterated that the CWA says one cannot add a pollutant from a
point source into navigable waters, and noted that controversy exists with
respect to the interpretation of each of these terms. She called
attention to some particularly problematic terms in the act such as
"neighboring," "perennial," "intermittent," and "perennial waters" and
stated that the current administration favors interpretations that seek
to limit the jurisdiction of the CWA. With a battle over the
jurisdictional reach of the act, the interpretation of these vital terms
becomes quite important. Ms. Strand concluded that current statutory
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tools are inadequate at addressing current problems and stated that
government needs to work backwards from the needs of the receiving
water towards effective regulation of pollution.
SYLVIA QUAST, ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL REsouRcEs DMVISION,
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Sylvia Quast discussed section 402 of the CWA, regarding the act's
activities jurisdiction.
She focused on the Mikasuki case, which
involved water pumping into a new source where the pumped water
already contains a high level of phosphorous. She noted the split in
authority regarding whether one needed an NPDES permit to release
such water when nothing had been added to the water. This
demonstrated the complicated task of enforcing the CWA.
On the topic of enforcement, Ms. Quast spoke of criminal and civil
enforcement actions under the CWA. She noted that CWA's civil
enforcement has been used to combat pipeline pollution.

THE CLEAN WATER ACT UNDER ATrAcK
Nancy Stoner, Director of the Clean Water Project, NRDC, spoke
about the growing inability of the CWA to serve as an effective tool to
protect the environment, She noted the past effectiveness of the act to
combat old problems, but also noted the inadequacy of the CWA in
addressing new problems like storm water discharges. Ms. Stoner
pointed out that the Bush administration had reinterpreted certain
CWA provisions germane to these emerging problems, usually to avoid
having to undertake enforcement, which is often expensive and
difficult.
She suggested that the administration is now inappropriately
interpreting the narrow holding in Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook
County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), as a
justification for further limiting the jurisdiction of the CWA and
creating loopholes that threaten the efficacy of the whole statutory
scheme. This is especially true, Stoner asserts, with respect to
wetlands. Some of the key reinterpretations include definitional
changes for terms such as "fill" and "CAFO." Stoner also says the term
"blending," mixing sewage and untreated water, will become
important in terms of what activities can be regulated by the CWA.
Merc Pittinos
Daniel C. Wennogle

